Richardson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

Bond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question argued is whether a requirement of due proof of death in a life insurance policy could be held dispensed with because another policy on the life of the insured, issued by the same insurer, had been paid. There was no evidence of the nature and terms of the paid policy, or of the time and circumstances of its payment. The trial court, in a suit on the contested policy, directed a verdict for the defendant at the conclusion o'f the testimony offered by the plaintiff, because, as the plaintiff states in his brief, no evidence had been adduced to show that the proof of death had been furnished.

The policy in suit, upon the life of Andrew Sapko, provided for payment by the insurer “upon receipt of due proof of the death of the insured.” And extracts copied into the record include, among others, a stipulation that if the insured, on the date of the issuance of the policy, was not alive, or not in sound health, or had been rejected for insurance by any insurer, or within two years previously had been attended by a physician for any otne of some specified serious ailments, the company might declare the policy void and be liable only for the return of the premiums paid. The company, at the trial, made a tender of the amount of premiums paid on this policy, but no reason for refusal to pay the ²⁹⁴ insurance, other than the failure of the claimant toi furnish proof of death, was given. The direction of the verdict in its favor relieved the defendant of the necessity of producing its evidence below. It had demanded a bill of particulars of the plaintiff’s claim, and the reply was that the declaration contained the particulars.

And then the defendant pleaded that it never promised as alleged and never was indebted as alleged. The facts adduced in evidence are no more informing, and do not reveal whatever substantial controversy there may be between the parties on this one policy. It is stated in the bill of exceptions, as facts agreed upon or settled, that the policy in suit had been issued on July 1st, 1929, that the insured had died on February 1st, 1930, and that letters of administration upon his estate had been granted to the plaintiff, Stanley L. Richardson. As no objection is made to suit by the administrator, it is to- be presumed that the policy was payable to the estate of the insured.

As to the other paid policy the testimony is meagre. The widow testified that she had two policies on the life of the insured in the same company, that the first was paid, and she received $460 upon it. There was no other reference to that policy, and no description of its terms, except that it was a life insurance policy. There is no evidence of any proof of death given under the paid policy, and no explanation is given by the plaintiff of failure to furnish the proof required under the present unpaid policy.

The governing principle, as usually stated, is that, unless such a requirement is waived by the- insurer, it must be met, and must be shown to have been met, as a condition precedent to a right of recovery upon the policy. Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 H. & J. 408, 411 ; Spring Garden Co. v. Evans, 9 Md. 1, 21 ; Citizens’ Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89, 102 ; Hartford Co. v. Keating, 86 Md. 130, 149 , 38 A. 29 ; Mutual Life Co. v. Thomas, 101 Md. 501, 504 , 61 A. 293 ; Citizens’ Co. v. Conowingo Co., 113 Md. 430, 448 , 77 A. 378 . And the plaintiff duly alleged in the present declaration, “that due proof of the death of the insured was furnished.” The plaintiff’s excuse for failure to do this is not that the requirement ²⁹⁵ had been waived by the insurer, but rather that compliance was shown to have been unnecessary, and should be dispensed with by the court, because it appears that the company was sufficiently satisfied of the fact of death to make payment on the other policy.

This much can be said on the facts. The plaintiff having failed to show that the proof was furnished, as required by the terms of the policy, but instead offering an excuse for not furnishing it, it is to be inferred that- the proof was not furnished. The payment made by the company to the widow on another life insurance policy, the terms of which are not made known, would, in the absence of evidence of mistake, prove that at the time of making the payment the company accepted it as a fact that the insured was dead. It seems to amotait to an admission that he was dead.

But the cause of death, any fact beyond that admission that he was dead, would not be inferable from the fact of payment, and if any more information about the death was needed under the second policy, there is nothing to show that the company had as yet received it. It is true that, in the absence of any evidence of the circumstances of the payment of the first policy, and any evidence to show