Republic Properties Corp. v. MISSION WEST PROPERTIES, LP.

⁷³⁶ HARRELL, Judge. “In the late 1930s, Winston Churchill disclaimed any ability to forecast the Soviet Union’s reaction to Nazi aggression, reputedly terming the Russian colossus ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’ That phrase might just as aptly describe the doctrinal vagaries of the concept of personal jurisdiction.” Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir.1990). The numerous interconnected business entities involved in the present case further complicate this already challenging area of the law. We consider here whether a Maryland state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign limited partnership whose only connection to Maryland consists of its corporate managing general partner’s re-incorporation in Maryland. We consider also whether that general partner itself may be held liable for the actions of the foreign limited partnership entity, occurring outside of Maryland, in a contractual dispute among the partners of a second, distinct foreign limited partnership of which the first foreign limited partnership is the general partner.

I. The premise of the cause of action underlying this case is about its only relatively straight-forward aspect. 1 Hellyer Avenue Limited Partnership (“HALP”) was established in the summer of 2000, pursuant to the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act, for the purpose of developing, constructing, and managing a headquarters building in California for a communications company. The principal office and place of business of HALP also is in California. HALP consists of: Mission West Properties, L.P. (“MWLP”), the managing general partner and registered agent of HALP; Republic Properties Corporation (“Republic”), also a general partner of HALP; and Steven Grigg (“Grigg”), David Peter (“Peter”), ⁷³⁷ and Mentmore Partners LLC (“Mentmore”), the three limited partners of HALP.

The present action was brought by Republic, Grigg, Peter, and Mentmore (collectively the “Suing HALP Partners”) against MWLP, the managing general partner of HALP, and Mission West Properties, Inc. (“MWINC”), the general partner of MWLP. MWLP was formed as a limited partnership under Delaware law, but maintains its principal place of business in California. MWINC, the general partner of MWLP, was incorporated initially under the laws of California as a real estate investment trust, but later was re-incorporated in 1999 under the laws of Maryland. As required under Maryland law, MWINC named a registered agent in Maryland as part of its re-incorporation under Maryland law.

The Suing HALP Partners filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that MWLP, acting through its general partner MWINC, breached the HALP partnership agreement by improperly diluting the interests of the Suing HALP Partners in HALP and failing to make owed distributions. The complaint named as defendants MWLP and MWINC. The Circuit Court denied MWLP’s and MWINC’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After a week-long bench trial, the trial judge concluded that, under California law, MWLP and MWINC breached the partnership agreement.

Accordingly, judgments for damages were entered in favor of the Suing HALP Partners against both defendants jointly and severally. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, Mission West Properties, L.P. v. Republic Properties Corporation, 162 Md.App. 17 , 873 A.2d 372 (2005), vacated the judgments against MWLP and MWINC. The intermediate appellate court determined that the Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over MWLP. Mission West, 162 Md. App. at 38 , 873 A.2d at 384 .

Because MWLP was not domiciled in Maryland, and although “MWLP was properly served with process in Maryland,” it “never conducted any activity of any kind in Maryland.” Mission West, 162 Md. ⁷³⁸ App. at 30, 37, 873 A.2d at 380, 384 (Emphasis in original). Derivative of its conclusion regarding MWLP, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment against MWINC as “MWINC face[d] liability only by virtue of its status as corporate general partner of MWLP.” Mission West, 162 Md.App. at 38 , 873 A.2d at 385 . We granted the Suing HALP Partners’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider whether: (1) the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over MWLP where the foreign limited partnership was served with process upon the Maryland resident agent of its general partner, MWINC, 2 a corporation that re-incorporated in Maryland, and (2) the Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court against MWINC “because MWINC face[d] liability only by virtue of its status as corporate general partner of MWLP.” 3 Republic v. Mission West, 388 Md. 97 , 879 A.2d 42 (2005). ⁷³⁹ II. The Court of Special Appeals ably stated the relevant facts and procedural posture of this case: 4 Stellex Microwave Systems, Inc. (Stellex Microwave) was a high-tech communications company with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California.

