Radcliff v. Vance

²⁸⁰ RAKER, Judge. Appellant, Barbara Radcliff, an attorney in private practice in Prince George’s County, applied to the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County for payment of a bill for legal services. The personal representative of the estate of James Vance paid the bill after the Orphans’ Court ordered payment. The bill was subsequently contested by an interested party of the estate, and the Orphans’ Court ordered Appellant to repay the money to the estate.

Radcliff noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and this Court granted certiorari on its own motion before consideration by that court. We shall affirm the judgment of the Orphans’ Court. On August 4, 1998, Appellant filed a Motion for Order for Payment of a Debt in the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County. She alleged that as a creditor of the estate of James Franklin Vance, who died on August 6, 1997, she was entitled to payment of costs and fees from the proceeds of the estate in the amount of $17,375.00 for services she rendered to the decedent prior to his death.

The only person served with this motion was Robert B. Vance, the personal representative of the estate. On September 8, 1998, Orphans’ Court Judge Angelo I. Castelli signed an order granting the motion. Elizabeth E. Vance, Appellee, the third wife of decedent, first learned of the motion and order when her counsel reviewed the Register of Wills file on November 13, 1998. On November 19, 1998, she filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court, praying (1) that the court vacate the order of September 8, 1998, and (2) that the court direct Radcliff to return the funds to the estate.

On December 11, 1998, the Orphans’ Court vacated the September order, and further ordered that Rad-cliff return the funds to the estate. Radcliff moved the Orphans’ Court to strike the December 11, 1998 order on the grounds that she was a creditor of the estate who had submitted a valid claim that was paid by the personal representative. She argued that payment of the claim by the personal representative ended any jurisdiction the court may have had over the subject matter, and that the Orphans’ Court ²⁸¹ never had personal jurisdiction over her. Radcliff noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the denial of her motion to strike the order.

We granted certiorari on our own motion before consideration by that court. There is no real dispute as to the facts of the case. James F. Vance, the decedent, was married to Elizabeth E. Vance on June 30, 1989. In 1995, James Vance became ill and was hospitalized; he was diagnosed with dementia and was admitted to a veterans’ home.

On or about June 6, 1996, while James was at the veterans’ home, Elizabeth Vance filed a petition for guardianship of the person and the property of James F. Vance in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 13-206 of the Estates and Trusts Article. 1 The petition was opposed by decedent’s children, including Robert Vance, decedent’s son apparently from a prior marriage. Robert Vance retained Barbara Radcliff to write a new will for James, to prepare a deed relating to property owned by James, and to prepare a power of attorney to enable Robert to manage the affairs of his father. On June 1, 1995, the power of attorney was executed by means of an illegible mark purported to be James Vance’s signature. Robert Vance used the power of attorney to deposit funds of James Vance’s into an account titled in the names of Robert and James Vance as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

Radcliff prepared a deed to the house in Oxon Hill that had been the marital home of James and Elizabeth Vance, and in which Elizabeth Vance continued to live. According to an earlier deed, the property previously had been held by James and Elizabeth Vance as tenants by the entirety. The new deed, executed on August 1, 1995, purported to convey the property in fee simple solely to James Vance. The new deed bears the signature of Elizabeth Vance, the signature of Robert Vance as attorney-in-fact for James Vance, and an ²⁸² illegible mark purported to be the signature of James Vance.

The validity of this deed was challenged in a quiet title action brought in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by Elizabeth Vance on August 17, 1998. Radcliff prepared a will for James Vance. The will was executed at the veterans’ home on August 20, 1995, by means of an illegible mark purported to be James Vance’s signature. Several specific bequests to Elizabeth Vance that were contained in a prior will, executed in 1993, were eliminated in the new will.

Robert Vance and his sister Carolyn Vance Hyde retained Radcliff to oppose the guardianship petition filed by Elizabeth Vance. In the guardianship action, in addition to opposing the guardianship, Elizabeth Vance raised issues related to the power of attorney, the deed and the will prepared by Radcliff. In his response to the guardianship petition, Robert Vance contended that his power of attorney rendered the guardianship unnecessary. In the alternative, he contended that he should be appointed guardian of his father’s property.

The Circuit Court scheduled a hearing for January 27, 1997. Before the hearing, the parties agreed upon settlement terms that were acceptable to the Circuit Court. The court found that James Vance was disabled and unable to care for his person or his property. The court appointed Elizabeth Vance as guardian of the person, and appointed a disinterested attorney as guardian of the property. 2 James Vance died on ²⁸³ August 6, 1997.

