Pyles v. Manufacturers & Merchants Co.

Burke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the opinion of this Court filed February 10, 1915, in the case of the Manufacturers and Merchants Company v. Julius E. Pyles and Joseph B. Mitchell, Receivers, 125 Md. 317 , the facts disclosed by the proceedings prior to the appointment of the receivers were fully stated. That was an appeal by the mortgagee, the appellee in this- case, from the order appointing receivers for the property mentioned in the bill. We held, for the reasons stated in the opinion, that the appellant was not injured by the order appealed from, and the appeal for that reason was dismissed.

In the course of the opinion we said that the bill upon which the receivers were appointed asked no relief against the appellant’s mortgage; that the order appointing receivers did not affect the appellant’s rights under the mortgage; that their appoint ⁵⁶¹ ment did not disturb or divest the lien of the mortgage; that the receivers bold tbe property subject to the mortgage, and without the written consent of the mortgagee could sell only the equity of redemption. We further said that instead of appealing from the order the appellant should have applied to the Court for permission to sell the property, and if the Court had improperly refused the application it could have appealed; that upon the record as it then stood there was no reason to suppose that the Court would have denied the mortgagee permission to enforce whatever rights it may have had to collect the mortgage. After the Court had dismissed the appeal, the mortgagee filed a petition in the receivership proceedings in which it was alleged that prior to the appointment of receivers it had instituted .proceedings in Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City to foreclose its mortgage: that receivers had applied to that Court for an injunction to restrain the petitioner from foreclosing the mortgage upon the ground that the mortgage had been invalidated by the institution of the proceedings for the appointment of receivers, and that an order nisi had been passed upon the petition. The petition of the appellant referred to the appeal in the former case and quoted from the opinion of this Court to show that its mortgage was not invalidated, or its rights thereunder in any manner impaired by the institution of the receivership case or by the appointment of receivers.

It alleged “that since the date of the taking of the appeal, as aforesaid, no further proceedings have been taken by any of the parties to this case, and that the case as presented to this Court at the present time is based on the same