Reed v. State

BISHOP, Judge. The question presented in this appeal is whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that he was denied his statutory and/or constitutional rights to a speedy trial. CHRONOLOGY December 31, 1986: The appellant is arrested and charged with two separate counts of battery. January 30, 1987: The appellant appears for trial in the District Court.

The trial is postponed at the request of the State because a complaining witness is ill. March 9, 1987: The appellant appears again in the District Court and requests a jury trial. March 26, 1987: The appellant is arraigned in circuit court. He enters a plea of not guilty and requests a jury trial. ⁵²⁶ June 25, 1987: The appellant appears before Judge Hilary Caplan and requests a severance of the two charges; he requests that one charge be tried by a jury and that the other be tried by the court.

The following occurs: MS. MATTHEWS [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, in view of the fact that Mr. Reed requested a judge trial, a court trial on the first incident — well, the only thing we would be asking would be to have that trial, it shouldn’t take very long and then after that trial is finished, we could then request— THE COURT: Well, I am not saying they should be presented in a sense of the same time, but on the same day. Certainly should be tried at the same time. If there is any prejudice because of the witnesses’ testimony, which over-spills into the second trial, that is your concern, and that is my concern as well; however, I don’t think that, at this time, there is sufficient evidence for this court to grant your motion to sever.

So, I’m denying your motion to sever unless there is something additional that you come up with that gives the court that hears this case the opportunity to do that. In any event, the court is unable to hear this case today because of the schedule that it has. I have to postpone. Is there a Hicks problem in the case?

MS. MATTHEWS: It was arraigned on 3/26/87. Your Honor, we would be objecting to the postponement. THE COURT: Well, I’m going to find that there is good cause since no court is available at this time.

We will reschedule the case as soon as possible and ask counsel to get together and reschedule within the next six weeks so the gentleman can be tried immediately. The gentleman is incarcerated. MR. GASKINS [Prosecutor]: Hicks date, I believe, is September 24, '87.

THE COURT: Well, I want you to get together within the next six weeks so there is ample opportunity to summon witnesses, so you both can try the case as quickly as possible. ⁵²⁷ The Postponement Form shows “No court available” as the reason for postponement. August 21, 1987: The appellant appears before Judge Mary Arabian and renews his request for separate court and jury trials on the two charges. The following occurs: THE COURT: They are both going to have to be postponed because Ms. Holland [Prosecutor] is in another jury trial. You can’t have any of it today.

MR. WEINER [Defense Counsel]: Is that saying that the motions are granted or is the Court denying such at this time? THE COURT: I don’t want to make the decision. DEFENDANT REED: The case has been postponed.

MR. WEINER: I would note that this case has been in before. DEFENDANT REED: It has been postponed four times. MR.

WEINER: It was postponed on January 25th and around March 6th in the Circuit [sic] Court. THE COURT: This case already had a decision on the severance and that is binding on any Judge in this case. The motion to sever has already been denied by Judge Hilary Caplan, and Hicks’ was waived. I find good cause and I don’t have to ask for a waiver.

MR. WEINER: May I just for the record object. THE COURT: You certainly can. MR.

WEINER: Because Mr. Reed is anxious to have this matter fully litigated. DEFENDANT REED: Yes, I am. THE COURT: I can’t try but one at a time. MR.

WEINER: I understand. THE COURT: There is already a jury trial in progress. I already agreed to Ms. Holland starting right away. DEFENDANT REED: Excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There are no other courts available. DEFENDANT REED: Is Judge Caplan aware of that? Judge Caplan asked that it be brought back in a six week ⁵²⁸ period or a seven week period and now each time it comes back it’s just impossible for me to have my day in court. THE COURT: There are a lot of people who have to wait, you are not the only one.

DEFENDANT REED: I have been waiting and I am sure you are aware I have been here prior to me being here more so than I was aware of. THE COURT: I am sorry about it, there is nothing I can do about it. DEFENDANT REED: What about possible arrangements that can be made for me to have my case heard today. THE COURT: Today?

DEFENDANT REED: Yes. THE COURT: None. I cannot try more than one at a time. ****** DEFENDANT REED: So, basically this is just an arraignment proceeding here? THE COURT: It is just a postponement, that is all it is.

DEFENDANT REED: When will I be back? THE COURT: Roughly three weeks. MR. WEINER: They normally don’t come back in three weeks.

THE COURT: I think that would be fair to say, I think three weeks or almost a month. I would like to see him tried within the Hicks time. MR. WEINER: I will try to find out who is handling the case and see if it can go to criminal assignment and get a date certain.

DEFENDANT REED: I have been incarcerated for eight months and two months ago this is exactly the same thing that happened to Judge Kaplan [sic], and we are here today before another Judge and I am going through the same thing now. THE COURT: Well, the person that is going to try you is also entitled to be here. ⁵²⁹ The Postponement Form shows “No court available” as the reason for postponement. September 22, 1987: The 180th day after arraignment. October 29, 1987: The case is postponed by Judge Arrie Davis.

Although there is no transcript of proceedings on that date in the record, the Postponement Form shows “No courtroom available” as the reason for postponement. That form also shows that the prosecutor agrees and defense counsel disagrees with the request. “Good cause shown for postponement” is checked. November 25, 1987: The appellant files a pro se Motion for Speedy Trial. Defense counsel files a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the appellant has been denied his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

December 22, 1987: The appellant appears before Judge Robert Hammerman, pleads not guilty, and elects a jury trial. The following occurs: THE COURT: All right. As I believe you know, Mr. German [Defense Counsel], that cannot be tried now. We are beginning another Jury trial that Miss Watts [Prosecutor] is involved in, so the case will have to be postponed for that reason.

