Randolph v. Randolph

BLOOM, Judge. A. Raymond Randolph Jr. appeals from a post-divorce judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which, inter alia, granted his former wife, Mary Theresa A. Randolph, a monetary award of $25,000 and attorney’s fees in the amount of $30,000. We will vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. Facts The parties were married on June 20, 1966.

They separated on July 20, 1982, at which time Mr. Randolph moved from the marital abode in Chevy Chase, Maryland, to McLean, Virginia. In December of that year, Mrs. Randolph filed a complaint for divorce a vinculo matrimonii in Montgomery County. In addition to a divorce, Mrs. Randolph sought custody of the parties’ minor children, alimony, support, counsel fees, and a use and possession order for the family home and family use personal property. Her complaint also asked the court to determine the ownership of real property, identify and value the parties’ marital property, and make a monetary award.

Mr. Randolph filed a counter-complaint. ⁵⁸⁰ On October 7, 1983, while this action was pending, appellant obtained a no-fault divorce in Virginia, where he was then domiciled. The Virginia judgment terminated the marriage but did not resolve any of the other issues between the parties. The trial on those remaining issues, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, concluded on April 30, 1985, at which time the court announced its tentative decision. Both parties then submitted post-trial memoranda at the court’s request.

The court orally announced its final conclusions on May 31,1985, and on July 12, 1985, entered a final judgment from which both parties appealed. Mrs. Randolph subsequently withdrew her appeal. The judgment resolved several matters in dispute, but in this appeal Mr. Randolph asserts error only with respect to two of them: the granting of the monetary award and the award of attorney’s fees. Issues Specifically, appellant raises four issues: 1.

Whether the Court properly issued a monetary award under Section 8-205 of the Family Law Article without identifying marital property, as Section 8-203(a) required, and without valuing marital property, as Section 8-204 required. 2. Whether the Court could properly enter a monetary award under Section 8-205 when the party seeking the award failed to introduce evidence regarding the value of marital property and when the evidence presented in opposition showed that upon the distribution of marital property according to title, the party seeking the award would receive more than twice as much as the party against whom the award was sought. 3. Whether the Court should have refused to render a monetary award in light of the failure of the party seeking the award to request a 90-day reservation under Section 8-203(a) of the Family Law Article. ⁵⁸¹ 4. Whether the Court could properly enter an award of $30,000 for attorneys’ fees in favor of Mrs. Randolph when the Court did not properly evaluate financial considerations, when Mrs. Randolph herself took the position that the fees of her three former attorneys were not reasonable and necessary, and when not all of the fees of her present counsel, which totalled less than $30,000, were reasonable and necessary in connection with proceedings that were substantially justified.

Motions Before addressing any of the above issues, we must dispose of several motions filed by the parties in this court. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, coupled with a petition for attorneys’ fees. Appellant responded by filing a motion to strike and, subsequently, an answer. We will deny the petition and the motions.

Appellee raises two arguments in support of her petition for attorneys’ fees. First, she avers that Md. Fam.Law Code Ann. §§ 11-110 and 12-103 (1984) contemplate an award of attorney’s fees where, as here, an appeal is taken from a decision resolving alimony and child custody issues. Although we agree with that contention, we believe it is not appropriate for this court to make the initial determinations as to whether such an award is warranted and, if so, in what amount. The original factfinder, the circuit court, is in a much better position than this court to evaluate the propriety of an award based on those statutes because there are various factors to be considered, including the financial status, resources, and needs of each of the parties, §§ ll-110(c)(l) and 12-103(b), with which the trial court is familiar.

Any application for an award of additional attorney’s fees based on those sections, therefore, should be made in the circuit court; accordingly, we will not address the petition for attorneys’ fees under §§ 11-110 and 12-103. ⁵⁸² Second, appellee claims that the appeal is frivolous and that she is therefore entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341. We reject this argument because we do not find the appeal to be frivolous. In fact, we have found sufficient merit in appellant’s arguments to vacate the judgment. We therefore deny appellee’s petition for attorneys’ fees made pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341.

Appellee raises two arguments in support of her motion to dismiss the appeal. First, she claims that appellant’s record extract failed to comply with the requirements of Maryland Rule 1028. The record indicates, however, that appellant substantially complied with the requirements of the rule. We certainly find no dismissable noncompliance with Rule 1028.

Second, appellee claims that appellant has attempted to mislead the court. In support of this argument, she makes numerous allegations which are supported neither by reason nor the record. Appellee’s assertions are totally lacking in merit, and we decline to respond to them in detail. Instead, we will simply deny her motion to dismiss and direct her attention to appellant’s answer, which succinctly responds to each allegation.

The Monetary Award After Mr. Randolph obtained a judgment of divorce a vinculo matrimonii in Virginia, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, pursuant to Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. § 8-212, undertook to grant a monetary award in accordance with the provisions of Title 8 of Subtitle 2 of the Family Law Article, entitled Property Disposition in Annulment and Divorce. Appellant’s first attack upon the monetary award is that the court was without jurisdiction to grant one because it had not expressly reserved the power to do so within ninety days of the Virginia divorce decree. To support his argument, appellant relies on § 8-203(a) which states: ⁵⁸³ (a) Time of court action.—In a proceeding for an annulment or an absolute divorce, if there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the court shall determine which property is marital property: (1) when the court grants an annulment or an absolute divorce; (2) within 90 days after the court grants an annulment or divorce, if the court expressly reserves in the annulment or divorce decree the power to make the determination; or (3) after the 90-day period if: (i) the court expressly reserves in the annulment or divorce decree the power to make the determination; (ii) during the 90-day period, the court extends the time for making the determination; and (iii) the parties consent to the extension. It is pellucid that § 8-203 places certain restrictions on the ability of the court to make dispositions regarding marital property in a Maryland divorce action.

The question presented by appellant is whether the time restrictions of § 8-203(a) apply to a proceeding under § 8-212, after a foreign divorce decree is obtained by one of the parties. We hold that they do not. Initially we note that § 8-203(a) does not expressly apply to situations involving foreign divorces. It applies to proceedings in this state for an annulment or an absolute divorce.

Once a foreign decree of divorce has been rendered, any further proceedings in the Maryland courts to determine the parties’ property and custody rights are not proceedings for annulment or divorce; consequently, § 8-203(a) is not applicable to them. Furthermore, § 8-203(a) requires the court to make its determinations respecting marital property either when the court grants an annulment or an absolute divorce or within ninety days after the court grants an annulment or divorce, if it expressly reserved the right to do so in the annulment ⁵⁸⁴ or divorce decree. Obviously, neither condition is possible if a foreign state has dissolved or terminated the marriage. We hold, therefore, that § 8-203(a) has no applicability to a proceeding for relief under § 8-212 after one of the parties has obtained a divorce in a foreign state.

Having determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to render a monetary award, we now turn to the question of whether the award was appropriate in this instance. Appellant alleges that the court erred in granting a monetary award without first identifying and valuing the marital property. Appellee, on the other hand, asserts that the court sufficiently identified and valued the marital property and that a monetary award was therefore appropriate. We agree with appellant.

The statutory language is perfectly clear on this point. Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. § 8-203 specifically provides that if there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the court shall determine which property is marital property; § 8-204 unequivocably requires the court to determine the value of all marital property. Those determinations are prerequisites to the granting of a monetary award. Section 8-205, conferring authority to make a monetary award and setting forth the criteria for doing so, states, in pertinent part: (a) Grant of award.—After the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property, the court may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded.

The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award after considering each of the following factors: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; ⁵⁸⁵ (4) the circumstances that