Randall v. Peaco

BARBERA, J. Louis E. Randall, Jr., appellant, is an adult suffering from schizophrenia. He lives with his mother, Winona Randall. In May 2001, Ms. Randall called the Prince George’s County Police Department and asked that police to come to her house and assist in transporting appellant to the hospital. The police responded to the house and tried to convince appellant to come outside.

After a five-hour barricade, members of the Emergency Services Team entered the house and found appellant in bed with a butcher knife in his hand. We shall detail later what led one of the officers, Corporal Peaco, moments thereafter to shoot appellant multiple times, severely injuring him. In May 2004, appellant brought suit against Corporal Peaco and Prince George’s County, Maryland, appellees. The complaint, as amended, alleged negligence, gross negligence, and ³²² battery by Corporal Peaco, and violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by Corporal Peaco, and, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, Prince George’s Comity.

Appellant requested $15,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages, plus interest and costs. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were no disputes of material fact and that Corporal Peaco was immune from suit because he acted without malice during the performance of a discretionary, official duty. 1 The court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees on all counts of the amended complaint. On appellant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, the court held a hearing and, following it, issued a memorandum opinion and order denying the motion and clarifying its analysis in support of the grant of summary judgment. Appellant argues that the court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the counts alleging battery and the state constitutional violations.

He concentrates his argument on the contention that the court wrongly determined that no reasonable finder of fact could have found that Corporal Peaco acted unreasonably when he shot appellant. We disagree and affirm the summary judgment. FACTS The facts are, in appellant’s words, “not substantially in dispute.” 2 In 1986, appellant was diagnosed with schizophre ³²³ nia, for which a doctor prescribed medication to control hallucinations. Appellant took the medication as prescribed for years, but stopped taking it in late 2000, because it caused him to gain weight.

On May 10, 2001, at approximately 8:15 p.m., appellant was in the kitchen of his home, using a paring knife to cut up strawberries. He started hearing voices that were “mumbling words” and began to feel “a little agitated” and “a little uneasy.” Ms. Randall observed appellant behaving erratically. At approximately 9:00 p.m., she telephoned the Prince George’s County Police Department and asked the police for assistance in transporting appellant to the hospital for medical attention. When officers arrived at appellant’s home, Ms. Randall informed them that appellant was schizophrenic, appeared to be off his medication, and had displayed “unusual behavior” that evening while cutting strawberries with a knife.

She also informed the police that there were no guns in the house and appellant had not threatened or harmed anyone. Sometime that evening, Ms. Randall contacted appellant’s younger brother, Shawn Randall. He arrived at the house after the police did. Shawn yelled inside the house in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade appellant to come outside.

At approximately 10:45 p.m., the police declared a barricade, and the Prince George’s County Police Emergency Services Team (“EST”) was dispatched to the home. Among the team were Corporal Jose Rodriguez and Corporal William Peaco. Corporal Rodriguez and Corporal Peaco testified by way of deposition about the events of that night. According to their depositions, police negotiators were unable to convince appellant to come outside, and, at 3:00 a.m., the EST personnel entered the house.

Corporal Rodriguez and Corporal Peaco ³²⁴ located appellant in his bedroom behind a closed door. They positioned themselves behind body shields and opened the bedroom door. Corporal Rodriguez, who was the operation’s “point officer,” crouched at the doorway. Corporal Peaco, who was the primary “cover officer” and assigned to protect Corporal Rodriguez, stood behind him.

Corporal Peaco was armed with a department-issued nine millimeter submachine gun. Throughout the events that immediately followed, both officers remained in the doorway to the room. Appellant sat up in his bed, and Corporal Rodriguez observed a butcher’s knife in appellant’s right hand. Appellant got out of bed, “moved directly to the wall and then started down the wall” towards the officers.

Corporal Rodriguez commanded appellant, at least once, to drop the knife. Appellant did not comply. Corporal Rodriguez called for an ARWEN, which is a weapon that shoots a rubber baton. The ARWEN evidently was in the possession of other EST personnel, elsewhere in the house.

