Ramirez v. State

HOLLANDER, J. Following a trial in July 2005, a jury in the Circuit Court for Carroll County convicted Edinson H. Ramirez, appellant, of numerous counts related to a home invasion and armed robbery. 1 At sentencing on November 17, 2005, the court imposed a total term of 95 years’ imprisonment. ²⁶¹ Shortly before the jury delivered its verdict, the judge disclosed that the alternate juror briefly entered the jury deliberation room with the regular jurors when the jury was first released to begin deliberations. At that time, appellant did not voice any objection or seek any particular relief. The jury then returned its verdict. A few days later, the State filed a “Motion for Appropriate Relief in Clarification of Alternate Juror’s Presence in Jury Deliberation Room for Establishment of a Factual Appellate Record,” which appellant opposed.

At an evidentiary motion hearing held in October 2005, appellant moved, for the first time, for a mistrial or a new trial, claiming prejudice based on the presence of the alternate juror at the outset of jury deliberations. The court denied appellant’s motions in an Order entered November 8, 2005. This appeal followed. Ramirez poses a single question, which we quote: Did an error occur when the alternate juror retired, along with the twelve regular jurors, to the jury room for deliberations and was that error aggravated by the trial court speciously obtaining testimony from the alternate juror as to what occurred in the jury room, ignoring other extrinsic and obvious evidence and finding that the defendant was not prejudiced?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A detailed recitation of the evidence presented at trial is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal. Therefore, we note only that appellant’s convictions arose from horrifying events that occurred on the night of October 11, 2004, when appellant and another man, masked and wielding guns, entered the home of Rodney and Linda Hidey; forced them into the ²⁶² basement with their six-year-old daughter; shot Mr. Hidey; hit him repeatedly in the head with a gun; forced Ms. Hidey to open a safe in the basement; and fled with more than $80,000 kept in the safe. After counsel’s closing argument on July 15, 2005, the court did not formally excuse the alternate juror.

When the jury was excused to deliberate at 2:58 p.m., the alternate accompanied the jurors into the jury room. She remained there for a few minutes, until removed by the bailiff. The parties were not immediately told what had happened. At 5:58 p.m., as the jury was about to return with a verdict, the trial court stated: All right.

Counsel, before we bring the jury in, it came to my attention that the alternate went in with all of the evidence and we retrieved her a few minutes later. So, I don’t know that there’s—can be any prejudice to anybody, given how long the jury was out, but for the record, that is noted, I will estimate, five minutes. I haven’t got any detailed timing, but she was removed by the Clerk and the Jury Bailiff at my direction. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel voiced any objection or concern at that time.

Nor did appellant move for a mistrial or seek any other relief. The jury then returned to the courtroom, announced its verdict, was polled, and was dismissed, all without any comment from the defense. The ten-day deadline for filing a motion for new trial passed without any motion filed by the defense. See Rule 4-331(a).

On July 27, 2005, the State filed a “Motion for Appropriate Relief in Clarification of Alternate Juror’s Presence in Jury Deliberation Room for Establishment of a Factual Appellate Record.” Relying on Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618 , 843 A.2d 64 (2004), in which the Court of Appeals considered the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations, the State asked the trial court to hold a hearing to establish a factual record, and to permit the State to attempt to “overcome the ‘presumption of prejudice’ (ie., plain error)” flowing from the alternate juror’s presence in the jury room. Appellant moved to dis ²⁶³ miss the motion on the ground that such a proceeding was not authorized by statute or case law. In an “Order of Court” entered September 27, 2005, the court stated that “it would be appropriate to grant the State’s Motion, in part, to allow it to present evidence for the record as to this issue.” It continued: The presiding Judge will not be called as a witness to testify by either party. By the same token, none of the active jurors who ultimately participated in the verdict will be allowed to testify in any manner, including the Foreman.

The Court believes that testimony from either is prohibited by the Rules. The Court believes that any other witness with any evidence to present may be called to testify, including but not limited to the Court Clerk, the Jury Bailiff, and potentially the alternate juror. The alternate juror, at least by inference, was excused at the time the incident occurred and was no longer a part of the jury that ultimately determined the verdict. The Defense is free to call any witnesses it desires, with the exceptions stated above.

