R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc.

ELDRIDGE, J. The issue in this case is whether Maryland courts may entertain a private cause of action for damages, under the provisions of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 , for the receipt of unsolicited commercial telephone facsimile messages. We shall hold that such actions may be brought in the courts of this State. I. Petitioner, R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. (“Ponte”), is a Maryland corporation located in Bethesda, Maryland. According to the allegations of the complaint, Ponte received unsolicited ⁶⁹² advertisements via facsimile on August 23, 2000, and on several occasions subsequently.

These advertisements consisted of an investment newsletter entitled “Investors’ Alert,” created by Investors’ Alert, Inc. and Access Financial Consulting, Inc. The newsletter promoted its own paid subscription, and the purchase of the common stock of certain small corporations, and was distributed free of charge via facsimile broadcast, which permits the transmission of the facsimile to thousands of recipients in a single broadcast session. Ponte filed a complaint and a motion for class certification in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Investors’ Alert and Access Financial, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 . 1 The motion for class certification was never ruled upon. Following discovery, Investors’ Alert and Access Financial filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted after oral argument, on the basis “that no private cause of action exists within the State of Maryland to allow these claims to proceed.” The court reasoned that Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl.Vol.), § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article, addresses the issue of unsolicited ⁶⁹³ faxes and makes no provision for private suits. 2 Ponte noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. See R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, 149 Md.App. 219, 238-239 , 815 A.2d 816, 827 (2003), where the Court of Special Appeals stated: “In sum, Maryland has a statute, [Maryland Code § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article], that covers substantially the subject matter covered by the claim raised in this lawsuit under the TCPA.

Appellant could not proceed under the Maryland statute, because it does not permit a private right of action. By opting not to create a private right of action for violation of Maryland law, the legislature has indicated its intent not to permit a private right of action for violation of the comparable federal law.” Ponte then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. Ponte v. Investors’ Alert, 374 Md. 358 , ⁶⁹⁴ 822 A.2d 1224 (2003). The Court also granted motions to participate as amici curiae to the State of Maryland and to a private individual on behalf of the petitioner, and to PrimeTV, LLC and DirecTV, Inc., on behalf of the respondents. 3 II.

The only question in this case is whether a Maryland trial court is authorized to entertain the federal cause of action created by Congress in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C., § 227 . Before addressing this specific question, however, it would be useful to review the law concerning the jurisdiction of Maryland courts over civil causes of action created by the laws of other jurisdictions, and particularly civil causes of action created by federal law. As a general matter, courts in Maryland regularly entertain civil causes of action arising under the laws of other jurisdictions. See Ward v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Ins., 328 Md. 240, 247 , 614 A.2d 85, 88 (1992); Rein v. Koons Ford, 318 Md. 130, 135 , 567 A.2d 101, 103 (1989); Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, 311 Md. 387 , 535 A.2d 466 (1988); County Exec., ⁶⁹⁵ Prince George’s County v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 453-455 , 479 A.2d 352, 356-357 (1984); Pine Street Trading v. Farrell Lines, 278 Md. 363, 379-380 , 364 A.2d 1103, 1114 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Bosche, 242 Md. 334, 339-340 , 219 A.2d 80, 83 (1966); Lambros v. Brown, 184 Md. 350, 356-357 , 41 A.2d 78, 81 (1945); B & O Rail Road Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287, 322 (1868); LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F.Supp. 162, 165 (D.Md.1963).

Moreover, Maryland courts exercise jurisdiction in such actions even when identical causes of action could not be brought under Maryland law. See, e.g., Rein v. Koons Ford, supra, 318 Md. at 133-138 , 567 A.2d at 102-104 ; Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, supra, 311 Md. at 392 , 535 A.2d at 468 ; County Exec., Prince George’s County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 452-456 , 479 A.2d at 355-358 ; Lambros v. Brown, supra, 184 Md. at 354-355 , 41 A.2d at 79-80 ; B & O Rail Road Co. v. Glenn, supra, 28 Md. at 322 . See also LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., supra, 215 F.Supp. at 162-163 . The principle that Maryland courts will entertain civil causes of action arising under the laws of other jurisdictions reflects the nature of judicial jurisdiction and the differences between “ ‘the political jurisdiction of a State [and] its judicial jurisdiction.’ ” Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md. 112, 129 , 617 A.2d 1057, 1065 , cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905 , 113 S.Ct. 2997 , 125 L.Ed.2d 690 (1993), quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 482 , 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2877 , 69 L.Ed.2d 784, 794 (1981).