The company’s management wanted to relocate its headquarters to the Silicon Valley region of California, but the company could not afford to build such a facility and could not obtain suitable financing. Stellex Microwave was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Stellex Industries, Inc. (“Stellex Industries”), also known as Stellex Technologies, Inc. Stellex Industries was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mentmore Holdings Corporation, which, in turn, was owned by two trusts. Stellex Microwave’s management tried to negotiate a deal with Carl Berg, a prominent Silicon Valley real estate developer. He “controls” a California construction company called Berg & Berg Enterprises (B & B).n Berg is also president and CEO of MWINC, a real estate investment trust incorporated under the laws of California and reincorporated under the laws of Maryland, with its principal place of business in California.

MWINC is the corporate general partner of MWLP, which itself is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal place of business in California. Nothing in the record shows that either MWINC or MWLP ever transacted any business in Maryland. ⁷⁴⁰ Stellex Microwave’s negotiations with Berg were unsuccessful. As a fallback measure, Stellex Microwave contracted with Republic, a corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia, with its principal place of business there. Under their agreement, Republic was to provide a headquarters to Stellex Microwave.

Steven Grigg and David Peter, both officers of Republic, restarted negotiations with Berg on behalf of Stellex Microwave. Through negotiations, Grigg, Peter, and Berg agreed that all the parties would form a joint-venture limited partnership to construct a headquarters for Stellex Microwave. The partnership would then lease the facility to that company, with the partnership itself being the landlord. B & B owned a suitable lot on Hellyer Avenue in San Jose, California, so they named their partnership the Hellyer Avenue Limited Partnership (HALP).

The constituents of HALP were MWLP, as managing general partner, Republic, as general partner, Grigg and Peter individually, as limited partners, and Mentmore Partners LLC, a Delaware company with its principal place of business in New York. Mentmore Partners was established by Richard Kramer and William Remley for the sole purpose of holding an interest in HALP/] MWLP held a 50% interest in the partnership, and the interests of all the other partners (all of whom were affiliated with Kramer and Remley) held the other 50%. The HALP limited partnership agreement essentially conditioned the membership of all partners except MWLP on Stellex Microwave’s payment of all its obligations under the lease. MWLP contends that one of those obligations was paying B & B for certain work Stellex Microwave hired B & B to do on the facility; appellees dispute that that payment was an obligation under the lease.

MWLP asserts that payment was not timely made to B & B, that Stellex Microwave defaulted and the default was never cured, and accordingly, MWLP purported to expel all the other partners and stopped paying them their distributions from HALP’s income/] ⁷⁴¹ Appellees, therefore, brought suit against MWLP for the distributions they contend were owed. The circuit court denied appellants’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction:[ 5 ] I have thought again about the integration and the operation of the partnership statutes, the California Revised Partnership Act and, as it is characterized in the California Revised Limited Partnership Act, and the arguments presented and I’m now satisfied that my ruling earlier was incorrect. I don’t believe that HELLYER is a necessary partyr 1.... The real effect and import of the integration of those California Statutes and the principles of partnership law satisfy me that, because a general partner can be sued for obligations of the partnership and jointly and severally liable, and because we have here, at least in part, one general partner from HELLYER suing another general partner and another entity, that the interests of HELLYER are necessarily effectively represented and protected by Mission West.

Without getting into the identities of what Mr. Berg’s connections are to all of this, because of the principles under the sections 15643 of the California statute and 16405, I am satisfied that [counsel for the Suing HALP Partners] arguments are correct and that I was incorrect earlier. I don’t need to worry or ⁷⁴² agonize any further over the issues that, in effect, I raised and I believe unnecessarily may have complicated this morning, so for that I apologize. * * * * * So, that being said, for the clerk’s benefit, and to note for her purposes, the motion of defendant Mission West Properties, L.P. and Mission West Properties Incorporated to dismiss or in the alternative to stay, is heard and denied. Moving on from there, what I would like to do, then— and I would, for whatever it’s worth, the got you (sic) provision of Maryland law, I think, is probably, as [counsel for the Suing HALP Partners] pointed out,—I did some further research, even though the cases that were noted don’t really address the issues—provides a, basis for sewice of process in Maryland, but that is an academic discussion at this point. After a bench trial, the trial judge concluded that MWLP wrongfully stopped payment of distributions to the other partners.

The court denied the relief requested by appellants under their counterclaim. (Emphasis in original) (Internal footnotes omitted). Mission West, 162 Md.App. at 21-25 , 873 A.2d at 374-77 .

