Riggins v. State

KENNEY, Judge. On July 20, 2001, appellant, Paul Stephen Riggins, Jr., was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Howard County of the first degree murder of his wife, Nancy Riggins (the “victim”). On November 29, 2001, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, appellant poses three ques ¹⁸⁷ tions for our review, which we have reordered and reworded slightly: I. Did the trial court err in not granting a mistrial after a witness made a statement bolstering another witness’ reputation for truthfulness?

II

Was there legally sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for first degree murder absent a body or other physical evidence indicating that a murder occurred?

III

Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury that it could not convict the appellant of murder based solely on statements he made to others absent some corroboration of the corpus delicti of the crime? For the reasons set out below, we shall affirm the decision of the circuit court. GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Case Begins According to appellant, at approximately 6:00 a.m. on the morning of July 2, 1996, he returned to his home in Howard County after working the night shift as a “yard jockey” at the Patapsco Waste Water Treatment Plant (“PWWTP”) in Baltimore City. 1 He noticed that the front door of the house was slightly ajar. At approximately 7:00 a.m., appellant found his five-year-old daughter in her bedroom. 2 The victim was not in the house.

Appellant took his daughter to day care, returned home, vacuumed the inside of the minivan, loaned a power washer to his neighbor, informed his neighbor that the victim had left him, and fell asleep for the remainder of the day. Later, a friend watched appellant’s daughter so that appellant could go to work. ¹⁸⁸ On July 3,1996, appellant called 911 and reported the victim missing. Despite extensive attempts to locate the victim, including checking all motor vehicle administration records throughout the United States and tracking her name, date of birth, and social security number, the victim was never located. After a four-year investigation by the Howard County Police Department (“HCPD”), appellant was arrested on September 21, 2000, and charged with first degree murder.

The Discovery of the Ongoing Affair In 1992, Amy Cole, then a minor, 3 began babysitting appellant’s daughter. Subsequently, appellant and Cole began a sexual relationship. According to Cole, she “loved” appellant and he “loved” her. As their relationship progressed, Cole visited appellant’s house when his wife was at work, visited appellant at work so that they could spend the evening together, 4 and visited with appellant and the victim when she was not hired to babysit.

Appellant introduced Cole to coworkers as his daughter. Appellant told Cole that he and the victim were “no longer sleeping together, they didn’t get along, and that [the victim] was going to leave [him].” At such time, when the victim allegedly left him, appellant wanted Cole to “move in with him and take care of [his daughter] and take care of the house, and [they] would get married.” In 1995, during Cole’s first year of college, she began dating another man, which disturbed appellant. The following year, appellant told Cole that the victim planned to move to Pennsylvania and that Cole could move into the house and take care of appellant’s daughter. A few months prior to her disappearance in 1996, the victim had approached appellant, inquiring about his relationship ¹⁸⁹ with Cole.

He denied that he and Cole had a relationship. Upset about the suspected affair, the victim told others that she was going to report appellant to the police and divorce him. 5 When he told Cole about that confrontation, appellant stated “that he wanted to kill [the victim],” and that he would either “shoot” or “strangle her” and “put her body in the truck with the waste, and nobody would ever find her.” In June 1996, appellant called his friend Leon Adams and asked him if he could borrow a handgun for a “turkey shoot.” Adams suggested that he purchase a gun from a pawn shop. A few days later, appellant contacted Adams and again asked about obtaining a handgun. Appellant also approached Ernest Stovall, Jr. and Christopher Alexander about obtaining a gun.

Brian Waugh, a PWWTP yard jockey who worked with appellant, 6 testified that, sometime in 1996, appellant asked him what was the “best way to get rid of [appellant’s friend’s] wife.” Waugh responded that the friend should “get a divorce.” Appellant responded, “[N]o, no, I don’t mean like that. Get rid of her, get rid of — dispose of her.” Waugh then advised appellant that “a lot of people connected with murder, just can’t, can’t get away with it.” Appellant then asked him “if you put a body in a hole and you put lime in it, would it eat the body?” Appellant also approached Waugh about getting a gun and asked him “if a .22 would kill somebody.” On June 30, 1996, the victim called Cole, and informed her that appellant had told her about their affair. Cole responded that it was a “one-time affair that had happened a couple months ago.” After her discussion with the victim, Cole visited appellant at PWWTP, where they discussed the situation. Appellant stated that “he’ll take care of it.” ¹⁹⁰ Events occurring from July 1 through July 5, 1996 Upset that she had lied to the victim about the duration of her affair with appellant, Cole called the victim on July 1, 1996, and told her that the affair with appellant had been going on for four years.

Later that evening, the victim called Cole back. She told Cole that she planned to inform Cole’s mother about the affair, which she did later that evening. Following her conversation with the victim, Cole called appellant and informed him of the victim’s intention to report the affair to Cole’s mother. Appellant responded, “don’t worry about it, [I’ll] take care of it,” and requested that Cole meet him at 10:00 p.m.

