Quecedo v. DeVries

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. As a result of an incident which occurred on July 4, 1970, the appellant, Carlos Quecedo, brought suit against the appellee, John F. DeVries, Jr., a Montgomery County policeman, on four counts, charging (1) assault and battery, (2) false imprisonment, (3) malicious prosecution for assault and battery, and (4) malicious prosecution for disorderly conduct. The case came on initially for trial on December 4, 1972. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, a directed verdict was granted in favor of the defendant-appellee as to the fourth count, alleging malicious prosecution on the charge of disorderly conduct.

As to the remaining counts, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. At a second trial, beginning on . May 4, 1973, the case went to the jury and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the defendant-appellee as to each count. Upon this appeal, the appellant raises the following contentions: (1) That the court erred in receiving into testimony the transcript of testimony from the first trial of two missing witnesses, rather than receiving the pretrial depositions of those witnesses; (2) That the court erred in having read to the jury certain remarks of appellant’s counsel reflecting adversely on one of the appellant’s witnesses who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol while on the witness stand; (3) That the court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial when the same appellant’s witness was asked about a murder with which he had never been charged; (4) That the court gave an erroneous instruction; and (5) That the court erroneously did not permit the appellant to relitigate at the second trial the fourth count, as to which the directed verdict had been granted at the first trial. ⁶¹ The first issue deals with the steps taken by the court and the parties to give the jury the benefit of the information possessed by two eyewitnesses to the event.

Mrs. Gertrude Seabolt and Mrs. Joan Nielson had both witnessed the stopping of the appellant by the appellee. Both had been deposed by the appellant under the appropriate provisions of Maryland Rule 413. This was done prior to the first trial. Both Mrs. Seabolt and Mrs. Nielson appeared at the first trial and testified under oath.

It is not disputed that at the second trial, Mrs. Seabolt was not able to be procured, subpoenas twice having been returned non est. A follow-up subpoena issued at the direction of Judge Plummer Shearin was also returned non est. Mrs. Nielson was unable to appear at the second trial because of a medical infirmity. The appellant offered the depositions of both missing witnesses.

The appellee objected and the court declined to receive the depositions. The court did permit, however, the full testimony, direct examination and cross-examination, from the first trial to be read to the jury at the second trial. The umbrage taken by the appellant at this procedure strikes us as captious. He argues, essentially, that the substitute testimony by Mode A (reading the transcript of testimony from the former trial) was not to his tactical advantage as much as would have been the substitute testimony by Mode B (the depositions).

He complains that they were read by counsel instead of by the court reporter, thereby presumably denying them their full authoritative imprimatur. We know of no rule which would require a deposition any more than a transcript necessarily to be read by a court reporter and not by counsel. In any event, no objection was made to this aspect of the procedure and it is not properly preserved for appellate review. Maryland Rule 1085.

The appellant complains further that the “transcripts were so lengthy that their reading had a soporific effect on the jury.” Implicit in that length is the greater possibility that the testimony was in full detail and was subjected to a more scrutinous probing upon cross-examination. The very allegation as made by the appellant supplies its own rebuttal. ⁶² Maryland Rule 413 a 3 does provide, in pertinent part: “The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, if the court finds: (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, mental incapacity,, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by summons; . . .” Within the clear contemplation of the rule is the fairly routine situation wherein a witness has been deposed and is then, for some reason, unable to attend the trial. The use of the deposition is a permitted exception to the hearsay rule because reasonable assurances of trustworthiness have been provided in the form of . the oath, the threat of perjury, confrontation with the adverse party and his counsel, and cross-examination. The rule is simply silent as to the far less routine situation before us at bar where two alternative modes of supplying the missing testimony are readily available.

Every advantage, in terms of trustworthiness, surrounding the deposition also surrounds the testimony from the first trial. There was again the oath and threat of perjury. There was again confrontation, not simply with the adverse party but with a judge, a jury and a potential courtroom full of spectators. There was again a full opportunity for cross-examination.

Indeed, we would think the cross-examination on that latter occasion ordinarily to have been fuller and more searching than on the former occasion. Counsel, at that point, were fully expecting to go to the jury for the ultimate resolution of the issue and all stops were inevitably out. Although we can see many advantages to the use of testimony from the first trial over the use of the possibly more sterile deposition, we think that the posture of the problem facing the trial judge was that he had available to him two adequate methods of accomplishing the ⁶³ same desired end. Under those circumstances, we think the election of means to be within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.

Although various procedural changes have rendered Consolidated Ry. Co. v. O'Dea, 91 Md. 506 , 46 A. 1000 (1900), somewhat obsolete in terms of binding authority, the analysis by Chief Judge McSherry of the advantages of testimony from a former trial over an earlier deposition are both current and profound. In that case, a witness had given a deposition prior to a first trial. The witness had then testified at the first trial.

A second trial became necessary. The court there ruled that the use of the deposition taken before the first trial as a substitute for testimony at the second trial was legally improper. It was not a matter of discretion, as it now, we hold, would be. The analysis of the impediments inherent in the possibly obsolete and superseded depositions are still, however, timely: “If it is possible that the reading of a deposition on a second trial — the deposition not having been read on the first trial because the witness was then present and testified orally — may result in obscuring the truth; then the deposition should not be permitted to be read if there is no imperative statutory requirement declaring that it shall be read.

It is not the fact that injustice will be done, but the possibility that it may be done which must be considered. It is not that a positive wrong in a concrete case will certainly be imposed, but that generally the method, if tolerated, is liable to become an instrument of wrong, that is the aspect to be contemplated. Now, suppose the witness upon the first trial had testified orally to a matter advantageous to the opposite side, and that in his deposition taken before the first trial no such testimony had been given by him; or suppose, upon a cross-examination during the first trial, he had flatly contradicted his examination-in-chief, whilst no such contradiction ⁶⁴ appeared in the deposition; it would work a great injustice to allow, upon the second trial, the original deposition to be read and thus to deprive the opposite party, in the one instance, of the advantageous matter testified to on the first trial, or, in the other instance, to deprive him of the benefit of the contradicting cross-examination. If the witness will be absent upon the second trial his deposition should be retaken for use at that trial, so that the opposing party may have the opportunity, at the execution of the second commission, to avail of the witness’ antecedent admissions or contradictions.” 91 Md. at 513-514 .

We have reviewed both the depositions and the testimony from the first trial which was offered at the second trial. There is no significant difference between them, certainly as to anything of real substance. We note, moreover, that an adverse party against whom either a deposition or a transcript of earlier testimony is to be used has a stake in the choice just as surely as does the party contemplating such use. The appellee here would have been as fully entitled as was the appellant to argue to the trial judge the advantages and disadvantages that might accrue to him in the choice of one method over another.

It is the very presence of such competing interests that makes judicial discretion so necessary. Under the circumstances in this case, there was not remotely an abuse of that discretion. The appellant's second and third contentions both revolve about a single plaintiff’s witness, Charles Hite. However awkward anyone may have been in responding to a difficult situation, the source of the problem is that this appellant’s witness took the stand under the influence of alcohol.

As the danger signs manifested themselves in the course of the direct examination of Charles Hite, the court excused the jury and engaged in the following colloquy with the witness: “The Court: . . . Mr. Witness, I seem to detect the odor of alcohol even at this distance from you. Have you been consuming alcohol — ⁶⁵ The Witness: Yes, I have had a drink today. I tried to take a drink for my nerves today.

The Court: How many drinks have you had today? The Witness: I had one drink today. The Court: When did you have that? The Witness: I had that about — I think it was about 11:30,12:00 o’clock.

I think it was about 11:30, a quarter to