Rawlings v. Rawlings

HARRELL, Judge. On 19 March 1999, the Circuit Court for Howard County found Michael L. Rawlings, Petitioner, in constructive civil contempt, pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-2fy¡(é), 1 of an 8 April 1996 Pendente Lite Order to pay child support. The unpaid child support totaled $33,679.00. On 29 March 1999, the ⁵⁴⁰ Circuit Court directed Petitioner serve six months in the Howard County Detention Center, with work release, and set a purge amount of $3,367.90.

The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported decision, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. We granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari, Rawlings v. Rawlings, 359 Md. 28 , 753 A.2d 1 (2000), to consider the following questions: 1. Did the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals err in finding that Maryland Rule 15-207 should not be applied retroactively 2 in this case? 2. Did the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals err in finding Petitioner in contempt for failure to pay child support? 3.

Did the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals err in setting a purge provision in the amount of $3,367.90 and ordering the Petitioner incarcerated where the uncon-troverted evidence showed that the Petitioner did not have the present ability to pay that amount? I. Michael L. Rawlings and Deborah M. Rawlings were married on 1 November 1980. Two children were born to the parties during their marriage: Sabrina Lynn Rawlings, born 14 April 1983, and Robert Michael Rising Rawlings, born 28 May 1985. On or about 16 February 1995, the parties separated.

On 22 August 1995, Respondent filed a Complaint to Establish Custody and For Other Relief in the Circuit Court for Howard County asking, in part, for custody of the parties’ two children and for child support. The subject Pendente Lite ⁵⁴¹ Order was docketed on 9 April 1996. The Order provided, in part, that Respondent be granted pendente lite custody of the two children, that Petitioner have reasonable visitation of the children, and that Petitioner pay monthly child support of $854.00, accounting from 22 August 1995, plus an additional $100.00 per month against a child support arrearage of $4,524.00 as of 22 March 1996. On 21 November 1996, after testimony was taken in front of a Special Master, 3 the Circuit Court granted Respondent a final divorce from Petitioner and ordered that the provisions of the April 1996 Pendente Lite Order be incorporated in the judgment and remain in full force and effect. 4 Respondent filed a Complaint for Contempt on 27 October 1997 based on Petitioner’s alleged failure to pay the ordered child support.

On 19 March 1999, the Circuit Court held a civil contempt hearing, the content of which is discussed infra parts III & IV, and found Petitioner in civil contempt of the terms of the 8 April 1996 Pendente Lite Order and as those terms were incorporated in the 21 November 1996 final divorce order. On 29 March 1999, the court sentenced Petitioner to serve six months in the Howard County Detention Center on work release. The court set a purge amount of $3,367.90 and an appeal bond of $33,679.00. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner raised the following two issues pertinent to our consideration of the case before us: (1) whether the Circuit Court erred in finding Petitioner in contempt for failure to pay child support; and (2) whether the Circuit Court erred in setting a purge provision in the amount of $3,367.90 and ordering Petitioner incarcerated when the evidence failed to show that Petitioner had the ⁵⁴² present ability to pay that amount.

The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported decision, affirmed. The intermediate appellate court resolved that the Circuit Court did not err in finding Petitioner in contempt for failure to pay child support. The court stated that Maryland Rule 15-207(e), supra note 1, which became effective 1 January 1997 and authorizes a court to make a finding of constructive civil contempt in a support enforcement action even if the alleged contemnor may not have the present ability to comply with the support order, should not be applied retrospectively. In this regard, the court apparently accepted Petitioner’s characterization that, because “some of his child support payments were due prior to January 1, 1997,” application of Rule 15-207(e) to the evidence adduced at the 19 March 1999 contempt hearing regarding his total unpaid child support, most of which accrued after 1 January 1997, constituted an impermissible retrospective application of the Rule.

Nonetheless, the court then appeared to apply the standards set forth in Rule 15-207(e) to Petitioner’s case. 5 As to this issue, the intermediate court concluded that, on the evidence, “it was proper for the court to find that ... [Petitioner] had the past ability to pay the child support and was therefore in contempt for failing to do so.” (Emphasis added). 6 Lastly, the Court of ⁵⁴³ Special Appeals determined that the Circuit Court did not err in setting a purge provision in the amount of $3,367.90 and ordering Petitioner incarcerated because he “failed to show that he lacked the then-present ability to pay the purge figure ... and, therefore, the court was within its discretion to sentence him to six months in jail on work release.” (Emphasis added). We determine that the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals did not err in their application of Rule 15-207(e) to the facts of the present case. We further conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in finding Petitioner in contempt for failure to pay child support as there was sufficient evidence to reach that conclusion. We resolve, however, that the Circuit Court erred in establishing the purge amount at $3,367.90 and ordering Petitioner incarcerated on the rec ⁵⁴⁴ ord before it.