The court held an evidentiary motion hearing on October 5, 2005. As an initial matter, appellant renewed his objection to the hearing, and the court heard argument from counsel. The court then said, in part: Well, I have given this a great deal of thought, and I realize we are into several different areas that overlap. But the way I read Stokes , the issue of whether or not the alternate juror was present during deliberations is presumed when the door is closed.

But the only way you can have a presumption is if it is rebuttable. Now, as to the issue of the alternate juror testifying, at least impliedly she was discharged and no longer a part of the jury that was deliberating and eventually rendered the verdict. I think that inquiry as to her is limited to whether or not deliberations had begun and not what they were. ²⁶⁴ Now, we find ourselves in a posture where there is no motion by the defense for a mistrial or a new trial. We also find ourselves in a posture where in the last analysis we really have a situation where the Appellate Courts will be devoid of any information about this.

There is no jury to be influenced or prejudiced by this occurring. It will simply be a record from which they can make an ultimate determination. I believe that that should be done, simply because I disagree with you strongly about the issue that it is plain error or that it violated constitutional rights. It is arguable at least, and again, there is no case that addresses this, that the defense’s failure to have raised the issue may constitute a waiver.

There is precious little doubt in my mind that this case will be appealed and that the Appellate Courts will have to sort it all out. But at this juncture we are in a posture where it is unexplained. I think the State has a right to make a record for appellate purposes only to explain it, and it is up to the Appellate Courts what to do with it. They can, conceivably, take the case on appeal and remand it to me to conduct a hearing about the issue.

Well, we are going to do it in this order, and then we will go from there. (Emphasis added.) The hearing continued, over appellant’s continuing objection. The State presented two witnesses: the alternate juror and the bailiff who retrieved her. Barbara Seabrease, the alternate, testified as follows: [PROSECUTOR]: And directing your attention then to approximately 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon on Friday the 15th of '05, all of the evidence was concluded, the closing arguments and the jury was released to go into the jury room.

Do you recall that? ²⁶⁵ [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes, I do. [PROSECUTOR]: And what did you do? Just tell us, step by step, what you did at that point in time. [MS. SEABREASE]: After the closing argument I just walked into the jury—the deliberation room with the rest of the jurors and— [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

And what did you do? [MS. SEABREASE]: And I walked into the room and I just sat down for a minute, and we started to get a soda and there was some candy on the table. And then I got up and then I went into the ladies room. And when I came out of the ladies room— [PROSECUTOR]: How long do you think you were in the—I know this might be an embarrassing question, but how long do you think you were in the ladies room? [MS.

SEABREASE]: Just for maybe two minutes. Maybe three minutes. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. [MS. SEABREASE]: And as I came out of the ladies room,— [PROSECUTOR]: Did you close the door behind you when you went into the ladies room? [MS. SEABREASE]: Oh, yes.

I did. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Yes. That is a separate room. Right? [MS.

SEABREASE]: Yes. Yes. It’s a separate room, and I was in there. Then, when I came out, the Bailiff and the Clerk from the court, they were asking, “where is the alternate?” And so I raised my hand and I said, “Here I am.” I didn’t know what they—I thought maybe there was some emergency they were trying to call me for that had ²⁶⁶ happened, that someone was calling for me, and they said that I wasn’t supposed to be in there.

And then they—with that, they said to get my things, and then I just walked out of the room with them at that time. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. So, I mean, your best estimate. How long do you think you were in the jury room, including the time that you were in the ladies room? [MS. SEABREASE]: I would—my guess would be it was just a couple of minutes.

At the very most it was five minutes, but I was in the ladies room for about two or three minutes. Then it was a total of—again, it was probably maybe five minutes at the very most. [PROSECUTOR]: In that time, during that time you were in there, did you participate in any deliberations? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. [PROSECUTOR]: Go ahead. I couldn’t hear you because of the objection. [MS.

SEABREASE]: No. I did not. [PROSECUTOR]: Did you witness any deliberations taking place? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead and answer the question. [MS. SEABREASE]: No. [PROSECUTOR]: Did you discuss this matter with anyone in the room in any way, shape or fashion?