This Court in Hansford continued ( 329 Md. at 130 , 617 A.2d at 1065 , quoting the Gulf Offshore opinion, 453 U.S. at 481 , 101 S.Ct. at 2877 , 69 L.Ed.2d at 793 ): “ ‘ “The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe.” The Federalist No. 82, p. 514 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (Hamilton), quoted in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. [130] at 138 [ 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876) ]. State courts routinely exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over civil cases arising from events in ⁶⁹⁶ other States and governed by the other States’ laws. See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 [, 26 L.Ed. 439 ] (1880). Cf.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 [, 101 S.Ct. 633 , 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981) ].’ ” See also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560 , 578 n. 4, 659 A.2d 1295 , 1304 n. 4 (1995). This characteristic of judicial jurisdiction is reflected in the statutory provisions relating to Maryland circuit courts.

Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.VoL), § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states: “ § 1-501. Jurisdiction and powers in general. The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.” (Emphasis added).

Consequently, unless a civil cause of action under another jurisdiction’s law is the type which the Maryland General Assembly has limited or conferred upon a different tribunal, Maryland circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action. Circuit courts do not require expressed statutory authorization to entertain a particular type of civil action; instead, they have jurisdiction over civil causes of action generally. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 372 Md. 692, 712-721 , 816 A.2d 68, 80-86 (2003) (Circuit court has jurisdiction to issue an order changing the plaintiffs gender identity, even though, under the circumstances, there was no statutory basis for the order except the general circuit court jurisdiction statute, § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article); County Exec. Prince George’s County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 453-454 , 479 A.2d at 356-357 (“As the circuit courts in Maryland generally have jurisdiction over all causes of action except to the extent the General Assembly or the Constitution limit that jurisdiction or confer it exclusively ⁶⁹⁷ upon another tribunal, and as the General Assembly has not attempted to exclude § 1988 actions from the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, we have taken the position that § 1983 actions may be brought in Maryland circuit courts.

De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 500, 511-513 , 438 A.2d 1348 (1982)”). See also Lambros v. Brown, supra, 184 Md. at 356 , 41 A.2d at 80 (“There is ample authority, both in this Court and in the Supreme Court of the United States, for the doctrine that competent state courts should take jurisdiction of suits authorized by Acts of Congress. This is sometimes placed ... upon the theory that where exclusive power is not given to the United States by the Constitution, the state courts retain their general jurisdiction over all matters not thus taken away.” In Lambros , because of the amount of money involved, this Court held that the federal cause of action could be brought in the People’s Court of Baltimore City, which was one of the predecessor courts to the District Court of Maryland). There is an exception to the rule that Maryland courts will entertain causes of action created by the laws of another jurisdiction, namely where such laws or causes of action are contrary to Maryland public policy.

Nevertheless, “for another state’s law to be unenforceable, there must be ‘a strong public policy against its enforcement in Maryland,’ ” Bethlehem Steel v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 189 , 498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985), quoting Texaco v. Bosche, supra, 242 Md. at 340-341 , 219 A.2d at 84 . See also, e.g., Ward v. Nationwide Ins., supra, 328 Md. at 247 , 614 A.2d at 88 (referring to the “limited exception where ... the foreign law is contrary to a very strong Maryland public policy”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 530 , 611 A.2d 100, 102 (1992) (For the exception to apply, “ ‘the public policy must be very strong and not merely a situation in which Maryland law is different from the law of another jurisdiction,’ ”§ quoting Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, supra, 311 Md. at 390 , 535 A.2d at 467 ). This “public policy” exception, however, has no application where the law of the “other jurisdiction” is federal law. ⁶⁹⁸ This Court explained in County Exec.

Prince George’s County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 454 , 479 A.2d at 357 , quoting Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 , 32 S.Ct. 169, 178 , 56 L.Ed. 327, 349 (1912), as follows: “ ‘The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state ... is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.’ ” We continued in the Doe case ( 300 Md. at 445 , 479 A.2d at 357 ): “Moreover, and contrary to the defendants’ argument in the present case, a state court exercising jurisdiction in a federal cause of action may not refuse to apply federal law in one particular respect where such law is deemed inconsistent with ‘state policy.’ Instead, the entire federal substantive law is applicable.” In Lambros v. Brown, supra, 184 Md. at 357 , 41 A.2d at 81 , Chief Judge Ogle Marbury for the Court, quoting from Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 , 23 L.Ed. 833, 838 (1876), stated: “ ‘The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State....

