R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Stidham

McDONALD, J., Dissenting in Part. I agree with the Majority opinion that there was a final judgment in this case. I also agree with the considerations suggested in the Majority opinion — and in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals — for determining whether tobacco defendants should be joined as co-defendants with asbestos defendants when a complaint alleges that synergistic effects of tobacco and asbestos exposure harmed the plaintiff. I differ with the Majority opinion on the question of mootness.

In my view, the Majority opinion fails to distinguish between a case or controversy being moot and a particular issue being moot. A case is moot when there is no longer controversy between the parties or when the court can no longer provide a remedy. Green v. Nassif, 401 Md. 649, 654 , 934 A.2d 22 (2007). However, a particular issue may become moot without resolving the controversy between the parties or depriving the court of the power to provide relief.

As the Majority opinion recounts, the Stidhams joined causes of action against asbestos defendants and tobacco defendants in a single complaint. The tobacco defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them on the ground that the joinder of defendants was not proper under Maryland Rules 2-212 and 2-213. The Circuit Court granted that motion. This appeal concerns the merits of the Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss the tobacco defendants.

Now that the causes of action against all of the asbestos defendants have been resolved, the basis for the Circuit Court’s order of dismissal is moot. But the controversy between the Stidhams and the tobacco defendants set forth in the causes of action pled in their complaint is not moot. The Majority opinion states that the “sole thing” sought by the Stidhams was joinder. That is not quite right.

The Stidhams were not pursuing joinder in the abstract, but rather sought to ⁵²² prosecute in this case claims concerning the allegedly synergistic effects of asbestos and tobacco against both asbestos and tobacco defendants. They are still interested in pursuing such claims against the tobacco defendants, even though the claims against the asbestos defendants have been resolved. But, as the Majority opinion accurately describes, the Circuit Court did not just sever the claims against the tobacco companies; it dismissed them. Majority op. at 509-10, 511-14, 141 A.3d at 8, 9-11.

Assume for the moment that it was legal error for the Circuit Court to dismiss the tobacco defendants. 1 It cannot be the case that a party whose claims are dismissed in error and who dutifully waits for a final judgment in order to seek relief in an appellate court loses the opportunity to pursue its claims because the rationale for the dismissal is not only erroneous, but has also become moot. That makes no sense. The Majority states that the Stidhams seek to have the tobacco defendants reinstated “in a case that no longer exists.” Majority op. at 516, 141 A.3d at 12. However, this case “no longer exists” in the same sense that any case in which the claims against the defendants are dismissed and the plaintiffs appeal “no longer exists.” For example, in Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment, 434