On remand, evidence may be adduced as to Petitioner’s present ability to pay an appropriate amount as a purge provision or, pursuant to Rule 15-207(e), if Petitioner lacks the present ability to purge, the court may fashion directions as to how otherwise he is to make payment in the future or perform acts to enable him to make such payments. See supra note 1; infra pp. 104-105.

II

We first consider whether and how Rule 15-207(e) may apply to the present case, and if so, whether Rule 15-207(e) applies to the entire amount owed or only to that child support accruing and unpaid after 1 January 1997, the effective date of the Rule. Rule 15-207(e), supra note 1, authorizes the court to make a finding of constructive civil contempt even though the alleged contemnor may not have the present ability to pay the ordered child support. 7 First, the moving party must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence “that a prior court order directed the party to pay the support or alimony and the alleged contemnor failed to make the court-ordered payments.” Jones v. State, 351 Md. 264, 273 , 718 A.2d 222, 227 (1998) (summarizing Rule 15-207(e)). The contemnor may then defend by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the failure to pay was not an act of willful or contumacious non-compliance.” Id. If the court makes a finding of contempt, then the court “must issue a written contempt order that specifies, in clear language, the amount of arrearage due, the sanction for the contempt, and what the contemnor must do to purge him or herself of the contempt.” Id.

Rule 15-207(e) modifies the standard for determining contempt in child support cases explained in Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509 , 677 A.2d 584 (1996). In Lynch , we explained that if ⁵⁴⁵ a child support obligor could show that he or she did not have the present ability to pay the amount owed, then he or she could not be held in civil contempt. Lynch, 342 Md. at 521-22 , 677 A.2d at 590 . We stated: Where the order is one prescribing or prohibiting a specified cause of conduct, the required defense showing is that the defendant is unable to conform his or her conduct in compliance with the court order.

Where the order calls for the payment of money, the defendant is entitled to the “opportunity to show that he [or she] had neither the estate nor the ability to pay his [or her] obligation.” [Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Md. 416, 420 , 216 A.2d 914, 917 (1966) ]. In that situation, “[m]oreover, the issue is not the ability to pay at the time the payments were originally ordered; instead, the issue is his present ability to pay. ” Elzey [v. Elzey ], 291 Md. [369,] 374, 435 A.2d [445,] 448 [ (1981) ]. Only if he or she fails to show such inability is a finding of contempt and subsequent imprisonment permitted. Id.

See McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 692-93 , 262 A.2d 52, 57 (1970); Schwartzman v. Schwartzman, 204 Md. 125, 135 , 102 A.2d 810, 815 (1954); Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 92 , 65 A.2d 899, 905 (1949); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 681 , 141 A. 387, 390 (1928). Id. (emphasis added) (second, third, and fifth alterations in original). The committee note accompanying Rule 15-207 explains that section (e) regarding constructive civil contempt and support enforcement actions was enacted to modify this holding in Lynch .

According to the committee note, section (e) modifies the holding in Lynch by allowing a court to make a finding of constructive civil contempt in a support enforcement action even if the alleged contemnor does not have the present ability to purge. In support enforcement cases, as in other civil contempt cases, after making a finding of contempt, the court may specify imprisonment as the sanction if the contemnor has the present ability to purge the contempt. ⁵⁴⁶ If the eontemnor does not have the present ability to purge the contempt, an example of a direction to perform specified acts that a court may include in an order under subsection (e)(4) is a provision that an unemployed, able-bodied eontemnor look for work and periodically provide evidence of the efforts made. If the eontemnor fails, without just cause, to comply with any provision of the order, a criminal contempt proceeding may be brought based on a violation of that provision. (Emphasis added).

