Reuter v. Reuter

DAVIS, Judge. Michael S. Reuter (Mr. Reuter) appeals from a judgment of limited divorce entered by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel ²¹⁷ County (Lerner, J.). On March 17, 1993, Nancy Swisher Reuter (Mrs. Reuter) filed a complaint for limited divorce. The complaint requested relief pendente lite, and a hearing on those issues was held April 26.

On May 20, the court (Goudy, J.) issued a pendente lite order which provided for Mr. Reuter’s payment of child support and alimony. On December 27, 1993, Mrs. Reuter filed a petition for contempt, alleging that Mr. Reuter was in arrearage for his support obligations under the pendente lite order. The contempt and limited divorce proceedings were consolidated, and a trial was held on February 23,1994. At the close of trial the court granted the limited divorce, awarded Mrs. Reuter both alimony and child support, and ordered Mr. Reuter to pay both the arrearage and attorney’s fees.

A judgment of divorce was entered on March 15, and Mr. Reuter’s motion to alter or amend that judgment was denied on March 25. Mr. Reuter presents five questions for our review, which we have restated and renumbered for clarity: I. Did the trial court err in finding that husband had voluntarily impoverished himself, and that he was capable of earning $45,000, when it failed to consider husband’s last three years of income?

II

Did the trial court err when it awarded alimony to wife, when wife is the financially superior spouse, and when wife had refused without good cause to refinance the mortgage on the family home at a lower monthly rate?

III

Did the trial court err when it established husband’s child support obligation?

IV

Did the trial court err when, it awarded wife a $2,200 judgment for child support arrearage, when it failed to modify husband’s pendente lite child support obligation to the amount required by the child support guidelines? V. Did the trial court err when it awarded wife attorney fees and costs, when wife is the financially superior spouse with over $160,000 in available assets, and ²¹⁸ when the trial court found that husband lacked the financial resources to pay the award promptly? FACTS Nancy Swisher Reuter and Michael S. Reuter were married on July 11, 1981. They presently have two sons: Stephen (age 7) and Kevin (age 4).

While the parties disagree about the circumstances surrounding their separation, it is not disputed that Mr. Reuter announced his intention to end the marriage relationship in November, 1992, and left the family home on January 23, 1993. At the start of their marriage, Mrs. Reuter was employed full-time as a registered nurse. After Stephen was born in January, 1987, Mrs. Reuter returned to work part-time until 1988. Kevin was born in December, 1989, and Mrs. Reuter returned to work part-time in 1990.

At the time of trial, Mrs. Reuter continued to work 10 hours per week as a nurse, at a rate of $16 per hour. In addition to her wages, Mrs. Reuter also receives a substantial amount of income from investments, and periodically has received income from a trust established by her father. Mrs. Reuter testified that the value of her assets was between $160,000 and $170,000, while the total taxable and tax-free income from those assets exceeded $7,000 per year. In support of her decision to continue working part-time after the separation, Mrs. Reuter testified that Kevin was having difficulty adjusting to the separation.

A clinical psychologist also testified about Kevin’s emotional difficulties, and concluded that spending a full day in day care would not be in Kevin’s best interest at this time. Mr. Reuter began the marriage employed as a police officer. He attended law school in the evening, and was admitted to the bar in 1983. Between 1984 and 1991 Mr. Reuter was employed by a small law firm, first as an associate and later as a partner.

In 1991, Mr. Reuter and Malik Turna started the firm of Reuter & Tuma (the firm). In 1993, the firm added a ²¹⁹ third partner and additional office space. Mr. Reuter’s income from the firm was $39,366 in 1992, and $31,775 in 1993. In 1994—-just prior to trial—Mr. Reuter executed a “buy-sell agreement” in which his interest in the firm was sold to his partners for a net loss. 1 Mr. Reuter continued to work for the firm as an employee, and the firm has continued to use the name “Reuter, Turna & Davis.” 2 The buy-sell agreement carefully sets out Mr. Reuter’s compensation for different types of cases, based on how the case is billed, and states that Mr. Reuter is not paid for his work until the firm receives payment.

