Richfield Oil Corp. v. Railroad Co.

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On October 6th, 1939, the Richfield Oil Corporation of New York, a body corporate, appellant, acquired by deed from Joseph P. Connor, Special Master, certain real estate located on Curtis Bay in Baltimore City, Maryland. Through this property the appellee, the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company, a body corporate, formerly operated a railroad over property in which it acquired an interest from the United States Asphalt Refining Company by deed dated September 11th, 1925. The appellant owns land on both sides of the railroad property.

In November, 1926, the stock of:the appellee, the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company, was acquired by the Western Maryland Railway Company, which operates the railroad formerly operated by the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company. On November 2nd, 1940, the appellant placed certain sleeves and pipes, from one part of its property to another, necessary for the transportation of petroleum products under the railroad tracks of the appellees, late at nig'ht, which appellees claim was done in a clandestine manner but which appellant claims was done at that late hour for the purpose of not interfering with the operation of appellees’ railroad. Before the installation of these pipes was completed, the appellees removed one of them. On November 29th, 1940, the appellant filed a bill of com-, plaint against appellees reciting among other things the aforesaid facts, and alleging ownership of the fee under said right-of-way in the appellant and that the appellees’ interest in said property is a certain easement of “the right of way for railroad purposes.” The bill asked among other things: “That the defendants, ⁵⁶³ they and each of them, their agents and servants, may be permanently enjoined and strictly prohibited from interfering, obstructing or molesting the complainant, its agents and servants, in crossing or recrossing over, or in placing its pipe lines, connections, or other equipment necessary and proper to the operation and enjoyment of complainant’s property hereinabove described, across and under right of way of defendants located on the complainant’s said property; provided, however, that the same be performed by the complainant in such manner as not to interfere with or interrupt the reasonable and proper use by the defendants of said right of way for railroad purposes.” The bill also asked for other and further relief.

After an answer was filed by the defendants, testimony was taken in open court before the chancellor and on February 4th, 1941, a decree was filed by the chancellor declaring the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company to be the owner in fee simple of the property in question and dismissing the bill of complaint. The appeal is taken from that decree. All parties to this proceeding admit that the equity court has jurisdiction in this case in view of the findings of the chancellor. Equity, however, cannot obtain jurisdiction merely by the consent of the parties to the cause, nor has equity jurisdiction to determine a matter involving a real disputed title to real estate.

Greenbaum v. Harrison, 132 Md. 34 , 103 A. 84 ; Clayton v. Shoemaker, 67 Md. 216 , 9 A. 635 ; Gulick v. Fisher, 92 Md. 353, 364 , 48 A. 375 ; Whalen v. Dalashmutt, 59 Md. 250 ; Bernei v. Sappington, 102 Md. 185, 190 , 62 A. 365 ; Arey v. Baer, 112 Md. 541, 542 , 76 A. 843 . “The law is well settled that an injunction will not issue to restrain a trespass, simply as such, but it will be granted where the injury alleged is irreparable, or where full and adequate relief cannot be had at law, or where the trespass is of a character to work destruction of the property as it had been held and enjoyed, or where it is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of litigation.” Long v. Ragan, 94 ⁵⁶⁴ Md. 462 at page 464, 51 A. 181, 182 ; White v. Flannigain, 1 Md. 525 , 54 Am. Dec. 668 ; Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408 , 61 Am. Dec. 871 ; Clayton v. Shoemaker, supra; Baltimore Belt R. R. Co. v. Lee, 75 Md. 596 , 23 A. 901 . At the time the bill of complaint was filed there had been breaches of the peace, and-the parties having agreed to commit no further acts while this present case was pending, in order to avoid a multiplicity of litigation, the chancellor was correct in holding that jurisdiction in the present case is in equity.