We have noted previously that Rule 15-207(e) modified Lynch in the sense that “a finding of contempt under 15-207(e) requires only a determination that the alleged eontemnor had the ability in the past to comply with the court order.” Jones, 351 Md. at 276 , 718 A.2d at 228 . Rule 15-207(e), however, does not change the requirement in Lynch that any party judged to be a civil eontemnor must be afforded the opportunity to show a present inability to purge the contempt: “Where the order calls for the payment of money, the defendant is entitled to the ‘opportunity to show that he [or she] had neither the estate nor the ability to pay his [or her] obligation.’ ” Lynch, 342 Md. at 521 , 677 A.2d at 590 (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson, 241 Md. at 420 , 216 A.2d at 917 ) Jones, 351 Md. at 276 , 718 A.2d at 228 (emphasis added). In Lynch , as noted supra p. 103, a person could not be found in civil contempt for not paying a certain amount of money, such as that required by a court order, if the person did not have the present ability to pay. 8 Under this standard, both determining contempt and the contemnor’s ability to ⁵⁴⁷ comply with the purge provision were evaluated based on the person’s financial capabilities at the same point in time, the present, i.e., the contempt hearing. Lynch, 342 Md. at 521 , 677 A.2d at 590 (citing Elzey, 291 Md. at 374, 435 A.2d at 448).

In Lynch , we reasoned: Moreover, because the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to coerce future compliance, [State v. Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 728 , 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973) ], the defendant must have been fully capable of having complied; in addition, the ability to perform the act required by the court order must have been within the power of the defendant. Elzey, 291 Md. at 374, 435 A.2d at 446 (quoting Williams & Fullwood [Fulwood] v. Director, 276 Md. 272, 313 , 347 A.2d 179, 201 (1975)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 , 96 S.Ct. 2178 , 48 L.Ed.2d 801 (1976). Lynch, 342 Md. at 520-21 , 677 A.2d at 590 . Present inability to comply with the court order was a defense against being held in contempt.

Lynch, 342 Md. at 521 , 677 A.2d at 590 . 9 In Lynch , we explained why the standard for determining contempt and the ability to purge was whether there was a present ability (1) to pay in accordance with the support order and then (2) to purge the contempt order. Lynch, 342 Md. at 528 , 677 A.2d at 594 . If the contemnor does not have the present ability to pay or to comply with the support order, then he or she may not be able to pay the purge amount, and before one can be imprisoned after a finding of civil contempt, ⁵⁴⁸ one must “have an opportunity to purge the contempt.” Lynch, 342 Md. at 519-20 , 677 A.2d at 590 . Moreover, if the civil contemnor is sentenced to imprisonment after being unable to prove a present inability to purge, then he or she must have the “keys to the prison in his or her pocket”— imprisonment coupled with a purge amount. 10 Id.

(citing In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 (8th Cir.1902)); see Johnson, 241 Md. at 419 , 216 A.2d at 916 (noting that “[w]hether or not the father was subject to incarceration depends on whether he was able to meet the obligation imposed on him by the support order”); see also Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 355 , 464 A.2d 228, 232-33 (1983); Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 728 , 298 A.2d at 876 ; Elzey, 291 Md. at 374-75, 435 A.2d at 447. 11 In addition, we stated that the goal of civil contempt proceedings is “to coerce compliance with a court order ... [, and] [i]f the responsible party does not have money, or any means of obtaining it, payment cannot be coerced.” Lynch, 342 Md. at 523 , 677 A.2d at 591 . Thus, it was thought at the time that if one was held in contempt based on a past ability to ⁵⁴⁹ pay, but it was shown that the he or she did not have the present ability to purge, then holding that person in contempt was a form of punishment, which is not permitted in civil contempt proceedings. We explained in Lynch : [Mjerely finding a defendant in contempt of court does not ordinarily further the purpose of coercing future compliance with the court order. Indeed, a finding of contempt, where there is no possibility of enforcing compliance with the court order to which it relates, simply labels the defendant a contemnor and imputes guilt to him or her....

As our cases recognize, civil contempt requires a purge provision with which the defendant is able to comply in order to purge, ie., clear or exonerate, him or herself of the contempt. Lynch, 342 Md. at 529 , 677 A.2d at 594 (citations omitted). We further concluded that “[w]here, based on past acts and/or the defendant’s lack of good faith compliance with the court order, a finding of contempt is permitted to stand, the defendant is denied any opportunity to purge the contempt.” Id. The “legislative history” of Rule 15-207(e) discussed the impact of the Lynch holding.

