Ray v. State

Hotten, J, Petitioner, Bashawn Montgomery Ray, pleaded not guilty to conspiracy to commit theft and making a false statement to the police at a hearing based on an agreed statement of facts, and was thereafter sentenced to ten years’ incarceration with six years suspended and four years’ probation. He argues that the circuit court imposed an illegal sentence after it bound itself to a “[e]ap of four years on any executed incarceration.” Petitioner contends that a reasonable lay person in his position would not have understood the agreement’s cap to mean that the circuit court could have imposed a suspended sentence and probation in addition to incarceration for up to four years. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, holding that the plain language of the cap was clear and unambiguous, and thus, Petitioner’s sentence was legal. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Petitioner was charged by indictment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with conspiracy to commit theft of property with a value over $1,000, theft scheme, identity fraud, and making a false statement to the police.

After the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Petitioner and the State ⁵⁶⁷ entered into the following agreement: Petitioner would proceed by way of a plea of not guilty with an agreed statement of facts on the conspiracy and false statement charges, and the State would enter the remaining counts as nolle prosequi. This agreement was written, signed by the prosecutor and Petitioner’s attorney, and submitted to the circuit court’s Assignment Office, in the form of an agreement memorandum. The memorandum contained the following terms: The defendant agrees to proceed by way of an agreed statement of facts on count one, amended to allege conspiracy to commit theft of property having a value at least $1,000 but less than $10,000 and on count four, alleging false statement when under arrest. Cap of four years on any executed incarceration.

Judg[ ]ments of restitution totaling $8,377 will be entered as part of the sentence, not merely as a term of probation. The State will enter nolle prosequi as to counts two and three at sentencing. The State will defer to the Court as to the defendant’s bond status between the date of the trial and the date of sentencing. The defendant will waive his right under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) to request modification of his sentence.

(Emphasis added). In addition to the agreement memorandum, the record reflects a form entitled “GUILTY PLEA—VOIR DIRE[J” We recognize that the form’s title is inaccurate—Petitioner did not enter a guilty plea. This form was characterized at the hearing at which Petitioner pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts as an “advice of rights form[.]” At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel stated “I have crossed out a number of items” on the form “that deal with the appeal issues because [Petitioner] would maintain his appeal rights[.]” The form, signed by Petitioner and his counsel, outlines the elements of the conspiracy and false statement counts, and states that “[t]he maximum penalty for the offense you are offering to plead guilty is: 10 years + 6 months[,]” ⁵⁶⁸ The hearing at which Petitioner pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts, and the subsequent trial, were held on April 18, 2011. The circuit court read into the record the terms of the agreement: THE COURT: The terms of the plea are that [Petitioner] agrees to proceed by way of an agreed statement of facts on Count 1, amended to allege conspiracy to commit theft of property having a value of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000.

And on Count 4, alleging false statement when under arrest. There’s a cap of four years [on executed 1 ] incarceration. The State will enter a nolle prosequi to Counts 2 and 3 at sentencing, and the State will defer to the Court as to defendant’s bond status between the date of trial and the date of sentencing. The defendant will waive any right under Maryland [R]ule 4-345(e) to request a modification of his sentence.

Are those the complete terms of the agreement? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They are, Your Honor. Mr. Montgomery, understanding those terms of the agreement— Are those the terms of the plea agreement that you and I discussed? [PETITIONER]: Yes, What was it about the bond issue? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The bond is that the State’s not going to be asking to have your bond revoked— $ ⅜ ⅜ ⁵⁶⁹ THE COURT: Whether you stay out of jail between now and the time you get sentenced or not, the State is not going to request that you be locked up while you’re waiting for sentencing, okay? [THE STATE]: That’s correct. [PETITIONER]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. The State then read into the record the agreed statement of facts, and the circuit court found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit theft and making a false statement while under arrest.