The income and financial status of the parties is crucial to most of the questions presented in this case, and we discuss Mr. Reuter’s employment history, as well as Mrs. Reuter’s income and assets, in greater detail where appropriate. Under the pendente lite order, Mr. Reuter’s obligations for alimony and child support were $200 and $1,100 per month, respectively. Mr. Reuter paid the full amount at first, but in November, 1993, he began to make smaller payments, and by the February trial date he was $2,200 in arrears. In granting Mrs. Reuter’s petition for divorce, the trial court found that Mr. Reuter was voluntarily impoverished, and concluded that his potential income was $45,000.

The court then ordered that Mr. Reuter pay $1,250 per month in child support, $100 per month in alimony, $4,000 in attorney’s fees, and $203.50 in costs. Mr. Reuter was also ordered to maintain health insurance for Mrs. Reuter and both of the children. With regard to the $2,200 child support arrearage, Mr. Reuter ²²⁰ was ordered to make additional monthly payments until the arrearage was paid in full. The court requested—but did not order—that Mrs. Reuter supplement her income by increasing her work week from 10 hours per week to 15 hours or more.

LEGAL ANALYSIS As a preliminary matter, we reject Mrs. Reuter’s assertion that the appeal should be dismissed for Mr. Reuter’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal. On March 15, 1994, Mr. Reuter filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-534. He then filed a notice of appeal on March 18—one full week before the court ruled on the earlier motion. Mrs. Reuter contends that the March 18th notice of appeal was ineffective because the court’s judgment ceased to be final for purposes of appeal until the withdrawal or disposition of the Rule 2-534 motion.

See Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Commission, 303 Md. 473, 486 , 494 A.2d 940 (1985). Mrs. Reuter’s argument was correct under the former Rule 1012(d), but Maryland law on the point was changed in 1988 when Rule 1012 was amended and renumbered as Rule 8-202. Edsall v. Anne Arundel County, 332 Md. 502, 505-06 , 632 A.2d 763 (1993). Under Maryland Rule 8-' 202, a timely notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a Rule 2-534 motion is effective.

Id. Processing of the appeal is merely delayed until the withdrawal or disposition of the motion. I. Voluntary Impoverishment Mr. Reuter’s challenge of various orders contained in the divorce judgment rests heavily on his assertion that the lower court erred in finding that he was voluntarily impoverished, and that his potential income was $45,000 per year. In considering that question, we look to certain provisions of the statutory scheme that governs child support in Maryland, as set forth in the Family Law Article (FL) of the Maryland Annotated Code (1991 Repl.Vol.). • ²²¹ When a court calculates a parent’s financial obligations under the child support guidelines, the central factual issue is the “actual adjusted income” of each party.

The court must consider the “actual income of a parent, if the parent is employed to full capacity,” FL § 12—201(b)(1), or the “potential income of a parent, if the parent is voluntarily impoverished.” FL § 12—201(b)(2). Before an award may be based on potential income, the court must hear evidence and make a specific finding that the party is voluntarily impoverished. John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 428 , 601 A.2d 149 (1992). Once a court reaches that conclusion, the court must then make findings regarding the factors related to potential income.

Goldberger v. Goldberger, 96 Md.App. 813 , 327-28, 624 A.2d 1328 (1993). Both issues are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. 486, 491 , 617 A.2d 1154 (1993), and rulings based on those findings must stand unless the court abused its discretion. John O., 90 Md.App. at 423 , 601 A.2d 149 .

In determining whether a parent is voluntarily impoverished, some factors to be considered include physical and mental condition, educational background, work history, efforts to find and retain employment, and the condition of the job market in the area where the parent lives. John O., 90 Md.App. at 423 , 601 A.2d 149 . Those same five factors may also be considered when establishing a parent’s potential income. Goldberger, 96 Md.App. at 327-28 , 624 A.2d 1328 .

In ruling on the issue of voluntary impoverishment, the court may also consider: (1) the timing of any change in employment or other financial circumstances relative to the divorce proceedings; (2) the relationship between the parties prior to the initiation of divorce proceedings, and (3) whether or not the parent has ever withheld support. John O., 90 Md.App. at 423 , 601 A.2d 149 . In the present case, the court heard extensive testimony on Mr. Reuter’s prior work history and earnings; the ²²² financial status of the firm; the circumstances surrounding the purported sale of his interest in the firm; and his brief financial history as an employee rather than partner. Mr. Reuter testified that the firm had been able to pay only low and inconsistent paychecks, which totalled $39,366 in 1992 and $31,775 in 1993.

