Randolph v. State

CHARLES E. MOYLAN, Jr., J., Retired, Specially Assigned. Across the scorched earth of Maryland Rule of Procedure 4-215, the appellant, Joe Henry Randolph, and no less than three judges of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County waged a four-month war of attrition between November 10, 2008 and February 18, 2009. On February 19, 2009, a jury, presided over by Judge Ronald B. Rubin, found the appellant guilty of first-degree escape. He was sentenced to a term of eight years imprisonment.

The appellant would now like to refight the war of 4-215. On this appeal, he contends 1. that the trial court erroneously permitted him to discharge counsel without punctilious compliance with Rule 4-215; 2. that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when the court erroneously failed to insure that two of his subpoenas for documents were honored; 3. that the court erroneously instructed the jury on the law of escape; and 4. that the court erroneously denied his request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. An Amalgam of Subsections 4-215(e) and 4-215(d) The appellant’s flagship contention is that because of a breach in the Maginot Line of Rule 4-215 he was forced to go to trial on February 18, 2009, without the benefit of counsel. As is common with long-range struggles, the nature of the conflict seemed to evolve, over time, from one initially concerning the discharge of counsel pursuant to subsection 4- ¹²⁷ 215(e) into one involving waiver by inaction pursuant to subsection 4-215(d).

We will try to deal with the totality of the metamorphosis. Judge Weinstein on November 10, 2008 It was on October 3, 2008, that Administrative Judge Ann S. Harrington set the appellant’s first scheduled trial date for November 10, 2008, before Judge Paul Weinstein. Until that point, the appellant had been represented by the Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office. At the very outset of the proceedings on November 10, however, the appellant stated that he had fired his assistant public defender, Adam Harris.

Judge Weinstein immediately pointed out that the unilateral decision of the appellant in that regard was not the official decision of the court. THE COURT: I’m not going to let him, you can take it up with the trial judge, but I’m not going to let him go, I’m not going to let you fire him. MR. RANDOLPH: I already fired him, I mean, a while ago in my case.

THE COURT: You may have fired him, but the Court didn’t fire him. December 3rd for trial. (Emphasis supplied). At the suggestion of the prosecutor, Judge Weinstein then conducted what the parties referred to as a waiver hearing.

The subject of a waiver of the right to counsel by the act of discharging counsel is covered by Rule 4-215(e), which provides: (e) Discharge of counsel — Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritoñous reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial ¹²⁸ ■with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.

If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(l)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance. (Emphasis supplied). It is a curiously drawn subsection that uses a lot of words to make what purports to be an important distinction without any truly significant difference. The common denominator threshold is that if the defendant requests the judge’s permission to discharge counsel, he must “explain the reasons for the request.” The heart of the subsection then contrasts 1) the finding of “a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request” with 2) the finding of “no meritorious reason.” With one minor difference, the judge, in either event, has to do almost precisely the same thing.

The meritorious reason and the non-meritorious reason produce essentially the same result: MERITORIOUS REASON NO MERITORIOUS REASON 1. Advise defendant of risk of 1. Advise defendant of risk of going to trial unrepresented going to trial unrepresented 2. Grant a continuance, if necessary Presumably in the non-meritorious scenario, the defendant could theoretically be forced to go to trial immediately.

In either situation, however, there must be compliance with subsection (a)(l)-(4) of the Rule. In this case, it seems clear that Judge Weinstein did not find any meritorious reason for the appellant’s request. Because the trial was not going forward on that day in any event, that finding made absolutely no difference. The warning about the possibility of having to go to trial without a lawyer had to be given in either event.

Compliance with subsection (a)(l)-(4) had to be effected in either event. Subsection (e) does seem to be unnecessarily bloated. ¹²⁹ Although the meritorious versus non-meritorious character of the appellant’s request appears to be inconsequential, it was apparent that there was bad blood between the appellant and the assigned assistant public defender dating back to an earlier case where the appellant had fired him as his lawyer. There were also claims that the lawyer had not done all of the things the appellant asked him to do in the present case. THE COURT: I’m not going to let your fire your lawyer.

