Requardt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The residuary danse of the will of Charles Hook, of the City of Baltimore, who died in 1906, is, in part, as follows: “All the rest and residue of the corpus of my estate I desire the said Safe Deposit and Trust Company to invest the same in safe securities and from the interest, income .and emolument derived from same to pay. my brothers and sister as follows, that is to say: One-third to Jacob W. Hook, one-third to Sebastian J. Hook, and one-third to Katherine Brauer, and on the ...death of either of said beneficiaries their respective shares in the said income shall be paid to their issue, 'until the last of said beneficiaries shall depart their life', then said trust shall cease and the corpus be - divided equally among their surviving children.” ■ The testator's brothers and sister, who were the original beneficiaries for life under the provision just quoted, are now all deceased, Katherine Brauer having died on July 14th, 1914, Sebastian J. Hook on February 14, 1915, and Jacob W. Hook on August 29,1922. There are. nine surviving children of Katherine Brafier, eleven of Sebastian J. Hook, and two of Jacob1 W. Hook. Since the death of Katherine Brauer in 1914 her-children have been paid, ,a.s the will provided, the share of income which their mother had received.

The children of Sebastian J. Hook have likewise been receiving one-third of the income from the trust estate since his death in 1915. But the time for the termination of the trust has now arrived in consequence of the recent death of Jacob W. Hook, the last survivor of the legatees for life, as the will directs that when “the last of said beneficiaries shall depart their life, then said ⁴³³ trust shall cease and the corpus be divided equally among their surviving children.” The question to be determined is whether the distribution of the corpus among the surviving children of the life beneficiaries should be per capita or per stirpes. The appeal is from a decree construing the will as intending a per capita division. This conclusion was in accordance with the views expressed in the; answers filed by the children of Katherine Bruner and Sebastian J. Hook, but it was contrary to the contention of thei children of Jacob W. Hook, and they have therefore appealed from the decree.

As there are twenty-two; surviving children of the three life beneficiaries a per capita distribution would give each of them one twenty-second of the estate, while on the basis of a division per stiipes each of the, nine children of Katherine Brauer would receive one twenty-seventh, each of the eleven children of Seibastion J. Hook on© thirty-third, 'and each of the two, children of Jacob W. Hook one sixth. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that as the testator adopted the per stirpes method of disposition as to the income of the trust estate, on the death of a beneficiary for life, during the period of the trust, he presumably intended the seme principle to; be; applied to the division of the corpus. But the provision as to- the; payment of income was expressly made operative only until the death of the last surviving legatee for life. When, that event occurred the corpus of the estate was to be “divided equally” among the surviving children of those for whose benefit primarily tile trust bad been created.

Prior to the death of the last surviving life beneficiary the corpus; was clearly intended to be held and administered as an undivided estate. Until the trust expired only the income was to be divided, and that was to be paid in equal shares to the testator’s; brothers and sister for life, each receiving one-third. It was not intended that the children of any of them should receive any part of the income during their parent’s life. The direction was that “on the death of either of said beneficiaries their respective shares in the said ⁴³⁴ income shall he paid to their issue,” until ’the expiration, of the trust.

It would have involved a departure from the general plan and purpose of the will to have provided for a per capita division of & deceased life beneficiary’s share of the income among the children of all three of the persons originally entitled. The effect of such a provision would have been to give interests in the income to children of a legatee for life while their parent was still living. This was evidently not a result which the testator desired. The expression of his purpose in regard to the income, therefore, does not, in our opinion, reflect upon the question relating to the corpus which we have to decide.

No disposition of the corpus of the trust estate was contemplated by the will until the death of the last survivor of the testator’s sister and brothers. Then, as the will declares “said trust ’shall cease and the corpus be divided equally among their surviving children.” There is no uncertainty in the description of the class of remaindermen among whom the corpus of the estate is to' he divided. They are the surviving children of the brothers and sister of the testator named in