Meanwhile, appellant continued to move towards the officers, with the butcher knife in his hand. Corporal Peaco, believing that appellant posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury, fired five shots from the submachine gun into appellant’s torso, within a two-second time span. Corporal Peaco testified in his deposition that appellant was “well inside 15 feet” when he discharged his weapon, and he stated in a police report that appellant was “4-5 feet” away from him when he fired. According to the officers, appellant retained hold of the knife after being shot.

Once appellant fell to the ground, Corporal Rodriguez used his shield to move the knife away from appellant. The shooting occurred before the ARWEN was delivered to the bedroom. Appellant testified in his deposition that, on the night of the shooting, he went into his bedroom with a 13-inch butcher knife and got into bed with the knife. He does not remember seeing police officers at the doorway of his bedroom or hearing the officers give him commands.

Appellant stated that he got out of bed and crawled towards the doorway with the knife ³²⁵ in his hand. He rose to his knees at the doorway to put down the knife. Appellant stated that there was a person with a shield six inches away from him at the time. Before he could put down the knife, he was shot.

He then dropped the knife and was shot seven more times. He does not remember receiving medical treatment that night. THE LAWSUIT Appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, which, after amendment, contained four counts. Count I alleged that Corporal Peaco was negligent by, among other things, using lethal force, rather than a nonlethal alternative, to subdue appellant, and failing to consult with mental healthcare providers.

Count II alleged that Corporal Peaco’s decision to use lethal force was a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent police officer, and was beyond the scope of his official authority as a police officer. Count III alleged that Corporal Peaco committed a battery upon appellant, by intentionally and unlawfully shooting him. Count IV alleged that Corporal Peaco violated Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by employing “objectively unreasonable, unnecessary and excessive force,” and Prince George’s County (hereafter, the “County”) has respondeat superior liability for the acts of Corporal Peaco. Appellant sought $5,000,000.00 in compensatory damages, $10,000,000.00 in punitive damages, interest, and costs.

Appellees answered the amended complaint, asserting immunity, among other defenses. Appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were no disputes of material fact and that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellees supported the motion with the depositions of appellant, Ms. Randall, Shawn Randall, the affidavits of Corporal Rodriguez and Corporal Peaco, and a copy of a photograph depicting the 13-inch butcher knife that appellant was holding when he was shot. The depositions of Corporal Rodriguez and Corporal Peaco, which had been attached to appellees’ answer, were also before the court. ³²⁶ During the hearing on the summary judgment motion, counsel for appellant stated: We don’t allege malice because we don’t think that Corporal Peaco went into that residence to kill Mr. Randall.

We don’t say that he was some sort of monster that went in there for the perversion of killing him. We’ve alleged that Corporal Peaco was at the least negligent in what he did, and at the worst, he was grossly negligent because he shot a man that didn’t have a firearm, who was attempting to put down a knife, five times and not from the front, but from the side. Following the hearing, the court issued a memorandum and order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. The court reasoned that, because Corporal Peaco did not act with malice, as appellant conceded, Corporal Peaco was immune from suit on both the constitutional and common law tort claims (Counts I through IV).

The court noted that the County, as a local government entity, had respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from constitutional violations committed by its agents. The court ruled that because Corporal Peaco was immune from suit and therefore entitled to summary judgment, the County also was entitled to summary judgment on the single claim in which it was named (Count IV). Appellant filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment. In the motion, appellant argued, inter alia, that the question of whether a police officer acted with malice is for the fact-finder and cannot properly be disposed of on summary judgment.

He further argued that a public official who violates a person’s constitutional rights is entitled to no immunity and that immunity is not a defense to intentional torts. Appellees filed a response to the motion, arguing, inter alia, that there was no evidence affirmatively showing ill will, improper motivation, or evil purpose on the part of Corporal Peaco. They contended that, under the circumstances, Corporal Peaco acted reasonably. Further, they pointed out that counsel for appellant stated at the hearing on appellees’ ³²⁷ motion for summary judgment that appellant did not allege malice.