On October 8, 1997, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County issued an order terminating the guardianship, approving the final accounting, and discharging the guardian of the property. On April 17, 1998, the court amended the termination order to order the release of the estate assets to the personal representative, Robert Vance, upon presentation of his letters of administration. Appellant never presented her claim for attorney fees or costs to the Circuit Court. On September 25, 1997, after the death of James Vance, Radcliff presented her claim in the amount of $17,375 to Robert Vance, and on June 17, 1998 to Ralph Powers, attorney for the estate, for the payment of her fees incurred in the preparation of the power of attorney, the deed, the will, and for representation in the guardianship proceeding.

When the fees were not paid, on August 4, 1998, Radcliff filed a motion in the Orphans’ Court requesting that the personal representative, Robert Vance, pay, from the estate assets, her bill for legal services in the amount of $17,375. The bill indicates that $16,125 was for the preparation of the power of attorney, the deed, and the will, and for representation in guardianship proceeding. Of the amount billed, $13,850 was related to the guardianship proceeding. Radcliff served a copy of the motion on Robert Vance as personal representative; no other interested person received notice.

The court granted Rad-cliffs motion on September 8, 1998, directing payment in the amount of $17,375 to Radcliff from the estate assets. Robert Vance, as personal representative, paid the bill. Elizabeth Vance’s attorney learned of the motion and payment while reviewing the file at the Register of Wills on November 13, 1998, and, on November 19, 1998, filed a motion in the Orphans’ Court to vacate the order to pay Radcliffs fees. She also prayed that the court order Radcliff to refund ²⁸⁴ the money to the estate.

Elizabeth Vance argued that under § 7-502(a), the personal representative was required to give notice to all interested parties because he stood to personally benefit from payment by the estate. Elizabeth Vance also argued that the fees for the guardianship litigation could be approved only by the Circuit Court. On the merits, she maintained that the fees should not have been approved because Radcliffs legal services had not been rendered with due care, and that in any case the estate could not be charged the fees because the services had been rendered at the behest of and for the benefit of Robert Vance, and did not benefit James Vance. On Depember 11, 1998, the Orphans’ Court vacated the order of September 8, 1998 and directed Radcliff to return the money to the estate.

On December 18, 1998, after a hearing before the court on Elizabeth Vance’s motion for summary judgment related to proceedings to caveat the 1995 will and admit the 1993 will to probate, Radcliff filed a motion to strike the order of December 11, 1998. On January 13, 1999, the court denied Radcliffs motion to strike the December 11, 1998 order, ruling that payment should not have been ordered without prior notice to all interested persons. Radcliff noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted a writ of certiorari on our own motion before review by that court.

On June 25, 1999 the Orphans’ Court entered a consent order reflecting a settlement agreement reached by the parties. The order requires, inter alia, that Robert Vance deliver to Elizabeth Vance a promissory note in the amount of $17,375, to use his best efforts to recover the fee paid to Barbara Radcliff, and to pay any amounts so recovered to Elizabeth Vance to reduce the amounts due under the promissory note. Appellant argues that the settlement moots this appeal. We disagree.

The settlement contemplates action to recover the fees for the estate; far from being moot because of the settlement, this appeal helps to fulfill its terms. The consent order requires ²⁸⁵ the creation of a life estate in Elizabeth Vance in the Oxon Hill house, with the remainder in James Vance’s children and grandchildren. The promissory note is to be payable upon the sale of the Oxon Hill house or the death of Elizabeth Vance. Also, the note is to be secured by a deed of trust, on the remainder interest in the house, in favor of Elizabeth Vance.

Thus, Elizabeth Vance will receive the money during her lifetime only if she agrees to the sale of the house or the fees paid to Eadcliff are recovered. To determine that the consent order moots the appeal would thus be to prevent Elizabeth Vance from recovering the money during her lifetime unless she agrees to the sale of the house. We reject Appellant’s mootness argument. Appellant argues that the Orphans’ Court did not have jurisdiction to order her to repay money to the estate.

She asserts that once her bill was paid by the personal representative pursuant to the court order, she was simply a satisfied creditor who had no further business with the estate. The court’s narrowly defined statutory jurisdiction over the administration of estates, Appellant argues, does not extend to ordering a creditor to make any payment to the estate. Appellee contends that the jurisdiction and authority of the orphans’ court are sufficiently broad to include the power to correct errors and to order a creditor to restore money to an estate which the estate was ordered to pay erroneously. Appellee’s view is that the orphans’ court has the same equitable power to order repayment of funds in such a case as a circuit court would have.