MR. RANDOLPH: Excuse me. The reason I said that, I had him for other cases where I had fired him and, we had never got along on terms on other cases, and in this case, too, I told him I didn’t have (unintelligible) for my case. He came to me and we talked and I said, listen, you not, all this stuff I asked him to do for me, he never done it.

And the stuff I asked him to do this time, he still hasn’t done it for me. THE COURT: Who is going to represent you? MR. RANDOLPH: He’s not going to represent me because he’s not in my best interest.

I mean, he’s a good and competent lawyer, but he hasn’t done the things that I asked him, and the things that I asked him to get for this Court so I could present mitigating factors. THE COURT: What did you ask him to do? MR. RANDOLPH: I asked him to get some stuff from PRC.

I asked him subpoena my records from PRC, actually my medical records so I said if I’m going with disposition, I need to present my evidence to the judge also and my facts. He hasn’t done none of that. He says that he did it but nobody got back to him but Pm pretty sure, these people told, me that they haven’t even talked to him. (Emphasis supplied).

The assistant public defender, interjecting, insisted that he had complied with the appellant’s requests and had communicated with the appellant. [THE COURT]: But I’m telling you, you have a trial date and you’re not getting a continuance. ¹³⁰ A I mean, I don’t even know, why can’t I get a continuance, I mean, I don’t even have no paperwork, no nothing. How can I even go, this is my first time I’ve ever seen an indictment and I can’t even get a continuance. Q Well, you knew what you were charged with, you just told me. A I knew what I was charged with, but I kept asking for my discovery, my paperwork and trying to get subpoenas and he hasn’t done any of that.

Q Well, he just told me he gave it to you. A He didn’t. THE WITNESS: When did you give me discovery, what date? MR.

HARRIS: I mailed the discovery and I subpoenaed the people that you wanted to. THE WITNESS: You mailed it, now he mailed it to me, first he handed it to me, now he mailed it. He doesn’t even know what he did. I mean, this, I’m the one who’s going to have to do this time.

This is my, you know what I’m saying, I’m the defendant. (Emphasis supplied). Compliance With Subsection (e) Generally Before we get to compliance with subsection (a)(l)-(4), subsection (e) generally expressly required the following in the appellant’s case. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.

Judge Weinstein fully satisfied that requirement. BY THE COURT: Q All right. I’m telling you now that if you fire him, you’re going to represent yourself. ¹³¹ A Okay. So I can represent myself at the disposition hearing also?

Q Disposition hearing, that’s right now. A Can I, I can represent myself, at this hearing too, also? Q Well, you can tell me anything you want to. I’m not going to make a decision to let you fire him yet.

A Okay. Q I want you to listen to what I’m telling you. A Uh-huh. Q Do you understand that you have a right to a lawyer?

A Yes, I do. Q You have a lawyer that was appointed by the Public Defender. If you fire him, they’re not going to give you another lawyer. A I know that.

Q You do have a right, if you have money, to hire a lawyer. A I have money, but they won’t release my money from the police station. I have money, I have money, but I’ve been trying to get it. Q I don’t have any, I’m just telling you what your rights are.

A Okay. Q And I want to point out that it’s dangerous for you to represent yourself because as a lawyer, he knows a lot more how to protect your interest and how to defend you than you do. Okay. A He may know that, but he’s not in my best interest.

Q All right. I’m just— A Okay. Q Listen to me. A All right. ¹³² Q You’re ultimately going to make the decision as to what you want to do.

A Right. Q But I’m tell[ing] you, you have a trial date and you’re not getting a continuance. (Emphasis supplied). As of that hearing of November 10, if not before, the appellant was apprised of the fact that he had a scheduled trial date of December 3, 2008.

BY THE COURT: All right. You have indicated that you want to fire Mr. Harris, is that right? A Yes. Q Do you understand you have a trial date on December 3rd?

A No, I did not, I never had, I never had no paperwork. I don’t know nothing, I’ve never seen an indictment, I don’t know if I can, you waived my indictment, right, waived my preliminary hearing? MR. HARRIS: No. THE WITNESS: I mean, I didn’t see no paperwork or nothing, I don’t know nothing.

I don’t know nothing about my trial date, anything. It’s the first I’m hearing about the trial date on December 3rd. MR. HARRIS: I sent Mr. Randolph a letter on October 6th.

