R. H. Frazier & Son v. Leas

Burke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellants in this ease made an application to the Superior Court of Baltimore City under section 55, Chapter 800, of the Acts of 1914, known as the “Workmen’s Compensation Law,” for the review by that Court of a decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission rendered against them on the 22nd of July, 1915, in favor of Uartin Leas, claimant, who is the appellee on this record. The order which the Court was asked to review does not appear in the record, nor does the record contain a copy of any of the proceedings of the Commission, although it states that at the hearing of the appeal the Court had before it a transcript of the testimony taken before the Commission. Enough, however, appears to enable us to pass upon the single question presented, which is a narrow one and involves a construction of the section of the Act referred to. ⁵⁷⁴ The application by which the proceedings in the lower Court was initiated stated facts which showed jurisdiction in that Court to entertain the appeal, and that the appellants felt aggrieved by the decision of the Commission by the terms of which compensation was ordered to be continued from June 3, 1915.

It further alleged that they felt that the Commission had not justly considered all the facts concerning the injury; that it had exceeded its powers under the Act; and that it had misconstrued the law and the facts applicable to the case. At the hearing the appellants filed a motion to be allowed to introduce evidence in support of the appeal to show: “1. That the transcript of the testimony taken before the State Industrial Accident Commission does not contain all the facts upon which the Commission founded its decision. “2. Because the report of Dr. Robert Bay, the Chief Medical Examiner of the State Industrial Accident Commission, is not embodiéd in said transcript of the testimony. “3.

Because the evidence of Dr. Keller,- taken before the State Industrial Accident Commission, shows that he ceased attending the claimant on April 18th, 1915, at which time, in the opinion of said physician, he was suffering from the results of the hernia, but the testimony of Dr. Keller does not show from what he was suffering at the time of the hearing before the State Industrial Accident Commission on July 22nd, 1915. “4. Because the insurer is desirous of introducing additional testimony tending to show that on July 22nd, 1915, and at all times subsequent to June 24th, 1915, the date upon which compensation was last paid to the claimant, the said claimant was not suffering from the effects of the hernia sustained by h,im on January 22nd, 1915, but was suffering from the effects of arterio-sclerosis, which is a disease, and that said disease was not the natural and unavoidable result of the said accident.” ⁵⁷⁵ The Court overruled the motion. The appellants then offered to prove by Doctors Harvey B. Stone, Charles J. Keller, Henry J. Berkley and Robert Bay, the condition of the claimant on July 22, 1915, the day on which the hearing before the Commission was had. The Court refused to admit the proffered testimony.

The action of the Court in overruling the motion and in refusing to admit the testimony of the physicians constitutes the first and second bills of exceptions. A judgment was entered confirming the decision of the Commission and dismissing the appeal, and from that judgment this appeal was taken. The sole question presented by the appeal is this: Has the party appealing the right under section 55 of the Act to offer additional testimony to that taken before the Commission in support of the appeal ? The Court below held that he could not introduce additional testimony, and this holding constitutes the ground upon which the exceptions rest.

We are unable to agree with the ruling of the lower Court upon this question. The language of the section must be examined in the light of accepted rules of construction. First, the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words of the Act must be ascertained and given effect; secondly, “the language of a statute is its most natural expositor, and where the language is susceptible of a sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by any extraneous considerations” (Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 ) ; thirdly, the construction must be liberal in favor of private right, and construction which imputes an intention to deny valuable rights should be avoided; fourthly, statutes are presumed to be passed in