So, thank you. That will conclude the hearing. THE DEFENDANT: Does His Honor know that I’ve been incarcerated since last year, that I’ve made four previous experiences for Jury trials? THE COURT: Well, all I can explain to you, Mr. Reed, is that the State is not trying you promptly and if it’s violating your right to a speedy trial you have an attorney who can exercise those rights for you.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I’ve been told that every time I came. I filed my own motions for speedy trial, dismissal motion, motion for bail reviews and alternatives and different things, you know. There has been no response. The only letter that I have here is from Judge Hilary Caplan, the Administrative Judge, telling me these things.

I’ve also sent them to Miss Banks, the ⁵³⁰ Clerk of the Court, as well as to the State's Attorney and I haven’t had any remedy at all. THE COURT: Well, again I say to you, Mr. Reed, you have an attorney representing you. He is familiar with the statutory rights to a speedy trial and he will do what has to be done to properly represent your interests. THE DEFENDANT: My interests hasn’t been properly represented for a whole year and they have known this for a whole year.

THE COURT: The case will be postponed and thank you, Counsel. That will conclude the hearing. MISS WATTS: Your Honor, would the Court find good cause for the postponement? THE COURT: The Court will find good cause.

MISS WATTS: The unavailability of Court. THE COURT: The unavailability of the State’s Attorney who is tied up in other Jury trials at this time. The Postponement Form, however, shows “No court available” as the reason for postponement. January 26, 1988: The appellant appears before Judge John Themelis.

Counsel present argument on the Motion to Dismiss. The case is continued. February 10, 1988: The appellant appears before Judge Themelis. Argument on the Motion to Dismiss continues.

The State presents documentary evidence and testimony of the Deputy Criminal Assignment Commissioner to show that: 1. All judges assigned to misdemeanor courts were designated by the administrative judge to grant postponements pursuant to Md.Rule 4-271. 2. After each postponement in the instant case, the next available trial date was assigned. 3. The use of the “move list” [see State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984)] for misdemeanor cases had been discontinued. ⁵³¹ 4.

The influx of misdemeanor cases was such that they could not be tried more expeditiously by the limited judicial resources. Following further argument, the court denies the Motion to Dismiss. After an off-the-record discussion, the case is called for trial and the following occurs: MR. WEINER: Charles Weiner, Assistant Public Defender on behalf of Mr. Gordon Reed.

For the record, I am objecting, I suppose, in a sense, to the proceeding, inasmuch as we feel our speedy trial right and his rights have been denied. We do specifically proceed with the understanding that we do nothing to prejudice our position as regards an impending appeal on these matters. To that end, Your Honor, we would at this time like to enter a plea of not guilty to the charges. We do so with the understanding that we will be securing a sentence from the court, which will— THE COURT: Release him.

MR. WEINER: Which will release Mr. Reed from the Baltimore City Jail. He will no longer be held on charges. The court questions the appellant and determines that he agrees to be tried on a “statement of facts” with the understanding that, if he is found guilty, the court will impose a three-year sentence and suspend execution of all except time served in favor of a three-year term of probation.

The State presents a “statement of facts” (more accurately described as a stipulation of the State’s evi dence — see Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25 , 354 A.2d 499 (1976) for a discussion of the distinction). After the court announces its verdict of “guilty”, defense counsel makes the following comments: I would like Your Honor to know that Mr. Reed says it didn’t happen that way, Judge. And, I think, Your Honor knows why we proceeded in this particular fashion. ⁵³² I don’t want Mr. Reed to feel at this particular point that he has to spend any greater period of time in his allocution trying to refute that the statement of facts is improper. That’s the only reason I make this statement.

I want to make sure Mr. Reed understands that we do not mean to be agreeing with what the State just presented for the purpose of these proceedings and that we have proceeded in this fashion because in light of everything else that has happened in the case, it does work to Mr. Reed’s benefit that we do proceed on this basis. The court imposes sentence in accordance with the “bargain.” THE ISSUES The appellant presents four arguments in support of his claim that he was denied his statutory and/or constitutional rights to a speedy trial: 1. That trial was postponed beyond the time permitted by statute without “good cause” because the judge who granted the postponement did not contemplate that the trial would be scheduled after the deadline. 2. That the judge who granted the postponement beyond the statutory deadline was not a proper designee of the administrative judge because the practice of designating all misdemeanor court judges violated the spirit and intent of the statute. 3.

That the reason for postponement beyond the statutory deadline did not amount to “good cause” under the circumstances of this case. 4. That the delay between the appellant’s arrest and trial, under the circumstances of this case, was sufficiently inordinate to constitute a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. THE LAW The Statutory Right Article 27, § 591 of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides: ⁵³³ Trial date. (a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court: (1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: (1) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and (2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.

(b) On motion of a party or on the court’s initiative and for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date. (c) The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts. (1971, ch. 212; 1980, ch. 378; 1982, ch. 820, § 1; 1987, ch. 222.) Similarly, Maryland Rule 4-271(a) states: TRIAL DATE (a) Trial Date in Circuit Court. — The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 40213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. On motion of a party, or on the court’s initiative, and