Nonetheless, the court also heard testimony that: (1) Mr. Reuter earned $43,569 in 1988 and $56,800 in 1989 while working for a different firm; (2) during 1993, Mr. Reuter received $4,900 in loans from the firm in lieu of receiving a paycheck; 3 (3) Mr. Reuter had received gross paychecks totaling more than $10,000 during the first two months of 1994 (part of which had been earned in 1993); (4) Mr. Reuter was due a one-third share of $50,000 in outstanding receivables billed by the firm in 1993; (5) the firm’s income for the first two months of 1994 was approximately $75,000—substantially higher than the firm’s average monthly income for 1993; and (6) the firm had deposited an estimated $28,000 in unearned retainers into its escrow account during the first two months of 1994, while Mr. Reuter had $13,000 in trust accounts for various clients. The court also heard evidence that Mr. Reuter used a $6,000 paycheck received from the firm to pay a $3,300 credit-card bill and other expenses rather than paying his court-ordered support obligations in full, and that Mr. Reuter was $2,200 in arrears with regard to those obligations at the time of trial. Mr. Reuter testified that he sold his interest in the firm because he “couldn’t rely on the unpredictability of the amounts of money coming in, nor survive on what was coming in.” Mr. Reuter also testified that he was actively seeking employment with the federal government or the attorney general’s office. Nonetheless, there was sufficient evidence ²²³ from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that Mr. Reuter had voluntarily impoverished himself by selling his interest in a firm whose partners could expect to make, in the trial court’s words, “a substantial amount of money” during 1994.

As to the court’s determination that Mr. Reuter’s potential income was $45,000 per year, not all of appellant’s arguments are well taken. Mr. Reuter argues that the court’s view of the firm’s future prospects, assuming he remained a partner, was purely speculative, and that such speculation cannot serve as the basis for a court’s judgment (citing John D. Copanos & Sons v. McDade Rigging and Steel Erection, 43 Md.App. 204 , 403 A.2d 402 (1979)). Copanos & Sons is not apposite here, as the ruling there involves a claim for lost profits as damages. Id. at 205 , 403 A.2d 402 .

In some sense, any determination of “potential income” must necessarily involve a degree of speculation. See Newman v. Newman, 71 Md.App. 670, 676 , 527 A.2d 61 (1987) (discussing speculation with regard to future income in context of alimony and a monetary award). So long as the court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, Maryland Rule 8-131(d), the amount calculated is “realistic,” Goldberger, 96 Md.App. at 328 , 624 A.2d 1328 , and the figure is not so unreasonably high or low as to amount to abuse of discretion, the court’s ruling may not be disturbed. John O., 90 Md.App. at 423 , 601 A.2d 149 .

Cf. Wolfe v. Turner, 267 Md. 646, 653 , 299 A.2d 106 (1973) (discussing abuse of discretion in context of attorney’s fees). Mr. Reuter also challenges the evidence considered by the court in determining his potential income. He argues that the trial court’s inquiry into his prior earnings was limited by statute to the previous three years, and hence the trial court erred in considering his substantially higher earnings from 1988 and 1989.

In support of that proposition Mr. Reuter points to FL § 12-203(b), which states: (b) Verification of income.—(1) Income statements of the parents shall be verified with documentation of both current and past actual income. ²²⁴ (2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, suitable documentation of actual income includes pay stubs, employer statements otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, or receipts and expenses if self-employed, and copies of each parent’s 3 most recent federal tax returns. (ii) If a parent is self-employed or has received an increase or decrease in income of 20% or more in a 1-year period within the past 3 years, the court may require that parent to provide copies of federal tax returns for the 5 most recent years. Mrs. Reuter argues that FL § 12-203 applies only to verification of actual income, and has never been interpreted to restrict the court in its task of determining potential income. When addressing the meaning and application of statutory provisions, the statutory scheme must be examined as a whole, and the relationship between its various provisions must be considered.