The primary question to be decided by us is whether the appellees, the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company and the Western Maryland Railway Company, own the fee of the land in question, underlying its railroad tracks. The chancellor below held that the fee of the land under the right of way was in the appellees. The United States Asphalt Refining Company by a series of deeds prior to March, 1916, acquired the land now occupied by both the appellant and the. appellees, a ground rent being reserved unto the Curtis Bay Company. On October 5th, 1925, the Curtis Bay Company conveyed to the United States Asphalt Refining Company the reversion in all the lands heretofore conveyed by it, thereby extinguishing the ground rent and converting the leasehold into fee simple property.

At the time all this tract was owned by the United States Asphalt Refining Company, it erected on the property at various locations tanks, stills, buildings and other structures of various kinds, and pipe lines were placed under the ground at different locations to carry oil from one part of the property to the other. In order to further develop this property, the United States Asphalt Refining Company built and laid out railroad tracks for the purpose of transporting its products and some of its pipe lines passed under the tracks at various points. In 1916, the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company was incorporated by the same interest which controlled the United States Asphalt Refining Company and by a series of deeds made con ⁵⁶⁵ veyance of the tracks and the property covered by the tracks to the new corporation. The first of these deeds was executed on March 16th, 1916, and the granting clause in this deed was: “doth grant unto the said Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the rights of way for railroad purposes in and to that part of the lands of the United States Asphalt Refining Company at Wagner’s Point,” and the description followed.

This deed contained the following saving clause: “Saving and reserving however to the said the United States Asphalt Refining Company a joint use in said right of way and the tracks thereon for the necessary switching and other uses and purposes for itself and its allied industries now or which may hereafter be located along said right of way.” It also contained the following clause: “To Have and To Hold the said described rights of way. and the railroad tracks thereupon unto and to the use of the said Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company, its successors and assigns; subject however to the reserve joint use aforementioned.” Included in this deed was certain land which had previously been conveyed to the Texas Company and in which the United States Asphalt Refining Company had certain rights, and in the case of Texas Company v. United States Asphalt Refining Company, 140 Md. 350 at pages 357 and 358, 117 A. 879, 882 , this court said that “The Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company was made a defendant in the case, because the Asphalt Company executed a deed to it on March 16th, 1916, attempting to convey certain rights of way for railroad purposes over part of the land appropriated to the use in common of the plaintiff and the Asphalt Company, and in which the plaintiff owned the fee, and it was alleged that the Railroad Company was making use of the easement in violation of the plaintiff’s rights. * * * The easement which the Asphalt Company’s deed purported to convey to the Railroad Company was not appurtenant to the land for the benefit of which the right ⁵⁶⁶ of way under the plaintiff’s deed had been created. The deed to the Railroad Company did not convey to it the fee in any part of the land in connection with which the pre-existing easement had been used.” The second deed to the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company was dated January 2nd, 1924, and the granting clause, the reservation clause, and the To Have and To Hold clause were the same as in the deed of March 16th, 1916. Prior to September 11th, 1925, the railroad tracks had been spread over parts of the property of the United States Asphalt Refining Company and certain parts of the tracks formerly used by the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company had been abandoned by it. Therefore, on September 11th, 1925, an exchange deed was executed whereby the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company conveyed back to the United States Asphalt Refining Company the properties conveyed by the latter to the former in the deeds of' March 16th, 1916, and January 2nd, 1940, and the granting clause in that deed reads in part as follows: “The said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company doth grant, assign and reconvey unto the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company, its successors and assigns, its right, title and interest in and to all that portion of land heretofore conveyed by the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company to the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company. * * *” This deed also contained the following clause: “To Have and To Hold the same unto and to the use of the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company, its successors and assigns, in the same manner as if the same had not heretofore been conveyed. * * *” In the same deed of September 11th, 1925, “the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company doth grant, convey and assign unto the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, the rights of way for railroad purposes in and to the following lots or tracts of ground * * a description of which followed.

