Richardson v. Boozer

HOTTEN, J. On August 16, 2010, appellant, Donald Richardson, filed a pro se motion to modify child support in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, seeking to compel appellee, Jacquelyn Boozer, to pay child support commencing in December ⁵ 2009 and to reimburse appellant for overpayment of child support. The court granted appellant’s motion, but ordered that he pay appellee an outstanding child support balance of $7,101. Appellant filed for reconsideration of that order, alleging that (1) his child support obligation was legally terminated when the child failed to graduate from high school and that (2) the court erred in calculating his total child support obligations under the post-October 1, 2010 child support guidelines. The court denied appellant’s motion, finding that appellant’s obligation extended beyond the date of termination and that his contentions regarding the court’s calculations, were unfounded.

Appellant noted an appeal, and presents four questions for our consideration: 1. Did the trial court err in determining that appellant had an obligation to pay child support until the minor child of the parties reached the age of nineteen years old? 2. Did the trial court err in failing to properly assess the termination date of the parties’ obligation to pay child support and thereby improperly calculate the number of months of support owed by the appellant? 3. Did the trial court err in not utilizing the pre-October 1, 2010 child support guidelines in calculating appellant’s child support obligation? 4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to address appellant’s claim of overpayment of child support? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The procedural history of the parties’ efforts to obtain a divorce is extensive, so we will present a brief overview for purposes of the instant appeal. The parties married on November 26, 1988, and are the parents of their then-minor child, Christian Taylor Richardson (“Christian”), whom they adopted as an infant shortly after his birth on February 7, 1992.

The parties mutually and voluntarily separated on July ⁶ 14, 2001, and the trial court granted a judgment of absolute divorce on May 9, 2005. On December 20, 2007, appellant noted his first appeal, in which we affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 1 Relevant to our review, however, is the court’s judgment of absolute divorce. As part of the dissolution, the court awarded appellee sole legal and primary physical custody of Christian. Appellee was responsible for maintaining health insurance coverage for Christian, and appellant was ordered to pay appellee $1,456 per month for child support commencing from May 1, 2003.

On July 15, 2009, the parties reached an agreement regarding child support, and on August 15, 2009, the court ordered that appellant pay child support to appellee in the amount of $1,062 on the first day of each and every month until the later of (1) Christian attaining the age of eighteen years or (2) Christian’s graduation from high school. On November 24, 2009, appellee informed Christian that he could no longer reside with her, since he ignored her instructions. Christian began residing with appellant on November 29, 2009. Appellant ceased his child support payments, and filed a motion on December 9, 2009, requesting that the court (1) order appellee to pay child support in the amount of $895 per month until Christian attained the age of eighteen or graduated from high school; (2) order appellee to pay by check the amount of $3,369 for overpayment of child support; and (3) order appellee to file a statement of satisfaction of monetary judgment, reflecting appellant’s payment of $43,975.75 with accrued interest.

On April 11, 2010, Christian returned to his mother’s home. He was expected to graduate from Sidwell Friends School ⁷ (“Sidwell”), a private educational institution, on June 12, 2010. However, he failed to meet the graduation requirements and earn his high school diploma. As a result, on August 16, 2010, appellant renewed the abovementioned motion regarding child support.

Appellee alleged that Sidwell’s administration permitted Christian to register for substitute courses at Prince George’s Community College to obtain his diploma from Sid-well. Christian enrolled for the summer and fall 2010 semesters, but failed the necessary courses. 2 During the motion’s hearing on January 31, 2011, the court stated, “... [U]nder Maryland law, child support extends to age 19 or high school graduation, whichever comes first. So as long as he is working towards his high school graduation, then child support continues to age 19.” Because Christian would attain the age of nineteen on February 7, 2011, the court determined that appellant’s support would be terminated seven days from the hearing. The court granted appellant’s motion, finding that there was a material change in circumstances, but ordered that appellant pay appellee an outstanding child support balance of $7,101.

The court used the post-October 1, 2010 child support guidelines, and computed appellant’s obligation, less the five months that Christian resided with appellant and unreimbursed medical expenses of $419, resulting in a total of $7,101. On February 10, 2011, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court erred in (1) determining that his child support obligation was not legally terminated when Christian failed to graduate high school and (2) calculating his total child support obligations under the post-October 1, 2010 guidelines. The court denied appellant’s motion, finding that ⁸ appellant’s obligation to pay the child support arrearages extended beyond the date of termination for ongoing child support. The court concluded that there was no merit to appellant’s assertion that his child support obligation was calculated under the wrong criteria, since the court’s calculations were effective until September 30, 2010.

