Rhee v. Combined Enterprises, Inc.

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. The issue before us is a relatively narrow one: Whether the announced policy of the forum court precludes a suit by a spouse in a tort action, brought in the domicile state, when suit would have been permitted in the state in which the tort occurred. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County concluded that the law of the forum should apply. We conclude otherwise based on the circumstances of this case.

We will explain. The facts are relatively brief and the parties 1 through counsel, much to their credit, agreed in accordance with Maryland Rule 1026 e to a statement of the case and of the facts. We quote: “Statement of the Case “Appellant Chu S. Rhee (hereinafter ‘Mr. Rhee’) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on May 13, 1986, against the appellee, Chaiha K. Rhee (here ²¹⁶ inafter ‘Mrs. Rhee’) and against Combined Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Budget Rent-A-Car of Rockville (hereinafter ‘Budget’). Mr. Rhee alleges that on May 15,1983, he was injured in a single-car accident on the New Jersey Turnpike, near route 18 in New Brunswick, New Jersey, while occupying a vehicle leased from Budget and operated by Mrs. Rhee.

Mr. Rhee seeks damages for his injuries from Budget under theories of negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict liability, alleging that Budget supplied a vehicle that was in a dangerous, unsafe, and defective condition. Mr. Rhee also seeks damages from Mrs. Rhee, alleging that she was negligent in the operation of the vehicle. Both defendants filed Answers denying liability. In addition, Mrs. Rhee asserted in her Answer that the action against her was barred by the interspousal immunity rule. “On April 30, 1987, Mrs. Rhee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and attached thereto an Affidavit stating that on the date of the accident, and at all times to the present, she and Mr. Rhee were married to one another.

In her Motion, Mrs. Rhee asserted that Mr. Rhee’s action against her was barred by the common law of Maryland, which precludes a suit at law by one spouse against the other.2 [(2Mrs. Rhee pointed out that the decision of the Court of Appeals in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242 , 462 A.2d 506 (Md.1983), abrogated the inter-spousal immunity rule as to actions sounding in negligence and accruing after June 30, 1983. As the instant action accrued on May 15, 1983, Mrs. Rhee asserted that the Boblitz abrogation does not apply.)] Mr. Rhee opposed the Motion, asserting that the substantive law of the state of New Jersey applies to this case and permits suit by one spouse against the other because New Jersey abrogated interspousal tort immunity in 1970.3 [ (3See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482 , 267 A.2d 481 (N.J.1970); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 , 388 A.2d 951 (N.J.1978).)] Neither party requested a hearing. ²¹⁷ “By Order dated May 21, 1987, the Circuit Court (Cave, J.,) granted Mrs. Rhee’s Motion and entered summary judgment in her favor. Judge Cave, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b), determined that there was no just reason for delay and entered a final judgment in favor of Mrs. Rhee. “On June 17, 1987, Mr. Rhee noted a timely appeal from Judge Cave’s May 21, 1987, Order.

Mr. Rhee’s action against Budget remains pending in the Circuit Court. “Statement of Facts “Mr. and Mrs. Rhee, at all times pertinent, have been domiciled in the state of Maryland and reside at 12730 Glen Mill Road, Potomac, Maryland. On May 15, 1983, and at all times relevant here, Mr. and Mrs. Rhee have been, and are, husband and wife. “On May 15, 1983, Mrs. Rhee was operating a 1982 Lincoln automobile, leased from Budget’s facility in Rock-ville, Maryland. Also present in the vehicle were Mrs. Rhee’s husband, sister, mother, and brother-in-law. The family was returning to the Rhee residence in Potomac, Maryland, from New York City, where they had spent the weekend visiting friends.

At approximately 4:50 p.m., while on the New Jersey Turnpike, near Route 18 in New Brunswick, New Jersey, the vehicle struck a guard rail, rolled down an embankment, and caused personal injury to each of the passengers, including Mr. Rhee.” (Footnotes in original). Linton v. Linton In Linton v. Linton, 46 Md.App. 660 , 420 A.2d 1249 (1980), we answered the precise questions asked here. Chief Judge Gilbert said for this Court: “The law of the forum [Maryland] will not be applied to defeat the appellant’s right to sue her husband for negli ²¹⁸ gence when, as here, the lex loci delicti permits that type of civil action.” Linton, 46 Md.App. at 667 , 420 A.2d 1249 . In Linton , the wife brought a negligence action against her husband for injuries she sustained when their car crashed through an intersection in Alexandria, Virginia.

Mrs. Linton’s complaint alleged that her husband was negligent in the operation of the vehicle. At the time of the accident, Maryland barred interspousal suits sounding in negligence while the State of Virginia permitted such suits. Linton, 46 Md.App. at 662-63 , 420 A.2d 1249 . The trial judge granted a preliminary objection based on the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.

On appeal, we reversed, remanded the case for further proceedings and directed the lower court to apply the lex loci delicti. Appellee does not dispute that Maryland continues to adhere to the rule that, when an accident occurs in another state, “the substantive tort law of the state where the wrong occurs governs.” She contends, however, that adherence to the doctrine of lex loci delicti, does not mandate application of the entire law of the foreign state. She argues that only questions concerning substantive tort law are to be governed by the law of the foreign state. Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 125 , 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).

