Ralkey v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. A patient executed a general release to settle a Health Claims Arbitration case against her physician. We are asked whether this release precludes a subsequent product liability claim against an alleged corporate joint tort-feasor ⁵¹⁹ which was not and could not have been included in that proceeding. 1 In March 1980, Mary Ann Ralkey (appellant) fractured her toe, and Roland Cavanaugh, M.D., (appellee) applied a cast to the lower part of her leg. The doctor used Scotch-guard casting tape, a product manufactured and sold by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M, appellee).

When he later removed the cast, using an electric saw and allegedly following directions supplied by 3M, Cavanaugh cut Ralkey’s leg in three places. The injuries left permanent scars and some disability. Ralkey filed a claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Office against Dr. Cavanaugh on May 19, 1981, asserting that he caused her injuries by negligently removing her cast. 2 Prior to arbitration, however, the parties agreed to a settlement of $4,500. Pursuant to receipt of that amount, Ralkey executed a release of the doctor on December 22, 1982.

On February 9, 1983, Ralkey filed an action against 3M in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, alleging negligence, breach of warranty and product liability. First, 3M filed a general issue plea and then moved for summary judgment claiming that the release served as a bar to Ralkey’s suit. On September 16, 1983, the court denied the motion and the case was set for trial before a different judge. 3 ⁵²⁰ In the interim, 3M entered a third-party claim for indemnity or contribution against Dr. Cavanaugh. The doctor sought summary judgment based on the release; the trial judge initially denied this motion, but then granted reconsideration.

Before the rehearing, however, 3M again submitted the motion for summary judgment which had been denied in September 1983 by the motion judge. The court granted 3M’s motion on August 22, 1984, and Dr. Cavanaugh’s summary judgment motion became moot. Ralkey appeals from this decision on two grounds: 1. The law of the case doctrine precluded the court from granting the motion for summary judgment which a court of coordinate jurisdiction previously denied; and 2.

The release did not apply to 3M, but specifically relieved only Dr. Cavanaugh from further liability. Appellant urges upon us that this is a case of first impression because it is the first time a Maryland court has considered whether a general release in a Health Claims Arbitration case releases all joint tort-feasors who were not and could not be a party in that arbitration case. We agree this jurisdiction has not decided that precise issue, but conclude that it is less of a first than appellant contends. We explain.

LAW OF THE CASE The law of the case doctrine generally provides that a “legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case” controls in subsequent proceedings between them. 21 C.J.S. § 195 at 330 (1940). Typically, a ruling by the trial court remains binding until an appellate court reverses or modifies it. Id. at 332. In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226 , 462 A.2d 58 (1983), the Court of Appeals explicated the doctrine as it exists in Maryland: “Once this Court has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or, if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that ⁵²¹ appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the ‘law of the case’ and is binding on the litigants and courts alike, unless changed or modified after reargument, and neither the questions decided nor the ones that could have been raised and decided are available to be raised in a subsequent appeal.” Id. at 230 , 46 A.2d 58 .

In effect, the decision which finally disposes of the matter becomes the law of the case in subsequent proceedings. Ordinarily, this refers to an appellate holding, but a trial court ruling also may stand as the law of the case when no appeal is taken from it. Acting Director, Department of Forests & Parks v. Walker, 39 Md.App. 298, 302 , 385 A.2d 806 (1978), Aff'd. 284 Md. 357 , 396 A.2d 262 (1979). The doctrine does not apply between courts of coordinate jurisdiction before entry of a final judgment, as indicated by this Court in Placido v. Citizens Bank and Trust Company, 38 Md.App. 33 , 379 A.2d 773 (1977): “Trial courts are bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals, until they may be overruled.

Until then they are precedents to be followed and obeyed. There is no decision or statute which requires one nisi prius judge to accept as final and conclusive the decisions on the law before trial of another judge or court.” Id. at 45 , 379 A.2d 773 , quoting Insurance Company v. Thrall, 181 Md. 19, 22-23 , 27 A.2d 353 (1942). In fact, the latter judge has the discretion to consider the matter de novo unless otherwise prohibited by a statute or rule. 4 State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449 , 470 A.2d 1269 ⁵²² (1984); see Driver v. Parke-Davis & Company, 29 Md.App. 354, 362 , 348 A.2d 38 (1975), cert. denied, 277 Md. 736 (1976). The present case involves whether the law of the case doctrine applies to the denial of a motion for summary judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment at any time during a proceeding when it appears that no genuine dispute of a material fact exists. Md.Rule 610; 5 Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 253 Md. 282, 289-90 , 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Placido, 38 Md.App. at 41 , 379 A.2d 773 . The grant of the motion does not constitute entry of a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken, Felger v. Nichols, 30 Md.App. 278, 279 , 352 A.2d 330 (1976), and the denial of the motion does not preclude resubmission of it at a later point in the proceedings. Joy v. Anne Arundel County, 52 Md.App. 653, 660-61, 451 A.2d 1237 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 440 (1983); Placido, 38 Md.App. at 44-46 , 379 A.2d 773 ; Mueller v. Payn, 30 Md.App. 377, 389-90 , 352 A.2d 895 , cert. denied, 277 Md. 739 (1976).