On that same day, the victim informed her fried and coworker, Margaret Speakes, that, because appellant was having a relationship with Cole, she intended to end the marriage and was going to contact an attorney regarding a divorce. Appellant reported to work for the shift beginning at 6:00 p.m. on July 1 and ending at 6:00 a.m. on July 2, 1996. When he arrived at work, he asked Brian Waugh to come in early the next day because appellant had to take his daughter to daycare. Appellant stated that he had to make such arrangements because the victim was “fed up with him and she was going to leave him.” At approximately 9:00 p.m., the victim spoke on the phone with Christopher Riggins, appellant’s brother.

She told him that she planned to leave the house because of the affair between appellant and Cole. Although she stated that she intended to leave appellant, Christopher Riggins testified that it was not in the victim’s character to “just leave” and that the victim and her daughter had a “very tight relationship.” At 10:00 p.m., John Mark Thomas, 7 a friend of appellant, spoke on the telephone with the victim. He described her as ¹⁹¹ being “very upset” and “crying.” She stated that she was going to leave appellant and go to Pennsylvania with her daughter. After getting off from work, Cole “stole” some beer and met appellant at 10:15 p.m. at a local food store.

They discussed appellant moving out of his house and whether Cole would go with him. 8 Cole then went home and watched appellant pull down the driveway of his house. Cole remained outside until 12:00 a.m. or 1:00 a.m., talking to her boyfriend, who was living with her at her parents’ house. July 2 At approximately 10:00 a.m. on July 2,1996, appellant called Thomas at work and told him that the victim was gone. Because there was no one there to watch his daughter, appellant requested that Thomas come over.

At lunch time, appellant visited Cole at work and told her that when he arrived home from work that morning, his daughter was in bed asleep and that the victim “was gone.” Cole did not observe any marks, scratches, or bruises on appellant. According to Cole, appellant was “happy” that the victim was gone. He then stated to Cole that the victim left him a note stating that “she was gone, to watch [their daughter], and she’d never come back.” Appellant then asked Cole to move into his home “[a]s soon as possible” and “help take care of [appellant’s daughter].” Thomas arrived at appellant’s house at 4:00 p.m. Appellant went to work while Thomas watched appellant’s daughter.

July 3 Appellant called 911 and reported the victim missing. At approximately 9:00 a.m., Howard County Police Officer Karen Johnson arrived at appellant’s home. Appellant told the ¹⁹² officer that he had last seen the victim on July 1,1996, at 8:00 p.m. He did not know she was missing until the morning of July 2, 1996.

He informed Officer Johnson that approximately $300, some clothes, and a computer were missing. 9 The victim’s car was in the garage and her wedding ring was upstairs. The officer asked appellant if he had contacted the victim’s family or friends or area hospitals. Appellant then contacted the victim’s parents in Pennsylvania and a sister in California. Appellant told Officer Johnson that he had waited to report the victim missing because he believed that he had to wait forty-eight hours.

He then stated that he was having an affair, that his affair caused tension in the couple’s marriage, but that they had planned on working it out. According to Officer Johnson, appellant “appeared very calm, very normal,” and “not too overly concerned.” In addition, the officer did not notice any signs of a physical altercation in the house or any marks, cuts, or abrasions on appellant. The officer subsequently contacted cab companies and area hospitals to see if the victim had been admitted as a patient. Later that day, Cole came to appellant’s home to watch his daughter.

She did not notice anything missing from the home. 10 July 4 Cole told appellant that her father believed appellant had killed the victim. According to her, appellant “laughed” and stated: “ ‘[D]o you think that I would be that dumb to risk my freedom, my daughter, to kill [the victim]. Do you actually think I could do that and get away with it?’ ” ¹⁹³ During the afternoon, Corporal Luther Johnson and Detective Pete Wright went to appellant’s home for a routine followup investigation into the victim’s disappearance. 11 Appellant told Corporal Johnson that approximately $2,500 in cash was missing from the house. Appellant also advised the officers that he had spoken with the victim about his affair and that, based on a telephone call from the victim’s friend, Mary Hand, he believed that she might have gone to Virginia.

Appellant indicated that the last time he had seen the victim was during the morning of July 1, 1996, but that he had spoken to her on the telephone several times that day. Appellant showed Corporal Johnson around the house mentioning missing items, including money, the victim’s fanny pack, medication, shoes, clothes, and suitcases. Appellant cried during part of the interview. July 5 Cole and appellant continued to see each other.

On July 5, 1996, upon a request of law enforcement officials, Cole agreed to tape telephone conversations with appellant. 12 Later that day, Cole placed a call to appellant in an attempt to obtain information about the victim’s disappearance. On or about July 5, 1996, appellant called John Muzzi, a manager where the victim worked, requesting “any monies that were due [the victim] either by normal pay, vacation pay, [or] any other monies that might be available that would go to [the victim].” Appellant further requested that the victim be placed on sick leave and that her “sick leave pay [be forwarded] to him.” Muzzi responded that he could not place the victim on sick leave without documentation from a doctor and that any pay would have to be given to the victim. ¹⁹⁴ The Ongoing Police Investigation On July 8, 1996, appellant was questioned at the police station. Detective William Walsh, a member of the Criminal Investigations Bureau, had appellant complete the interrogation waiver form and then questioned him about the victim’s disappearance. Appellant told Detective Walsh that the last time that he had seen the victim was on July 1, 1996, and that he had called her at 5:00 p.m., 6:00 p.m., and sometime after 6:00 p.m.

