Quigley v. Simon

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, James M. Quigley, sued the appellees, Fred I. Simon and wife, for conversion of various work tools, equipment and material and for damages. At the end of five days of jury trial, the presiding judge granted a motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant-appellees at the end of the plaintiffs case. The appellant appeals from that grant.

Shorn of unessentials, the appellant rented a townhouse property, 13027 Marquette Lane in Bowie, from the appellees on July 3, 1971. The lease was to run for three months. The appellant intended to operate a dental crown and bridge laboratory. Because of zoning difficulties, that plan aborted.

Rent was paid for July but not for August and September. On September 8, the appellees removed various items of material, tools and equipment and held them as a distraint against the unpaid rent. The appellant placed a value on the distrained goods of $4,464. The appellees characterized them as “trash and rubbish” although they only released one set of dental appliances to a dentist for $360 and later sold the remaining goods for $100.

The value, however, is immaterial for purposes of the motion. The appellees refused to release the goods to the appellant and refused to apprise him of the location of the goods. They were, it was revealed, in a padlocked farmhouse owned by the appellees. The appellees instituted formal attachment proceedings on September 29, 1971.

The goods were not ultimately located and attached by the sheriff until November 11, 1971. It is clear that the trial judge, in granting the motion, relied primarily upon the common law as to distress for rent, which permitted, under certain circumstances, self-help on the part of the distraining landlord: ⁴⁹⁵ “Now, the plaintiff seems to ground his case on the fact that the landlord had no right to seize this material and move it and then execute upon it and sell it. Now, it’s with that premise in the law that the Court has considerable difficulty. There isn’t any dispute about the fact that the landlord did pursue the legal process and eventually it was sold under that process.

My understanding of the history of the landlord and tenant in common law, a landlord had to remove possessions of a tenant who did not pay his rent, to another place. He did not store them on the demised premises unless the tenant consented. That ancient practice has been abrogated, to some extent, in this case by the statute which permits the landlord to seize goods on the premises and deal with them there without having to move them. But I would say that my understanding of the law is the option is still with the landlord and he may follow the older practice if he desires to clear out his equipment, clear out his premises of the other equipment and ready it for re-lease.

I have done a little research on my own and I have considered this matter as carefully as I know how and I fail to see how there can be any action against the