That is the trial, the case or the evidence? [MS. SEABREASE]: No. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And when you left the room, you were, I believe, numbered alternate number two? [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes, I was. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

When you left the jury room, how many jurors remained in the room? [MS. SEABREASE]: There was [sic] the 12 original jurors in the room. ²⁶⁷ [PROSECUTOR]: So you were the 13th? [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. On cross-examination, Ms. Seabrease reiterated that she was only in the jury room for around five minutes.

The following ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, the case concluded. The jury was dismissed to the jury room. [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You went into the jury room with the 12 jurors? [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes, I did. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The jury room door was closed? [MS.

SEABREASE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you were in the jury room with those 12 jurors with the door closed? [MS. SEABREASE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you have with you your notebook that you had during the trial? [MS. SEABREASE]: I just put it on the table when I walked in. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when you walked in and you put the notebook on the table, then you went into the bathroom? [MS. SEABREASE]: Uh-huh. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And during the time that you were in the bathroom the notebook was on the table? [MS.

SEABREASE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you came out of the bathroom, did you pick the notebook up? [MS. SEABREASE]: No, I did not. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you left the jury room, did you have the notebook with you? ²⁶⁸ [MS. SEABREASE]: No, I did not. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you take the notebook and turn it over to anybody at that point time? [MS. SEABREASE]: No, I did not. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, as far as you know, the notebook was left on the jury table at the time that the deliberations started? [MS.

SEABREASE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, your notebook was in the jury room after the jury room door was closed and after you had left. Is that correct? [MS. SEABREASE]: That’s correct. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, did you say anything at all during the course of your being in the jury room? I don’t want to know what you said.

I just want to know did you say anything at all? [MS. SEABREASE]: Not that I remember. No, I don’t. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You didn’t exchange any words at all with any of the other jurors? [MS. SEABREASE]: No, I didn’t. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Were any of the other jurors talking at the time that you were in there? [MS.

SEABREASE]: I don’t remember anybody talking. We just walked into the room and we were just getting some candy, getting some soda and then people were just going to the bathroom, and I was the first person to just go into the bathroom. And as I came out of the bathroom, like I said, the Bailiff and the Clerk were there looking for me. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But was there any conversation going on? [MS. SEABREASE]: There probably was some conversation going on. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And there was conversation going on during the time that you were in the bathroom? [MS.

SEABREASE]: I don’t know. I was in the bathroom. Sol— ²⁶⁹ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You couldn’t hear anything? [MS. SEABREASE]: I couldn’t hear anything. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when you came out and the court Clerk and the Bailiff were there, was there any conversation going on in the jury room at that time? [MS.

SEABREASE]: There may have been, but I was just—they were asking for me, and there might have been some conversation. But they were calling me. So I just went with them. Bailiff Keith Woodburn was sworn as the jury bailiff in the case.

He testified that, after closing argument, “[a]ll 13 jurors got up and went into the [jury] room and the door was shut.” Then, “several minutes” after the door to the jury room was shut, the court clerk, Peggy Galloway, informed him that an alternate had gone in the jury room with the jury. Accordingly, he went into the room to remove the alternate. Woodburn recalled: “Nobody with the jury was seated. They were all in small groups around the table.

Nobody was seated at the table.” Moreover, he claimed that “there was no deliberations going on.” Woodburn called out for the alternate juror, who was standing in the room. He advised her that she “would have to be removed from the area because she wasn’t supposed to be in there.” Woodburn also retrieved Seabrease’s “pad and pencil.” He had not seen anyone looking at Seabrease’s notes. Woodburn estimated that the entire incident lasted no more than five minutes, although he initially gave a written statement in which he said it could have been five to seven minutes. The State also introduced an excerpt of the trial transcript.

It showed that the jury entered the jury room at 2:58 p.m., and reached its verdict at 5:53 p.m. After the State completed its presentation of evidence, appellant moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, a new trial under Rule 4-331(b). The prosecutor responded that, under Rule 4-331(a), the motion was untimely; appellant was required to have moved for a new trial within ten days of the verdict. Defense counsel countered that, in addition to its ²⁷⁰ motion under subsection (b), the defense moved for a new trial under Rule 4-331(c), “because of the issue of the notebook having been brought up for the first time here today.” By written Order dated November 8, 2005, the trial court denied the defense motions for mistrial or a new trial.

