Rice v. State

EYLER, Judge. In the Circuit Court for Howard County (Gelfman, J.), William Thomas Rice, appellant, was convicted in a court trial of driving while his license was suspended, in violation of Md.Code (1999 Repl.Vol. & 2000 Supp.), § 16-303(c) of the Transportation Article (“TA”), speeding, failing to obey a stop ⁵⁹⁵ sign, and failing to display a registration card on demand. 1 Appellant was sentenced to one weekend in the Howard County Detention Center and was fined $500 on the driving while suspended conviction. He was fined a total of $200 on the lesser convictions. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for driving while suspended.

Specifically, he contends that, on the evidence presented, the State could not prove the element of mens rea necessary to sustain that conviction. We disagree, and affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Appellant’s trial was held on July 18, 2000. The State called Officer Thomas Rukamp, of the Howard County Police Department, who testified that on September 24, 1999, at 11:20 p.m., he was on patrol in a marked police cruiser on Ducketts Lane, near Karas Walk, in Howard County.

He saw the driver of a black car speed down Karas Walk, fail to stop for a stop sign, make a u-turn, and speed back down Karas Walk in the direction from which he had come. Officer Rukamp followed the driver, who continued to speed. Eventually, the driver turned into the driveway of the house at 6192 Karas Walk. Officer Rukamp pulled into the driveway behind the black car and turned on his emergency lights.

The driver jumped out of the car, ran to the front door of the house, and banged on it, yelling to be let in. The door opened and he ran inside. Appellant was the driver of the black car. Officer Rukamp was familiar with appellant and appellant’s wife from prior encounters with them at the Karas Walk house.

After appellant ran into the house, Officer Rukamp went to the front door and knocked. Appellant’s wife answered the door and opened it. Officer Rukamp looked into the house and saw appellant, ⁵⁹⁶ drinking a beer, walking toward the front door. Appellant told Officer Rukamp that he “wasn’t driving and [Officer Rukamp] couldn’t prove it.” Officer Rukamp asked for appellant’s driver’s license and registration.

Appellant said, “No.” Officer Rukamp repeated the request, and appellant again responded, “No.” Officer Rukamp asked appellant’s wife to retrieve his driver’s license and registration, which she did. Officer Rukamp then checked and ascertained that appellant’s license had been suspended by the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). He placed appellant under arrest for driving-while suspended. After his arrest, appellant gave Officer Rukamp information about himself, including his address.

The address he gave was 6192 Karas Walk, the same address at which he was arrested. That address also was the address on appellant’s driver’s license. During Officer Rukamp’s testimony, the State moved into evidénce, without objection, a computer print-out of appellant’s driving record, from the MVA. The record shows that on March 18, 1998, appellant’s driver’s license was suspended for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.

That suspension was withdrawn on July 15, 1998. On January 28, 1999, appellant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. He was tried and convicted of that charge on June 2, 1999, and was assessed eight points. See TA § 16-402(a)(22) (conviction for DUI carries 8 points).

Thereafter, on August 5, 1999, the MVA sent appellant a letter notifying him that unless he requested a hearing in ten days of the date the letter was mailed, his driver’s license would be suspended. This notice of suspension letter was sent by certified mail. On August 20, 1999, appellant’s license was suspended for six months. On August 30, 1999, the certified notice of suspension letter to appellant was returned to the MVA by the United States Postal Service.

The address reflected on the computer print-out of appellant’s driving record as of July 16, 2000 (the date of the computer print-out) was 8715 Bryant Court, Bowie, Maryland. ⁵⁹⁷ The computer print-out states that an address change was made on July 8, 2000, ten days before the trial date. Appellant testified in his own defense. He admitted driving on the night in question, but stated that he had not known, at that time, that his driver’s license was suspended. He claimed that he had been unaware that Officer Rukamp was following him and he denied running away from Officer Rukamp.

Appellant acknowledged drinking a beer when the officer came to the front door and telling him, “You did not see me driving.” He also acknowledged that 6192 Karas Walk was his marital home but explained that he and his wife had been having marital problems and he was not living in the house during the period preceding his arrest. Instead, he was staying with his father and his sister. According to appellant, his wife did not tell him about any correspondence for him from the MVA, and during the pertinent time frame he did not receive any mail at the Karas Walk address. Also, at some unspecified point in time, appellant’s wife went to Virginia for three weeks, and was not collecting the mail at the Karas Walk address.

Appellant went to that house “very seldom” and “wasn’t concerned about too much in the mail.” He happened to be at the house on the night in question because it was “the first night that [he and his] wife .. . had been back together.” Finally, appellant stated that he “had no idea” after the court proceeding of June 2, 1999, that his license was going to be suspended. In finding appellant guilty of driving while suspended, the trial court stated: When a defendant takes the stand, he puts his own character in evidence and the Defendant simply does not come off as credible, and let me explain to you why. He first of all basically says that the Officer was just making all of this up, that he was following him, that his lights weren’t on, and so on and so forth. It’s just not credible.

Moreover the Defendant is not a novice when it comes to the Motor Vehicle Administration. The Court notes that there was an address change on July 8th of 2000 on ⁵⁹⁸ [appellant’s driving record]. The Defendant has an obligation to continually notify MVA of any change of address. He testified that he was quote, unquote, living off and on at his marital home and Bryant Street.