THE WITNESS: Never got it. MR. HARRIS: To the detention center indicating that his trial date was December 3rd. (Emphasis supplied).

At the end of the hearing on November 10, Judge Weinstein did not find that there was “a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request” to fire his attorney. Indeed, Judge Weinstein had throughout the hearing consistently manifested his displeasure with the appellant’s request and his extreme reluctance to grant it. In the face of the appellant’s adamant insistence that he would not be represented by Mr. Harris but ¹³³ would represent himself, however, Judge Weinstein had no realistic choice but to acquiesce in the inevitable. 1 ¹³⁴ THE COURT: Mr. Harris’ appearance is stricken at the request of the defendant. Trial date December 3rd.

Mr. ¹³⁵ Harris is ordered by the Court to give a copy of his file to Mr. Randolph. MR. HARRIS: I’ll provide it today, Your Honor. Compliance With Subsection (a)(l)-(4) Subsection (e), dealing with the discharge of counsel, concludes with the direction: If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(l)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance.

Turning to subsection (a), requirement (a)(4) is not pertinent to the situation before us and requires no discussion. The other three requirements are applicable. Subsection (a)(l)-(3) provides, in pertinent part: [T]he court shall: (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel. (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importance of assistance of counsel.

(3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any. A. Subsection (a)(1): The satisfaction of subsection (a)(1) is very different from the satisfaction of (a)(2) or (a)(3). This Court discussed the difference in Broadwater v. State, 171 Md.App. 297, 304 , 909 A.2d 1112 (2006), ajfd, 401 Md. 175 , 931 A.2d 1098 (2007). With respect to the three absolute requirements, the first is, essentially, the court’s confirmation that someone delivered to the defendant “a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel.” The second and third requirements, concerning, respectively, 1) “the right to counsel” and “the importance of assistance of counsel” and 2) “the nature of the charges” and the “allow ¹³⁶ able penalties,” are actual advisements that must be made by the judge personally to the defendant on the face of the record.

Some appreciation of the different natures of these three (or four or five) requirements will make an application of a sometimes overly generalized caselaw more sensitively possible. (Emphasis supplied). What is required to satisfy (a)(2) or (a)(3) is not required for the satisfaction of (a)(1). Our Broadwater opinion went on, 171 Md.App. at 325 , 909 A.2d 1112 : It would not, however, apply to requirement # 1, by which the court only seeks information about an event (the delivery of a copy of the charging document).

The recipient of information pursuant to requirement # 1 is the judge, not the defendant. The requirement is that “the court shall make certain” that the event (the delivery of the charging document) had at some earlier time actually taken place. This is not part of a message being aimed at the defendant. (Emphasis supplied).

We also noted the distinction between (a)(1), on the one hand, and (a)(2) and (a)(3), on the other hand, in Muhammad v. State, 177 Md.App. 188, 248 , 934 A.2d 1059 (2007), cert. denied, 403 Md. 614 , 943 A.2d 1245 (2008). As we focus in on subsection (a)(1), it is important not to treat all of the provisions of Rule 4-215 the same but to recognize the fundamental difference, in terms of essential character, between subsection (a)(1), which concerns the happening of an event, and most of the other provisions of Rule 4-215, which involve the actual and direct imparting of specific information by the judge to the defendant. (Emphasis supplied). At the hearing on November 10, the discussion among Judge Weinstein, the appellant, and Assistant Public Defender Harris covered a wide range of papers, documents, subpoenas, and discovery.

In the course of the discussion, the appellant denied everything that Mr. Harris informed the court that he had done. ¹³⁷ THE COURT: Have you obtained, has he received a copy of his indictment? MR. HARRIS: I don’t know, I’d have to go through the file. I met with Mr. Randolph before this, I’ve provided him with discovery and I’ve issued subpoenas to the parties that he’s asked me to issue subpoenas to.

THE WITNESS: I never received any, he never gave me no discovery. I haven’t had any of the indictment papers, and he hasn’t issue any subpoenas at all, he hasn’t done anything on my case. (Emphasis supplied). At the end of the discussion, the appellant was assured that he would receive copies of everything Mr. Harris claimed he had earlier provided: BY THE COURT: Q You have about a month.

