Rivers v. Hagner Management Corp.

HOLLANDER, J. In this negligence/premises liability action brought by Lester Rivers, appellant, against Hagner Management Corporation (“Hagner”) and Oxon Park Apartments, Inc. (“Oxon Park”), appellees, Rivers sued to recover for injuries he sustained while attempting to flee from a fire in the entryway of the apartment building in which he resided. Appellees owned and operated the building. Because the fire was started by a serial arsonist, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County concluded that appellees were not negligent and granted summary judgment to them. Appellant has noted two appeals in connection with the litigation (No. 516 and No. 1870, September Term, 2007), which have been consolidated for briefing and argument.

As to appeal No. 516, appellant presents the following four questions: ⁶³⁶ ■ 1. Did the Trial Court Err in Granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and that the Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law? .2. Did the Trial Court Err in Granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there was no duty of care owed to Mr. Rivers? 3. Did the Trial Court Err in Granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Mr. Rivers must prove that Appellees were aware of criminal activity similar to the arson that occurred at Mr. Rivers’ apartment building on June 19, 2003? 4.

Did the Trial Court Err in Granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that even if the [appellees] were in violation of the Prince George’s County Fire Code, as alleged, Mr. Rivers must prove it was likely the [appellees] could have prevented the arsonist from starting the fire in the entryway by adhering to the fire code? Appeal No. 1870 pertains to the court’s denial of appellant’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement. In his brief, appellant advises that, “[a]fter further consideration, Mr. Rivers hereby withdraws his request that this Court consider the issues surrounding the enforcement of any settlement.” Appellant has not presented any argument as to the merits of No. 1870. For the reasons that follow, as to appeal No. 516, we shall reverse and remand for further proceedings.

As to appeal No. 1870, we shall dismiss the appeal. See Md. Rules 8-504(a)(5) & 8-602(a)(8). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 1 In the early morning hours of June 19, 2003, an arsonist set fire to the bottom level of the stairwell in an apartment ⁶³⁷ building located at 2619 Southern Avenue in Temple Hills (the “Property”). 2 The Property, originally constructed in the 1940s, was part of Oxon Park Apartments, an apartment complex in Prince George’s County (the “County”) that is owned and managed by appellees. Appellant lived on the second floor of the Property, in Apartment 202.

At the time of the incident, appellant was getting ready for work and noticed smoke coming into his apartment over and under the door to his unit. When appellant opened the door, he saw thick, black smoke in the hall. He woke his wife, told her to ⁶³⁸ get dressed, and called 911. Appellant was informed by the dispatcher that the fire had already been reported.

Because smoke was entering the apartment, appellant and his wife decided to escape from the building by way of the building’s only stairwell. Appellant descended the stairs first. When appellant reached the landing, his legs caught fire. He pushed his wife back up the steps and ran outside the building, where he attempted to extinguish the fire on his legs by rolling on the ground. 3 According to appellant, when the paramedics arrived, about fifteen to twenty minutes later, “[t]hey cut my pants, and when I looked down, you could see the skin rolled up on my legs....

They couldn’t get my tennis shoes off because they melted to my skin.” Appellant sustained severe burns to both legs. On December 19, 2005, appellant filed a “Complaint” against Hagner in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, containing a single count of negligence. An “Amended Complaint,” adding Oxon Park as a defendant, was filed on June 16, 2006. Appellant alleged that appellees “failed to provide or maintain smoke and fire alarms in working order so that [its] tenants would be provided sufficient warning to exit in the event of a fire.” Further, he alleged that, on the date of the fire, “means of egress at the Oxon Park Apartment complex were obstructed; the smoke detector in [appellant’s] apartment was missing; [and] fire extinguishers were not available in the corridors.” According to appellant, appellees owed numerous duties, including “maintaining] ... a safe and unobstructed egress by which tenants would be provided a safe and clear passage from the building in the event of ... a fire” and “obeying] all local, state, and federal regulations and standards concerning the maintenance [and] management ... of the subject premises.” According to appellant, appellees’ breach of these duties was the proximate cause of his injuries, which included “severe and permanent injuries to his body ... ⁶³⁹ permanent scarring ... medical expenses ... lost income from his employment, and ... pain and discomfort....” On March 5, 2007, appellees filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” and a supporting “Memorandum of Fact & Law.” They argued that, based on the undisputed facts, appellees “cannot be held liable for the causes of action asserted by [appellant] because the [arson] was not foreseeable and, therefore, [appellees] owed [appellant] no duty whatsoever to prevent the [arson].” Appellees also contended: In order to impose a duty on a business premises owner, requiring that he protect individuals upon his premises from the intentional criminal acts of third parties, it must be shown that the incident from which the case arises was foreseeable.

Proof of foreseeability requires evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that highly similar criminal activity against persons or property had occurred on the premises previously---- [T]he test as to whether a particular event is foreseeable is determined by evidence of prior, similar crimes committed against individuals lawfully on the defendant’s premises, or the premises itself. The determination of whether a particular incident was foreseeable, thereby creating a duty on the part of the defendant, is a question of law for the court. Here, there is absolutely no evidence of any prior incidences of arson occurring in Mr. Rivers’ apartment building, or even in the apartment complex known as the Oxon Park Apartments, from which a court could deem that this fire, started by a serial arsonist, was foreseeable. Furthermore, no similar incidents were cited by [appellant] in his Amended Complaint, or were testified to at any depositions.

