Raimondi v. State

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Thomas Paul Raimondi, the appellant, was convicted in a jury trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of attempted bribery, a violation of Md. Code, Art. 27, § 23. Judge H. Kenneth Mackey, the presiding judge, imposed a sentence of eighteen months and a fine of $500. Appellant* alleges error with respect to (1) the use of transcriptions of certain electronic recordings; (2) the instructions ; (3) the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the appellant’s character witnesses; (4) the prosecutor’s argument to the jury; and (5) failure to dismiss the indictment because of pre-trial publicity.

We see no merit to any of the contentions. This case grew out of the election in 1969 by the General Assembly of Maryland of a Governor to succeed Governor Spiro T. Agnew, who had resigned on January 15, 1969 to take the post of Vice-President of the United States on January 20,1969. There were one hundred eighty-five members of the General Assembly of Maryland entitled to vote on the governorship, forty-three in the Senate, and one hundred forty-two in the House of Delegates. Of these, eight in the Senate and twenty-five in the House of Delegates were Republicans; thirty-five in the Senate and. one hundred seventeen in the House were Democrats.

Ninety-three were required to elect. The chief prosecution witness, State Senator John J. ³²⁵ Bishop, Jr., from Baltimore County, testified that the appellant, Thomas Paul Raimondi, approached him, Bishop, by means of a telephone call at his home on November 27, 1968, and discussed the purchase of votes of the Republican members of the General Assembly for an unnamed candidate for the governorship. Mr. Bishop’s testimony was that Mr. Raimondi at that time mentioned “3” per vote, which he assumed meant $3,000. per vote, for the thirty-three Republican votes, to be voted for an undisclosed candidate for Governor. Mr. Raimondi’s testimony was that Mr. Bishop had called him on November 2, 1968, ostensibly with reference to helping Raimondi clear up a campaign deficit, incurred in Mr. Raimondi’s unsuccessful campaign as the Republican candidate for Congress in the Fourth Congressional District.

Both Bishop and Raimondi agree that there was a discussion on this subject which had been initiated by Mr. Bishop and there is in evidence (Defendant’s Exhibit 1) a copy of a letter dated November 7, 1968, wherein Mr. Raimondi informs Mr. Bishop of the amount of the deficit and Exhibit 1A, a list of unpaid bills. Mr. Raimondi testified that when Mr. Bishop called him he said something to the effect that “I hear they are trying to buy votes”, speaking of the gubernatorial election, which had come into the conversation. According to Raimondi, he, Raimondi, said he had not heard anything about this, but asked whether Bishop was interested, and Bishop’s reply was “I might be.” When Raimondi was the Republican candidate for Congress from the Fourth Congressional District, which included part of Baltimore County, Bishop had some control over the expenditure of funds and had refused to help Raimondi. Feeling ill-used, Raimondi conceived this situation as a means of getting back at Bishop, and, as he put it in his testimony, it back-fired.

He said that the candidate for Governor, the money and the proposed bribe were all mythical figments of Mr. Raimondi’s imagination, and that he had called Bishop back and strung him along to see how far he would go. ³²⁶ Although Mr. Bishop made several efforts to have money passed between the defendant and him, no money ever changed hands, nor did the defendant ever say that he actually had all or any of the money, nor was there any showing that he was in a position to get it if the deal progressed beyond the talking stage. Mr. Bishop’s daughter, Suzanne Bishop, testified that in November, 1968, when her father was in Annapolis, Maryland, she had received a telephone call from someone who identified himself as being Tom Raimondi, and that this person had given her two telephone numbers at which he could be reached. One was the office telephone number of one William Adelson, Plaza 2-6682, the other was 323-2255. The latter was not an active telephone number at the time of the alleged call, but Mr. Raimondi’s office telephone number at the time was 727-2255, the last four digits corresponding with the last four digits of one of the numbers which Miss Bishop said she was given.

The first three digits correspond with Mr. Raimondi’s home telephone number, 323-7222. Miss Bishop admitted that she did not know Mr. Raimondi before or since this alleged conversation and identified the caller as Mr. Raimondi only because the caller said that was his name. Appellant denied making this telephone call. He and his wife both testified that on the date and hour of this alleged telephone call they were in Washington, D.C. having dinner.