In an Opinion accompanying the Order, the court stated: The Court’s recollection of what transpired at trial and the events leading up to the time the alternate juror was present in the jury deliberation room are basically the same as that which was the subject of testimony at the Hearing on October 5, 2005. In the course of closing arguments at trial, Defense counsel addressed most, if not all, of the sixty-six (66) exhibits introduced by standing before the Jury and addressing each exhibit and arguing to the Jury that each exhibit had no significance to establish the Defendant’s guilt. Thereafter, each exhibit was dropped by defense counsel on the floor before the feet of the Jury. No objection was lodged by the State to this form of argument, and at the conclusion of all closing arguments, it was necessary for the Clerk and Jury Bailiff to retrieve all the exhibits and organize them, so that they could be delivered into the Jury Room for consideration during deliberations.

The Court had not formally excused the Alternate Juror at this time, but had recessed in order to allow the Court personnel and the parties involved in civil cases scheduled to follow deliberations to prepare for their hearings and reconvene. The Defense argues that the fact that the alternate juror entered the Jury Room, laid her notebook of notes on the jury table while she went to the restroom within the Jury Deliberation Room, and it was present there until she was retrieved by the Jury Bailiff, may constitute a possibility that her notes were involved in deliberations. On this basis, the Defense made a Motion for Mistrial, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, orally at the conclusion of the hearing on October 5, 2005. The motion for a Mistrial, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial was opposed by the ²⁷¹ State.

There are considerable issues relative to the lateness of the Motion for Mistrial, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, due to the fact that this Motion was not orally made at the time this issue was raised prior to the verdict having been received by the Court. The Court will assume, without deciding, that the Motion was timely raised as to this issue. The Court has carefully reviewed Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618 [ 843 A.2d 64 ] (2004), and some of the language contained in Stokes deals with issues of jury deliberations. The Court finds that there was no prejudice to the Defendant in any way by what occurred at trial.

The Jury was out for deliberations for nearly three (3) hours, and by all versions of the evidence, the incident that gave rise to this situation lasted no longer than five (5) minutes immediately after the Jury had retired to deliberate. There were more than sixty-six (66) exhibits provided at trial, which were kept in several boxes and required a separate table in the courtroom on which to place them. The Court finds that it was appropriate for the Jury Bailiff and the Clerk to gather and reorganize all of the exhibits and produce them to the Jury in an orderly manner. The Court also finds that the time frame is of no consequence and that deliberations had not as yet begun.

The Court will, therefore, enter the attendant Order denying the Defendant’s oral Motion for Mistrial, or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial in this case. DISCUSSION I. Appellant contends that the presence of the alternate juror in the jury room “at any time” after the jury retired to deliberate gives rise to a “presumption of prejudice” and “vitiates the verdict,” even if defense counsel “failed to object, to the presence of the alternate.” Relying on Hayes v. Maryland, 355 Md. 615, 636 , 735 A.2d 1109 (1999), appellant asserts that jury deliberations are “deemed to have com ²⁷² meneed” when the door to the jury room closes, and therefore the alternate was present during deliberations. Based on Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 630 , 843 A.2d 64 (2004), he further insists that the alternate’s presence was “a fundamental irregularity of constitutional proportions,” and therefore the trial court should have declared a mistrial. In his view, even the brief presence of the alternate juror in the jury room during deliberations is an error that cannot be “cured.” Although appellant concedes that the State is not precluded from attempting to rebut the presumption of prejudice, he posits that the State “failed to establish that the alternate juror’s presence in the jury room was incidental.” In addition, appellant contends that the trial court erred procedurally by taking the testimony of the alternate juror to ascertain whether the jury had begun to deliberate while the alternate was present.

