Ratchford v. State

MOYLAN, J. The appellant, Tony Ratchford, was convicted by a Baltimore City jury, presided over by Judge William D. Quarles, of two counts of first degree murder, one count of second degree murder, and other related charges. On this appeal, he claims 1. that he was denied his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial; 2. that Judge Quarles erroneously admitted his confession, the taking of which did not comply with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona; 3. that his efforts at the suppression hearing to cross-examine the interviewing detective about precise questions asked in the course of the interview were erroneously curtailed and that, at trial, his request for a de novo suppression hearing outside the presence of the judge was erroneously denied; and 4. that the State was erroneously allowed to give an improper rebuttal argument to the jury. Speedy Trial This is not a Hicks claim. It is exclusively a constitutional speedy trial argument pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

We shall review it under the four-factored analysis of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The crimes in this case were committed on September 27, 1997. The appellant, while in jail on an unrelated matter, was arrested for the crimes in this case on October 25, 1997, and that, for constitutional speedy trial purposes, is the date on which the clock begins to run. His first trial began on May 5, 1999, eighteen months and two weeks later.

It was on that day that the speedy trial motion now under review was argued before Judge John C. Themelis and was denied. Our concern, ³⁵⁸ therefore, is with the period from October 25, 1997 to May 5, 1999. A. The Trigger of “Constitutional Dimensions”: The “length of delay” between arrest and trial is a term of art that serves two separate and distinct functions in a speedy trial analysis. In its first function, it identifies the threshold that must be crossed before any further analysis is called for.

Along the delay continuum, the trigger of “constitutional dimensions” is not itself part of the ultimate merits of a speedy trial claim. It simply marks the minimal point, short of which a court will dismiss a claim summarily and will not waste its time even inquiring into such things as reason for delay, demand-waiver, or prejudice. Beyond that minimal or triggering point, however, the claim may riot necessarily have merit, but it is worthy at least of thoughtful consideration. The trigger of “constitutional dimensions” is exclusively a procedural phenomenon that justifies a further analysis and then drops out of the picture.

The defense bar, however, has a chronic tendency to conflate the two functions of “length of delay” and to transform the mere procedural catalyst into a judicial pronouncement on the merits that takes on an apparent gravity that was never intended. The phrase “constitutional dimensions” does, indeed, pack a potent rhetorical punch. Defense attorneys, therefore, frequently treat the preliminary finding that a delay is of “constitutional dimensions” as persuasive argument that there was a violation of the right to a speedy trial itself. It is, of course, no such thing.

Even a long delay caused exclusively by the defendant, for instance, would easily satisfy the procedural requirement of being of “constitutional dimensions” but as a factor on the ultimate merits would be entitled to no weight whatsoever. The “length of delay,” as one of four interrelated factors in a Barker v. Wingo analysis, may be a factor of great weight, may be of intermediate weight, or may be of slight weight. In an apparent paradox, even a delay of very slight weight would necessarily have been ³⁵⁹ of “constitutional dimensions” or the very weighing process, as part of the ultimate analysis, would never have taken place. Once the Sixth Amendment merits are in play, the only response that need be made to the no longer necessary use of the phrase “constitutional dimensions” is, “Of course, it’s of ‘constitutional dimensions’ or we wouldn’t even be having this hearing.” Our point is that the notion of a delay being of “constitutional dimensions” concerns only the threshold issue of whether a Barker v. Wingo analysis shall even be undertaken.

Once the decision has been made to engage in that analysis, the threshold procedural finding no longer has any pertinence. The phrase “constitutional dimensions” needs no further mention. The length of delay of eighteen months in this case was of constitutional dimensions and the speedy trial claim, therefore, was and is deserving of further analysis. The concept of “constitutional dimensions,” having fully served its purpose, will have nothing to do with that further analysis.

B. The Length of Delay: Once we are engaged in Barker v. Wingo’s four-factored analysis, we view the “length of delay” in a different light. As far as the length of delay itself is concerned, what was sufficient to enable it to serve its first and triggering function may be of only minimal significance when it comes to its second function. Depending on which of its two functions is being served, we treat the “length of delay” very differently. As one of the four factors on the ultimate merits, it is heavily influenced by the other three factors, particularly that of “reasons for the delay.” It may gain weight or it may lose weight because of circumstances that have nothing to do with the mere ticking of the clock.

When serving its procedural or triggering function, however, the “length of delay”is impervious to such influences and circumstances. It is a mathematical constant that only requires us to read the calendar. ³⁶⁰ “Length of delay” in one of its manifestations, moreover, is by no means the equivalent of “length of delay” in its other manifestation. For its procedural function, “length of delay” is the gross period of time between the arrest and the trial or the hearing on the motion. For its function as a factor on the merits, by contrast, the “length of delay” is the net period of time that may be chargeable to the State or to the court system as true “delay,” some of which, depending on other circumstances, may be given great weight and some of which may be given only slight weight.

The length of delay of eighteen months in this case, although it was more than enough to spark further analysis, is not on the ultimate merits particularly remarkable. In Barker v. Wingo itself, for instance, a length of delay of five years was held not to have violated the Sixth Amendment. An eighteen month delay is not, on the one hand, so brief as to call for summary dismissal and to obviate the need for further scrutiny. Neither, on the other hand, is it so overwhelming, as for example a ten year delay might be, as potentially to override the consideration of all other factors.