The disposition to regard the laws of the United States as emanating from a foreign jurisdiction is founded on an erroneous view of the nature and relations of the State and the Federal governments.’ ” ⁶⁹⁹ See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 , 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2037 , 138 L.Ed.2d 438, 452 (1997) (“The Constitution and laws of the United States are not a body of law external to the States, acknowledged and enforced simply as a matter of comity”); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 14 , 511 A.2d 1079, 1085-1086 (1986) (“[I]f Congress ... intended” that the federal cause of action should be entertained by state courts, “then the ‘Maryland policy’ ... would be immaterial”); Ordway v. Central Nat. Bank, 47 Md. 217, 248 (1877) (Judge Alvey for the Court stated: “[TJherefore, whether the right to maintain this action be placed upon the express terms of the [federal] statute giving cognizance to the State courts, or simply upon the non-exclusion of State jurisdiction, in either case the action is maintainable. And that the [federal] cause of action is a penalty, to be recovered in a civil action ... by the party grieved, constitutes no objection to the State courts taking cognizance of it, and enforcing the right”); Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 2 (“The Constitution of the Untied States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, . .. are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State ... ”). Moreover, the authority of a state to preclude its courts from entertaining federal causes of action is quite limited.

Generally, a state law “discriminating against federal causes of action” violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 4 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 366 , 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2437 , 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). The Supreme Court in Howlett v. Rose continued ( 496 U.S. at 367 , 110 S.Ct. at 2438 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 347 ): “Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum — although both might well be true — but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the State as laws passed by the state ⁷⁰⁰ legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure. ‘The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are.... ’ Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-137 , [ 23 L.Ed. 833 ] (1876).” The Howlett opinion, reviewing numerous earlier cases, reiterated that “[a] state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of ‘valid excuse,’ ” 496 U.S. at 369 , 110 S.Ct. at 2439 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 348 . The Court pointed out that state law “disagreement” with federal law “is not a valid excuse,” 496 U.S. at 371 , 110 S.Ct. at 2440 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 350 , but that a state may ordinarily apply to the federal cause of action “a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts” or its “own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law,” 496 U.S. at 372 , 110 S.Ct. at 2440-2441 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 351 .

The Supreme Court in Howlett invalidated Florida law which precluded Florida courts, on governmental immunity grounds, from entertaining actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 , 54 S.Ct. 690 , 78 L.Ed. 1227 (1934), involved an Alabama statute granting to Alabama courts jurisdiction over suits against foreign corporations based on causes of action arising under the laws of other states, but the statute did not encompass such causes of action arising under federal law. Relying on the statute, the Alabama courts refused to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).

The refusal to exercise jurisdiction was defended on the ground that the statute did not single out just FELA cases but applied to all federal causes of action against foreign corporations which did not arise out of Alabama law. The defendant relied on the principle that “a state may determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, [and] the ⁷⁰¹ character of the controversies which shall be heard in them,” McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., supra, 292 U.S. at 232 , 54 S.Ct. at 691 , 78 L.Ed. at 1228 . The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion by Justice Brandéis, reversed the refusal to entertain the action and reviewed some of the limits upon a state’s authority over the jurisdiction of its courts ( 292 U.S. at 233-234 , 54 S.Ct. at 691-692 , 78 L.Ed. at 1229 ): “The power of a State to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution.

The privileges and immunities clause requires a state to accord to citizens of other states substantially the same right of access to its courts as it accords to its own citizens.... The full faith and credit clause requires a state court to take jurisdiction of an action to enforce a judgment recovered in another state, although it might have refused to entertain a suit on the original cause of action as obnoxious to its public policy.... By Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 , [ 32 S.Ct. 169 , 56 L.Ed. 327 , 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44,] an action in a Connecticut court against a domestic corporation, it was settled that a state court whose ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate for the occasion, may not refuse to entertain suits under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. “While Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ... the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is brought under a federal law. The denial of jurisdiction by the Alabama court is based solely upon the source of law sought to be enforced.