He also claims that the court erred by failing to limit its examination to extrinsic evidence. As soon as the court revealed what happened, asserts appellant, “the State should have called the Jury Bailiff as a witness to testify to ‘objective and extrinsic’ evidence____” In his view, the State’s “failure to raise this issue in a timely manner” amounts to a “waiver” of its right to attempt to rebut the claim of prejudice. Yet, appellant concedes that the alternate juror’s “length of time” in the jury room “is not dispositive” of the issue. He also recognizes that, ordinarily, “[t]he State is not precluded from attempting to rebut the presumption of prejudice,” and acknowledges that “[t]he court could have considered matters such as, the length of time the alternate was in the jury room, did the alternate come out on her own or did someone have to enter to retrieve her, was the door closed or not, did she enter or exit the jury room with an apparent ulterior purpose (such as to just use the restroom or to retrieve her personal property).” Nevertheless, appellant argues: The trial record unequivocally demonstrated that the alternate juror was present during deliberation as the “door had been closed” and the alternate juror was present during said deliberations for upward of 7 minutes until the alter ²⁷³ nate was removed from deliberations.

Further, the trial court erred in questioning the alternate juror as to the happenings inside the deliberation room, instead of examining the extrinsic evidence which demonstrates the alternate juror’s presence during deliberation. The State responds that appellant “failed to preserve his complaint regarding the alternate juror’s brief presence in the jury room,” because “he did not alert the court that the alternate juror had not been excused, did not object or request any remedy when informed about the juror’s brief presence, did not object when the jury’s verdict was enrolled, and did not move for a new trial in a timely manner.” If appellant had “informed the court that the alternate juror had not been discharged,” argues the State, “the juror never would have entered the jury room in the first instance.” 2 The State adds: “Had Ramirez raised an objection at the time he learned about the alternate juror’s presence in the jury room, before the verdict was enrolled, the court unquestionably could have inquired whether deliberations had begun.f ]” In its view, “the claim unquestionably could have been presented to the trial court before the verdict was enrolled,” but “defense counsel elected not to do so____” According to the State, appellant is “mistaken” in his claim that “his failure to object to the alternate’s presence when the court announced what had happened is of no significance in evaluating his demand for reversal.... ” Citing Md. Rule 8-131(a), it insists that any claim of error is subject to a waiver analysis, and underscores that because “Ramirez did not raise any objection whatsoever at trial ... his current complaint therefore should be rejected on preservation grounds.” As to appellant’s failure to move for a mistrial until after the post-trial motion hearing on October 5, 2005, the State asserts: “It is axiomatic that a mistrial, by its very nature, is unavailable once the verdict is final.” Moreover, the State contends: ²⁷⁴ “Ramirez’s claim fares no better when considered as a motion for new trial. ‘A post trial motion cannot be permitted to serve as a device by which a defendant may avoid the sanction for nonpreservation.’ Torres v. State, 95 Md.App. 126, 134 , 619 A.2d 566 (1993).” In addition, the State contends that appellant’s motion for new trial must fail because it was untimely. In this regard, it points out that Rule 4-331(a) permits a court to order a new trial, “in the interest of justice,” on motion of the defendant filed within ten days after a verdict, but appellant’s motion was not brought within this ten-day period. Rather, the jury’s verdict was enrolled on July 15, 2005, and appellant’s motion for new trial was not made until October 5, 2005.

In the State’s view, appellant’s reliance on Rule 4-331(b) is also misplaced, as there was no fraud, mistake, or irregularity justifying exercise of the court’s revisory power. Similarly, the State argues that Rule 4-331(c), pertaining to newly-discovered evidence, is inapplicable. Further, the State asserts: “Ramirez does not request plain error review, and the circumstances of this case would not support this extraordinary remedy.” Even if appellant’s claim is considered on the merits, the State maintains that “it would fail on the record....” In this regard, the State posits that the trial court “correctly found that the alternate juror had left the jury room before jury deliberations began and that there was no prejudice to Ramirez from the alternate’s very brief presence in the room.” II. As we have indicated, appellant challenges the trial court’s authority to conduct a hearing to determine whether the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice; the court’s determination that jury deliberations had not yet begun when the alternate was in the jury room; and the court’s finding that the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice.