Appellant argues that the trial court could not grant the motion for summary judgment in this case because of the prior denial. As discussed above, the law of the case doctrine does not apply to trial court decisions in Maryland unless a statute or rule renders the decision binding or when no appeal is taken from the final judgment. See Placido, supra; Walker, supra. While the trial judges may choose to respect a prior ruling in a case, they are not required to ⁵²³ do so.

Placido, 38 Md.App. at 45 , 379 A.2d 773 . Furthermore, a denial of a motion for summary judgment does not “finally dispose” of any matter — it merely permits the case to proceed based on the finding that a dispute concerning a material fact exists. The denial neither decides any issues of law nor precludes a subsequent finding that no factual disputes exist. See Joy, supra; Placido, supra; Mueller, supra.

Thus, we hold that the law of the case doctrine did not require the trial judge to deny appellee 3M’s motion for summary judgment. We next consider whether the court properly granted summary judgment. RELEASE OF JOINT TORT-FEASORS Maryland has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act (UCATA), which creates a statutory right of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Md.Code Ann., (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 50 § 16.

The Act defines “joint tort-feasors” as: “two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.” Id. The provisions concerning release of a tort-feasor appear in Md.Code Ann., Art. 50 §§ 19 and 20, supra. Under the UCATA, the release of one tort-feasor does not automatically discharge the others, but it does reduce the total amount of the claim against those remaining. Md.Code Ann., Art. 50 § 19, supra.

The amount of this reduction is “the greater of the consideration paid or the amount or proportion agreed upon to reduce the total claim.” Martinez v. Lopez, 300 Md. 91, 100 , 476 A.2d 197 (1984); Md.Code Ann., Art. 50 § 19, supra. Furthermore, the discharged tort-feasor remains liable for contribution to the others unless: (1) the release is given before any right of contribution accrues, and (2) the release provides for a reduction of the claim by an amount equal to the released ⁵²⁴ tort-feasor’s pro rata share. Md.Code Ann., Art. 50 § 20, supra. 6 The following language appeared in the release in the present case: “I hereby release and discharge ROLAND CAVA-NAUGH, M.D. his or their successors and assigns, and all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable, from all claims of any kind or character which I have or might have against him or them, and especially because of all damages, losses or injuries to person or property, or both, whether known or unknown and whether developed or undeveloped, resulting or to result from the incident which happened on or about March 28, 1980, and which is the subject matter of the lawsuit filed in the Health Claims Arbitration Office for Maryland, HCA No. 81-166, and styled Mary Ann-Ralkey v. Roland Cavanaugh, M.D. and / hereby acknowledge full settlement and satisfaction of all claims of whatever kind or character which I or my heirs, executors and administrators may have against him or them by reason of the above mentioned damages, losses or injuries.” (The release was on a printed form. The italicized portions were typed in.) The Court of Appeals has held that “a general release to all mankind bar[s] further suits against other entities involved in the occurrence which produced the settlement with one participant that led to the release.” Peters v. Butler, 253 Md. 7, 10 , 251 A.2d 600 (1969); see Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Company, Inc., 252 Md. 374, 382-84 , 249 A.2d 711 (1969).

Thus, language releasing “all. other persons, firms and corporations” discharges remain ⁵²⁵ ing tort-feasors even though they are not named in the release. Peters, supra; Pemrock, supra. Despite the holdings of Peters and Pemrock, Inc., appellant contends that the phrase “and which is the subject matter of the lawsuit filed in the Health Claims Arbitration Office...” sufficiently limited the otherwise general release and, therefore, discharged only appellee Cavanaugh from liability. She explains that the reference to the Health Claims Arbitration Office restricted the effect of the release to parties who could have been brought before the arbitration office.

Because appellee 3M was not a health care provider, appellant could not include the corporation in that proceeding; hence, the release applies to only appellee Cavanaugh. In support of her position, appellant points to Kyte v. McMillion, 256 Md. 85 , 259 A.2d 532 (1969), and Huff v. Harbaugh, 49 Md.App. 661 , 435 A.2d 108 (1981). Appellee 3M agrees it could not be a party in the arbitration proceeding, but contends that appellee Cavanaugh is not the only party released. Although we agree that Kyte and Huff provide the relevant case law on this issue, we conclude that those decisions support appellee’s position that the release discharged both the doctor and the corporation.

We will discuss these cases individually and then compare each with the present situation. In Kyte v. McMillion, supra, Edna Kyte was injured in an automobile collision. The accident occurred when the driver of the car in which she was a passenger tried to outrun a police car and, ultimately, hit another car; the driver had no license to operate a motor vehicle. Kyte was taken to the hospital for treatment, which included a blood transfusion.

One of the nurses replaced the first bag of blood when it was almost empty; the new bag, however, was the wrong blood type. Another nurse noticed the error shortly after and corrected it. Initially, Kyte’s only physical reaction to the mistake involved a skin rash; a subsequent blood test, however, revealed that she had suffered ⁵²⁶ an “irreversible sensitization” which would affect her childbearing capacity. Id. at 88 , 259 A.2d 532 .