Thereafter, appellant filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Determining That Appellant Had a Child Support Obligation Until Christian Reached Nineteen Years Old? The circumstances under which child support may be terminated once a child attains the age of eighteen are governed by Md.Code (1957, 2011 RepLVol.), Article 1, § 24(a)(2) of the Rules of Interpretation, which provides in pertinent part: A person who has attained the age of 18 years and who is enrolled in secondary school has the right to receive support and maintenance from both of the person’s parents until the first to occur of the following events: (i) The person dies; (ii) The person marries; (iii) The person is emancipated; (iv) The person graduates from or is no longer enrolled in secondary school; or (v) The person attains the age of 19 years. The issue is whether Christian fell within the purview of Md.Code (1957, 2011 RepLVol.), Article 1, § 24(a)(2)(iv) of the Rules of Interpretation.

It is undisputed that Christian did not graduate from Sidwell in June 2010, but was enrolled at Prince George’s Community College in an effort to substitute the necessary courses required by his high school to secure his diploma. In appellant’s motion for reconsideration, he acknowledged that “... [Christian] did enroll at the Prince George’s Community College for [s]ummer and [f]all 2010 classes as a special student” and was enrolled in January 2011. ⁹ Furthermore, appellant did not object during the hearing when appellee asserted that Christian was registered at the community college for the purpose of attaining his high school diploma. Appellant asserts that his obligation to pay child support ended in June 2010 because Christian failed to attain his high school’s graduation requirements, and was not enrolled at the high school or other secondary school. Appellee avows that Christian’s pursuit of his high school diploma at Prince George’s Community College was the legal equivalent of enrollment in a secondary school.

She also avers that Md.Code (1957, 2011 RepLVol., 2012 Cum.Supp.), Article 1, § 24(a)(2) of the Rules of Interpretation would not suggest a narrow reading of the statutorily undefined phrase “enrolled in a secondary school.” We agree and explain. A question regarding statutory interpretation is a legal question, which we review de novo. Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 257 , 884 A.2d 1171 (2005) (citing Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 66-67 , 871 A.2d 575 (2005)); see also Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78 (2004) (Maryland appellate courts review issues de novo to decide if the trial court was legally correct in its interpretations of the Maryland Code.). The statute provides that a child, who has reached age eighteen, and is enrolled in secondary school, has the right to receive support and maintenance until the child (1) graduates from or is no longer enrolled in secondary school, (2) reaches the age of 19, (3) is emancipated, or (4) marries.

Md.Code (1957, 2011 Repl.Vol., 2012 Cum.Supp.), Article 1, § 24(a)(2) of the Rules of Interpretation. The term “secondary school” is not defined in the statute. However, the lack of an expressed definition does not prevent us from analyzing the legislative intent. Schreyer v. Chaplain, 416 Md. 94, 101 , 5 A.3d 1054 (2010).

To construe the intent, we start by observing the plain meaning of the statutory terminology. Bornemann v. Bornemann, 175 Md.App. 716, 724 , 931 A2d 1154 (2007) (citing Reier v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 397 ¹⁰ Md. 2, 26 , 915 A.2d 970 (2007)). “The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the [(legislature.” Witt v. Ristaino, 118 Md.App. 155, 162 , 701 A.2d 1227 (1997) (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995)). If the language is apparent and explicit, we end our search. Bornemann, 175 Md.App. at 724 , 931 A.2d 1154 (citing Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 341 , 914 A.2d 25 (2006)).

However, if the language is not clearly reflective of the legislature’s intent, we examine “intent from the legislative history or other sources.” Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 290 , 829 A.2d 611 (2003)). “We may thus consider the consequences resulting from one meaning, rather than another, and adopt the construction which promotes the most reasonable result in light of’ the General Assembly’s purpose. Witt, 118 Md.App. at 163 , 701 A.2d 1227 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Rucker v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 315 Md. 559, 565 , 555 A.2d 1060 (1989)).

The genesis of the amendment to Md.Code (1957, 2011 Repl.Vol., 2012 Cum.Supp.), Article 1, § 24(a)(2) of the Rules of Interpretation is found in the Age of Majority Bill, 3 which was passed and enacted in the 2002 session of the General Assembly. Bornemann, 175 Md.App. at 724 , 931 A.2d 1154 . The amendment is silent concerning the meaning of secondary school; however, the Revised Fiscal Note of the Department of Legislative Services is not. Our appellate courts have generally considered fiscal notes in determining legislative intent.

See generally Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 177-78 , 46 A.3d 443 (2012); Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 111 , 46 A.3d 426 (2012); Cosby v. Dep’t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 648-49 , 42 A.3d 596 (2012). The Revised Fiscal Note to the Age of Majority Bill reads: According to the Office of Child Support Enforcement of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 44 states require[d] child support until the child reache[d] the age of ¹¹ 18. Thirty-three of those states allow[ed] continuation of child support past the age of 18, if the child [was] a high school student. States var[ied] the termination date of child support for high school students and ... established] it at 19, 20, or 21. [In some states], enrollment in a high school equivalency, vocational, or technical course of education [met] the educational requirement....

Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Revised Fiscal Note, S.B. 657 (2002). Since the term “secondary school” was undefined in the statute, we consult those editions of the dictionary that were in close proximity to the statute’s enactment. See Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 261, n. 11 , 884 A.2d 1171 (2005) (citing Rossville Vending Mach.

Corp. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 97 Md.App. 305, 316-18 , 629 A.2d 1283 (1993)) (stating “it seems logical, at least in a linear way, that a popular dictionary [around the time in which a statute was enacted] would be an informative resource in attempting to arrive at a determination of what the 1936 [legislature intended by the usage of ‘gross receipts’ ”). In 2002, Article 1, § 24(a)(2) of the Rules of Interpretation was introduced for the first time. S.B. 657, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg.

Sess. (Md.2002). Therefore, we consult Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2051 (2002), defining secondary school as “a school more advanced in grade than an elementary schoolC[ 4 ] and offering general, technical, vocational, or college-preparatory courses.” Post-secondary education is defined as “a school or other institution that offers an educational program within the State for persons 16 years of age or older who have graduated from or left elementary or secondary school.” McCarthy v. Bd. of Educ. of Anne Arundel County, 280 Md. 634, 644 , 374 A.2d 1135 (1977). However, post-secondary education ex- ¹² eludes “an adult education, evening high school, or high school equivalency program----” Id.

The Maryland Dream Act, Senate Bill 167 of the 2011 General Assembly, established requirements for individuals who desired in-state tuition. See generally Doe et al. v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. 596, 602 , 53 A.3d 1111 (2012). In Doe et al. v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 428 Md. at 602, n. 3 , 53 A.3d 1111 , the Court of Appeals alluded to Md.Code (1978, Supp.2011), § 15-106.4(b) of the Education Article, which read: ... The individual must prove that he or she attended a Maryland secondary school for at least three years, and that he or she graduated from a Maryland secondary school or received a high school equivalency diploma.

Accordingly, we deduce that a secondary school education includes a high school equivalency program. While this issue is one of first impression in Maryland, other jurisdictions have considered what constitutes enrollment in a secondary school, including Missouri, which we surmise is one of the leading jurisdictions in analyzing the issue at hand. In In re Marriage of Copeland, 850 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993) [hereinafter “Copeland ”], the Missouri Court of Appeals determined whether a child’s enrollment in an adult basic education program at a vocational-technical school was enrollment in a secondary school program of instruction. Upon divorce, the trial court awarded the mother primary custody of the child, and ordered the father to pay child support.

Id. at 424 . The child discontinued his high school attendance at the age of seventeen. Id. His principal recommended that he transfer to a General Educational Development (GED) program to prepare for the high school equivalency exam, which the child, did.

Id. The father argued that the child’s GED program was not enrollment in a secondary school under the state’s statute, which terminated his child support obligation. Id. The Missouri statute read: ¹³ ... [W]hen a child reaches age eighteen, he is enrolled in and attending a secondary school program of instruction, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes such program or reaches age twenty-one, whichever first occurs....

Id. at 425 . The court concluded that “secondary school program of instruction” was a broad concept and could not be narrowly confined to a traditional high school. Id. In the Missouri court’s analysis, it noted that the child tested in reading, mathematics, language, social studies, and natural sciences to determine his areas of weakness.

Copeland, 850 S.W.2d at 425 . He was given assignments to improve his skills in those areas, he used computer disks and workbooks, and instructors were available to answer questions and give direction. Id. The program continued until the student was able to take and pass the GED exam.

Id. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the child was enrolled in and attending a secondary school program of instruction. Id. at 426 . In Thompson v. Dalton, 914 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo.Ct.App. 1995), the father averred that the trial court erred in continuing his child support obligation because his child was not enrolled in high school, a GED program, or a secondary school by his eighteen birthday.

The child discontinued high school, enrolled in a GED program, but did not pass the examination. Id. He re-registered for the program before his eighteenth birthday, as well as enrolled in a two-year aviation mechanical course of study at a community college. Id.

The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence displayed the child’s intention to complete his secondary education, so the trial court did not err, as the child was not emancipated. Id. In Beeler v. Beeler, 820 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), the wife argued that the trial court erred in terminating the father’s child support obligation. The child had not graduated from high school, and during the time he reached the age of eighteen, he was not enrolled in any secondary school pro ¹⁴ gram.

Id. Thus, the trial court was correct in terminating the father’s child support obligation. Id. Louisiana’s termination of child support statute operates in a similar fashion as our Maryland statute.

See Park v. Park, 634 So.2d 83, 85 (La.App. 1 Cir.1994). In Park, 634 So.2d at 86 , the Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit decided if a child’s enrollment in a vocational-technical school was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s secondary school requirement. The mother requested temporary and permanent child support, but the father argued that the mother was not entitled to child support because the parties’ child was no longer enrolled in a secondary school.