Following a hearing, the court issued a memorandum and order denying the motion. The court wrote: “The facts in this case present no possibility that an inference of actual malice on the part of [Corporal Peaco] could be drawn.” Consequently, the court ruled, Corporal Peaco was immune from suit for negligence and gross negligence (Counts I and II), and summary judgment was properly granted on those counts. With regard to Count III, battery, the court, quoting Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 457 , 688 A.2d 448 (1997), wrote: “Even though qualified immunity is not applicable to intentional acts, it is important to bear in mind that a public official, such as a policeman or fireman, in performing his or her discretionary duties within the cope of employment, in the absence of actual malice and without knowledge of the wrongdoing generally will not have committed actionable conduct.[ 3 ]” To assess the lawfulness of Corporal Peaco’s decision to shoot appellant, the court applied the reasonableness standard that the Supreme Court announced in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), about which we shall say more later in this opinion. The court reviewed the evidence presented in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and concluded that “no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that [Corporal Peace] acted unreasonably in shooting [appellant].” Accordingly, the court found that summary judgment was properly granted on the battery count.

With regard to the state constitutional claims, the court noted that “ ‘[i]n Maryland, qualified immunity does not apply to constitutional claims[,]’ ” (quoting Williams v. Prince George’s County, 112 Md.App. 526, 546 , 685 A.2d 884 (1996)).3 4 ³²⁸ Applying the reasonableness standard set forth in Graham, supra, the court concluded that, for the same reasons that summary judgment in favor of Corporal Peaco was appropriate on the battery count, it was also appropriate on the count charging violation of Articles 24 and 26. The court further noted that the County “ ‘cannot be liable on a theory of respondeat superior if the actions of the officer did not violate the constitution, and the [Plaintiff] has not alleged independent, separate grounds against the County[,]’ ” (quoting Williams, 112 Md.App. at 549 , 685 A.2d 884 ). Consequently, the court ruled, the County was entitled to summary judgment, as well. Appellant noted this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION Appellant challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees on the counts charging a violation of Article 24 and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and battery. Appellant dedicates his argument to a discussion of whether the record permitted the court to conclude, as a matter of law, that Corporal Peaco’s act of using potentially lethal force against appellant was objectively reasonable. He frames the issue as follows: “The question for resolution before this court is whether, as a matter of law, the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts of this case, which are not substantially in dispute, allow for presentation of the case to a jury as finder of fact.” Appellant further narrows the contention on appeal to whether a finder of fact should be permitted to consider the events leading up to the shooting, in particular, the officers’ decision to go to appellant’s bedroom without the non-lethal weapon — the ARWEN — and to infer from that fact that Corporal Peaco acted unreasonably when he resorted to lethal force to subdue appellant. Appellant elaborates on the contention as follows: The simple question in this case is whether the finder of fact focuses only on the brief moment in time in [] Louis ³²⁹ Randall’s bedroom, probably less than a minute, when [] Louis Randall allegedly posed a threat [to] the police officer defendant with a knife.

Or does the finder of fact consider the circumstances that led Officer Peaco to enter the room when an officer armed with non-lethal force for the express purpose of dealing with Mr. Randall non-lethally was left behind. Notably, appellant does not contend, and thereby implicitly concedes, that the conduct of Officer Peaco was reasonable if assessed solely by reference to the circumstances that confronted him when he made the decision to shoot appellant. As we read appellant’s assertions, he presents the purely legal question of whether he should be entitled to have a fact finder assess the reasonableness of Officer Peaco’s decision to use lethal force by resort to antecedent events. He points out that he presented evidence of such events from which a fact finder could infer that Corporal Peaco acted unreasonably in shooting him.

Appellant’s contention fails in its premise. The law in Maryland, and in a number of federal courts and our sister states, is that events that are antecedent to the conduct of the officer at issue do not bear on the objective reasonableness of that conduct. Before considering the merits of appellant’s claim that the court wrongly granted summary judgment, we briefly review the law on that subject. “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate ‘on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 896 Md. 469 , 478, 914 A.2d 735 (2007) (quoting Md. Rule 2-501). “The question of whether a trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal.” Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203 , 892 A.2d 520 (2006). “ ‘An appellate court reviewing a summary judgment examines the same information from the record and determines the same issues of law as the trial court.’ ” Haas, 396 Md. at 478 - ³³⁰ 79, 914 A.2d 735 (quoting United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Riley, 393 Md. 55, 67 , 899 A.2d 819 (2006)).

The Court must “review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.” Myers, 391 Md. at 203 , 892 A.2d 520 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, “we review