Mr. Bishop said that on receiving Mr. Raimondi’s telephone call early in the morning of November 27, 1968, he thought it over for a minute or so and decided to call Colonel Robert Lally, Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, and arranged to meet him at the Pikesville Headquarters of the State Police. After talking with Mr. Lálly, Mr. Bishop telephoned Mr. Raimondi from there but Raimondi was not in his office. He finally reached Mr. Raimondi on his third call, which was between 1:00 and 2:00 P.M. His testimony was: “Q. What was the discussion you had on the phone at that time ? ³²⁷ “A. Well, Colonel Lally had told me I should have a face-to-face contact with him, so I told him — I said T don’t want to talk on the telephone about the thing you called me about this morning. I have had some interest expressed in it by others, and I would like to talk to you further about it.’ “Q. When you said you had some interest expressed in it by others, who did you have in mind when you said others ? “A. Colonel Lally.” He told Raimondi to wait in his office for his, Bishop’s call, and called him at 2:00 P.M. and arranged to meet him at 3:30 P.M. He picked Raimondi up at Charles and Saratoga Streets and rode around with him for about fifteen minutes discussing the proposition, including a statement by Raimondi that his people wanted a minimum of twenty-five votes and would pay $3,000. per vote, up to a maximum of $75,000.

Mr. Bishop testified that he received another telephone call from Mr. Raimondi on December 2, 1968 at home. On December 3, 1968, at 11:00 A.M. Mr. Bishop met with Mr. Moylan, State’s Attorney of Baltimore City, Mr. Helinski, his deputy, and Colonel Lally in Mr. Moylan’s office. Mr. Bishop had called Mr. Raimondi earlier that morning at his home, having been instructed to be sure to do so. Mr. Bishop told Mr. Raimondi that he was trying to get some information and that he would be in touch with him later that date, which he did later that afternoon.

At the meeting in Mr. Moylan’s office Mr. Bishop was instructed to make further contacts with Mr. Raimondi, which he did. At Mr. Moylan’s suggestion, arrangements were made to use electronic equipment to record the conversations between Mr. Bishop and Mr. Raimondi. A Concord tape recorder was brought into Mr. Moylan’s office and Mr. Bishop was instructed in its use. An appropriate warrant was obtained. ³²⁸ Four electronic recordings of conversations between Mr. Raimondi and Mr. Bishop were played back to the jury.

The jury was given transcripts of these recordings and were permitted to refer to them during the playing of the recordings, during argument of counsel, and they were also given the transcripts to take into the jury room, all over the objection of the defendant. These electronic recordings took place on the following dates: December 4, 1968, while Mr. Bishop and Mr. Raimondi were riding in Mr. Bishop’s car in Baltimore City. December 10, 1968, around 7:00 P.M. during a visit by Mr. Bishop to Mr. Raimondi’s office in downtown Baltimore. December 12, 1968, telephone conversation between Mr. Bishop and Mr. Raimondi.

December 16, 1968, telephone conversation between Mr. Bishop and Mr. Raimondi. Mr. Bishop brought into their conversation the name of Mr. Dale Anderson, County Executive for Baltimore County, as being Raimondi’s candidate, and, as Mr. Raimondi put it, he agreed with everything Bishop said. Raimondi also brought in the name of M. William Adelson, with whom he had once been associated in the practice of law as being one of those interested in the deal. Mr. Adelson and Mr. Anderson both indignantly denied having had anything to do with such a scheme, and the record is completely devoid of any evidence that they did, or that they had any knowledge of it, other than Mr. Bishop’s recitations of what Raimondi had told him.

Mr. Raimondi testified that there was no real scheme to buy votes and that he had no connection with either Mr. Adelson or Mr. Anderson. After Mr. Bishop had met with Colonel Lally, he, either on his own account, or on instructions to get Mr. Raimondi to incriminate himself, called Mr. Raimondi several times to make appointments so that the conversations could be electronically recorded. Mr. Raimondi testified that he was trying to put the “charade” to an end but did not succeed in doing so until Mr. Bishop, Mr. ³²⁹ Moylan and Mr. Helinski felt that they had enough evidence for prosecution of Mr. Raimondi. I Transcriptions of Electronic Recordings Raimondi alleges the trial court erred: (a) In permitting the transcripts to be given to the jury while the recordings were being played back to the jury.

(b) In permitting the transcripts to be introduced into evidence. (c) In permitting the jury to have the transcripts during argument of counsel at the end of the case. (d) In permitting the jury to take the transcripts into the jury room and having them during their deliberations upon their verdict. To support his argument, Raimondi cites Duggan v. Florida, 189 So. 2d 890 , Basham v. Oklahoma, 340 P. 2d 461 and Bonicelli v. State, 339 P. 2d 1063 (Okla.) the latter pertaining to tape recordings of confessions; he also cites a number of cases pertaining to what evidence the jury can take into the jury room.