A So I got about a month. MR. HARRIS: That’s what he’s saying. BY THE COURT: Q And I’m going to order Mr. Harris to give you another set of the discover[y].

A He never gave me the first set. MR. HARRIS: I’ll be happy to send a copy. BY THE COURT: Q You just told me you didn’t get it, but you’re going to get it this time.

A Okay. Q Because it’s going to be hand carried to you. (Emphasis supplied). As the hearing of November 10 came to an end, Judge Weinstein’s final directive was: THE COURT: Trial date December 3rd.

Mr. Harris is ordered by the Court to give a copy of his file to [the appellant]. ¹³⁸ MR. HARRIS: I’ll provide it today, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied). Although this colloquy, to be sure, did not use the magic word “indictment” or “charging document,” the record itself establishes that the appellant was actually given a copy of his indictment.

On the scheduled trial date of December 3, 2008, he appeared before Judge Harrington and made the following acknowledgment: THE COURT: Are you Mr. Joe Henry Randolph? MR. RANDOLPH: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Randolph, today is the trial date in your case and you are charged by ... indictment in one count with escape in the first degree on or about June 11, 2008. Have you received a copy of the indictment? MR. RANDOLPH: Yes, I did. [ 2 ] (Emphasis supplied).

That acknowledgment of December 3 established that subsection (a)(1) had been satisfied. With respect to the nature of the proof required to show compliance with (a)(1), we observed in Muhammad v. State, 177 Md.App. at 249-50 , 934 A.2d 1059 : Subsection (a)(1), unlike the other provisions, involves only the objectively measured question of whether “the defendant received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel.” As Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 609 , 536 A.2d 1149 (1988), makes clear, the satisfaction of subsection (a)(1) ¹³⁹ does not require a judge to make inquiry of, or say anything to, a defendant in a courtroom. If evidence objectively establishes that the defendant actually received a copy of the charging document, moreover, the fact that the judge failed to “make certain” of that fact is immaterial. The very occurrence of receiving the document speaks for itself and ipso facto satisfies the subsection.

The holding in this regard of Fowlkes v. State was unequivocal. As to subsections (l)(l)-(3), the record contains a copy of the charging document in the defendant’s case. This document* which bears the defendant’s signature, contains a notice of the right to counsel; therefore, this document demonstrates compliance with subsection (a)(1). 311 Md. at 609 [ 536 A.2d 1149 ] (emphasis supplied). ... We cite Fowlkes for the threshold proposition that if extrinsic evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant indeed received a copy of the charging document, adequate compliance with subsection (a)(1) has been shown.

Whether the judge himself did or did not do something or other in the courtroom is a redundant technicality. (Emphasis supplied). B. Subsection (a)(2): Subsection (a)(2) requires that the judge personally advise the defendant of 1) the right to counsel and 2) the importance of the assistance of counsel. Judge Weinstein personally advised the appellant in both regards.

At one point early in the hearing, the exchange was: THE COURT: I want you to listen to what I’m telling you. A Uh-huh. Q Do you understand that you have a right to a lawyer? ¹⁴⁰ A Yes, I do. (Emphasis supplied).

A few questions and answers later in that same exchange, Judge Weinstein further advised the appellant: I want to point out that it’s dangerous for you to represent yourself because as a lawyer, he knows a lot more [about] how to protect your interest and how to defend you than you do. Okay? (Emphasis supplied). Subsection (a)(2) was satisfied.

C. Subsection (a)(3): Subsection (a)(3) required Judge Weinstein to advise the appellant with respect to 1) the nature of the charge and 2) the allowable penalties. As to the nature of the charge, the following exchange took place. THE COURT: Do you know what you’re charged with? A. I’m charged with first-degree felony escape.

Q. Right. (Emphasis supplied). A short time later when the appellant complained that that day, November 10, was “my first time I’ve ever seen an indictment,” the appellant acknowledged knowing what he had been charged with. Q Well, you knew what you were charged with, you just told me.

A I knew what I was charged with, but I kept asking for my discovery, my paperwork and trying to get subpoenas and he hasn’t done any of that. Q Well, he just told me he gave it to you. A He didn’t. (Emphasis supplied).

