Quinn v. State

Per Curiam. On June 15, 1966 appellant was convicted of two cases of false pretenses by the giving of two worthless checks in violation of the provisions of Maryland Code (1957), Art. 27, § 142, by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 8 years on each case, the sentences to run concurrently. The only question raised on this appeal is whether the evidence proved violations of the statute.

No motion for judgment of acquittal was made pursuant to Code, A'rt. 27, § 593, which, in conjunction with Maryland Rules, 755 was enacted to implement the right of the trial court, under Maryland Constitution, Art. XV, § 5, to pass upon the ³⁷⁵ sufficiency of the evidence. Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370 (1962). An appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case tried by a jury is predicated on the refusal of the trial court to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal. Lotharp v. State, 231 Md. 239 (1963); Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443 (1964); Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508 (1965).

In any event, apart from the rule that this Court will not review the sufficiency of the eviednce in a case tried by a jury in the absence of a motion for a judgment of acquittal below, this Court does not weigh the evidence presented to the jury, but only determines its sufficiency to take a particular issue, or the entire case, to the jury, when the point is properly preserved. Ramsey v. State, 239 Md. 561 (1965). It has been consistently held that in order to overturn a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury for insufficiency of the evidence it is necessary that there was no legally sufficient evidence or inferences drawable therefrom on which the jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Royal v. State, supra.

From our examination of the record, this was clearly not the case here. There was evidence that on June 21, 1965, the appellant gave two checks to the Aberdeen Hobby and Sport Shop. These checks were admitted in evidence without objection. Both were dated June 21, 1965 and drawn on the First National Bank of North East, Maryland by the appellant under the name of Louis Quinn.

The first check was payable to L.A. Grazzo in the amount of $317.80 and bore two endorsements, “L.A. Grazzo” and “Aberdeen Hobby and Sport Shop.” The second check was payable to Nile Lounsbury in the amount of $365.20 and bore three endorsements, “Nile Lounsbury,” “L.A. Grazzo,” and “Aberdeen Hobby and Sport Shop.” At the time the checks were given, the appellant was known to Ellis Friedlander, the proprietor of the Aberdeen Hobby and Sport Shop, as L.A. Grazzo, and it was not until June 28th that Friedlander learned that Grazzo and appellant were the same person. Friedlander gave the appellant cash for the checks and deposited them in the bank account of his company. The checks were returned about a week later with the notation that the account of the maker had been closed. The amount of the checks was debited to the account of the Aberdeen Hobby and Sport Shop and was ³⁷⁶ not repaid.

The appellant telephoned Friedlander a day or two before the checks were returned by the bank and told Fried-lander that “the roof is falling in, they have closed my account, don’t panic.” On July 3rd, not having received the money for the checks, arrest warrants were obtained. Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 142, provides: “Every person who, with intent to cheat and defraud another, shall obtain money, * * * of the value of one hundred dollars or more, by means of a check * * * drawn upon any bank * * * not indebted to drawer, or where the drawer or drawers thereof, shall not have provided for the payment or acceptance, * * * and the same be not paid upon presentation, shall be deemed to have obtained such money * * * by means of a false pretense * * *. The giving of the aforesaid worthless check * * * shall be prima facie evidence of intent to cheat or defraud; provided that if such person shall be a bona fide resident of the State of Maryland and shall deposit with the drawee of such paper * * * within ten days thereafter funds sufficient to meet the same, with all costs and interest which may have accrued he shall not be prosecuted under this section, and no prosecution either by presentment, indictment or otherwise, shall be instituted or commenced until after the expiration of said period of ten days.” As soon as the State proved that the appellant cashed the checks and they had been dishonored the presumption of an intention to defraud arose, Flannigan v. State, 232 Md. 13 (1963), unless funds had been deposited with the drawee bank within ten days of the time the checks were given. Maki v. State, 239