Vest v. Giant Food Stores, 329 Md. 461, 466-67 , 620 A.2d 340 (1993). The larger context must also be considered, including the legislative purpose. Baltimore Cty. C.A.U.T. v. Baltimore Cty., 321 Md. 184, 203-04 , 582 A.2d 510 (1990).

The range of a statute’s reach must be consistent with the plain meaning of the words and the structure of the statutory scheme. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992). In light of those considerations, it is clear that the provisions relating to tax returns apply only to “documentation of both current and past actual income,” FL § 12-203(b)(l), and not to potential income. We are mindful that the statutory scheme sometimes uses the phrase “adjusted actual income” to include “potential income.” The child support guidelines, for example, provide that child care expenses “shall be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes.” FL § 12-204(g).

It should be obvious, however, that a parent’s “potential income” is not the type of fact which is capable of being “verified,” through documentation or otherwise; hence FL § 12-203 does not apply. That conclusion is consistent with ²²⁵ the statutory definition of “potential income,” which provides that potential income is determined by “the parent’s employment potential and probable earnings level based on, but not limited to, recent work history” and other stated factors. FL § 12-201© (emphasis added). Construction of a statute that is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided.

D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538 , 578 A.2d 1177 (1990). A construction that is unworkable must likewise be rejected. The facts underlying several of our cases demonstrate that the application of FL § 12-203 to voluntarily impoverished parents would unreasonably restrict the court’s determination of potential income. In the case of In re Joshua W., the voluntarily impoverished parent was attending graduate school at the time of trial and had previously worked as a car salesman, a pastor, and a technical writer. 94 Md.App. at 492-93 , 617 A.2d 1154 .

In Goldberger, the impoverished parent had been a Talmudic student for all of his adult life, and was supported by the contributions of family members and others in his community. 96 Md.App. at 322 , 624 A.2d 1328 . In either of these cases, restricting the trial court’s inquiry to income from recent years might well prevent the court from considering the most probative evidence on a parent’s earning potential. In a case such as Goldberger, where the parent maintained a steady but impoverished income for more than three years, the court would be entirely precluded from considering any income earned at a time when the parent was employed to full capacity. The time of low tide at Ocean City on a particular day is a fact that is capable of being “verified”; so, too, is a spouse’s actual income.

An impoverished spouse’s potential income is not, and the rules pertaining to verification of actual income do not apply. Having ruled that a parent is voluntarily impoverished, the court may consider any admissible evidence in determining potential income. We are puzzled, however, as to how the trial judge arrived at the conclusion that Mr. Reuter’s potential income should be ²²⁶ $45,000 per year, based on the record evidence before him. The judge explained, in his oral opinion: ‘You’ve [the firm] got a gross of a hundred and ninety thousand dollars [in 1992], and then there’s a gross of two hundred and eighty-six thousand dollars [in 1993] ... you’ve got a substantial amount.of money coming to you on these two months [apparently referring to approximately $13,000 attributable to appellant in the firm’s escrow account and approximately $18,000 as appellant’s share of accounts receivable for January and February 1994] ...

But the fact is that I guess on average, uh, you’re making at least forty-five thousand dollars ... that’s what I’ve computed in the way of income to you.” ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ “... in ’89 you earned fifty-six thousand, eight hundred dollars ... One year you made forty-one thousand [1990], one year you made fifty-six [1989], one year you made forty-three thousand, five sixty-nine [1988]. And so I think ... I really believe that in looking over this thing that you really are capable of earning forty-five thousand dollars.

I don’t think there’s any two ways about it.” As we have acknowledged earlier, determining imputed income necessarily involves some speculation. Merely setting out a string of numbers, however, does not provide a rational basis for even the level of permissible speculation under the circumstances. The judge initially noted an increase of $96,000 in the law firm’s gross from 1992 to 1993. In those same years, appellant’s income decreased from $39,366 to $31,775.

It was not until 1994 that the so-called buy-sell agreement was executed and ostensibly took effect. As to the judge’s consideration of monies due from or received by appellant from the law firm in 1994, the evidence showed that Mr. Reuter had received $10,570 from the firm in January-February 1994. He was also entitled to approximately $13,000 in escrowed monies if, as, and when earned. The approximately $18,000 potentially attributable to appellant’s share of $50,000 in accounts receiv- • ²²⁷ able was dependent on the assumption that 100% of the unaged accounts would be collected.