Appellant then recited the events of July 2, 1996. In an attempt to locate the victim, appellant called her boss and found out that she did not report to work. Appellant stated that the victim’s mother called at 10:00 a.m. and he informed her that the victim was out shopping. Consistent with his earlier story, appellant informed the detective that Mary Hand had mentioned that the victim had talked about going to Virginia.

Appellant also informed Detective Walsh that the victim left a handwritten note near the coffee pot, saying “goodbye, take care of [the couple’s daughter], I won’t be coming back.” Appellant stated that “he threw [the note] in the kitchen trash.” Sergeant Charles Jacobs, one of the lead investigators in the case, 13 went door to door throughout the neighborhood talking with neighbors to discover any information about the victim’s whereabouts or if they had observed anything suspicious on the night of the victim’s disappearance. Flyers were distributed throughout the area, a commercial billboard was leased on southbound Route 1, and the local and national news media aired and wrote stories about the victim’s disappearance. In addition, Sergeant Jacobs contacted Brett Kirby, an FBI Special Agent, in an effort to locate the victim through the FBI’s databases. Other search techniques included seven searches using K-9 dogs and heat sensing equipment.

These ¹⁹⁵ efforts produced no evidence and no information concerning the victim’s disappearance. On July 9, 1996, the HCPD obtained and executed a search and seizure warrant for appellant’s house and the family vehicles, looking for any “signs of foul play” or “a struggle that may have occurred in the residence.” Additionally, the police “search[ed] for documentation, bank records, possibly a note, or anything of that nature to assist [them] in possibly locating the whereabouts” of the victim. During the search, the officers removed vacuum cleaner bags, the victim’s hairbrush, and a Rolodex. The cars were towed to the HCPD’s crime lab in Ellicott City, Maryland.

A second search and seizure warrant was executed on July 23, 1996, and several shovels and garden tools were seized. Soil samples were taken from the rear of the house. A landfill in York, Pennsylvania, was searched on July 18, 1996. Despite her ongoing sexual relationship with appellant, Cole continued to cooperate with the HCPD by wearing a body wire.

On one occasion, appellant suggested what Cole should say to authorities about her July 1, 1996 conversation with the victim, but appellant “never came out and said that he killed [the victim].” Appellant indicated to Cole that the victim was seeing someone named “Bob” and that “she could have possibly run away with him.” He further suggested that the victim could be in Florida or in “drug rehab” in Ohio. 14 On January 15, 1997, the FBI conducted a third search of appellant’s home. A “luminal” scan of the residence was conducted, in which a chemical compound was sprayed “in an effort to locate any trace evidence” that could not be seen “with the naked eye.” After the application of the chemical compound, bodily fluids such as blood would glow under certain lighting. Most of the house was scanned, but, because of the toxic nature of the chemical compound, the kitchen and ¹⁹⁶ living room were not tested. No evidence was discovered in this search.

In 2000, Sergeant Charles Jacobs located David Marshall, a former inmate at the Howard County Detention Center who had been incarcerated when appellant was serving his eighteen-month sentence for sexual child abuse. Marshall was informed that his cooperation was needed in the investigation of the victim’s disappearance. The State assisted Marshall in getting a bond review in an unrelated case, and in turn, Marshall promised to testify before a grand jury. Lieutenant Greg Marshall, who supervised the investigation of the victim’s disappearance and was not related to David Marshall, testified that he assisted David Marshall in receiving a bond reduction hearing, gave him approximately $200 to pay bills, and drove him to a halfway house.

On December 7, 2000, the HCPD executed a search and seizure warrant for two PWWTP waste tanks in search of human remains. No evidence was found. On April 25, 2001, based on an alleged statement made by appellant, the Baltimore County Police Department dive team searched an area of the Chesapeake Bay near PWWTP. Again, the search did not yield any evidence.

The Trial A fourteen-day trial began July 2, 2001, and ended July 20, 2001. The State called over fifty witnesses, many of whom testified about the days leading up to and following the victim’s disappearance, the victim’s close relationship with her daughter, and the investigation. David Marshall was a key witness. 15 He stated that, in April or May 1998, ¹⁹⁷ [appellant] told me that, he told me what happened the night he came home early from work, and he was sitting in the living room in the dark, he had been drinking. And he wanted to confront his wife about her going to the police about her finding out about the baby sitter. * * * Well, he said that, that when he, you know, he heard her come in, and she turned the lights on, and he came up behind her.

He startled her, because she thought he was at work. And he, you know, said he wanted to talk to her, you know. He wanted to talk to her. About the situation with the baby sitter.

She had found out that he had an affair with her, and that he, and he didn’t want her to go to the police. I don’t know if she was, I think she was planning on leaving and taking his daughter with her. Well, he said he tried to talk to her, you know, and she wouldn’t, she wouldn’t listen to him. And, you know, he tried, she just wouldn’t listen to him.

