Ringgold v. Barley

Mason, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The appellants filed their petition in Kent county circuit court, in which they claim their freedom under the act of Assembly of the year 1831, ch. 323, sec. 4. By that act it is ¹⁹² provided, that it shall not be lawful to import or bring into this State any negro slave, for sale or to reside; and any persan so offending shall forfeit for such offence the negro brought into the State contrary to this act; and suck negro shall be entitled to freedom., &c. The testimony presents substantially this case: In the year 1832, Money, under whom the appellee claims the negroes, having sold all his properly in Maryland, left for the State of Missouri, carrying with him the petitioner and other of his slaves, together with his own family.

Such of his slaves as were unwilling to remove with him to Missouri had been previously sold to the south. He had repeatedly declared his intention of settling in Missouri and of purchasing public lands in that State. That said Money, immediately on his arrival in Missouri, rented land and commenced farming; that he continued to farm till November 1833, when, falling into bad health and changing his purposes, he sold out his property of every kind, except his slaves, and returned to Maryland, bringing with him the petitioner, Rebecca. On the 19th of March 1834, Money returned a list of the slaves so brought back with him to the clerk of Kent county court,, accompanied with the declaration, verified by oath,- of his intention to become a citizen of this State.

Out of this state of facts several questions arose in the trial below. We will proceed to consider, first, the questions presented by the second exception. The testimony having been closed, the petitioners prayed the court to instruct the jury, “that if they believed Money left the State of Maryland with his family and servants and removed to the State of Missouri,with an intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and as a place of fixed present domicil, and while there engaged in agriculture, it became his place of domicil, notwithstanding he might have entertained a floating intention of returning to Maryland at some future petiod.” This prayer was rejected, whether properly or not we are now required to decide. It is settled by many well adjudged cases, especially by the case of Cross vs. Black, 9 Gill & Johns., 198, that a citizen of one State may break up his establishment, and, with the ¹⁹³ avowed purpose of becoming a resident of another, may actually leave his place of former abode, yet if before be reaches the point of his intended destination changes his purpose atld returns, he does not thereby forfeit his residence or his rights as a citizen at the place of his first abode.

The mere ihténtidn. to acquire a new domicil without tlie feci of an actual removal avails nothing, neither does the fact of a removal without the intention. Somerville vs. Somerville, 5 Ves., 750, 787. Harvard College vs. Gore, 5 Pick., 370. When once removed to his new domicil, however, the party’s purpose to remain need not be fixed and unalterable.

If it becomes a place of fixed present domicil it will be sufficient to fix a residence, and although there may be a jloating intention to return to Ms former place of abode at some future period, still these circumstances will not defeat the newly acquired residence or the rights and obligations which attach to it. The question now before us is, was there evidence tending to satisfy the jury that Money did acquire such a residence or domicil in Missouri, as