The plaintiff is cast out because he is suing to enforce a federal act. A state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.” See also, e.g., National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 587 , 115 S.Ct. 2351, 2355 , 132 L.Ed.2d 509, 516 (1995) (“When they have jurisdic ⁷⁰² tion, state courts have been compelled to provide federal remedies, notwithstanding the existence of less intrusive state-law remedies”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150, 151 , 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2313, 2314 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 146 (1988) (“Federal law takes state courts as it finds them only insofar as these courts employ rules that do not ‘impose unnecessary burdens upon the rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.’ * * * Just as federal courts are constitutionally obliged to apply state law to state claims, ... so too the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty ‘to proceed in such manner than all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law [are] protected’ ”); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 , 67 S.Ct. 810, 814 , 91 L.Ed. 967, 972 (1947) (A state has no “right ... to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law”); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 14 , 511 A.2d at 1085 .

III

Against the above-summarized background, we now turn specifically to the private federal cause of action created by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3). A. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act was enacted in response to what Congress perceived to be the growing problem of the use of automated telephone equipment to make unsolicited telephone calls and faxes. The Act imposed restrictions on the use of such equipment, and made it illegal, inter alia, “to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(C). The Act also created a private right of action in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3) (emphasis added): “A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State— ⁷⁰³ (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions.” The issue in this case concerns the Congressional intent underlying the phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,” along with the relationship between the language of the federal statute and state law.

Among the petitioner, the amici, the Court of Special Appeals, and cases in other states, four different interpretations have been advanced. First, the petitioner and the individual amicus supporting the petitioner argue that the phrase simply allows the states, in the enforcement of the federal cause of action, to apply neutral state laws or rules regarding the administration of the state courts or neutral procedural laws or rules. The language does not, in their view, allow a state to discriminate against the federal cause of action or refuse to enforce it because it is a federal cause of action. In other words, the petitioner and amicus contend that the statutory language was simply designed to reflect the Supremacy Clause holdings of Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. 356 , 110 S.Ct. 2430 , 110 L.Ed.2d 332 ; Testa v. Katt, supra, 330 U.S. 386 , 67 S.Ct. 810 , 91 L.Ed. 967 ; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.

Co., supra, 292 U.S. 230 , 54 S.Ct. 690 , 78 L.Ed. 1227 ; Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., supra, 223 U.S. 1 , 32 S.Ct. 169 , 56 L.Ed. 327 , and similar cases. Several state appellate courts appear to have adopted this position. See Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 647 (Fla.App.2003) (“[W]e interpret the language ‘if otherwise permitted’ to acknowledge the principle that states have the right to structure their own court systems and that state courts are not obligated to change their procedural rules or to create courts to accommodate TCPA claims,” relying upon Howlett v. Rose, supra); Mulhern v. MacLeod, 441 Mass. 754, 757 , 808 N.E.2d 778 , 780 ⁷⁰⁴ (2004) (“The ‘if otherwise permitted’ language was more likely intended to reflect that Federal claims remain subject to State procedural law,” also relying on Howlett v. Rose, supra); Zelma v. Market U.S.A., 843 N.J.Super. 356 , 362, 778 A.2d 591, 595 (2001) (“[T]he courts of this State have always embraced the principle that unless the federal act itself expressly or impliedly precludes states from assuming jurisdiction, the general jurisdiction of our courts will encompass federal statutory causes of action”); Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 A.D.2d 174, 177, 179 , 710 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371, 372 (2000) (The defendant’s “interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with established principles governing State court jurisdiction over claims based on Federal laws. * * * We therefore conclude that the phrase ‘if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State’ merely acknowledges the principle that States have the right to structure their own court systems and that State courts are not obligated to change their procedural rules to accommodate TCPA claims”). Second, the State of Maryland, as amicus curiae urging a reversal, argues that the language of the federal statute does authorize a state to prohibit private suits under the statute but that the state legislature must do so affirmatively and expressly.

According to the State of Maryland, the General Assembly’s inaction subsequent to the enactment of the federal statute means that Maryland courts are authorized to entertain the federal cause of action. The petitioner also advances this position as an alternative argument. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in International Science & Technology Institute v. Inacom Communications, 106 F.3d 1146, 1155-1158 (4th Cir.1997), seemed to share this view that a state legislature could affirmatively prohibit the state’s courts from entertaining private actions for damages under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 5 Those states which have not adopted the first interpreta ⁷⁰⁵ tion of the federal statute, as set forth above, have at least taken this position. See Lary v. Flasch Bus.

