Rajnic v. State

ALPERT, Judge. Paul Stefan Rajnic, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, which corresponded with the first and second degree murder convictions. The court imposed concurrent prison sentences of life with all but 20 years suspended for first degree murder, 20 years for second degree murder, and ten years for voluntary manslaughter. It merged the second handgun violation into the first and imposed a concurrent 15 year sentence.

On appeal, appellant argues: I. The evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, in that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense, II. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury (a) that appellant did not necessarily forfeit his right to self-defense by arming himself in advance, (b) on the jury’s duty to “assess reasonableness from [appellant’s] perspective” at the time of the incident, (c) on “the right to respond to a group with deadly force,” and (d) on the “castle doctrine,” and ²⁹¹ III. Because he was on psychotropic drugs at the time of trial, he was deprived of his right to be present at trial and to testify in his own defense. We shall reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

While we find no merit in appellant’s first argument, we do find merit in parts (a), (b), and (c) of his second argument. 1 We need not address his third argument in that our decision to reverse renders it moot. Facts What began as a Christmas party on December 17, 1993 ended with the three shootings that led to appellant’s convictions. The shootings occurred in the house that appellant shared with his girlfriend, Cecilia Boswell, and her sister, Margaret Boswell. The evidence presented at trial established that there was a longstanding feud between appellant on the one side and Margaret Boswell and her boyfriend, Brian Doty, on the other.

Cecilia kept a handgun in the bedroom that she shared with appellant. Shortly after the party began, appellant went into the bedroom and placed the handgun on a dresser. Later that evening, Margaret—apparently falsely—reported to Doty and other party goers that she heard appellant and Cecilia quarrelling in the bathroom and that she believed that appellant had struck Cecilia. That angered Doty and three other men, Doug Bostic, Steve Smith, and Mike Lachance.

Doty and Bostic had been drinking heavily. Despite Cecilia’s protestations that appellant had not struck her, the men shouted at appellant and threatened to beat him. Appellant went into his bedroom and closed the door, but he could hear the men continue to shout and threaten him from the hallway. He removed a shotgun from under his bed and loaded it. ²⁹² Ultimately, Doty, Bostic, and Smith charged into the bedroom.

During the melee that followed, Doty and Smith were shot and killed with the handgun; Bostic was shot and killed with the shotgun. Discussion I Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant does not dispute that he fired the fatal shots. 2 He argues only that he acted in self-defense. Appellant posits that he produced evidence that he acted in perfect self-defense and that the State failed to shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not do so. In the alternative, appellant argues that the evidence at least established imperfect self-defense and that his murder convictions should therefore be “reduced” to manslaughter convictions.

The requirements for perfect self-defense are: (1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant; (2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger; (3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and (4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 211 , 571 A.2d 1251 (1990) (quoting State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485-86 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984)). If “the defendant honestly believed that the use of [deadly] force was necessary but ... this subjective belief was unrea ²⁹³ sonable under the circumstances,” an imperfect self-defense would exist and the defendant would be guilty only of manslaughter. 319 Md. at 213 , 571 A.2d 1251 (quoting 301 Md. at 500 , 483 A.2d 759 ). There is no dispute that Doty, Bostic, Smith, and Lachance were all larger than appellant, were intoxicated, threatened to beat appellant, and charged into appellant’s bedroom on the heels of the threats.

Even so, we are not convinced that a jury was constrained to find that the requirements set forth in Dykes , for perfect or imperfect self-defense, were conclusively established. The jury heard the testimony of the witnesses and saw the physical evidence. It may well have concluded that appellant did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm. It may not have believed appellant’s testimony that he in fact believed himself to be in such danger.

Moreover, it may have determined that appellant used excessive force. As the Court of Appeals has explained, when a sufficiency challenge is made, the reviewing court is not to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”; rather, the duty of the appellate court is only to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479 , 649 A.2d 336 (1994) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis Jackson Court’s). II Jury Instructions (a) Arming One’s Self in Advance of an Attack Defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury to the effect that (i) appellant had a right to arm ²⁹⁴ himself if he was not seeking a fight but was apprehensive that he would be attacked, and (ii) appellant did not forfeit his right to self-defense by arming himself in advance, provided he did not seek the encounter and had reason to fear an unlawful attack on his life. Appellant now treats the two requested instructions as if they were identical and contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give them.

We agree that the second instruction should have been given and so we reverse the judgments of the trial court. The second requested instruction was lifted directly from Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 409 , 179 A.2d 880 (1962). In that case, the defendant’s sister asked him to help her move from the house where she lived with her physically abusive husband. Fearing trouble from the husband, who was known to the defendant to carry a gun, the defendant put a rifle on the back seat of his car before going to help his sister.

The husband did indeed lunge into the defendant’s car, and the defendant shot him to death. The court refused to instruct the jury that “the defendant had a right to arm himself in anticipation of an assault,” and the jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder. Id. at 408 , 179 A.2d 880 . In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals quoted Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law at 48 (1957) for the proposition that “ ‘one who is not in any sense seeking an encounter, but has reason to fear an unlawful attack upon his life, does not forfeit his privilege of self-defense merely by arming himself in advance.’ ” 228 Md. at 409 , 179 A.2d 880 .

Similarly, in Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562 , 188 A.2d 142 (1963), the defendant wife stashed a loaded shotgun in her kitchen in response to her husband’s threats to kill her. When, after an argument, the husband entered the kitchen with a hunting knife in his hand, the defendant shot and killed him. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an instruction “that if the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that her husband intended to kill her or to do her serious bodily injury, then she had a right under the circumstances to arm herself in anticipation of an assault.” Id. at ²⁹⁵ 566 , 188 A.2d 142 . The defendant was convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed, explaining: Since the decision in Gunther ..., the right of a defendant to arm himself in anticipation of an assault can no longer be questioned where the circumstances are such as could induce a jury to believe that the defendant was not the aggressor, but was instead apprehensive that he might be attacked by the victim.

Id. at 567, 188 A.2d 142 (citation omitted). See generally Crawford v. State, 231 Md. 354, 361 , 190 A.2d 538 (1963) (where, in