In a letter from the then Chair of this Court’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure regarding proposed Rule 15-207(e), it was explained: there is widespread concern that the Lynch decision has made the enforcement of child and spousal support orders very difficult. The Committee was advised that, in some areas of the State, enforcement through civil contempt proceedings has effectively been eliminated. The support enforcement personnel were aware, long before Lynch , that it was impermissible for a court, in a civil contempt action to imprison the obligor for nonpayment of court-ordered support if the contemnor was not then able to comply with the purge provision. The practice, however, in such a case, was for the court to make a finding of contempt based on evidence that the obligor had had the ability to make payments during the period at issue, set a purge amount, and direct the obligor either to make specific ⁵⁵⁰ payments on the arrearage in the future or to take other specific steps, such as searching for employment, to enable him or her to make those payments. 12 The witnesses indicated that, in most instances, that approach was successful in producing payments.

The problem now, according to the witnesses, is that Lynch prohibits a finding of contempt unless the obligee can prove an ability to purge on the day of the hearing, and it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have such immediately up-to-date information. The obligee may have evidence of employment or other ability to pay at the time the petition is filed but may be unable to prove that ability on the day of the hearing, which may be weeks later. Absent that ability, no finding of contempt can be made, and absent a finding of contempt, no purge provision can be set. The whole coercive mechanism fails.

The Committee was persuaded that the witnesses’ interpretation of Lynch was correct and that the rule should be changed to permit a finding of contempt based on evidence of an ability to pay during the period preceding the hearing. This change would not, of course, allow the court to imprison an obligor in the absence of evidence that he or she is capable of meeting the purge provision; its function is simply to allow the finding of contempt, coupled with a purge and, when appropriate, directions that the obligor make specific payments in the future or take other specific actions to enable him or her to make those payments. This is reflected in the proposed changes to Rule 15-207. 13 ⁵⁵¹ Rule 15-207(e) resolved Lynch's concern regarding the inability to purge if contempt is based on the past ability to pay or if the contemnor is determined to be unable presently to satisfy the purge amount. 14 Rule 15-207(e)(4) requires that if it is determined that the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge, then “the [contempt] order may include directions that the contemnor make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction to make payments.” Rule 15-207(e)(4). As the committee note explains, and as noted supra, “[i]f the contemnor fails, without just cause, to comply with any provision of the order, [then] a criminal contempt proceeding may be brought based on a violation of that provision.” Rule 15-207(e) thus complies with the notions in Lynch that one must first have the opportunity to demonstrate an inability to pay his obligation and, if imprisonment is ordered, the ability to purge, thus retaining the remedial nature of civil contempt proceedings 15 — civil ⁵⁵² contempt is to force compliance and not to punish. 16 Moreover, the goal of civil contempt of forcing compliance is met when the contemnor is provided with directions as to how to comply and only upon failure to do so may a criminal contempt proceeding be brought.

Thus, Rule 15-207(e) provides an extra opportunity for a contemnor to comply with the order before being subject to criminal contempt proceedings. 17 ⁵⁵³ Nonetheless, a defendant’s present inability to pay, other than as a pre-requisite consideration to setting the purge amount, was abolished effectively as a defense to a contempt finding by the adoption of Rule 15-207(e). We determine that the Lynch standard does not apply to the consideration of whether Petitioner was in constructive civil contempt as to any portion of the arrearages found in the present case; rather, Rule 15-207(e) is the applicable standard. We further resolve that the Court of Special Appeals was incorrect in expressly concluding that the application of Rule 15-207(e) to this case was impermissibly retrospective. Even though Petitioner’s question is framed in terms of whether the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in not applying 15-207(e) retrospectively, Petitioner argues that both courts erred in applying I5-207(e) retrospectively after determining that it should not be so applied.

Petitioner, however, is wrong in arguing that the courts, despite some ambiguities in their explained reasoning, inconsistently applied 15-207(e) retrospectively. Though it is not as clear that the Circuit Court did so, see supra notes 5-6, it is apparent that the Court of Special Appeals initially stated broadly that Rule 15-207(e) should not be applied retrospectively and, in a subsequent breath, seemed to apply the Rule “prospectively” on the assumption that it was the date of the filing of the contempt complaint, 27 October 1997, and not the docketing of the initial support order, 9 April 1996, that was the dispositive vantage point from which to consider retrospectivity versus prospectivity. All of the alleged unpaid support properly was considered, even that portion accrued prior to 1 January 1997, because Rule 15-207(e)(2) states that the petitioner for constructive civil contempt must prove “that the alleged contemnor has not paid the amount owed, accounting from the effective date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing.” (Emphasis added). In this respect, the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court applied the Rule correctly, though under a ⁵⁵⁴ misperception that to do so was not a retrospective application.