Since the errors, if any, were harmless, it will be unnecessary for us to discuss the authorities cited. We do, however, call attention to the cases cited in 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 at 1042 as well as three Maryland cases which have some bearing on the points raised. McGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601 , 92 A. 2d 582 ; Lynch v. State, 2 Md. App. 546 , 236 A. 2d 45 , and Tumminello v. State, 10 Md. App. 612 , 272 A. 2d 77 . It is specifically conceded on appeal and below that the transcriptions were accurate renditions of the words as occurred on the tapes.

Although in his testimony Raimondi asserted some minor discrepancies in the tapes themselves, he admitted the substance of the conversations stating “all the conversations on these tapes, and I don’t know how to make anybody understand this, is a figmentation [sic] of my imagination.” He said this to support his assertion that he was attempting to “string along” Senator Bishop. ³³⁰ The crucial issue for determination by the jury was, therefore, whether Mr. Raimondi was perpetrating a hoax on Senator Bishop or was making an actual attempt to purchase his and others’ votes in the General Assembly. Since the issue in point involves not the occurrence of the conversations, nor the substantial accuracy of the tapes, nor the accuracy of the transcripts, but only the proper conclusion to be drawn, this Court does not see how either conclusion, hoax or bribe, is encouraged by the transcriptions. Specifically, we do not see how transcripts of the recordings in any manner harmed Raimondi’s assertion he was playing a practical joke on Bishop. II Instructions A The court instructed the jury in part as follows: “Bribery has been defined as the voluntary giving or offering to any public official any sum of money to influence him in the performance of any official duties required of him.

The essence of the crime of bribery is the passing of money to him in order to so influence him. It is essential that the gift or the offering be made with the corrupt intent to so influence him. Now, this is bribery I have just described. In this case the defendant is not charged with bribery, but attempting to bribe.

I gave you the definition of bribery so we can more intelligently discuss the alleged crime of attempting to bribe. An attempt is an unsuccessful offer of a bribe or the commission of an act falling short of an offer. An attempt, generally-speaking, has been said to be something which amounts to more than the preparation but falls short of actualy [sic] consummation of the crime of bribery in this case. The actual tender of a bribe is not necessary to make up the offense.

That is, the ³³¹ actual passing of the money is not necessary, or the attempt to pass money is not necessary to make up the offense. Any expression of the ability to produce the amount offered is sufficient to constitute the crime of attempted bribery.” Raimondi duly excepted to that part of the charge which said an attempt is an “unsuccessful offer of a bribe or the commission of an act falling short of an offer” maintaining that under the indictment it was necessary for the State to prove the attempt to bribe by offering. Although confusing an offer with a tender, on appeal he expressly concedes that an expression of the willingness and ability to produce money could amount to an offer. The objection appears to have some merit only because it takes the sentence out of context.

The fact that certain parts of the instructions, taken out of context, might give an inaccurate statement of the law does not make the instructions wrong provided the instructions taken as a whole accurately state the law. Shotkosky v. State, 8 Md. App. 492 , 261 A. 2d 171 ; Graef v. State, 1 Md. App. 161 , 228 A. 2d 480 , and Roberts v. State, 4 Md. App. 209 , 241 A. 2d 903 . In the instant case, the trial judge explained that an attempt amounted to more than preparation but must fall short of consummation, and further that tender was not necessary since any expression of ability to produce the amount offered is sufficient to constitute the crime of attempted bribery. While we cannot endorse the instruction as a model one, we do not see any prejudice to the appellant’s position; we think the overall instruction correctly explained the law to the jury.

See Cunningham v. State, 190 Md. 578 , 59 A. 2d 337 ; Md. Code, Art. 27, § 23, and Perkins Criminal Law, Chapt. 5, § 3 (C) 3 page 403. B Although the appellant in arguing the preceding objection stated, “The Court correctly explained to the jury that in order to constitute an offer there need not be an ³³² actual tender of money”, he contends that the court committed error in refusing the following instruction: “That in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime with which he is charged, it is not sufficient for the State to show that there was a discussion of money to be paid, but there must be evidence of an actual attempt of the defendant to pay money to John J. Bishop, Jr.” He cites United States v. Klosterman, 248 F. 2d 191 (3d Cir., 1957), which concerns solely the question of entrapment; there is no contention concerning entrapment in the instant case. Klosterman provides no assistance