Reid v. State

RODOWSKY, Judge. Willie Reid (Reid) was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the murders and robberies of Irvin and Rose Bronstein and of conspiracy to rob. Reid was a principal in the first degree to the murder of Mrs. Bronstein, for which the jury sentenced him to death. On appeal to this Court Reid raised, in addition to the claimed disproportionality of the death sentence in his case, two issues relating to guilt or innocence and fourteen issues relating to the death sentence.

In an opinion filed November 8, 1985, we found no merit in Reid’s contentions of error at the trial on guilt or innocence. On the basis of the record then before us, we found that at the sentencing hearing the trial judge improperly excluded two character letters offered by Reid, each of which purported to be from an official at the Baltimore City Jail. Consequently, we would have issued a mandate affirming the convictions and sentences, except as ¹³ to the death sentence which the mandate would have vacated with a remand for a new sentencing proceeding. On November 22, 1985, the State filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Stay of Issuance of Mandate, with supporting affidavits from the Warden of the Báltimore City Jail, and from the Administrative Director of therapeutic programs at that facility.

The substance of the State’s motion and of the affidavits is “that the writers of [the two] letters do not exist, and that the letters are thus bogus.” The State requests that we remand this case pursuant to Maryland Rule 871 for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of authenticity “with directions that if the circuit court finds that the letters are authentic, it shall proceed with resentencing, and if the circuit court finds that the letters are not authentic, it shall return the record to this Court for review of Appellant’s remaining challenges to his sentence.” As a result of our decision, hereinafter explained, to grant the State’s motion we have today directed the Clerk of this Court to withdraw the opinion filed on November 8, 1985. A copy of that opinion is attached hereto for informational purposes and is marked “Appendix A.” We hereby incorporate by reference into this opinion parts I A and I B from Appendix A. For the reasons therein set forth there is no error in the judgments of conviction. Reid filed a response to the Motion for Reconsideration raising three grounds of opposition: (1) the death penalty statute does not permit a limited remand; (2) objection to the letters on the basis of authenticity was waived; and (3) Rule 871 cannot be used to correct errors committed during the trial itself. For the following reasons we reject Reid’s arguments.

(1) Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 414(f) provides that, with regard to the death sentence, [this] Court shall: ¹⁴ (i) Affirm the sentence; (ii) Set aside the sentence and remand the case for the conduct of a new sentencing proceeding under § 413; or (iii) Set aside the sentence and remand for modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life. These provisions do not apply at this stage of the case. They relate to a mandate which finally adjudicates the merits of a death sentence review. No mandate issued under the opinion attached as Appendix A. We do not reach the merits of the death sentence in this opinion and do not issue any mandate finally adjudicating the merits of the death sentence review.

Section 414(f) is not an implied repeal of MD.R. 871. Further, § 414(f) cannot have the effect of precluding a limited remand. See Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511 , 474 A.2d 890 (1984) (limited remand entered in capital case without vacating death sentence, to determine under former Md.R. 73111 whether appellant had been denied effective representation of counsel). (2) Because the grounds given by the State at the sentencing hearing for its objection to the letters never raised an issue of authenticity, Reid argues that any authenticity objection has been waived.

Of course, by offering the letters, Reid impliedly represented that they were genuine. Indeed, defense trial counsel expressly and on the record represented, presumably innocently, to the State, to the trial court, and thereby to this Court that the character letters were “from individuals who know Mr. Reid.” Whatever the extent of the State’s waiver might be for purposes of reviewing objections on evidentiary grounds, the waiver does not extend to a waiver of any opportunity to demonstrate that the letters are in fact bogus, if such an opportunity is allowed by this Court under MD.R. 871. ¹⁵ (3) MD.R. 871 in pertinent part provides: If it shall appear to this Court that the substantial merits of a case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment from which the appeal was taken, or that the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in the cause, either through amendment of the pleadings, introduction of additional evidence, making of additional parties, or otherwise, then this Court, instead of entering a final order affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment from which the appeal was taken, may order the case to be remanded to the appropriate court. Reid contends that the issue of whether the letters are genuine or bogus cannot be addressed under MD.R. 871 because it is not collateral to the proceedings. Reid refers to Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357 , 289 A.2d 575, 579 (1972), where we said that MD.R. 871 may be suitable to correct procedures subsidiary to the criminal trial, [but] it can never be utilized to rectify prejudicial errors committed during the trial itself.