The orphans’ court is a court of record. See Redman v. Chance, 32 Md. 42, 52 (1870). Judicial power is vested in the Orphans’ Courts by the Maryland Constitution, see Md. Const. art. 4, § 1; and the court has such powers as the Legislature may prescribe, see Md. Const. art. 4, § 40. 3 Sec ²⁸⁶ tion 2-102, setting forth the jurisdiction of the orphans’ courts as the probate courts of the State, makes clear that the legislatively-conferred jurisdiction is to be construed only as expressly stated: (a) Powers. — The court may conduct judicial probate, direct the conduct of a personal representative, and pass orders which may be required in the course of the administration of an estate of a decedent. It may summon witnesses.

The court may not, under pretext of incidental power or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction not expressly conferred. The orphans’ courts are tribunals of special limited jurisdiction, and can only exercise such authority as is expressly provided by law. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Russell, 284 Md. 174, 177 , 395 A.2d 488, 489 (1978). These limitations do not, however, prevent the orphans’ courts from properly administering justice within their assigned sphere. “Whilst the Orphans’ Court has a special and limited jurisdiction, it is, by- the law, clothed with extensive powers, and charged with the performance of very important duties in regard to the administration of the personal estate of deceased persons.” Jones v. Jones, 41 Md. 354, 361 (1875).

Accordingly, “it is not without all power to do justice.” Parker v. Leighton, 131 Md. 407, 423 , 102 A. 552, 558 (1917). Section 2-103 ensures that the orphans’ courts have authority sufficient to carry out their duties. That section provides as follows: The court has the same legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction, punish contempts, and carry out its orders, judgments, and decrees as a court of record with general jurisdiction in equity. Thus the orphans’ courts are empowered to decide such matters as are necessarily incident to the exercise of the powers expressly granted them.

See State v. Talbott, 148 Md. 70, 79 , 128 A. 908, 911 (1925). We have stated that “the legislative intention was to confer adequate power and juris ²⁸⁷ diction upon Orphans’ Courts in every case in which their general powers would enable them to act.” Wingert v. State, 125 Md. 586, 541 , 94 A. 166, 167 (1915). We referred then to former Art. 93, § 235, 4 but the present § 2-103 expresses a similar intention. The power of the court to correct its mistakes made in the course of the exercise of its expressly-granted powers is among those necessarily incident to the exercise of those powers.

See In re Estate of Stratton, 46 Md. 551, 554 (1877) (holding that “[ejrrors and mistakes in [an administration account] can as properly be corrected as in any order that may be improvidently passed”); see also Philip L. Sykes, 1 Maryland Practice: Probate Law and Practice § 206, at 218 (1956) (noting the Orphans’ Court’s “power to correct errors into which it has fallen,” and noting that to the end of correcting such errors, “it may abrogate or modify its own orders when necessary in the interests of justice”). This Court has long recognized the power of the Orphans’ Courts to correct errors. As early as 1827 we rejected the argument Appellant now makes, ie., an Orphans’ Court’s correction of its error is an exercise of jurisdiction not expressly conferred “under pretext of incidental power,” as forbidden by § 2-102. See, e.g., Raborg v. Hammond, 2 H. & G. 42, 51 (1827) (holding power to revoke letters of administration is “necessarily inherent in the Orphans’ Courts, and a part and of the essence of the power delegated to them, of granting” letters).

By 1914 the principle that an Orphans’ Court has the authority to correct its own errors had been applied often, and we could state that “[i]t has been repeatedly held that the Orphans’ Courts of the state have ample authority ... to abrogate and modify their own orders, when neces ²⁸⁸ sary to promote the ends of justice.” Malkus v. Richardson, 124 Md. 224, 229 , 92 A. 474, 476 (1914) (citing French v. Washington County Home, 115 Md. 309 , 80 A. 913 (1911)). In Malkus , a widow who had been devised five dollars by her husband’s will sought to re-open the administration two years after the orders of ratification and distribution had been entered, on the ground that she had been denied her right to renounce the will and elect a statutory share. The Court rejected the administrator’s argument that the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore County had no power to re-open the administration and rescind the orders of ratification and distribution, and that the widow’s application for such action had not been made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the Orphans’ Court’s order dismissing the widow’s petition.

See also Gallagher v. Martin, 102 Md. 115 , 62 A. 247 (1905); Geesey v. Geesey, 94 Md. 371 , 51 A. 36 (1902); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 88 Md. 60 , 40 A. 712 (1898); Hardt v. Birely, 72 Md. 134 , 19 A. 606 (1890); Gavin v. Carling, 55 Md. 530 (1881); Bantz v. Bantz, 52 Md. 686 (1880); In re Estate of Stratton, 46 Md. 551 ; Scott v. Fox, 14 Md. 388 (1859). We have applied the principle