III

Sections 6-102(a) and 6-103 6 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“C & JP”) Article of the Maryland Code ⁷⁴³ (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.) addresses the conditions for establishing personal jurisdiction in Maryland over non-resident defendants. In our analysis, we shall focus exclusively on C & JP § 6-102(a), 7 which provides that “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person domiciled in, served with process in, organized under the laws of, or who maintains his principal place of business in the State.” The Suing HALP Partners assert two theories, under C & JP § 6-102(a), by which a Maryland court could acquire and exercise personal jurisdiction over MWLP. We shall address each in turn. A. Petitioners argue that the Circuit Court possessed jurisdiction over MWLP because the general partner of MWLP was re-incorporated in Maryland, thus causing MWLP to be domiciled in the State as well.

As the Suing HALP Partners stated in their brief, “except for tax and other ⁷⁴⁴ liabilities and rights created specifically by statute, a partnership has no juridical existence except through its partners.” In McLane v. State Tax Commission, 156 Md. 133, 145-46 , 143 A. 656, 661 (1928), this Court, as Petitioners correctly noted, recognized that a partnership may be treated as a distinct legal entity for the purpose of taxation. We now also recognize that a limited partnership may be considered a distinct legal entity from its constituent partners for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction questions in our courts. A partnership is defined in the Maryland Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) of the Corporations and Associations (“C & A”) Article of the Maryland Code (1975, 1999 Repl.Vol.) as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit....” C & A § 9A-101(i). A limited partnership is defined under the Maryland Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“RULPA”), Md. Code (1975, 1999 Repl.Vol.), as “a partnership formed by two or more persons under the laws of the State and having one or more general partners and one or more limited partners.” C & A § 10-101(i).

An important similarity in the statutory treatment of the two business entities in Maryland is the application of an “entity” theory with regard to both. Under RUPA, which took effect in 1982, “[a] partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.” C & A § 9A-201. As we noted in Creel v. Lilly, 354 Md. 77, 89-90 , 729 A.2d 385, 392 (1999), RUPA’s underlying philosophy differs radically from UPA’s, [which governed partnerships before the enactment of RUPA,] thus laying the foundation for many of its innovative measures. RUPA adopts the “entity” theory of partnership as opposed to the “aggregate” theory that the UPA espouse[d].

Under the aggregate theory, a partnership is characterized by the collection of its individual members, with the result being that if one of the partners dies or withdraws, the partnership ceases to exist. On the other hand, RUPA’s entity theory allows for the partnership to continue even with -the departure of a member because it views the partnership as “an entity distinct from its partners.” (Internal citations omitted). ⁷⁴⁵ The Suing HALP Partners, quoting from C.T. Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 190 , 110 S.Ct. 1015, 1018 , 108 L.Ed.2d 157, 165 (1990), argue that the jurisdictional domicile of a limited partnership is the domicile of its partners because “while a corporation would be viewed as a legal entity for purposes of jurisdiction, all other entities ‘would be treated for purposes of the diversity statute pursuant to ... [t]he tradition of the common law, which is to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups and to assimilate all others to partnerships.’ ” (Internal quotations omitted). Yet, as the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion in the present case, see Mission West, 162 Md.App. at 29 , 873 A.2d at 379 , the Supreme Court, in C.T. Carden , was addressing only whether an artificial entity may be considered a “citizen” of the state under whose laws it was created with regard to subject matter jurisdiction, in the context specifically of determining diversity jurisdiction in federal courts. C.T. Carden, 494 U.S. at 187 , 110 S.Ct. at 1017 , 108 L.Ed.2d at 163 .

In addition, Maryland, through its statutes, applies the entity theory approach to partnerships and limited partnerships. Therefore, we find C.T. Carden not instructive in determining the domicile of a foreign limited partnership for purposes of personal jurisdiction in Maryland’s state courts. In the present case, we need not consider whether the state of formation of a limited partnership or the state in which the limited partnership maintains its principle place of business, or any combination of the two, is determinative of a limited partnership’s domicile. The state of incorporation of the corporate entity that may be a general partner (managing or otherwise) of a foreign limited partnership is not, however, the domicile of the limited partnership for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction in Maryland’s courts.