It is logical to view the initiation of the constructive civil contempt proceedings pertaining to failure to pay spousal or child support as controlling because a support order, such as the Pendente Lite Order in this case, standing alone does not lead necessarily to the initiation of a contempt proceeding. An alleged support order violation is prerequisite to a contempt proceeding; the order itself does not amount to the initiation of the contempt proceeding for purposes of the Rule at issue. This appears clear from the language of the Rule. The petitioner’s burden of proof under Rule 15-207(e) requires him or her to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has not paid the amount owed accounting from, the effective date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing.” Rule 15-207(e) (emphasis added).

This language demonstrates that the violation of the support order is part of that which must be proven. The Court of Special Appeals stated, in its unreported opinion in this matter, the following regarding the Rule’s retrospectivity: Rule 15-207 does not contain any statement instructing or implying that it should be applied retroactively. Moreover, the Legislature [and the Court of Appeals] knows how to express its own intent when it desires retroactive application. Owens Coming v. Bauman, 125 Md.App. 454, 531 , 726 A.2d 745 , cert. denied, Owens Coming v. Hammond, 354 Md. 572 , 731 A.2d 970 (1999).

Though these observations are not inaccurate in and of themselves, when the retrospectivity analysis is taken to its fruition, it is clear that Rule 15-207(e) is a remedial rule with expressly intended retrospective sweep. To ascertain the permissible retrospective or prospective 18 sweep of Rule 15-207(e), it is necessary to examine and ⁵⁵⁵ “effectuate the legislative intention.” 19 Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219 , 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987) (citing Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986); Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 816 , 490 A.2d 1289 (1985); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347 , 456 A.2d 20 (1983)); see Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 410 , 754 A.2d 389, 392-96 (2000). Generally, “[r]etrospective operation is not favored by the courts ... and a law will not be construed as retroactive unless the act clearly, by express language or necessary implication, indicates that the legislature intended a retroactive application.” Norman J. Singer, 2 Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.04, at 349 (5th ed.1993).

We stated in Mason v. State: [S]everal well settled rules of statutory interpretation are applicable in seeking to ascertain the actual intention of the legislature. These are: (1) A statute is presumed to operate prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature indicates otherwise; (2) Despite the presumption of prospectivity, a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed; and (3) A statute affecting or impairing substantive rights will not operate retrospectively as to transactions, matters, and events not in litigation at the time the statute takes effect unless its language clearly so indicates. Mason, 309 Md. at 219-20 , 522 A.2d at 1346 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Neither the Rule nor its accompanying note states expressly whether the Rule should be applied retrospectively or only prospectively.

See Langston, 359 Md. at 406 , 754 A.2d at 394 (“There is a general presumption in the law that an enactment ⁵⁵⁶ is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect.”)(quoting Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607 , 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We also have stated, as the Court of Special Appeals took note of supra, that the Rule or its accompanying comment could have stated, had it been the Court’s intention, how Rule 15-207(e) could be applied retrospectively. See Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co. Inc., 308 Md. 556, 568 , 520 A.2d 1319, 1325 (1987) (stating that “when the General Assembly intends a statute to have retrospective application, it knows how to express that intent” and providing examples thereof); Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md.App. 454, 531 , 726 A.2d 745, 783 (1999), cert. denied, Owens Corning v. Hammond, 354 Md. 572 , 731 A.2d 970 (1999).

It is also true that the Rule has a clearly stated effective date of 1 January 1997. One scholar explained: The power to enact laws includes the power to fix a future effective date. A statute with a definite effective date commences operation from that time. The rule applies only where a contrary intent is not manifest in the act itself.

Where a contrary intent is expressly stated a statute should take effect in accordance with the purpose and intent of the body which enacts it. 2 Singer, supra, § 33.07, at 17 (emphasis added). The second inquiry, which the Court of Special Appeals did not reach, as explained supra in Mason , is whether, even though there is a presumption of prospectivity, the Rule only effects procedure, and not substantive rights, and is therefore remedial in nature and may be applied retrospectively unless a contrary intention is expressed. After analysis of this factor, it is clear that Rule 15-207(e) contemplates, on its face, a degree of potential retrospective application. In Langston v. Riffe, we explained that remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.