In a practice that was admittedly heavily dependent on family law cases, one may question this underlying, rosy assumption with regard to the collection of the accounts. Even assuming the best case scenario for appellant, that is, that the January-February income experience ($10,570) would replicate itself for each remaining two-month period in 1994, the projected annual income would far exceed $45,000. We have no clue on this record how the trial judge could have discounted this to $45,000. The average of appellant’s incomes for the five-year period, 1989-93, was $38,893.

The average for the latter three years, 1991-93, was $31,921. We fail to discern how these trends lead to the conclusion that the judge reached. It may be that the judge, on remand, can better explain the basis for his conclusion of “on average ... [appellant is] making at least forty-five thousand dollars.” We shall give him that opportunity.

II

Alimony Mr. Reuter’s second broad theme is that the trial court erred in considering Mrs. Reuter’s income and assets. We begin our examination of that question in the context of alimony, and continue it later when we address the calculation of Mr. Reuter’s child support obligation under the guidelines. In awarding Mrs. Reuter $100 per month in alimony, the trial court stated: Now, the question comes down, is Mrs. Reuter not doing her share? I really do believe Mrs. Reuter could do a little better.

I mean, I think she can do better than ten hours a week. And I do think she should seek, uh, uh, additional hours. I know she said there was some testimony that she sought some additional hours. It seems to me—I don’t think you can just sit back and just close your eyes to this thing.

Even if it’s fifteen hours a week, add another few ²²⁸ hours on to try to stabilize this thing. These poor children, they’re young yet ... And so, I going—I’m going to—I’m going to order that she—that she get a hundred dollars alimony a month, and that will make it thirteen hundred and fifty dollars. But, uh, I really do believe that she can do better.

Now, it seems to me that the only evidence I’ve heard is from the parties that they’re—they’re in pretty good health both of them, at least I observe that. This is a marriage of, uh, of, uh, twelve, thirteen—twelve years, thirteen years. You got these two young children. This is the income that you have, the circumstances in—in this case.

It really appears to me that the only fault in this divorce is the fault of Mr. Reuter. He’s the one who, uh, left. Obviously fell out of love. Mrs. Reuter was not that keen on a separation in this case.

And, uh, in taking all these—all this—all of this into—into consideration that’s how I arrived at—at giving her a hundred dollars a month, to at least try to stabilize her and help her out. And—and that money will continue until, uh—let’s see what the future holds. Mr. Reuter contends that the trial court erred because Mrs. Reuter is the “financially superior spouse,” and because she had refused, without good cause, to agree with his proposal to refinance the mortgage on the family home at a lower interest rate. 4 Citing Hull v. Hull, 88 Md.App. 218 , 574 A.2d 20 (1990), Mr. Reuter concludes that an award of alimony for the purpose of rehabilitation was unnecessary in this case. In Hull v. Hull, we recognized that an award of alimony is composed of two distinct questions.

The twelve “required considerations” outlined in FL § ll-106(b) address themselves only to the amount of an award; before reaching ²²⁹ those considerations, the court must first determine that an award of alimony is warranted. Id. at 220-221, 574 A.2d 20 . Where the award is temporary rather than permanent, the sole purpose of alimony is the rehabilitation of the recipient spouse. Id. at 223-24, 574 A.2d 20 .

The award must be grounded in a finding that the recipient spouse is not self-supporting and that training, education or other steps are necessary to help the recipient achieve financial self-reliance. Id. See James v. James, 96 Md.App. 439, 457-58 , 625 A.2d 381 (1993). An alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that was clearly wrong.

Tracey, 328 Md. at 385 , 614 A.2d 590 . Applying our two-step analysis from Hull and the proper standard of review, Mr. Reuter’s objections to the award may be summarized in the following manner: 1. The trial court erred in ruling that alimony was appropriate, because: a) Mrs. Reuter was capable of being self-supporting by working longer hours, b) Mrs. Reuter was capable of being self-supporting by liquidating some portion of her investment assets, and c) the court’s ruling was based on erroneous findings of fact with regard to Mrs. Reuter’s income. 2. The trial court erred in determining the amount of the alimony award, because: a) the amount of the award was based on erroneous findings of fact with regard to Mrs. Reuter’s income, and b) the court abused its discretion in light of Mr. Reuter’s debts and Mrs. Reuter’s assets.

