Reddick v. State

HPndiJrsox, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from a judgment and sentence to a term of five years in the Maryland Penitentiary, following a general verdict of guilty by a jury upon a ten count indictment charging forgery and uttering, and attempting to forge or utter, a license to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Maryland, issued on or about October 19, 1957, and unlawfully affixing and making use of a public seal of the State. The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the appellant failed to print in his record extract all of the testimony necessary to the determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, in violation of Maryland Rule 828 b. At the hearing of the appeal we reserved judgment on the motion.

Since the record extract contains at least enough to permit us to pass on the motion to dismiss the indictment, we think the motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied. The appellant was formerly the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board of Medical Examiners representing the Maryland State Homeopathic Medical Society. However, prior to the time alleged in the indictment, he had resigned as a member of the Board of Medical Examiners, and subsequently, by -decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, he was permanently restrained and enjoined from conducting examinations and issuing licenses for the practice of medicine and surgery in this State. The decree was affirmed by this Court on April 9, 1957, and motion for reargument was denied, May 9, 1957.

Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18 . The evidence in the instant case was to the effect that Dr. Reddick, nevertheless, issued a license to practice medicine and surgery to one Joseph Biscardi, an automobile mechanic without professional qualifications, in October, 1957. The certificate, in the required statutory form, bore the facsimile seal of the State and the imprint of the seal of the Society, and was dated December 27, 1955. It falsely recited that Biscardi ⁹⁸ had been examined by the Board and found proficient and qualified to practice medicine and surgery, and it .was signed by Robert D. Brown as President and Robert H. Reddick as Secretary of the Society.

The appellant’s first contention is that the indictment did not charge any offense. As to the first eight counts charging forgery and uttering, he points out that Code (1957), Art. 43, Sec. 119 et seq., do not purport to deal with the unlawful issuance of a medical license, but merely prescribe penalties for practicing without a license. This would seem to overlook the fact that Code (1957), Art. 27, Sec. 45, under the sub-title “Public documents generally”, makes it a crime, and a felony, to falsely make, forge or counterfeit “any commission, patent or pardon, * * * with intention to defraud any person or persons, * * The penalty is from two to ten years in the Penitentiary. See also Code (1957), Art. 27, Sec. 46, relating to unlawfully affixing a public seal.

It may well be that the term “commission” could be construed to include a license to practice medicine and surgery issued by a public agency to which is delegated a part of the police power of the State. See Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 544 , certiorari denied 348 U. S. 880 . But if we assume, without deciding, that the statute does not cover the case at bar, it would seem that the indictment for forgery and uttering would be good at common law. See Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J. 219.

Forgery has been defined as “the false making or material alteration, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability.” 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson’s ed.), Sec. 621. See also Clark and Marshall, Crimes (5th ed.), Sec. 398. Even where a statute has been enacted covering forgery, the common law offense is still applicable where the statute was not intended to cover the whole field or to repeal the common law. Clark and Marshall, supra, Sec. 14; Joyce, Indictments, Sec. 14.

Cf. Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15 . The appellant argues