They also include statutes intended ⁵⁵⁷ for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights. Every statute that makes any changes in the existing body of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be said to “remedy” some flaw in the prior law or some social evil. Langston, 359 Md. at 409 , 754 A.2d at 395 (quoting 3 Singer, supra, § 60.02, at 152 (footnotes omitted)).

We then discussed the difficulty in defining substantive or vested rights, noting: A most natural definition of the term “vested” is “accrued” or, as dictionaries put it, “completed and consummated.” But in that sense, any claim or interest which has come into being and been perfected as a “right” would have to be said to be vested.... Justice Holmes once remarked with reference to the problem of retroactivity that “perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as sound as the instinct which directed the decisions,” and suggested that the criteria which really governed are “the prevailing views of justice.” The problem is to comprehend what real considerations influence judgment in application of “the prevailing views of injustice.” It is impossible to discover the precise meaning of the term through which all of the decisions can be consistently explained. Most of the numerous attempts at definition are essentially circuitous in nature, as in the pronouncement that “a vested right, as that term is used in relation to constitutional guarantees, implies an interest which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect, and of which the individual may not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.” Thus “vested right means simply a right which under particular circumstances will be protected from legislative interference. Another definition notes that a vested right is ⁵⁵⁸ an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment.” Langston, 359 Md. at 419-20 , 754 A.2d at 401 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Singer, supra, §§ 41.05, 41.06, at 369-70, 379).

We concluded that the statute under scrutiny in Langston , Maryland Code (1984,1999 Repl.Vol.), section 5 1038(a)(2)(i)(2) of the Family Law Article, which allows “a circuit court to set aside or modify a paternity declaration ‘if a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order,’ ” applies retrospectively as it was remedial and did not affect any substantive rights. Langston, 359 Md. at 400 , 754 A.2d at 391 (quoting § 5 — 1038(a)(2)(i)(2) of the Family Law Article). Thus, § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) of the Family Law Article applies to paternity declarations issued prior to the law’s effective date of 1 October 1995. Langston, 359 Md. at 403 , 754 A.2d at 392 .

In reaching this conclusion we determined from the language of the statute (which stated that it covers proceedings) and from the extensive legislative history (which indicated clearly that the Legislature intended the statute to be remedial) that the statute is remedial in nature. Langston, 359 Md. at 408-17 , 754 A.2d at 395-400 . We then explained that the statute did not interfere, destroy, or modify any substantive or vested rights. Langston, 359 Md. at 420-21 , 754 A.2d at 402 .

In determining that the statute in Langston was remedial, we noted that “[m]any statutory issues relating to family law are considered remedial.” Langston, 359 Md. at 409 , 754 A.2d at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3 Singer, supra, § 60.01, at 147). It is clear that the same may be said of Rule 15-207(e), which also “applies to proceedings for constructive civil contempt,” as did the statute in Langston . Additionally, it has long been understood that civil contempt is remedial. Civil contempt proceedings are defined as being “coercive or remedial in nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary 313 (7th ed.1999).

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the remedial nature of civil contempt proceedings. The ⁵⁵⁹ Court explained that “[i]f it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.” Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 , 31 S.Ct. 492, 498 , 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). We have also noted that civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature. In Lynch , we stated that “[a] civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily made to benefit such parties.

These proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future compliance.” Lynch, 342 Md. at 519 , 677 A.2d at 589 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 728 , 298 A.2d at 876 ). Additionally, as noted supra, remedial statutes are those which “can be said to remedy some flaw in the prior law.” Langston, 359 Md. at 409 , 754 A.2d at 399 . Rule 15-207(e) is curative in that it alters the Lynch standard. The committee note to the Rule explains that “[sjection (e) modifies the holding in Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509 , [ 677 A.2d 584 ] (1996).” (Emphasis added).

See also supra pp. 14-15 (discussing the history of Rule 15-207(e)). Therefore, it seems clear that Rule 15-207(e) is remedial in nature, and as such, “[t]he general rule is that statutes dealing with a remedy are to be applied to actions tried after their passage even though the right or cause of action arose prior thereto.” 3 Singer, supra, § 60.01, at 147. Even though the Rule is remedial, we must consider also whether its retrospective application would modify or destroy a substantive or vested right. We stated in Langston that “[generally, a remedial or procedural statute may not be applied retroactively if it will interfere with vested or substantive rights.” 20 Langston, 359 Md. at 418 , 754 A.2d at 400 .