I don’t know if that’s the father’s residence or the sister’s residence, but he had an obligation to notify MVA where he was. And it is ignorance and it is intentional ignorance to just say, well, ghee [sic], I didn’t get the mail. He’s not saying anyone usurped the mail, he’s simply saying that I didn’t get it, and that is not satisfactory. Moreover, his testimony that he was convicted of a DUI, he’s not supposed to be drinking, but he had a couple cocktails at dinner, and then he takes out a beer can and starts to drink in the officer’s presence, again, puts his whole truthfulness and sincerity into obvious question.

Fact of the matter is, the Court just found his testimony not credible. The Court enters a guilty finding to driving on a suspended license. I find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain that even if he didn’t hear it from his attorney and that can’t be introduced because that’s attorney/client privilege, unless it was part of an actual record which the State hasn’t produced, but the fact of the matter is, Defendant has been suspended before as shown by the record and he’s not a novice in these kind of proceedings. DISCUSSION Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because it could not support a finding of the mens rea—i.e., criminal intent—element of the crime of driving while suspended.

Specifically, he argues that there was no evidence that on the night in question he knew that his driver’s license was suspended; therefore, there was no evidence to support a finding that he intended to drive while his license was suspended. He maintains that the standard of proof of mens rea in a driving while suspended case is actual knowledge, of which there was no proof here; and that, even if deliberate ignorance or willful blindness is sufficient to show knowledge, the evidence was insufficient to support such a ⁵⁹⁹ finding. He relies upon State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451 , 583 A.2d 250 (1991), in advancing that argument. The State, also citing McCallum , acknowledges that there was no evidence of actual knowledge in this case, i.e., that appellant had obtained possession of the suspension letter and had read its contents.

The State responds, however, that deliberate ignorance or willful blindness is a proper standard of proof of knowledge in a driving while suspended case, and that the proof in this case met that standard. Before discussing the McCallum case, we shall explain with more particularity the operation of the statute under which appellant’s license was suspended. The suspension was effected under TA § 16-404(b)(1)(i), which provides, in pertinent part, that if a person accumulates 8 points on his driver’s record, the MVA “shall issue a notice of suspension.” The notice “shall ... [b]e personally served or sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark from the United States Postal Service.” TA § 16-404(b)(2)(i). It shall state the duration of the suspension and advise the person of his right, within ten days after the notice is sent, to file a written request for a hearing before the MVA.

TA § 16-404(b)(2)(h) & (iii). Finally, “[ujnless a hearing is requested, each notice of suspension ... is effective at the end of the 10 day period after the notice is sent.” TA § 16-404(b)(3). Thus, when the MVA issues a notice of suspension based on the accumulation of points and goes about serving it by mail (as opposed to personal service), the notice must be sent by certified mail. The suspension becomes effective 10 days after the notice was sent, unless a hearing was requested in that 10-day period.

In State v. McCallum, supra, 321 Md. 451 , 583 A.2d 250 , McCallum, like appellant, was charged with driving while suspended, under TA § 16-303(c). 2 McCallum was tried by a jury. His driving record, which was admitted into evidence, ⁶⁰⁰ showed that the MVA had mailed him three suspension letters: two for failing to pay fines in district court and one for failing to appear in district court. Ultimately, the MVA suspended McCallum’s license. 3 The suspension letters were sent by ordinary mail, consistent with the applicable provision of the Transportation Article. See TA (1987) § 16-206(c).

McCallum testified that, notwithstanding that the suspension letters had been mailed to the apartment that the MVA had on record as his address, he did not receive them because, when they were mailed, he was in jail on an unrelated charge, and was not living in the apartment. Moreover, while he was in jail, and during the time that the suspension letters were mailed, his landlord had brought eviction proceedings against him and had confiscated and destroyed all of his mail. Thus, according to McCallum, he never received the suspension letters and, at the time of his arrest for driving while suspended, did not know that his license had been suspended. McCallum asked the trial court to instruct the jury that criminal intent is an element of the crime of driving while suspended.

The court declined to do so. McCallum was convicted, and appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury about criminal intent was in error. This Court reversed the conviction, holding that mens rea is an element of the crime of driving while suspended. McCallum v. State, 81 Md.App. 403 , 567 A.2d 967 (1990).

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of this Court in a per curiam opinion. Reasoning ⁶⁰¹ that driving while suspended is not a “public welfare” offense in which the legislature “intended to eliminate the requirement of scienter ” and create a strict liability offense, 321 Md. at 457 , 583 A.2d 250 , the Court held that “mens rea is required for the charge of driving while suspended, and the trial judge erred in failing to so instruct the jury.” Id. The Court did not elaborate further. In a concurring opinion, Judge Chasanow, expressing the belief that, for the guidance of the trial court, the Court of Appeals “should ... elaborate on the mens rea that would be necessary to convict,” 321 Md. at 458 , 583 A.2d 250 , explained that the criminal intent required for the offense of driving while suspended “is ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘intent.’ Unquestionably, McCallum intended to drive.

The issue is whether McCallum had ‘knowledge’ that his driving privileges were suspended, and thus, his mental state must be assessed.” Id. Judge Chasanow further explained that knowledge in