B. Alternatively, the Suing HALP Partners argue that MWLP was served with process in Maryland under Maryland Rule 2-124(1) because they served the Maryland resident ⁷⁴⁶ agent of MWLP’s general partner, MWINC, and, therefore, satisfied the basis of C & JP § 6-102(a) providing for jurisdiction “over a person ... served with process in ... the State.” Maryland Rule 2—124(f), which describes the procedure for serving a “limited partnership,” provides that “[sjervice is made upon a limited partnership by serving its resident agent. If the limited partnership has no resident agent or if a good faith attempt to serve the resident agent has failed, service may be made upon any general partner or other person expressly or impliedly authorized to receive service of process.” The Suing HALP Partners assert that service of process according to Rule 2—124(f) alone establishes a basis for personal jurisdiction over MWLP. Assuming that MWLP, a foreign limited partnership, was served properly with process through service on the Maryland resident agent of its general partner, MWINC, as outlined under Maryland Rule 2—124(f), 8 such service of pro ⁷⁴⁷ cess alone, under the circumstances in the present case, is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over MWLP. Rule 2—124(f) does not delimit the jurisdictional limits of Maryland courts, but rather serves as part of the service of process rules that define the procedural requirements that enable a Maryland court to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant where constitutionally permitted.

See Md. Rule l-201(b) (“These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of any court or, except as expressly provided, the venue of actions.”); One Hundred Twenty-Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Letter by the Rules Committee Chairman (Judge Alan M. Wilner) to the Court of Appeals (March 18, 1994) (“The amendments to Rules 2-124 and 3-124 are designed to make clear how service is to be effected on general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and unincorporated associations.”); One Hundred Twenty-Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 2-124, Reporter’s Note (1994) (stating that section (f) was “proposed to address a gap in the current rules, which do not ⁷⁴⁸ address service upon ... a limited partnership”). Therefore, satisfaction of the procedural requirement, Maryland Rule 2-124(f), does not confer, by itself, personal jurisdiction over MWLP by a Maryland state court. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 , 24 L.Ed. 565, 572 (1878), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that when an action “involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.” As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently noted, “[i]t remains well-established that a state’s sovereignty over persons, property and activities extends only within the state’s geographical borders and that therefore its laws have no operation in another state except as allowed by the other state or by comity.” Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 941 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878)); see also McSherry v. McSherry, 113 Md. 395, 400 , 77 A. 653, 655 (1910) (“Where, however, a defendant appears generally, either in person or by attorney, or process is served upon him within the State, the Court acquires jurisdiction over him for the purpose of the suit.”). The Supreme Court continues to recognize the validity of conferring personal jurisdiction based solely on the physical presence of the defendant within the forum.

In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610 , 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2110 , 109 L.Ed.2d 631, 639 (1990), the Court addressed “whether due process requires [an analysis] between the litigation and the defendant’s contacts with the State in cases where the defendant is physically present in the State at the time process is served upon him.” The defendant, while visiting California on business, was served with a California court summons and a copy of the plaintiffs (the defendant’s wife) divorce petition following a visit with one of their children, who resided in California with the plaintiff mother. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 , 110 S.Ct. at 2109 , 109 L.Ed.2d at 638 . The Supreme Court commenced its analysis by recogniz ⁷⁴⁹ ing that “[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 , 110 S.Ct. at 2110 , 109 L.Ed.2d at 639 . This jurisdictional principle, with regard to service upon a physically present defendant, exists “without regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of action was related to his activities there.” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612 , 110 S.Ct. at 2111 , 109 L.Ed.2d at 640 .

Yet, while instructive, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted in the present case, see Mission West, 162 Md.App. at 38 n. 13, 873 A.2d at 384 n. 13, Burnham was confined to circumstances where service of process was made upon a natural person who was personally within the forum state when served. The present case is not analogous to that context. Since Pennoyer , advancements in commerce and transportation have created a need for determining the jurisdictional reach of state courts over non-residents not dependant solely upon a territorial basis. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617 , 110 S.Ct. at 2114 , 109 L.Ed.2d at 643 ; Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 942 .