A little further along in the hearing, Mr. Harris briefly summarized the nature of the case and the nature of the defense for the appellant’s benefit. ¹⁴¹ THE COURT: Tell him what you told me. MR. HARRIS: What I represented to the Court was that the escape came in the course of a moment of panic, that it was, that there were mental health issues that fed into that briefly considered decision and that no one was hurt in this case and that the conduct that’s alleged doesn’t justify a sentence of seven years. That was my argument to the Court.

(Emphasis supplied). In explaining to Judge Weinstein at one point why he would not agree to a plea bargain resulting in a sentence of seven years, the appellant demonstrated a clear understanding of what was being charged. Q Tell me what you want to say. A I wanted to tell you about the facts of the case and why I don’t think I should get seven years.

Q I understand what the facts were. A You understand. Q The allegation is that you walked off from the PreRelease Center. A Allegation.

Q Okay. They have to prove it. A Right. (Emphasis supplied).

The appellant was advised of and fully understood the nature of the charge. The maximum penalty for the felony of first-degree escape is ten years imprisonment. There are no mandatory provisions. In the course of a longer discussion as to why the appellant would not accept a plea bargain resulting in a seven-year sentence, Judge Weinstein informed the appellant that upon a verdict of guilty without a plea bargain, he would be inclined to impose a sentence of nine years.

In the course of the discussion, moreover, Judge Weinstein expressly informed the appellant that the maximum penalty for first-degree escape was ten years imprisonment. ¹⁴² Q Ms. Armstrong, who is the prosecutor, has made you an offer. Mr. Harris has told me he conveyed that offer to you. A He told me they offered me seven years. Q Seven years.

A They said you was going to give me— Q You don’t have to accept it. A I didn’t want to. Q And I’m not suggesting you accept it, because if you do accept it, you have to tell me it’s voluntary. A I’m not going to accept seven years.

Q All right. Then you have a right to go to trial. The maximum penalty that you can receive is 10 years. You understand that?

(Emphasis supplied). The appellant was thus fully informed as to the maximum penalty he was facing. In all respects, subsections (a)(l)-(3) were fully complied with. Judge Harrington on December 3, 2008 The appellant has chosen to argue this contention exclusively in terms of Rule 4-215(e), dealing with the discharge of counsel.

His narrow analysis of events ends with the hearing of November 10, 2008. The saga of the appellant and Rule 4-215, however, did not end on November 10. Because of a heroic effort by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to insure that the appellant enjoyed every constitutional protection to which he was entitled, the story did not end with a scheduled trial of the appellant on December 3, 2008. There was instead an extended pretrial hearing on that day in front of Judge Harrington, in which the entire panoply of warnings and advisements were bestowed on the appellant all over again.

In contrast to the appellant, who chooses to remain doggedly entrenched in 4-215(e), the State argues that the supervening post-December 3 reality is that the appellant’s ultimate ¹⁴³ trial without counsel on February 18-19, 2009, was a product of a 4-215(d) waiver by inaction in the circuit court. The position of the State is that what began as a subsection (e) discharge of counsel segued or metamorphosed, post-December 3, into what then became a subsection (d) waiver by inaction. In pertinent part, subsection (d) provides: If a defendant appears in circuit court without counsel on the date set for ... trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the record shows compliance with section (a) of this Rule ... in a previous appearance in the circuit court ... the court shall permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s appearance without counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.

If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the defendant’s appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived counsel by failing ... to obtain counsel and may proceed with the ... trial. The ultimate issue, of course, is whether the appellant, when he ultimately went to trial without a lawyer on February 18, 2009, was unconstitutionally denied his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Looking back from February 18, 2009, we resist the notion that our analysis must be confined either to a hermetically sealed subsection 4-215(e) or to a hermetically sealed subsection 4-215(d), with no leakage between the two. As we assess the collective effort of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to follow the law, the totality of circumstances necessarily includes both the hearing before Judge Weinstein on November 10 and the hearing before Judge Harrington on December 3.