He said he got angry and he, he choked her. Well, he told me that — he said, he, like, he zapped out, said he chocked [sic] her. He didn’t realize, you know, what he was doing, and he choked her, and he — when he took his hand off her neck she fell down, bumped her head. He went to check her pulse, he didn’t feel anything.... ¹⁹⁸ He said, then he said, he told me, he put her, he put her in the trunk.

And I got up, and I looked at him, and told him, I didn’t want to hear anymore, and I went back to my bunk. Marshall testified that he did not receive any assistance or help from the State regarding his case, but he had received approximately $200 from Lieutenant Marshall. 16 John McKenny, an inmate at the Howard County Detention Center from March 12 through April 23, 2001, testified that appellant talked about suing Howard County and receiving a large monetary award. Appellant said that, because he was not supervised at work, he needed McKenny’s help in establishing an alibi. Appellant said that he would share some of the money with McKenny if he provided appellant with an alibi.

Appellant and McKenny worked out an elaborate story in which they were together from the morning of July 1 through July 2,1996. McKenny further testified: Well, at another conversation, he told me that I had asked him where she was, what he did with the body? And he said it’s in a place where nobody would ever find it. He don’t [sic] have to worry about anybody ever finding it.

And I said that must, that must be interesting. And he told me that at work his alibi, his boss, could see him somewhere, wherever he was at in the yard or wherever, driving his truck. His boss was — in visual of his boss, [sic] And when his boss left from where he could see him, he got out of one side of his truck, went to the other side, and took her out and threw her over the wall into the water. His exact words, the bitch became fish food.

And I asked him what, asked him what would happen to a body, wouldn’t it float or ¹⁹⁹ whatever? Between salt water and the fish eating, to [sic] body would deteriorate, and so would the bones. * * * And he also said the skull would be the hardest thing, the last, and the hardest thing to go, but with the current and the tides, it wouldn’t be in the same place where it was dropped at. Tony Ross testified that he had shared a “dormitory” with appellant at the Howard County Detention Center. 17 In response to Ross’ questions about the victim, appellant “never gave [him] a yes or no answer,” but stated that “she left, and the bitch is never coming back.” Appellant later stated to Ross, “if I wanted to kill my wife, think about it, I’d just burn her body.” That information was provided to the HCPD without Ross receiving any consideration in his pending criminal case. Ross, a self-admitted drug dealer, said he had been arrested approximately twenty times, had thirteen convictions, and was serving eight years at the Eastern Correction Institute.

Members of the victim’s family testified that she “stayed in contact often,” that she “always returned calls,” that she would “[n]ever” walk out on her daughter, and that no one had been in contact with the victim since her disappearance. Although the victim was close to her family, she did not always share personal information with them. Cole testified that only days after the victim disappeared, appellant proposed marriage to her and on two separate occasions gave her rings. On the first occasion, appellant gave Cole an engagement ring and a wedding band that had belonged to his former wife, Amaryllis.

Appellant took those rings back and gave Cole another engagement ring, which she believed had belonged to the victim. Appellant also planned a honeymoon in Florida. Concerned with how a honeymoon ²⁰⁰ would be perceived by others, they discussed telling law enforcement officials that he was going to Florida to look for the victim and that Cole was going with him to watch his daughter. In the weeks after the victim’s disappearance, appellant sold the family minivan and asked a co-worker about the length of time required before a family member could place a claim for insurance money.

On July 25, 1996, Sharon Kurinij responded to a classified ad to rent a room at appellant’s house. 18 Appellant told Kurinij that the victim had left him, that he had observed her getting into a car with “Bob,” that he believed they had gone to Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, and that “she’s never coming back.” Appellant stated that Kurinij could take whatever she wanted from the victim’s wardrobe because he was “going to get rid of it or trash it.” Kurinij and her two children moved into appellant’s home on July 26, 1996. Later, appellant informed Kurinij that he was going to stop seeing Cole. Cole ceased all contact with appellant on February 17, 1997, the date that the State brought charges against him. The State rested its case-in-chief on July 18, 2001.

Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that an extrajudicial confession of the accused could not warrant a conviction unless corroborated by independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti. 19 Because there was no evidence about what tran ²⁰¹ spired on the evening of July 1, 1996, appellant contended that the case was nothing more than an “unexplained disappearance.” Appellant’s counsel stated: “So even in a light most favorable to the State at this point, the best evidence ... would suggest not premeditated first degree murder, but would suggest only second degree murder.” The trial court responded, in pertinent part: The Appellate Court said in [Lemons v. State, 49 Md.App. 467 , 433 A.2d 1179 (1981) ] that it is possible to prove the corpus delicti of a homicide even in the absence of finding a corpse. The other cases that have been mentioned, [Hurley v. State, 60 Md.App. 539 , 483 A.2d 1298 (1984); Tu v. State, 336 Md. 406 , 648 A.2d 993 (1994) ] also speak to murder cases where a body is not found. In [Hricko v. State, 134 Md.App. 218 , 759 A.2d 1107 (2000) ], which is a 2000 case, ... there — the issue there was the toxic agent, succinylcholine, that was ultimately determined to have been used to have killed the victim. And the reason that that case, in my opinion, has some significance, is because in that particular case, the Court said that, even if proof of the death may be circumstantial, so may proof of the cause of death be circumstantial.

