Pyle v. State

Mason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Steven Allen Pyle, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and of carrying a concealed weapon. He was sentenced to a term of one year for the drug conviction and a consecutive term of three years for the concealed weapon conviction. ⁶¹ On appeal the appellant contends: I. The trial judge erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.

II

The trial court erred in forcing the appellant to proceed on the motion to suppress after the appellant had shown his standing to object to the admission of the evidence against him.

III

The trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence as a result of an illegal search and seizure.

IV

The trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the carrying a concealed weapon charge over the objection of the appellant. I. As to the appellant’s contention that he was denied a speedy trial, the evidence discloses that he was arrested and incarcerated in the Howard County Jail on November 22, 1974. On December 23, 1974 the appellant appeared in the District Court of Howard County and prayed a jury trial. The Public Defender’s Office filed its appearance and a motion for a speedy trial on behalf of the defendant on or about January 24, 1975.

This motion, however, was filed in the district court and not in the circuit court where the appellant’s case had been transferred. On June 26, 1975 the appellant filed a motion for removal which was denied on July 30,1975. On November 5,1975 the appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial was heard and denied. He was then tried and convicted on November 17,1975.

In order to determine whether the appellant has been denied a speedy trial we must, in making our independent constitutional appraisal, engage in a four-factored balancing test as delineated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 . The four factors are: (1) the length of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of right; (4) prejudice to the defendant. ⁶² 1. Length of Delay The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.

Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily depeident upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. at 530-531 . The delay with which we are concerned, in determining if there is a necessity for an inquiry into the other factors, is from the date of the appellant’s arrest, November 22, 1974, to the date of his trial, November 17, 1975. In Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96 , the Court of Appeals held that a one year, fourteen day delay was sufficient to trigger the balancing process outlined in Barker .

Consonant with this view is Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521 , where a sixteen month delay was sufficient to enter into the balancing process. We are persuaded that the eleven month delay in this uncomplicated and run-of-the-mill case requires us to engage in the prescribed balancing test. 2. Reason For Delay Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons.

A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. at 531 .