He also contends that, when the court informed the parties about the error relating to the alternate, it was incumbent on the State to immediately “attempt! ] to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the Defendant....” In his view, the State’s failure to ²⁷⁵ do so amounted to a waiver by the State of its right to rebut the claim of prejudice. The State argues, inter alia, that appellant waived his contentions, because he did not object when he learned about the problem, nor did he timely move for a mistrial or a new trial. As a preliminary matter, we consider the waiver/preservation claims. Immediately before the jury was to deliver its verdict, the court disclosed that, when the jurors were released to deliberate, the alternate juror briefly entered the jury room with the regular jurors.

As we have observed, at that time, appellant did not voice an objection to the alternate juror’s presence, nor did he move for a mistrial or a new trial. It was not until October 5, 2005, nearly three months after the jury returned its verdict on July 15, 2005, that appellant sought the remedies of a mistrial or a new trial. The question here is whether the waiver doctrine applies to a claim of prejudice based on the presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberations. We have not uncovered any reported opinion in Maryland setting forth what steps the State or the defendant must take, if any, to preserve for appeal a claim arising from the alleged presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberations.

As we consider the waiver issue, we are mindful that in Stokes, supra, 879 Md. at 639, 843 A.2d 64 , the Court admonished: “The rule formulated by the overwhelming majority of the decided cases is that the presence of an alternate, either during the entire period of deliberation preceding the verdict, or his presence at any time during the deliberations of the twelve regular jurors, is a fundamental irregularity of constitutional proportions which requires a mistrial or vitiates the verdict, if rendered. And this is the result notwithstanding the defendant’s counsel consented, or failed to object, to the presence of the alternate.”[ 3 ] ²⁷⁶ (Quoting State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608 , 220 S.E.2d 521, 531 (1975)) (footnote and other citations omitted). However, as the State notes, and as we recently observed in Brockington v. Grimstead, 176 Md.App. 327, 350 , 933 A.2d 426 (2007), “preservation was not at issue [in Stokes ] because Stokes’s counsel indeed objected below.” Moreover, while the Stokes Court quoted the North Carolina case of Bindyke, supra, 220 S.E.2d at 531 , it qualified the broad language of that case when it said, 379 Md. at 639 n. 10, 843 A.2d 64 : Since the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), some jurisdictions have modified this view on the issue, particularly when there was no objection below and the threshold issue on appeal is whether the issue is preserved for appellate review, and then the matter is considered under the plain error doctrine. See id. at 739 , 113 S.Ct. at 1780 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 523 (stating “the issue here is whether the alternates’ presence sufficed to establish remedial authority under Rule 52(b), not whether it violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause”).

The issue of preservation for appellate review or waiver is not an issue in the case sub judice because appellant objected to the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room. Appellant has not directed us to any authority that requires the State to request an immediate hearing in order to preserve its right to attempt to rebut a claim of prejudice. Notably, any error due to the improper presence of an alternate would have occurred when the alternate was physically present in the jury room; appellant could not have suffered further prejudice no matter when the evidentiary hearing was held. Moreover, the State’s conduct must be viewed in light of appellant’s failure to have complained of the occurrence at the time he learned of it.

Therefore, we conclude that the ²⁷⁷ State did not waive its right to attempt to rebut the claim of prejudice, nor did trial court err in conducting the hearing several weeks after the trial. With respect to a claim of waiver based on appellant’s failure to object immediately upon learning of the alternate’s presence, we are mindful that the alleged error was not one that lent itself to a cure, even if appellant had objected; a prompt objection may well have been futile. To put it colloquially, the horse was already out of the barn; the bell could not be unrung. Even if a curative instruction could cure such an error at the outset of deliberations, here the jury had already reached its verdict by the time the court disclosed what had occurred.

The case of Williams v. State, 131 Md.App. 1 , 748 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 359 Md. 335 , 753 A.2d 1032 (2000), is probative. In that case, we considered the defendant’s failure to object to an arguably uncurable error, and rejected as “legally flawed” the appellant’s claim that “there was no point in objecting to an incurable error____” Id. at 40, 748 A.2d 1 . The Court found “completely untenable” the appellant’s claim that he was relieved from the preservation requirement because an objection “could have accomplished nothing....” Id. at 43 , 748 A.2d 1 . Speaking for this Court, Judge Moylan