The determination then goes on to be whether or not there has been, if you will, enough circumstantial evidence to present. In other words, how circumstantial can circumstantial be before or distinguished from speculation. And if the Court, at this juncture, were to adopt [appellant’s] argument, in essence, the Court would be attributing a higher standard of proof to circumstantial than to direct evidence, and that’s simply not the state of the law. Supreme Court says that the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence is no less than that to be given to direct or vice ²⁰² versa.

And that the finder of fact should take all evidence into account. The evidence in this case is certainly circumstantial. The family and friends, acquaintances of [the victim] have testified that she was not the type or character of individual who would up and go without any type of note, word, communication and continual communication with her family of origin, as well as her immediate family, particularly her daughter Amanda, how devoted she was to her daughter. Her coworkers at the Giant organization uniformly and consistently state how rehable, punctual, even-tempered, helpful, courteous and cordial she was to everyone.

There is, there is nothing to show that she had, other than any medical condition, which was able to be controlled by medication, and even her physician, Dr. Levine, who testified today said that it was a moderate blood pressure, or mild, in one aspect he used, blood pressure condition, and even that was controlled with medication. Defense, on cross examination, elicited testimony from Dr. Levine saying that, well, if you don’t take your medication, can’t you up and die? Well, the doctor said, there could be the variety and variability of symptoms from absolutely nothing to sudden death. But there is nothing to indicate that the alleged victim ..., had any medical problem that would have shown an immediately [sic] cause of death.

There was nothing to show that she was of the type of temperament, mental or emotional state, where she would have committed suicide, either because of her own health, and she wouldn’t have left Amanda. We’ve also had testimony of [appellant’s] interest in killing his wife, to what agency he might be able to use, whether it was by gun, or if he could not stand the sight of blood, by strangulation or suffocation, to indicate, at least from the State’s portrayal of the case, that there had been some thinking, some discussion, some planning, some plotting, some premeditation. Further testimony of State’s witnesses to indicate that [appellant] indicated that he had done the completed act, and disposed of the body. ²⁰³ For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the State has made a prima facie case, and thereby denies [appellant’s] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to all counts. The defense then rested and renewed its motion for judgment of acquittal, which again was denied.

The jury convicted appellant of first degree murder. DISCUSSION I. Witness Bolstering Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Lieutenant Marshall to bolster the credibility of David Marshall, the State’s key witness. The State argues that the admissibility of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court and that the court neither erred nor abused its discretion in overruling appellant’s objection and denying his motion for a mistrial. When Lieutenant Marshall was asked on direct examination to describe what inmate David Marshall was told by the State regarding his testimony, the following colloquy occurred between the court and counsel: [STATE]: Was there an occasion in which you were present at a meeting between Sergeant Jacobs, David Marshall, yourself and representatives of the State’s Attorney’s Office? [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: Yes. [STATE]: Can you tell the jury what, what David Marshall’s legal status was at that time? [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: His legal status was he was pending charges.

He had a shoplifting charge in, in Howard County. And I believe he also had a violation of probation charge. And to my best recollection, I think, that is what his legal status was at the time. [STATE]: By that point, had he made a statement to, to Sergeant Jacobs? [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: Yes. [STATE]: Did he ask for a deal? ²⁰⁴ [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: Yes. [STATE]: Were you present when that was discussed with him? [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: Yes, I was. [STATE]: And what was he told? [LIEUTENANT MARSHALL]: He was told he would not be given any deal. That the only thing we would be able to do for him would be to represent to, to anyone who wanted that knowledge that he offered truthful testimony in a homicide case, and that the State would represent that to anybody. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Basis? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May we approach? THE COURT: Um-hum. (Bench conference. [Appellant] present.) [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, now I am [motioning] for mistrial, instead of [Defense Counsel], in light of the fact he’s now saying this guy is truthful— [STATE]: No, that he had offered— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That he had offered truthful testimony. Now, he’s judge, jury, fact finder and grand jury person all in one.

He can (inaudible) and he’s vouching now for this gentleman comes in to testify (inaudible) reliability, credibility, veracity in this (inaudible) guy. He’s truthful because he just said it. [STATE]: They have already — first of all, I want to advise the Court that this witness has been taken out of order, in part, because of the defense proper objection that they didn’t want Lieutenant Marshall’s appearance to be serial in this case. He — they have already, in their cross examination of Sergeant Jacobs, attempted to impeach the credibility of David Marshall, and it was proper of them to do so. Because he, because of the suggestion that he ²⁰⁵ received benefits from the State, this witness has testimony of, of his own direction [sic] knowledge of, of the discussion of, of benefits to be offered to Mr. Marshall in return for his cooperation.

And the lieutenant was merely trying to answer my question to address that issue, which has already been raised by the defense, and which we feel is proper for us to, to raise since we won’t be, by their objection and our understanding of the Court’s ruling, able to bring Lieutenant Marshall back on future occasions to rehabilitate those State’s witnesses who had been in the jail with [appellant], whose credibility will be impeached in this fashion. And Mr. Marshall’s credibility has already begun to be impeached. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It isn’t those issues. It really it comes down to a very limited statement that Detective Marshall said — saying — if he said if he had prefaced the word truthful testimony, if he. But he said, had, that he had offered truthful testimony in this case.

I just think that’s a, ultimately, that’s a determination for the fact finder to determine whether or not Detective Marshall or any of the other witnesses are truthful. For this witness to definitively state that he had offered truthful testimony is truly a form of vouching to put the official Howard County Police Department informant on the testimony of David Marshall, and that is the inappropriate comment that is the subject of this objection, Your Honor. [STATE]: May I suggest a remedy, because I take [Defense Counsel’s] point, Your Honor, as, as a valid one. It was not the intention. That’s the way it came out.

If I can be given a little room to lead, 1 think I can rectify that and clear that up. THE COURT: What I was going to ask you was how do you distinguish the difference between what the witness’s opinion of the testimony was versus what the actuality of the testimony was in terms of its truthfulness or not? ²⁰⁶ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think that there should not be an opinion that should be permitted to be elicited from the witness, Your Honor. I think if he comes in and then offers and cooperates fully, consistent with what he said before or something like. I mean there’s ways of them to identify that he — I mean I believe that Lieutenant Marshall is of the opinion that it’s truthful, which was— THE COURT: That’s what I was getting at. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — which is not appropriate for him to testify as to the truthfulness of any witness’s testimony.

And, therefore, it would be inappropriate for him to say anything about the — whether it was truthful or not truthful. THE COURT: Frankly, I received his meaning as — I understand what your point is, but I received his meaning as that was his opinion. So motion for mistrial denied. There’s no basis, again. [Emphasis added.] The trial court directed the State to “clarify” the matter.

Accordingly, the State asked Lieutenant Marshall whether “[David Marshall] was told that the only deal that would be offered was that representatives of the State’s Attorney’s Office would go to any judge, anywhere, anytime to give an account of David Marshall’s cooperation, period?” Lieutenant Marshall replied: “Yes, sir.” In Maryland, “[i]n a jury trial, judging the credibility of witnesses is entrusted solely to the jury, the trier of fact; only the jury determines whether to believe any witnesses, and which witnesses to believe.” Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 313 , 730 A.2d 181 (1999). Witness bolstering is not permitted. In Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277-78 , 539 A.2d 657 (1988), the Court of Appeals stated: In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness’ testimony are solely within the province of the jury.... It is ... error for the court to permit to go to the jury a statement, belief, or opinion of ²⁰⁷ another person to the effect that a witness is telling the truth or lying. [Internal citations omitted.] It is the settled law of this State that a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth.

Testimony from a witness relating to the credibility of another witness is to be rejected as a matter of law. Bohnert is distinguishable because, in that case, the State obviously sought to bolster the credibility of an allegedly abused child through an “expert” opinion of a social worker that the child had been abused. The social worker’s opinion was not based on any objective tests, nor on a review of the medical reports, but rather on the child’s statement to her. In Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 153 , 729 A.2d 910 (1999), a police officer testified that he was able to verify certain statements made by the defendant’s cellmate, relating to inculpatory statements made by the defendant, stating: Yes, sir.

There was a significant number of statements that were made by Mr. Johnson, some factual statements that were made by Mr. Johnson that were not included in the application for statement of charges and/or the affidavit, for the search and seizure warrants that myself and my partner obtained. These statements which I knew upon hearing them from Mr. Johnson to be truthful, and I was able to verify each and every statement that he gave us. [Emphasis in original] The Court of Appeals determined that Conyers’ reliance on Bohnert was misplaced because the police officer was not offering an opinion about the cellmate’s credibility. Rather, the officer was “stating that certain information [that the cellmate] had supplied [the officer] with prior to trial was not contained in Appellant’s papers and, because [the officer] was able to confirm that information, [the officer] regarded it as accurate and, therefore, truthful.” Id. at 154, 729 A.2d 910 . ²⁰⁸ In Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650 , 759 A.2d 764 (2000), the Court of Appeals considered whether the testimony of a critical witness for the State was admitted in error. The witness testified that he had given certain law enforcement officials truthful information and that they had testified at a hearing in an unrelated case.

The Court of Appeals concluded: [W]e do not think the testimony was proper. Nevertheless, the form of the evidence reduced its prejudicial impact. Anderson made a self-serving statement to the effect that certain persons not present once affirmed, on an unknown basis, his truthfulness in making the statements he again made at trial. Such a statement, by a witness whose credibility is in question, is far less weighty than the expert testimony in Boknert, and its effect on the jury was likely to be insignificant.

Moreover, it is implicit that the police believed Anderson or they would not have gone to bat for him at the hearing on his motion to reduce his sentence. Although error, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We are “satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of ... may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). Id. at 679-80 , 759 A.2d 764 .

Here, the lieutenant’s statement regarding David Marshall and “truthful testimony” was offered to explain what consideration the State would give Marshall for his assistance in the case against appellant. The State, as it should with all witnesses, desired and expected Marshall’s testimony to be truthful. It was not the intent, nor do we believe the effect, of Lieutenant Marshall’s testimony to convey his belief or opinion that David Marshall was a “truthful” witness. Moreover, the issue was clarified by restating the question using the word “cooperation,” rather than “truthful.” Reviewing Lieutenant Marshall’s testimony in context and the State’s rephrasing of the question, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for a mistrial. ²⁰⁹ Had we found error or abuse of discretion, we would deem the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because we are satisfied that, in context and as clarified, there was no reasonable possibility that the testimony contributed to the guilty verdict.

II

Sufficiency of the Evidence A. Generally Appellant argues that the State’s evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Specifically, he contends that, absent a body or some other physical evidence, there was no evidence indicating that the victim was murdered. As stated in his brief, “[i]t is not enough for the State to establish that if a crime took place, the defendant committed it; the State must first establish that a crime did in fact take place.” Appellant further contends that, because “the only evidence establishing that a murder occurred in this case, [was] the testimony of David Marshall” and that testimony was not independently corroborated, “the evidence in this case was simply insufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder.” In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not “undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478 , 649 A.2d 336 (1994). Rather, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.” Id. 478 , 649 A.2d 336 . “[W]e accord deference to the factual findings of the jury and recognize its ability to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility.” Streater v. State, 119 Md.App. 267, 275 , 704 A.2d 541 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 352 Md. 800 , 724 A.2d 111 (1999).

So long as we are satisfied that “any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s conviction must be upheld.” Cooper v. State, 128 Md.App. 257, 266 , 737 A.2d 613, 617 (1999) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). ²¹⁰ B. Corpus Delicti and the Missing Body We recognized in Lemons v. State, 49 Md.App. 467, 486-87 , 433 A.2d 1179 (1981), that the State could prove a homicide in the absence of a body, stating: In every Maryland case reported thus far involving the corroboration rule in the context of a homicide, the victim’s body had been recovered and there was other independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to suggest that the death was not the result of accident or suicide. This, of course, does not imply that the inability to produce a body is an insuperable obstacle, in itself, to the obtention and sustention of a murder conviction. This Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, has repeatedly said that the independent evidence of the corpus delicti “may be circumstantial in nature when direct evidence is not available.” ... Moreover, courts from other jurisdictions that have been confronted with the “missing body” problem have unanimously concluded that the death of the alleged victim need not be evidenced directly by the production of the body.

Nevertheless, it is clear from these cases that there must be independent evidence, at least circumstantial in nature, that relates to both elements of the corpus delicti. [Internal citations omitted.] In Hurley v. State, 60 Md.App. 539, 550-51 , 483 A.2d 1298 (1984), we again affirmed a conviction for manslaughter where the victim’s body was never discovered. Writing for the Court, Judge Alpert stated: Our decision in Lemons and here — that failure to recover the victim’s body is not fatal to the State’s case in a homicide prosecution — is in accord with other states that have addressed a similar situation. As the California Court of Appeals succinctly stated: “The fact that a murderer may successfully dispose of the body of the victim does not entitle him to acquittal. That is one form of success for which society has no reward.” We concur with this view and with the admonition espoused by the Appellate Division of New Jersey’s Superior Court when it stated that “sue ²¹¹ cessful concealment or destruction of the victim’s body should not preclude prosecution of his or her killer where proof of guilt can be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Internal citations omitted.] See Tu v. State, 97 Md.App. 486, 505 , 631 A.2d 110 (1993) (affirming the second degree murder conviction when there was no witness to the alleged murder and no body was found), aff,d, 336 Md. 406 , 648 A.2d 993 (1994).

Clearly, a murder conviction is not dependent upon the recovery of the victim’s body. C. Corpus Delicti Generally Corpus delicti translates from the Latin as “the body of crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed.1999) defines corpus delicti as the “fact of a transgression; actus reus.” Although its practical significance arises most often, as in this case, in connection with the use of extrajudicial confessions in homicide cases, the concept is applicable to any crime. Generally, corpus delicti is the fact of specific loss or injury and the criminal agency of someone. As discussed in more detail below, in Maryland, proof of the corpus delicti of a crime does not require evidence that the defendant was the criminal agent. “ ‘In a homicide case the proof of the corpus delicti is sufficient if it establishes the fact that the person for whose death the prosecution was instituted is dead, and that the death occurred under circumstances which indicate that it was caused criminally by someone.’ ” Lemons, 49 Md.App. at 473 , 433 A.2d 1179 (quoting Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 272 , 52 A.2d 484 (1947)).

The State may establish the corpus delicti by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Lemons, 49 Md. App. at 486 , 433 A.2d 1179 . See Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 616 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989); Pierce v. State, 227 Md. 221, 226 , 175 A.2d 743 (1961). The corpus delicti of the crime of murder is ordinarily established through the presence of the victim’s body and by direct evidence establishing that death resulted ²¹² from criminal activity.

Although it is certainly more difficult to establish the corpus delicti of homicide when the victim’s body is missing, it is not impossible. See Whittlesey v. State, 326 Md. 502 , 562 n. 11, 606 A.2d 225 (1992) (Bell, J., dissenting). D. The Corpus Delicti Rule: Corroboration of the Extrajudicial Confession There was no physical evidence that the victim in this case had been murdered. In addition to the circumstantial evidence and the statement to John McKenny, the State relied heavily on appellant’s confession to David Marshall.

Appellant argues that his statement was not independently corroborated and was insufficient to support his conviction. In Maryland, “an extra-judicial confession of guilt by a person accused of crime, uncorroborated by other evidence, is not sufficient to warrant his conviction.” Pierce, 227 Md. at 225 , 175 A.2d 743 . See Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) (“The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.”); Bradbury v. State, 233 Md. 421, 424 , 197 A.2d 126 (1964) (stating that “[i]t is, of course, well settled that an extrajudicial confession of guilt by a person accused of crime, unsupported by other evidence, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed.1999) (the “corpus delicti rule” “prohibits a prosecutor from proving the [body of the crime] based solely on a defendant’s extrajudicial statements”). In Ballard v. State, 333 Md. 567, 577 , 636 A.2d 474 (1994), the Court of Appeals explained that [t]he Maryland corroboration requirement, operating in homicide cases as above described, does not require that every element of the consummated crime be independently established.

Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals in Ball v. State, 57 Md.App. 338 , 470 A.2d 361 (1984), modified on other grounds sub nom. Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552 , ²¹³ 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), correctly rejected an argument in a felony murder case that there was insufficient corroboration because the only evidence of an attempted robbery was the statement of the appellant. “The requirement that there be some corroborating evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti generally, does not establish an independent corroboration requirement as to each component element of the corpus delicti.” 57 Md.App. at 351 , 470 A.2d at 368 .... The Court of Appeals also explained that 1 McCormick on Evidence § 145 at 557-59 (Strong 4th ed.1992) “provided a national overview of the corroboration requirement,” stating: “The traditional formulation of the requirement, still applied by most jurisdictions, demands that there be some evidence other than the confession that tends to establish the corpus delicti.... There is some dispute regarding the definition of corpus delicti, which literally means the ‘body of the crime.’ To establish guilt in a criminal case, the prosecution must ordinarily show that (a) the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred; (b) this injury or harm was done in a criminal manner; and (c) the defendant was the person who inflicted the injury or harm.

Wigmore maintains that corpus delicti means only the first of these, that is, “the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained,” and does not require proof that this was occasioned by anyone’s criminal agency. ...” Most courts, however, define corpus delicti as involving both (a) and (b). This means that the corroborating evidence must tend to show the harm or injury and that it was occasioned by criminal activity. It need not, however, in any manner tend to show that the defendant was the guilty party. Thus in a homicide case, the corpus delicti consists of proof that the victim died and that the death was caused by a criminal act, but it need not tend to connect the defendant on trial with that act.

The traditional approach has been to require that the elements of the offense be carefully distinguished and that ²¹⁴ the corroborating evidence tend to show each of those elements. A growing number of courts, however, are abandoning the strict requirement that the corroborating evidence tend to prove all elements of the corpus delicti. Thus the corroborating evidence need only tend to show the ‘major’ or ‘essential’ harm involved in the offense charged and not all of the elements technically distinguished. This tendency is most pronounced in homicide cases, where defendants are often tried for offenses that involve requirements beyond simply the causing of death in a criminal manner.... ” Ballard, 333 Md. at 577-78 , 636 A.2d 474 .

The Court of Appeals concluded: Further, McCormick points out that “[a] growing number of courts” do not require “that the corroborating evidence tend to prove all elements of the corpus delicti, ” but only the major or essential harm involved in the charged offense. Id. at 558. That is the rule applied by the Court of Special Appeals in Ball which we now approve. 20 Id. at 578, 636 A.2d 474 (emphasis added). The Circumstantial Evidence Notwithstanding the absence of physical evidence in this case to establish the corpus delicti of the crime, the circumstantial evidence established that: the victim was close to her family, most especially her daughter; the victim had not been heard from in five years, despite an exhaustive record and document search in addition to national media awareness of the disappearance; the victim was aware of ²¹⁵ appellant’s ongoing affair with Cole; the victim had stated that she was going to report the affair to the police; the victim was going to leave appellant; prior to the victim’s disappearance, appellant had asked co-workers about killing a person and disposing of the body; appellant had asked friends about obtaining a gun; appellant had stated to Cole that “he wanted to kill [the victim],” stating that he would either “shoot” or “strangle her,” and “put her body in the truck with the waste,” where “nobody would ever find her”; appellant stated that the victim “wasn’t coming back”; and appellant had conspired to fabricate an alibi.

Moreover, on the night of the victim’s disappearance, the evidence indicated that appellant left work early to meet with Cole. Cole then observed appellant go to his house. There was clearly sufficient independent evidence that the victim had been murdered to corroborate appellant’s confession to