The admissibility of a confession is always an integral part of the trial. This is not only true of the confession, per se, but also encompasses the entire process of ascertaining, prima facie, that it was legally obtained. [Footnote omitted.] In Gill a trial judge, sitting nonjury, had admitted a confession without the State’s having made a prima facie showing of voluntariness. Under a Rule 1071 remand, which the Court of Special Appeals had ordered, evidence of voluntariness given by the police officers who had custody of Gill when his confession was obtained would, under the Maryland procedure, have to have been re-evaluated in connection with all the evidence of guilt or innocence, even in a bench trial. Consequently the issue on remand was integral and not collateral to the trial. ¹⁶ Gill was distinguished in Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425 , 430 A.2d 588 (1981).

The question there was whether Wiener’s right to the effective assistance of counsel had been prejudiced because an undercover agent for the Attorney General was employed in the office of the District Public Defender who was representing Wiener. We said that “[ujnlike the issue relating to the voluntariness of the confession in Gill , evidence given in support of, or in opposition to, Wiener’s motion to dismiss is not presented again in the course of the trial for consideration with all of the evidence bearing on guilt or innocence.” Id. at 438 , 430 A.2d at 596 . On our remand without affirmance or reversal, for the purpose of conducting a new hearing, we specifically stated the additional evidence “may include evidence directed to demonstrating and negating prejudice arising from [the undercover agent’s] receipt of information in Wiener’s statement, from defense suggestions made by [the undercover agent], or otherwise.” Id. Rule 871 was employed in Warrick v. State, 302 Md. 162, 486 A.2d 189 (1985).

There we held that the trial court had erred by misconstruing a discovery rule when the court concluded that the State had not violated its obligations under those rules. On remand the trial court was to determine whether the State possessed any information which should have been produced. If that were the fact, the trial court was then to exercise discretion as to the sanction, including “evaluating whether a discovery violation has caused prejudice.” Id. at 173 , 486 A.2d at 194 . See Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650 , 496 A.2d 665 (1985) (Rule 871 remand to determine, inter alia, prejudice, if any, from discovery violation).

With respect to the Rule 871 motion now before us, a remand to determine whether the letters are genuine or bogus will, as in Wiener, Warrick, and Bailey , determine whether there has been any prejudice. A remand in the instant matter is not for the purpose of giving the State an opportunity to demonstrate that what appeared to be error from the record presented to us for review was not error. ¹⁷ The remand here will determine whether there has been a fraud on the court by presenting bogus letters as evidence. If it is determined that the letters are bogus, there can be no prejudice. Denial of an advantage obtained through working a fraud on the court is not prejudice.

We recognize that the fraud alleged by the State in its motion is “intrinsic” as opposed to “extrinsic” fraud. See Schwartz v. Merchants Mortgage Co., 272 Md. 305 , 322 A.2d 544 (1974). Intrinsic fraud, which includes forged documents and perjured testimony, is not a basis for vacating an enrolled decree under “the principle that, once parties have had the opportunity to present before a court a matter for investigation and determination, and once the decision has been rendered and the litigants, if they so choose, have exhausted every means of reviewing it, the public policy of this State demands that there be an end to that litigation.” Id. at 308 , 322 A.2d at 546 (emphasis added). Here the mandate has not issued so intrinsic fraud may be considered.

We shall exercise our discretion under MD.R. 871 and grant the requested remand because of the unique facts in this case. Under its motion and supporting affidavits the State proposes to prove not simply that the content of the character letters is mistaken, inaccurate, or untrue but that the purported authors thereof do not exist. The remand will not be a rehashing of credibility issues. Whether the purported authors ever existed and thus, whether a fraud was committed on the court, can be determined objectively and from a review of public records as well as from live witness testimony under the peculiar facts in this case.

From the content of the character letters one of the authors is represented to be Matthew Saunders, a captain at the Baltimore City Jail where he had been a correctional officer for eleven years and had been acquainted with Reid for one year preceding June 23, 1984. The other author was represented to be Vance Rosenbaum, Director of Treatment at the therapeutic community at the ¹⁸ Baltimore City Jail known as Eager Village, where Rosenbaum is said to have been employed from at least June of 1983 to June 22, 1984. These representations of objective, historic, and readily determinable facts justify in this case applying the Rule 871 powers. On remand the circuit court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the two letters are bogus in that their purported authors do not exist.

