Real Estate Central, Inc. v. Kramer

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee (Kramer), who styles himself a public relations consultant, sued appellant (REC) because it refused to pay him for his services. His declaration consisted of the eight common counts and a special count. The trial judge, Shure, J., sitting without a jury, entered a judgment in the amount of $1,574 in favor of Kramer against REC.

Although Kramer’s claim was for a larger amount he has not appealed. Kramer and James S. Gibson met for the first time in November 1966. In January 1967 they discussed Gibson’s plans to set up a real estate marketing business. As a result of that discussion and a few later ones Kramer was engaged by Gibson to render services as a public relations consultant.

Kramer contends that he was to be paid $150 per day, $50 of which was to be paid upon the submission of a monthly bill; the balance ($100 per day) was to be paid six months later when the corporation to be formed (REC) would be a going concern. Gibson, on the other hand, contends that the $100 per day was to be paid only as a bonus if Kramer’s proposals “were approved and carried out.” In his oral opinion Judge Shure said: “There is substantial evidence to show that he did some work during January, February and March of 1967. * * * The exhibits in evidence show that he did make some contributions on some of the materials which he participated in, at least, that were in use and are still in use. The defendant company is still in business and apparently doing very well, since Mr. Gibson, the president of the defendant corporation states that they now have eight salesmen; and it is indeed fortunate that they are doing as well as they seem to be.” ²⁹² “The Court having found that a prima facie case was made out will allow as follows': six- ■ teen hundred dollars for sixteen days, less twenty-six dollars which is the amount that the defendant states he was required to pay for this error which is attributed without contradiction to the plaintiff.” I. REC assigns error in that Judge Shure refused to grant a motion for a judgment of non-pros on the ground that Kramer did not comply with its demand for particulars. We have set forth in full REC’s initial defensive pleading: “Defendant, Real Estate Central, Inc. by its attorney, Harry P. Anestos, in answer to the Declaration, pleads: “1.

The allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 [the common counts], and 9 are denied. “2. Further answering the Declaration, Defendant alleges that it never was indebted as alleged and that it never promised as alleged. “3. Defendant further demands and requires the Plaintiff to file a Bill of Particulars setting forth a more specific and detailed statement of the alleged claim.” As pleadings go this, without doubt, is a rara avis. We shall assume that REC intended by the first and second paragraphs to plead the general issue.

Judge Shure, quite properly, held that the demand for particulars was too late. In White Automobile Co. v. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251,