Further muddying the traditional physical presence jurisdictional standard was the increased usage of the corporate entity and the fiction it created. 9 In St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 , 1 S.Ct. 354, 358 , 27 L.Ed. 222, 224 (1882), the Supreme Court noted this concern as corporations increasingly began to enter multiple geographical fora throughout the country: “This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation ⁷⁵⁰ from suit in a state other than that of its creation, was the cause of much inconvenience and often of manifest injustice.” The Court observed that while “[individuals] can act by themselves, and upon them process can be directly served, ... a corporation can only act and be reached through agents.” St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 356 , 1 S.Ct. at 359 , 27 L.Ed. at 225 . Yet, service upon the agent of a foreign corporation in the forum was not sufficient by itself to confer personal jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court remarked, we are of the opinion that when service is made within the state upon an agent of a foreign corporation it is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court to render a personal judgment, that it should appear somewhere in the record ... that the corporation was engaged in business in the state. St. Clair, 106 U.S. at 359 , 1 S.Ct. at 362 , 27 L.Ed. at 226 .

Thus, where a corporation once was required to be present physically in the state to be subjected to in personam jurisdiction in that forum, the Supreme Court, in St. Clair , recognized that a corporation could be considered present within a state through its authorized agents that conducted the corporation’s activities in the forum state. Extending the notion of establishing in personam jurisdiction through implied consent, 10 in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Company, 243 U.S. 93, 94 , 37 S.Ct. 344, 345 , 61 L.Ed. 610, 615-16 (1917), the Supreme Court determined that a Missouri state court could establish jurisdiction over a defen ⁷⁵¹ dant insurance company, an Arizona corporation that insured buildings in Colorado, where the superintendent of the insurance department of Missouri was served with process on behalf of the insurance company. The Court specifically highlighted that the defendant obtained a license to do business in Missouri and, as a result, voluntarily filed a power of attorney consenting to service of process upon the superintendent as equating to personal service upon the company. Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 94 , 37 S.Ct. at 345 , 61 L.Ed. at 616 .

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the defendant, by voluntarily filing the power of attorney document, created the equivalent of an agent authorized to receive service. Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 95 , 37 S.Ct. at 345 , 61 L.Ed. at 616 . Decided on the same day as Pennsylvania, Fire, the Court in Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 , 37 S.Ct. 280, 280 , 61 L.Ed. 710, 711-12 (1917), determined that “[a] foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state in such a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there.” The defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation that operated a railroad in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, was sued in New York based on service of process on the “defendant’s president, while he was passing through New York, engaged exclusively on personal matters unconnected with the company’s affairs.” McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 266 , 37 S.Ct. at 281 , 61 L.Ed. at 712 . The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant company was not doing business within New York because it was not situated within the State, had no dock, freight, or passenger ticket office within the state, transacted no business within the state, and no business was transacted in the state on its behalf.

Id. Almost four decades later, the Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), settled upon a more flexible analytical scheme, founded upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court determined that the State of Washington could establish in ⁷⁵² personam, jurisdiction to collect taxes under a state statute from a Delaware corporation where the foreign corporation was served with process through personal service upon a salesman employed by the corporation and received a copy of the notice, by registered mail, at its corporate address in Missouri. 11 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312 , 66 S.Ct. at 156 , 90 L.Ed. at 99 . After recognizing generally the historical physical presence requirement for determining in personam jurisdiction divined in Pennoyer , the Court stated: [b]ut now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Citations omitted).

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 , 90 L.Ed. at 102 . Then, considering the traditional physical presence requirement with regard to corporate entities, the Court noted: ⁷⁵³ Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 , 51 S.Ct. 15, 16 , 75 L.Ed. 140 , 73 A.L.R. 679 , it is clear that unlike an individual its “presence” without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms “present” or “presence” are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.

L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 2 Cir., 45 F.2d 139, 141 . Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An “estimate of the inconveniences” which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its “home” or principal place of business is relevant in this connection. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, supra, 45 F.2d [at] 141. “Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.

St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 , 1 S.Ct. 354, 359 , 27 L.Ed. 222 ; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610, 611 , 19 S.Ct. 308, 311, 312 , 43 L.Ed. 569 ; Pennsylvania, Lumbermen’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 414, 415 , 25 S.Ct. 483, 484, 485 , 49 L.Ed. 810 ; Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 255, 256 , 29 S.Ct. 445, 448 , 53 L.Ed. 782 ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, [ 234 U.S. 579 , 34 S.Ct. 944 , 58 L.Ed. 1479 ] supra; cf. St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. ⁷⁵⁴ Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 , 33 S.Ct. 245 , 57 L.Ed. 486 , Ann. Cas.l915B, 77.

Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit