Maryland case law › Rickard v. Neff

Rickard v. Neff

130 Md. 89 (1917) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedBurke, J.✓ Good law
HoldingJohn E.

Burke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. John E. Neff and Delia S'. Neff, his wife, the appellees' on this record, filed a bill in the Circuit Court for Worcester County against William H. Rickard "and Amanda Rickard, his wife, in which they asked that a decree be passed for the sale of a tract, of land called “Seaside Rest” situated in that county, and for the distribution of the proceeds of sale between the complainant, John E. Neff, and William II. Rickard, one of the defendants.

The bill alleged that John E. Neff and William H. Rickard were seized in fee simple as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest therein, of a tract of land, called “Seaside Rest” situated at or near Sinepuxent Bay, in Worcester County, the oneumdivided one-half interest of John E. Neff having been conveyed to him by a deed from John D. Wisman and wife, dated August 26th, 1913, and recorded among the Land Records of Worcester County, and that the lien reserved for unpaid purchase money in said deed had been released and the purchase money paid; that the onedialf undivided interest of William II. Rickard in said land had been acquired by him by a deed from Joseph E. Wisman and wife, dated August 27, 1913, and recorded among the Land Records of Worcester County, and that the lien reserved for unpaid purchase money in said deed had been released and the purchase money paid. The bill further alleged that said real estate was not susceptible of partition without material loss and injury to the parties entitled to interests as above stated,. 91 and that in order to make division of said interests it would be necessary to sell the property, and divide the proceeds of the sale between the parties according to their respective interests. The relief prayed for was: “1.

That a decree be passed for the sale of the property; and “2. That the proceeds of said sale may be distributed between your Orator, John E. Neff, and the said William H Nickard according to their respective rights and interests; and for other and further relief.” The defendants answered the bill. Their answer denied that the plaintiff, John E. Neff, and the defendant, William H. Nickard, are seized in fee simple as tenants in common, each in an undivided one-half interest therein, of the tract of land mentioned and referred to in the bill; it admitted that an undivided one-half interest in said land was conveyed to John E. Neff by the deed from John L. Wisman and wife, dated August 26, 1911, referred to in the bill, and that the lien reserved by the deed for the unpaid purchase money had been released and the purchase money paid; it further admitted that a one-half undivided interest in the land was acquired by William H. Nickard from Joseph F‘. Wisman by deed dated the 27th of August, 1913, and that the lien reserved by the deed for unpaid purchase money had been released and the purchase money paid, as alleged in the bill.

The answer then set up the following contract: “This Contract, Made this 21st day of August, 1913, by & between W. H. Nickard of Harrisonburg, Va., of first part and John E. Neff of Shenandoah County, Virginia, of second part: Witnesseth, That for & in consideration of one dollar in hand paid the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by first party, and the further considerations as hereinafter set out that will accrue to both parties, first party does this day sell unto second party one-half undivided interest in the farm known as the Jonathan Shaeffor or Starke 92 farm, containing 611 acres, more or less, situated about 8 miles south of Lexington, Va., on the Plank Road, together with all its belongings and easements as set out in the deed that is to be executed' to the said Rickard by W. E. L. Stark & wife on or about Sept. 2nd, 1913, upon the following terms & conditions, to wit, second party is to execute a deed of general warranty to first party of his % undivided interest in a farm known as Seaside Rest, situated near Newark, Md., containing about 360 acres more or less, being the same farm deeded to said J. E. Neff & Joseph E. Wisman by J. L. Wisman & wife and formerly owned by Gordon Gones, known as Seaside Rest, free of encumbrance, said Neff obligating himself to pay all obligations upon his interest in said property as is understood between himself & Joseph Wisman & is to execute his notes or bonds to first party for $9,250.00, nine thousand two hundred & fifty dollars, with interest from Sept. 2nd, 1913, said $9,250.00 to be evidenced by 4 bonds of $2,312.25/100 dollars, two thousand three hundred and 25/100 dollars, dated Sept. 2, 1913, and due 3 years after date, interest payable annually; second party agrees to unite in the contract that first party has made with C. E. Rice as tenant on said farm for the ensuing year. The bonds above referred to are to be recited in deed from first to second party as vendor’s bonds retaining a lien upon the interest conveyed. This contract is subject to Rickard securing a deed with satisfactory title to said 611 acres from W. E. L. Stark, with whom he has a contract in writing to deliver said deed about Sept. 2, 1913, possession of all the property herein mentioned is to be given Sept. 2, 1913, subject however to the present tenant’s rights on said properties. “Witness the following signatures this 21st day of August, 1913. “W. H. Rickard. (Seal) “J. E. Neff. .(Seal)” 93 The answer averred that William II.

Rickard did secure a deed with satisfactory title to said land in Virginia, from said W. E. L. Stark and wife and that said Rickard had performed all 1he requirements of said agreement on his part to be performed, and had tendered himself ready and willing to convey to said Neff the undivided one-lialf interest in said .Tonathan Shaeffer farm in the State of Virginia, but that the said John E. Neff has refused and still refuses to convey to the said William II. Rickard his undivided one-half interest in said tract of land in Worcester County, called “Seaside Rest,” and likewise has refused and still refuses to execute to the said William H. Rickard his notes or bonds for the sum of nine thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. The defendants prayed “that the said agreement, may be specifically enforced, and that the said John E. Neff may be decreed to convey unto the said William H. Rickard his aforesaid interest in said land called “Seaside Rest,” and to execute unto the said William IT. Rickard the said notes or bonds for nine thousand two hundred and fifty dollars in ao-„ eordance with said agreement; and that in the event, the said John E. Neff, who is a resident of the State of Virginia, and resides beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, should refuse or neglect to obey the decree of this Court specifically enforcing said contract against him, that this Court appoint a trustee to convey to the said William II.

Rickard, the undivided one-half interest of the said John E. Neff in the said land called “'Seaside Rest”; whereupon, after the execution by the said John E. Neff to the said William IT. Rickard of the aforesaid notes or bonds for nine thousand two hundred and fifty dollars and interest, as provided in said contract, the said William IT. Rickard tenders himself ready, willing and able to convey to the said John E. Neff an undivided one-half interest in the aforesaid farm in the State of Virginia, called the Jonathan 'Shaeffer farm, in accordance with the terms mentioned in said agreement.” 94 The answer did not deny the allegation of the bill that the land was not susceptible of division without loss and injury to the parties in interest. . The allegation, however, was fully supported by the evidence of witnesses who testified in the case.

A replication was filed, and testimony was taken in Maryland and Virginia by the respective parties upon the issues of fact raised by the pleadings. The case was submitted for decision to the lower Court, after argument, and that Court by its decree, dated September 5, 1916, dismissed the defendants’ cross^bill which asked for the specific performance of the contract of August 21, 1913, set up in the answer, and decreed that the real estate (Seaside Rest) mentioned in the proceedings be sold, and appointed "William F. Johnson and George M. Dpshur, trustees, to make the sale. The appeal before us was taken by the defendants from that decree. Upon the allegations of the bill and the admissions in the answer, and the proof, it must be admitted that the decree appealed from was properly passed, unless the record shows that it was the duty of the Court below to have specifically enforced the contract set up' and relied upon by the defendants.

Apart from that contract, the case is a plain one for a sale under Section 13Y, Article 16 of the Code. The single question is this: Does the record disclose a, state of facts which required the Court, under the well settled rules relating to specific performance, to have enforced the contract set up by the defendants ? The principles which control the Court in the granting or withholding the decree for specific performance of contracts are so well established as to render it unnecessary to cite many cases in which they have been announced. We will state the general principles as announced in two cases in this Court.

In Semmes v. Worthington, 38 Md. 298 , Judge Alvey said: “Specific execution of contracts by courts of equity is not a matter of absolute right in the party applying, but of sound discretion in the Court, to be exercised upon consideration of all the circum 95 stances of each particular case. The Court will be controlled, of course, in the exercise of its discretion, by the established doctrines and settled principles upon the subject; but it does not follow, as matter of course, that because the legal obligation under the contract may be perfect, therefore the equitable power of the Court will be exercised to compel or effect specific execution. In every case, the question is, whether the exercise of the power is called for to subserve the ends of justice; and unless the Court is satisfied that the application to it, for this extraordinary assistance, is fair, just and reasonable, in every respect, it will refuse to interfere, and leave the party to other remedies for redress. Waters v. Howard, 1 Md. Ch. 112 , and 8 Gill, 262 ; 2 Story’s Eq., secs. 767, 770; Seymour v. Delancey, 6 John.

Ch. 222; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557 .” We said in Horner v. Woodland, 88 kid. 511: “The principles regulating the exercise by courts of equity of their

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