Appellee states that the right of a resident of this State to maintain an action against his or her spouse is not a matter of substantive tort law but a threshold question. Hauch v. Connor On the strength of Hauch , appellee would have us overrule Linton . She points out, quite correctly, that we did not have the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Hauch when we decided Linton . Appellee reads Hauch to support her position that inter-spousal immunity is a threshold question which must be determined by the law of the forum.

While appellee’s ²¹⁹ position is not totally without foundation, we do not agree with her conclusion. We will explain. Hauch involved three Maryland residents who were employed by Hertz Corporation in Maryland. In the course of their employment, the three employees drove together to Delaware.

Their car collided with another car. The two passengers filed for and received benefits under the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act for their injuries. Then they filed suit against the co-employee, the driver. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County followed the lex loci delicti and applied Delaware’s workers’ compensation statute to bar the suit.

The appellants in Hauch sought to have the court apply an approach to the conflict of laws issue that varies from the lex loci delicti, one which is based on the law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. While the Court of Appeals reversed, it relied primarily on public policy considerations associated with workers’ compensation law. The Most Significant Relationship For many years, the choice of governing law in tort cases depended solely upon the place of the wrong, which was deemed to be the place where the first harmful impact was inflicted. This has been referred to as the lex loci delicti doctrine.

This was the law with a few exceptions espoused in the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 377, 378 (1934). In more recent years, a number of states have reconsidered the doctrine. Some states have characterized the doctrine as mechanical and are applying the Second Restatement approach—application of the law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).

The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws states the rationale for the changed rule as follows: “The vested rights approach of the original Restatement has been rejected in the present Chapter. Instead, the rights and liabilities of the parties in tort are said to ²²⁰ be governed by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Separate rules are stated for different torts and for different issues in tort. In other words, the identity of the state of most significant relationship is said to depend upon the nature of the tort and upon the particular issue.” Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law ch. 7 introductory note (1971).

Under the original Restatement approach—lex loci delicti—we would ordinarily apply the law of New Jersey in a tort case. In contrast, under the Second Restatement approach, we would often apply the law of Maryland. In White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 352-55 , 223 A.2d 763 (1966), the Court reviewed the criticism of lex loci delicti and arguments advanced to support adoption of the most significant relationship approach as set forth in the Second Restatement. The Court concluded that, “in the present state of the law, we [should] leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature.” White, 244 Md. at 355 , 223 A.2d 763 .

This position was reaffirmed in Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 296 , 336 A.2d 118 (1975). More recently, in Hauch , the Court specifically announced its continued “adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti for determining the applicable tort law,” Hauch, 295 Md. at 125 , 453 A.2d 1207 , however, the Court proceeded to carve out an exception to the rule. The Court commented that “many courts recognize that workers’ compensation law conflict issues present distinct policy questions and should not be treated as tort or contract matters for choice of law purposes.” Hauch, 295 Md. at 127 , 453 A.2d 1207 . Further, the Court enunciated the rationale which supports this exception in a workers’ compensation case: “Suits by employees against their immediate employers for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment are now barred by virtually all workmen’s compensation statutes in this country.

Nevertheless, ‘because of ²²¹ varying rules as to the availability of the exclusive-remedy defense to the statutory employer,’ choice of law issues arise with respect to suits against statutory employers. In these suits, it is generally held that the forum state will enforce a bar created by the exclusive remedy statute of any state in which the employer may be liable for workmen’s compensation benefits. Although the outcome in some of these cases is the same as it would be if the rule of lex loci delicti were applied, the underlying rationale in holding the employer immune is different. The rationale is that the employer has undertaken the burden of supplying workmen’s compensation insurance in return for immunity from suit.

Moreover, in several cases this rationale has been used to bar an action which would not be barred under the rule of lex loci delicti. The rationale for precluding employee-employer suits, however, does not apply in actions by employees against fellow employees. “Consequently, where actions by injured employees have been brought against co-employees in one state for wrongs committed in another state, courts, even in traditional lex loci delicti jurisdictions, have applied the workmen’s compensation law of the forum state.” Hauch, 295 Md. at 127-28 , 453 A.2d 1207 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Despite the unequivocal assertion by the Court that it would continue to adhere to the lex loci delicti approach, Hauch, 295 Md. at 123-25 , 453 A.2d 1207 , appellee divines a move from that position which would require us to apply the law of the forum in cases such as the instant case where the parties would be barred from recovery under the law of the forum despite the fact that a different law applies under lex loci delicti. Hauch is not a different approach to the resolution of conflicting laws, but, on the contrary, affirms an exception that has long been recognized under lex loci delicti.

This exception, while only tangentially raised in earlier Maryland cases, has been followed in other jurisdictions. This exception briefly stat ²²² ed is that the public policy of the forum domicile state can bar an action which would be permitted