Stated otherwise, “[i]n the final part of a retroactivity analysis, ⁵⁶⁰ a court must determine whether the retroactive application of the statute or ordinance would interfere with vested rights.” Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15, 29 , 650 A.2d 712, 718 (1994). Retrospective application of Rule 15-207(e) would not impair the substantive rights of an alleged contemnor, here Petitioner. 21 In Langston , we touched upon the possible substantive rights involved with child support, and we reiterate the same here to demonstrate that substantive rights are not affected by Rule 15-207(e). We explained that there exists in the child or petitioning parent a vested right in monetary support already paid and to the arrears owed in support. 22 Langston, 359 Md. at 422-23 , 754 A.2d at 400 . ⁵⁶¹ Neither of those rights are modified or destroyed in the present case. Rather, Rule 15-207(e) provides a remedy to secure such rights, and “[t]here is no vested right in a particular remedy or procedure so long as an adequate remedy exists.” 2 Singer, supra, at § 41.06, at 380 (footnotes omitted).

It has further been explained: [N]o person has a vested right in a particular remedy for enforcement of a right, or in particular modes of procedure, or rule of evidence. The legislature may pass retroactive acts changing, eliminating, or adding remedies, so long as efficacious remedies exist after passage of the act. Id. at § 41.16, at 429. We have also stated that “[sjtatutes which do not destroy a substantial right, but simply affect procedure or remedies, are not considered as destroying or impairing vested rights, for there is no vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of the right.” Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 650 , 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (quoting Ketch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140,144 , 36 A.2d 544, 545 (1944)).

III

The Circuit Court did not err in finding, and the Court of Special Appeals did not err in affirming, that Petitioner was in civil contempt for failure to pay child support. Respondent met her burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner had not paid the amount owed, accruing according to the 8 April 1996 Pendente Lite Order and through the date of the contempt hearing, 19 March 1999. See Rule 15-207(e)(2). According to the Pendente Lite Order, Petitioner was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $854.00 per month plus $100.00 per month on arrears that had accumulated in the amount of $4,524.00 as of 22 March 1996.

The certified record from the Support Enforcement Unit was admitted at the 19 March 1999 civil contempt hearing as Respondent’s Exhibit 1, without objection from Petitioner. That exhibit showed that at the time of the contempt hearing Petitioner owed $33,679.00 in child support. Petitioner paid no child support in 1996, $90.00 in 1997, $995.00 in 1998, and, ⁵⁶² as of 19 March 1999, had paid $75.00 for 1999. From these undisputed facts, the Circuit Court correctly found that Petitioner had “not paid in accordance with the order,” and the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that Respondent had met her burden and that Petitioner “did not dispute the fact that he owed $33, 679.00 in child support.” Once Respondent met her burden, Petitioner, so as not to be held in contempt, was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that “from the date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing he (i) never had the ability to pay more than the amount actually paid and (ii) made reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the funds necessary to make payment.” Rule 15 — 207(e)(3).

Petitioner testified that, prior to the parties’ separation, he earned sixty to one hundred thousand dollars per year, 23 but that after the separation, he had not earned more than six thousand dollars per year. At the contempt hearing, Petitioner and Respondent testified that Petitioner owned and operated a landscaping and excavation business while they were married and that this business required the use of heavy equipment. Respondent also testified that she retained possession, after the parties separated, of some of the heavy equipment needed to do the excavation work and that, on advice of counsel, she had refused to release to Petitioner at least one of the pieces of equipment in her control 24 until Petitioner signed a separation ⁵⁶³ agreement “guaranteeing” payment of child support. She further testified, however, that, against advice of counsel, she released one of the other machines to Petitioner and had him sign a note promising to return the equipment in two weeks.

Petitioner acknowledged that he took this piece of equipment, but, after about a month, Respondent retrieved the piece of equipment from its job location without first notifying him. According to Respondent, however, Petitioner never returned the piece of equipment, and furthermore, Petitioner “had every piece of equipment that he need[ed] to operate with.” In riposte, Petitioner testified that he was unable to do his landscaping and excavating without the equipment that Respondent had in her possession. Moreover, Petitioner related that he could not rent equipment as he did not have any credit and his license to drive 25 had been suspended in the State of Maryland for non-payment of child support. On these