The parties appeared before the circuit court for sentencing on August 11, 2011. The State repeated the facts of the case and reminded the judge of the parties’ agreement: “In this ease, Your Honor agreed to a cap of four years of any executed incarceration.” The circuit court imposed the following sentence: Now, on the first count, conspiracy to commit theft, the Court will impose a sentence of 10 years to the Maryland Department of Corrections; I’ll suspend all but four years and that will be concurrent with the sentence in the Hagers-town case.[ 2 ] Now, with the false statement ..., the Court will impose a sentence of six months, which is the maximum sentence in that particular case, and that will be concurrent with the sentence in Count 1. Upon release, [Petitioner] will be on a period of probation of four years supervised probation. On March 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, contending that the sentence exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by the agreement.

Petitioner contended that he, or a reasonable lay person in his position, would have understood the agreement was limited to a maxi ⁵⁷⁰ mum total sentence of four years, not suspended time and probation in addition to a four-year term of incarceration. The State filed a motion in opposition, asserting that the sentence imposed by the circuit court was “in accordance with the plain terms” of the agreement. The State noted that the four-year cap was qualified by the term “executed[,]” and Petitioner had been advised of the maximum penalty of ten years for the conspiracy count. On July 24, 2015, the circuit court denied the motion without a hearing or a written opinion.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued that his sentence was illegal because a reasonable lay person in his position would not have understood that he could have received a total sentence in excess of four years. Petitioner further contended that the only potential term of incarceration mentioned in the agreement and by the parties was the cap on “executed incarceration[,]” without mention of an additional period of suspended punishment and probation. The State countered that Petitioner’s sentence was legal because the agreement expressed a four-year cap on executed incarceration.

Further, the State contended that Petitioner understood that there could be an additional, but unexecuted, portion imposed in his sentence because Petitioner had been advised that he was subject to a maximum sentence of ten-and-a-half years. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s motion to correct illegal sentence. Ray v. State, 230 Md.App. 157 , 146 A.3d 1157 (2016). The court held that the meaning of a “[c]ap of four years on any executed incarceration” is clear and unambiguous.

The Court of Special Appeals determined there was “no ambiguity in the critical terms of the plea bargain[.]” Id. at 187 , 146 A.3d at 1174 . Thus, the court held that it was not necessary to consider “what a reasonable lay person in [Petitioner’s] position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law would have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the plea proceeding.” See id. at 187-189 , 146 A.3d at 1174 -75 (quoting Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 582 , 7 A.3d ⁵⁷¹ 557, 565 (2010)). Moreover, the intermediate appellate court went on to consider, only for the purposes of argument, “that the term ‘executed incarceration’ ” was ambiguous. Id. at 187, 146 A.3d at 1174 .

The court concluded a reasonable person in Petitioner’s position, unaware of the niceties of sentencing law, would have understood the meaning of “executed incarceration,” Id. at 187-94 , 146 A.3d at 1174-78 . We granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari, Ray v. State, 451 Md. 249 , 152 A.3d 753 (2017), to consider the following questions: 1. Under this Court’s decisions in Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 [, 7 A.3d 557 ] ( 2010), and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 [, 7 A.3d 578 ] (2010), which require that a plea agreement be construed according to what a reasonable lay person in [Petitioner’s] position, unaware of the niceties of sentencing law, would understand it to mean, would a reasonable lay person understand “a cap of four years on executed incarceration” to mean that the court could impose suspended time in addition to a four-year term of non-suspended incarceration? 2. Where the circuit court bound itself to a “cap of four years on executed incarceration,” but the term “executed” was never explained to Petitioner and he was never informed that the court could impose suspended time in addition to incarceration for up to four years, and the court sentenced him to ten years’ incarceration, with six years suspended, is the sentence imposed on Petitioner illegal?

DISCUSSION Parties’ Contentions Petitioner maintains that under the agreement with the State, which the circuit court approved, Petitioner was entitled to a maximum total sentence not exceeding four years. The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to ten years’ incarceration, with six years suspended, and four years of probation. Thus, Petitioner urges that the circuit court exceeded the maximum ⁵⁷² sentence authorized by the agreement, thereby imposing an illegal sentence. In response, the State argues that the circuit court sentenced Petitioner within the terms and sentencing cap of Petitioner’s negotiated agreement, as the executed portion of Petitioner’s sentence was capped at four years.