While we are unable to conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion for the reasons previously discussed as to Mr. Reuter’s potential income, we nonetheless hold that the trial court erred as to Mr. Reuter’s income. Both of the questions that we identified in Hull require the court to make specific findings of fact with regard to the income of the recipient spouse. The court failed to make those findings. As we note ²³⁰ in detail below, there is evidence that the court used a clearly erroneous estimate of Mrs. Reuter’s actual income in completing the child support guidelines.

We discuss the matter fully in the context of child support; for now, we simply note that the alimony award was not properly grounded in the necessary findings of fact. On the basis of that error, the alimony award is vacated and remanded. A full explanation of our ruling, however, requires that we consider the questions Mr. Reuter raises with regard to Mrs. Reuter’s part-time employment and assets. Mrs. Reuter’s part-time employment.—In determining whether alimony is necessary for the purpose of rehabilitation, the court must consider the income and expenses of the petitioning spouse, as well as the potential for suitable employment through training or other means.

See Coviello v. Coviello, 91 Md.App. 638, 643-4 , 605 A.2d 661 (1992). While the twelve required considerations detailed in FL § ll-106(b) are directed only to the amount of the award, the trial court is not precluded from addressing equitable concerns when concluding that a spouse is not self-supporting. The role that equitable concerns may play in that determination is underscored by Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992). At the time of trial, Ruth Tracey was working two jobs: a full-time job as a government payroll clerk, and a part-time job at McDonald’s.

Id. at 383 , 614 A.2d 590 . In granting an award of indefinite alimony, the trial court concluded that Ms. Tracey was not required to work a second job, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 389-90, 614 A.2d 590 . After considering the statute as a whole and reviewing the legislative history, the Court declared that “the paramount goal of the legislature was to create a statutory mechanism leading to equitably sound alimony determinations ____” Id. at 388, 614 A.2d 590 .

In concluding that “the alimony statute does not consign Ruth to an existence of unremitting toil,” id. at 390, 614 A.2d 590 , the court recognized that trial judges are empowered by the statute to reach a fair and equitable result based on a particular set of facts. Id. at ²³¹ 389, 614 A.2d 590 . See also Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 66-67 , 646 A.2d 413 (1994). If Mrs. Reuter were required to work full-time, it is undisputed that she would be self-supporting at an income level very close to Mr. Reuter’s past and potential income.

Mr. Reuter’s vocational expert testified that Mrs. Reuter was presently qualified for a variety of nursing jobs with pay in the range of $35,000 to $45,000 per year. With a modest amount of retraining and recertification, Mrs. Reuter would also be qualified for the many available jobs that require clinical experience, at a salary of $36,000 per year. But the issue, as framed by the trial court, is whether Mrs. Reuter is required to act contrary to the best interests of her child in order to be self-supporting. The court ruled that she was not, and we agree.

Our conclusion is not foreign to the concept of rehabilitative alimony. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in whole or in part by at least eight states, provides that a court may award alimony where it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance “is the custodian of a child whose age or condition make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.” Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 308, 347-348 (West 1987); see, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 25-319(a)(2) (1991) (containing similar language). Our own statute on alimony was drafted by the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, and the subject of alimony was discussed extensively in the Commission’s 1980 report. We find nothing in that report to indicate that the Commission rejected the broader concept of rehabilitative alimony embodied in the Uniform Act; indeed, such a reading would be contrary to the importance the Commission gave to the role of trial judges, when sitting as a court of equity, to make a fair and just award.

Tracey, 328 Md. at 388-89 , 614 A.2d 590 . The lesson of Tracey is that the trial court may not require a spouse to take unreasonable steps in order to become self-supporting. The law and policy of this State is ²³² that the child’s best interest is paramount. See Shrivastava v. Mates, 93 Md.App. 320, 327 , 612 A.2d 313 (1992) (discussing that interest in context of child support).

In the context of custody, for