If the court finds that the letters were in fact written by real persons who are the persons described by the content of the letters as the respective authors thereof, then the court should set aside the death sentence and promptly schedule a new sentencing hearing. If, on the other hand, the circuit court concludes that the letters are bogus because the persons described by the content of the letters as the respective authors thereof are not in fact real persons, then we shall review the death sentence as we are required to do by statute. See Art. 27, § 414(a); Harris v. State, supra. JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED, EXCEPT AS TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR MURDER.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GRANTED. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY WITHOUT AFFIRMANCE OR REVERSAL OF THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION. MANDATE SHALL ISSUE FORTHWITH. APPENDIX A (Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in No. 7, September Term, 1985 — Willie Reid AKA William Rogers v. State of Maryland, filed November 8, 1985; withdrawn December 17th, 1985) Appellant, Willie Reid (Reid), was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the murders and robberies of ¹⁹ Irvin and Rose Bronstein and of conspiracy to rob. 1 Reid was a principal in the first degree to the murder of Mrs. Bronstein, for which the jury sentenced Reid to death. 2 The cases are before us on appeals and a capital sentence review pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 414.

We shall remand for a new sentencing proceeding in the capital case and in all other respects we shall affirm. The bodies of the victims were found on May 20, 1983, in the living room of their home, a bungalow in the Pimlico section of Baltimore City. Each had been stabbed to death, with twelve stab wounds each. Mrs. Bronstein’s body lay face down on the floor with her hands tied in front of her and with a scarf tied around her head.

Mr. Bronstein’s body was sprawled on a couch. His hands had been bound behind his back with a belt and he was gagged. There was a hood or cover over his face. The house had been ransacked.

The jury could have found from the State’s proof that the Bronsteins were murdered by Reid and a John Marvin Booth (Booth) late in the afternoon of May 18, 1983. Booth resided at his mother’s home located two houses from the Bronsteins’ domicile. In the evening of May 18 Reid and Booth, with jewelry taken from the Bronsteins, went to the apartment at 400 North Aisquith Street of Yeronda Mazyck (Veronda), the woman with whom Reid was then living. After Booth’s wife, Jewell, arrived at the apartment, the two couples returned to the Bronstein home to loot it further.

They brought the loot back to Veronda’s apartment in the Bronsteins’ car. Part of the loot was fenced or bartered for hard drugs. ²⁰ Veronda’s brother, 14-year-old Henry Mazyck (Henry), had been babysitting with her two children at the Aisquith Street apartment on the night of May 18, 1983. The next morning Reid admitted to Henry that Reid had stabbed Mrs. Bronstein while Booth had stabbed Mr. Bronstein. Reid raises sixteen issues in addition to the claimed disproportionality of the death sentence in his case.

We need consider only (I) the alleged trial errors and (II) certain proof offered by Reid but excluded at sentencing. I A The State opened its case with the testimony of the Bronsteins’ son, who had discovered their bodies, and of the first police officer to arrive at the scene. Each described what he had observed. The next witness was the homicide detective who had been in charge of the. investigation.

Through him the State introduced a series of photographs presenting various rooms in the Bronstein home, most of which had been ransacked. Reid unsuccessfully objected to photographs of the living room which included the victims’ bodies. He argued that the scene had been adequately described orally by the prior witnesses and that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed any assistance which they might give the jury. The admissibility of photographs is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and that discretion will not be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary.

Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502 , 495 A.2d 1, 8 (1985). The photographs objected to in the instant matter are in black and white. They do not focus on the wounds of either victim. While some bloodstains are visible on the clothing of each victim, the photographs are not close-ups of the wounds and do not highlight the bloodstains in any way.

Indeed, later in the trial the court excluded autopsy photographs which clearly depicted the wounds. There was no abuse of discretion, particularly in lgiht of the fact that the State was ²¹ seeking first-degree murder convictions against Reid on the basis of premeditation as well as on a felony murder theory. The photographs present more clearly than words what the witnesses were attempting to describe concerning the bindings and the covers over the faces of the victims. B Appellant also complains of the trial judge’s having assisted Henry Mazyck’s in-court identification.

There was no objection when the witness was testifying on June 12, 1984. The jury began its deliberations on guilt or innocence on Thursday, June 14, and deliberated throughout Friday, June 15. Just before 6 p.m. on that date defense counsel, at the request of Reid,