The deed also contained the following clauses: ⁵⁶⁷ “Being all that portion of the lots of ground heretofore conveyed by the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company to the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company by the Deeds herein-before recited, and the right of way for railroad purposes in such other land of the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company, not heretofore conveyed to the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company, as is now used by the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company in the operation of its railroad as aforesaid.” “Together with all and every, the rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances and advantages, to the same belonging, or anywise appertaining.” “To Have and To Hold the said described right of way and the railroad tracks thereon unto and to the use of the said The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, saving and reserving, however, to the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company, its successors and assigns, and to The Interocean Oil Company, a corporation duly incorporated, its successors and assigns, a joint use in such parts of said right of way as may now be occupied by any tanks, stills, or buildings of the said The United States Asphalt Refining Company and the said The Interocean Oil Company, now erected thereupon, and for such time as the same may remain thereupon.” We must note the difference between the granting clause to the United States Asphalt Refining Company and that to the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company in this deed of September 11th, 1925, one conveying “its right, title and interest,” the other conveying “the rights of way for railroad purposes.” Whatever title is held by the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company is held under this deed. Subsequently, on October 5th, 1925, the United States Asphalt Refining Company conveyed all of its property to ⁵⁶⁸ the Interocean Oil Company, a body corporate, which deed contained the following saving and excepting clause: “Saving and excepting however from the above described land such portions as is described and conveyed to the Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company by and in a deed of exchange and in the annexed hereto made between the said United States Asphalt Refining Company and the Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company dated September 11th, 1925, recorded or intended to be recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore City prior hereto, with the benefit however to the said party of the second part, its successors or assigns, of the reservations mentioned in said deed of exchange relating to the joint use of such parts of the right of way of said railroad as may now be occupied by any tanks, stills or buildings therein as recited in said deed.” On the same day the Interocean Oil Company executed an indenture of trust on its aforesaid property to the Century Trust Company of Baltimore which contained the following saving and excepting clause: “Saving and excepting, however, from the above described land such portions as are described in a deed of exchange and in the plat thereto attached between the United States Asphalt Refining Company and the Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company dated September 11th, 1925, recorded or intended to be recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore City prior hereto.” Later the Interocean Oil Company went into receivership and Joseph P. Connor, appointed receiver by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, as Special Master, granted and conveyed to the appellant on October 6th, 1939, the property now held by it by metes, bounds, courses and distances subject to the following clause: “Subject also to the grant of various railroad rights of way by deed between United States Asphalt Refining Company and The Chesapeake and Curtis Bay Railroad Company, dated September 11th, 1925, and recorded ⁵⁶⁹ among the Land Records of Baltimore City in Liber S. C. L. No. 4465, folio 321, said railroad rights of way having an area of approximately Thirteen (13) acres of land, more or less.” Whatever title is held by the appellant, Richfield Oil Corporation of New York, was acquired by this deed of October 6th, 1939. We must determine whether the conveyance of September 11th, 1925, above referred to, from the United States Asphalt Refining Company to the Chesapeake & Curtis Bay Railroad Company, whereby it made a grant of “the rights of way for railroad purposes,” was a grant of the fee or whether it was an easement. This court said through Judge Sloan in the case of Hodges, Trustee v. Owings, 178 Md. 300 at page 304, 13 A. 2nd, 338, 340: “Both parties agree that if the language of a deed be doubtful, it shall be most strongly construed against the grantor, but, as said in Zittle v. Weller, 63 Md. 190, 196 , ‘this rule is to be resorted to, and relied on, only where all other rules of exposition fail to reach, with reasonable certainty, the intention of the parties.’ ‘And,’ as said in Maryland State Fair v. Schmidt, 147 Md. 613, 621 , 128 A. 365, 368 , “to ascertain its true meaning the situation of the parties and the circumstances attending the execution of the deed may be considered.’ Brown v. Reeder, 108 Md. 653, 657 , 71 A. 417 ; Logsdon v. Brailer Mining Co., 143 Md. 463, 474 , 123 A. 113 ; Weinbeck v. Dahms, 134 Md. 464 , 107 A. 12 .” The chancellor admitted extrinsic evidence, over exception, as to the intention of the parties at the time this deed of September 11th, 1925, was executed and we believe it was rightly admitted.

From the testimony in the record, it appears that Mr. J. Cookman Boyd, Sr.,