Consulting, Inc., 878 So.2d 1158 (Ala.App.2003); Kaufman v. ACS Systems, Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296 (2003); Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 245 Ga.App. 363 , 537 S.E.2d 468 (2000); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907 (Mo.2002); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365 (Tex.App.2004). 6 Third, the Court of Special Appeals held, and one of the amici supporting an affirmance argues, that the private action provision of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act does authorize a state to prohibit private actions under the federal statute, that the state legislature need not do so affirmatively and expressly, and that the role of a court is to ascertain the state legislature’s intent as reflected in existing state statutes. ⁷⁰⁶ As earlier indicated, the Court of Special Appeals went on to hold that Maryland Code (1975, 2000 RepLVol.), § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article, authorizing a civil action by the Maryland Attorney General when unsolicited facsimile transmissions are made in violation of the state statute, and subsequent inaction, indicated a state legislative intent that private actions under the federal statute could not be entertained by Maryland courts. Fourth, one of the amicus favoring an affirmance suggests, at one point in its brief, “that an ‘express’ or affirmative action must be taken [by a state legislature] in order to ‘permit’ ” private actions under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. (Brief of amicus curiae, DirecTV, Inc., at 15). The Court of Special Appeals also discussed this position, but the appellate court held that it was “unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether the General Assembly must expressly ‘opt in’ to the jurisdiction granted the states in 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3),” because of the court’s holding that § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article evidenced the General Assembly’s intent to preclude private actions.

R.A. Ponte Architects v. Investors’ Alert, supra, 149 Md.App. at 237-238 , 815 A.2d at 827 . We agree with the petitioner’s basic position in this case. The phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of a court of a State” simply expresses the congressional recognition that neutral state laws and rules concerning the general jurisdiction of state courts and procedures therein are applicable to the federal cause of action. This view is supported by the pertinent language of the federal statute, the legislative history, the principles of statutory construction governing state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, and decisions by other state courts.

Moreover, even if Congress had intended to authorize a state legislature to discriminate against the federal private cause of action created by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3) and preclude any of that state’s courts from entertaining such cases— something that perhaps would be unprecedented in American ⁷⁰⁷ history — we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals that the General Assembly did so by enacting § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article and by not subsequently enacting legislation concerning unlawful unsolicited telephone facsimile transmissions. B. Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in November 1991, and it was signed into law in December of that year. The purpose of the Act was to address telemarketing practices that were made possible by technological changes that resulted, inter alia, in a substantial increase in unsolicited commercial telephone calls and faxes, and the resulting expense and disruption imposed on the recipients. At that point in time, some states had begun to take action to restrict such telemarketing practices.

See S.Rep. No. 102-178 at 3; H.R.Rep. No. 102-317, 1st Sess., at 25 (1991). Maryland had enacted its own statute prohibiting such “junk faxes” two years prior to the passage of the federal Act.

See § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article. State laws, however, had limited effect because states did not have jurisdiction over interstate calls. The federal law was primarily intended to reach unsolicited facsimile and other telephone communications that crossed state lines, and fell outside the jurisdiction of the states. See S.Rep.

No. 102-178 at 5; H.R.Rep. No. 102-317, 1st Sess. at 25 (1991). The proposed legislation which became the Telephone Consumer Protection Act was favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and considered on the floor of the Senate on November 7, 1991. See 137 Cong.

Rec. 30820. The proposal was in the form of two separate bills. One bill, sponsored by Senator Hollings of South Carolina, contained regulations covering automatic telephone dialing system calls and unsolicited advertisements by telephone facsimile machines. 137 Cong. Rec. 30820-30821.

The other bill, sponsored by Senator Pressler of South Dakota, dealt with calls from “live persons.” 137 Cong. Rec. 30824. ⁷⁰⁸ When the proposed legislation reached the Senate floor, neither bill contained a provision for private causes of action. On the floor of the Senate on November 7, 1991, two “amendments,” or “substitute bills” as they are sometimes referred to, were offered. Senator Hollings, the chief sponsor of one of the bills, offered Amendment No. 1811 to his bill relating to telephone calls using automated equipment and unsolicited advertisements by telephone facsimile machines. 137 Cong.

Rec. 30821-30824. The other “amendment” or “substitute bill,” offered by Senator Pressler, was to his bill concerning unwanted telephone calls from “live persons.” 137 Cong. Rec. 30824. Both Senator Hollings’s amendment to the bill regulating automated telephone calls and facsimile transmissions, and Senator Pressler’s amendment