If we were looking only at subsection 4-215(e), the appellant would have been tried, without a lawyer, on December 3, 2008. As of the hearing of November 10, he was, indeed, scheduled for trial on December 3. On December 3, however, no such trial took place. As Judge Harrington introduced the pro ¹⁴⁴ ceedings, she noted that what was on her docket was a trial with a “self-represented litigant.” The assistant state’s attorney indicated that the appellant had fired the public defender who had originally represented him and that he was “going to ask for a continuance today to retain Spencer Hecht.” With the acquiescence of the prosecutor, Judge Harrington agreed to a continuance and ultimately settled on a more remote scheduled trial date of February 18, 2009.

There followed a discussion about whether Rule 4-215(a) had earlier been satisfied and then a decision to do it again simply as a precaution. THE COURT: [T]he file doesn’t reflect that there’s ever been a— MS. ARMSTRONG: Judge Weinstein actually did, but I don’t think it would hurt to do it again. THE COURT: Judge Weinstein did?

MS. ARMSTRONG: He did. THE COURT: It just doesn’t show it on the docket entries. Oh, yes, it does, Tab No. SO.

MS. ARMSTRONG: But I don’t think it would hurt to do a complete one. THE COURT: Oh, okay. (Emphasis supplied).

In terms of 4-215(d), Judge Harrington explored with the appellant the subject of his representation and heard from him that he hoped to get a privately retained lawyer and, indeed, had the funds to do so. THE COURT: Now I see that you had Mr. Harris representing you, but right now you don’t have an attorney. Were you going to represent yourself? MR.

RANDOLPH: No. THE COURT: What were your plans? MR. RANDOLPH: My plan was to have a lawyer. THE COURT: Who are you going to have represent you?

MR. RANDOLPH: Over at the (unintelligible), since it’s hard for me,, you know, to get in contact with a lawyer, so right now I’ve just been sending out letters trying to get in ¹⁴⁵ touch with a lawyer. I have no other way to get in contact with a lawyer. THE COURT: Well, do you have any family members who can contact attorneys for you?

MR. RANDOLPH: Uhn-huh. THE COURT: Do you have funds to hire a lawyer ? MR.

RANDOLPH: Yes, I do have funds. I have funds, all my funds when I got locked up— THE COURT: Okay. MR. RANDOLPH: — they’re at the police station.

I need somebody to go pick them up. So I’ve been trying to get a lawyer to see if he can go, I can file a power of attorney so he can pick my money up and represent me. (Emphasis supplied). Judge Harrington then heard from the appellant as to why he had fired the assistant public defender.

THE COURT: Did you fire Mr. Harris? MR. RANDOLPH: Yes, I did. THE COURT: You don’t want the assistance of a public defender in this case?

MR. RANDOLPH: The only thing about it, with me and Mr. Harris, I had Mr. Harris on some other cases and we weren’t seeing eye-to-eye and I fired him in those other cases. So I figured there was some kind of, some animosity going on. We wasn’t seeing eye-to-eye— THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RANDOLPH: — because I had to fire him in my other case last year and I thought that maybe he had something against me. He wasn’t representing me right. Judge Harrington ascertained that the appellant actually wanted a continuance in order to retain an attorney.

She granted him a two-and-one-half month continuance to do just that. [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I did have a conversation with Spencer Hecht yesterday. He indicated that I don’t know who he had been contacted with, but that he was ¹⁴⁶ trying to see if Rule No. 1 could be taken care of and that he was hoping to get in. But I don’t know what conversations Mr. Randolph has had with him. MR.

RANDOLPH: I had some, I had some conversations with him. I filed, I signed over a power of attorney with him so he can see if he’s going to get my money. THE COURT: Okay. MR.

RANDOLPH: So I am in the process of trying to hire a lawyer. THE COURT: Well, what I’m trying to ascertain is, are you ready for trial right now or are you asking— MR. RANDOLPH: No, I’m not. THE COURT: — to postpone this case?

MR. RANDOLPH: I’m asking for a postponement. THE COURT: Okay. And the State does not object to that?

MS. ARMSTRONG: No, Your Honor, but I would put on the record that we are prepared today. THE COURT: Okay. MS.

ARMSTRONG: We do have all of our witnesses. Most of them are on call. THE COURT: Okay. MS.

ARMSTRONG: But I