The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that Petitioner’s agreement was clear and unequivocal, and the sentence imposed by the circuit court fully complied with that agreement. Standard of Review If a trial court approves an agreement reached by the parties, “the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement ....” Md. Rule 4—243(c)(3); see also Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 523 , 583 A.2d 710, 714 (1991) (“When the judge accepted the pleas, the agreement as to punishment came into full bloom; it stood approved by the judge. Thereafter, the agreement was inviolate, and the judge was required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment the agreed sentence.”). Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” The illegality must be inherent in the sentence.

See, e.g., Tshiwala v. State, 424 Md. 612, 619 , 37 A.3d 308, 312 (2012) (“[W]here the sentence imposed is not inherently illegal, and where the matter complained of is a procedural error, the complaint does not concern an illegal sentence for purposes of Rule 4-345(a).”). This Court has held that “a sentence imposed in violation of the maximum sentence identified in a binding plea agreement and thereby ‘fixed’ by that agreement as ‘the maximum sentence allowable by law,’ is ... an inherently illegal sentence!),]” and is cognizable under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503, 519 , 36 A.3d 499, 508 (2012) (quoting Dotson, 321 Md. at 524 , 583 A.2d at 714 ). “Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo.” ⁵⁷³ Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581 , 7 A.3d 557 . Interpretation of an agreement as to sentencing, including the question of whether the agreement’s language is ambiguous, is a question of law, subject to de novo review.

United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2007); cf. Towson v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 78 , 862 A.2d 941, 946 (2004) (“The interpretation of a contract, including the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law, subject to de novo review.”). The Cuffley Trilogy In support of the claim that his sentence was illegal, Petitioner points us to our decisions in Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 , 7 A.3d 557 (2010); Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 , 7 A.3d 578 (2010); and Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503 , 36 A.3d 499 (2012). Here, our brethren on the Court of Special Appeals coined these cases as the Cuffley Trilogy: The promulgation of the Cuffley Trilogy was truly a watershed. The Trilogy vastly expanded the potential for legitimate Rule 4-345(a) challenges.

Construing the meaning of a plea bargain, moreover, is a far more complicated and ad hoc exercise than was ever the construing of a statute in the simpler pre-Cuffley era. Rule 4-345(a) has taken on a much larger life and Maryland law is still adjusting to it. Ray v. State, 230 Md.App. 157, 174 , 146 A.3d 1157, 1167 (2016). Reflection on the Cuffley Trilogy provides the background for our clarification of the law governing plea agreement interpretation.

In Cuffley , we decided that a sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration, with all but six years of that term suspended in favor of five years’ probation, was illegal where the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding plea agreement that called for a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range of four to eight years’ incarceration. 416 Md. at 577, 7 A.3d at 562. During the plea proceeding, the prosecutor advised the court that the agreement called for a “sentence within the guidelines[,]” which was “four to eight years.” Id. at 584, 7 A.3d at 566-67. “Defense counsel added nothing to explain ⁵⁷⁴ further what the parties meant by that sentencing term,” Id. at 585, 7 A.3d at 567. The court then stated its understanding of the agreement: “The plea agreement, as I understand it, is that I will impose a sentence somewhere ’within the guidelines. The guidelines in this case are four to eight years.

Any conditions of probation are entirely within my discretion.” Id. at 585, 7 A.3d at 567. The circuit court subsequently sentenced Cuffley to “15 years at the Department of Correction, all but six years suspended, consecutive to the sentence imposed by [the judge who presided over the violation of probation]. Upon release the defendant will be placed on a period of probation for five years [with a number of special conditions].” Id. at 574, 7 A.3d at 560. We recognized that the circuit court violated the plea agreement by imposing a