In and of itself, it is not a weighty factor, one way or the other. C. Demand-Waiver: For organizational convenience, we choose to consider the remaining factors out of their usual order. As with the length of delay, the demand-waiver factor is of little help to either party in this case. The appellant never waived his right to a speedy trial.

Nor did he, except for an early on and pro forma objection to a postponement on a single occasion, ever consistently and vigorously cry out for the speedy disposition of the charges against him. This potential factor is a non-factor in this case. D. Prejudice: Prejudice is not a weighty factor in this case. Presumed prejudice simply enjoys a weight proportionate to the length of delay itself, a factor that we have observed as being in this case very marginal. ³⁶¹ In terms of actual prejudice, the appellant was subjected to pretrial incarceration.

By the same token, the appellant was facing three separate charges of murder in the first degree and he ultimately was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole, compounded by another consecutive term of thirty years imprisonment. We also note that when the appellant was arrested on October 25, 1997, he was in jail on another unrelated matter. In his brief, the appellant has not bothered to tell us whether all or part of his pretrial incarceration overlapped detention for some other reason. In terms of this variety of actual prejudice, the appellant does not make much of a case.

In terms of showing actual prejudice, moreover, the burden is on the defendant. The most significant variety of actual prejudice is prejudice to the defense of the case. The appellant does not suggest any such prejudice. The appellant did not take the stand in his own defense nor did he call any defense witnesses.

There is no suggestion of any lost witnesses or of how their presence might have helped the defense case. There is no suggestion of any failed memory or of how a fresher recollection would have helped the defense case. There was no prejudice to the defense of the case. E. Reason for Delay: Eighteen months, to be sure, was a long time in scheduling this case for the trial table for the first time.

Much of that delay, however, was attributable, in whole or in part, to the defense itself. Following the arrest of the appellant on October 25, 1997, the case was first scheduled for trial on May 5, 1998. That period of time was necessary for the orderly administration of justice and is not considered an unreasonable delay that calls for further accounting. Howell v. State, 87 Md.App. 57, 82 , 589 A.2d 90 (1991).

That conclusion is well supported by the fact that appellant’s first defense attorney did not enter his initial appearance until January 14,1998. This was, moreover, an extremely complex case, involving three separate murders charged ³⁶² against multiple co-defendants. It involved numerous witnesses and considerable forensic evidence, including two forms of DNA testing. On May 5, the trial was postponed until May 27 because the prosecutor was tied up in another protracted case.

That three-week delay was attributable to the State. The second postponement, from May 27 to July 14, is something of which the appellant may not complain because he requested it. The fact that the State also wished the postponement is coincidental. Defense counsel represented to the court that he wanted a postponement “until July for further trial preparation.” The third postponement, from July 14 until September 8, became inevitable when the appellant’s first defense attorney withdrew from the case because of a conflict of interest and his second defense attorney only entered his appearance in June.

July 14 had been scheduled for a hearing on motions and the new defense attorney indicated that he did not intend to pursue those motions. By mutual agreement, the case was sent to the administrative judge for a postponement “into September or November.” It was scheduled for September 8. On that day the case was postponed a fourth time, until October 14, because counsel for both the appellant and his codefendant “wanted time to investigate new witnesses.” The fifth postponement, from October 14 until January 19, 1999, was not the appellant’s fault. Neither, however, was it the State’s fault.

The judge to whom the case was then assigned had a very truncated trial schedule and all indications were that the case against the two codefendants would take between two and one-half and three weeks with “some fifty witnesses at least noted on the State’s side.” The scheduled court was unavailable for a trial of that length. The sixth postponement, from January 19 to March 9, became inevitable when the appellant’s second defense attorney withdrew from the case and his third lawyer entered her ³⁶³ appearance on December 28, 1998. The new attorney was, moreover, in trial in another court in another case. The seventh and final postponement, from March 9 to May 5, was one where new defense counsel indicated that she needed more time to prepare the case.

The fact that the prosecutor was in trial in another case was again coincidental. Basically, probably because of having had three different lawyers, we have a defendant who was not ready to go to trial on those serious charges. It is not a case in which a defendant, ready and eager to resolve the charges against him, was unconstitutionally denied his right to a speedy trial. We affirm Judge Themelis’s denial of the speedy trial motion.

A Reluctant Analysis The appellant’s second and third contentions both challenge, in different ways, the admission into evidence of a statement he gave to Detective Darryl Massey on September 30, 1997, three days after the crimes were committed. Our chagrin at having to get embroiled in the contentions is because the impact of the statement on the appellant’s case was so marginal as to be virtually nugatory. We are being asked to make a mountain out of a molehill. When Detective Massey interviewed the appellant on September 30 (he was not arrested for these crimes until a month later), the detective noticed that the appellant had scratches just above his left eye and on his neck.

These could have had significance because there was evidence that there had been a struggle at the scene of the murders. The appellant’s explanation for the scratches was that he had been involved in a fight with someone named Rodney. That “fight” did, to be sure, place him within two blocks of the murder scene. On the other hand, it was a crowded neighborhood that the appellant regularly frequented.

The total impact of the statement was in the following exchange. Q And did you specifically ask him about the