Therefore, in the absence of proof of any such prior similar incidents, there can be no duty imposed upon [appellees] whereby they should have precluded the occurrence. Accordingly, [appellees] are entitled to summary judgment. (Internal citations omitted.) ⁶⁴⁰ In his “Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,” appellant argued: [Appellees’] Motion requests judgment be entered as a matter of law in this case because, they claim, there is an absence of proof of any prior similar incidents and, therefore, there can be no duty imposed upon the [appellees] whereby they should have precluded the occurrence.... The basis for their request for judgment is misplaced.... [T]he facts establish a violation of a statute and a prima facie case of negligence. [Appellees’] negligence is based on their violation of the fire code, not any breach of duty to protect against third party actors as alleged by the [appellees] ----When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the [appellant], there are sufficient facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn there from, to support his negligence claim.

Therefore, [appellant] respectfully requests that [appellees’] Motion be denied. Appellant attached several exhibits to his “Opposition,” including the deposition, affidavit, and report of Bernard •Schwartz, a professional engineer and certified fire investigator. Schwartz inspected the Property on behalf of appellant and opined that appellees were negligent for violating the Prince George’s County Fire Prevention Code (“Fire Code”), codified at Prince George’s County Code (2003), § 11-251 et seq. (“County Code”).

In particular, he opined that the Property did not have two separate exits, as required by the Fire Code, and this violation was a proximate cause of appellant’s injuries. The following excerpt from Schwartz’s deposition is relevant: [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: [With respect ... to the number of exits, your testimony is the building only had one and that would have been the front door to the apartment building; is that correct? [SCHWARTZ]: Yes, sir. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: In your opinion, what measure should have been taken by the owner or manager of the ⁶⁴¹ apartment building to bring the building in compliance with [the Fire Code]? [SCHWARTZ]: Well, one would be to provide a second exit, but there are other provisions that are acceptable to the code, which could also have been implemented, and that’s basically a matter of choice. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: [A]re you aware of any Prince George’s County Fire Department or other authority which ever indicated to the owner of manager of the apartment building that they were in violation of a code, and that they needed to do one of several options as it appears in [the Fire Code]? [SCHWARTZ]: I have seen no reports which specifically state that they were in violation of that criteria by the Prince George’s County Fire Department. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: With respect to Section 31.2.4, do you believe, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that the building which Mr. Rivers was in qualified for any of the four exceptions listed under that section? [SCHWARTZ]: At the time of the fire, no, I do not believe it did. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: How about presently? [SCHWARTZ]: I did not do a detailed analysis, so presently I still believe it does not. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: [C]an you briefly state for the record what your opinion is with regard to whether or not [appellees] were negligent as of the date of the occurrence with failing to have more than one exit in the building? [SCHWARTZ]: Yes, I believe that the codes mandate that two exits be provided. There was only one exit provided, and I believe that the failure to have a second exit was ⁶⁴² directly related to the injuries received by Mr. Rivers, that he was forced to exit the building through the only ... method available. Appellant also attached the deposition of appellees’ expert, Stephen Olenick, who opined at his deposition that appellees did not violate the Code: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Do you agree that the fire code, in effect in Prince George[’]s County in June, 2003, required this particular building to have two separate exits? [OLENICK]: I do not agree with that.... [The Fire Code], basically, states that ... if you have a building ... that[ ] ... was built in the '40s, [it] was grandfathered in.

That, if the Fire Chief — and remember, they were inspecting this every year, at least. If they don’t have a problem with this layout, it’s ... a legal design to have just the one exit. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: ... [H]ave you seen any information which suggests ... that in the opinion of a Fire Chief or his authorized representative, the lack of two separate exits did not constitute a distinct hazard of life or property? [OLENICK]: Yes.... I believe ... it is implied in each and every one of the inspection reports that we’ve received from PG County, that they inspected the building. At no time were they ever cited for only having one exit.

And, in fact, even after the fire, they were required to put in manual pull stations. They were required to fix up two smoke detectors that were missing in apartments. But, they still did not cite them or ask them to put a second exit in. Clearly, the approval was implied, through those inspections. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Have you seen any documents in this case which suggests the management company, or the owner, applied for a variance from the fire code in Prince Georges [sic] County? ⁶⁴³ [OLENICK]: I have not.

Although, I wouldn’t really expect one.... On existing construction, I wouldn’t ... expect to see that type of paperwork. As noted, appellant also submitted as exhibits the affidavit and report of Schwartz. In his affidavit, Schwartz summarized the conclusions of his report, stating: At the time of the subject fire, the apartment building in which Mr. Rivers resided and was injured was considered “an existing building” under the Code.

This building was also considered a four-story building under the Code. The Code required that this building have two exits, remotely located from each other. Remotely located from each other means, among other things, accessible by separate paths of travel and that they must be arranged to minimize the possibility that more than one has the potential to be blocked by any one fire. There were recognized alternatives under the Code whereby the subject building, in lieu of having two exits, would have been in compliance with only one exit if it contained a supervised automatic sprinkler system throughout, if it had a smoke-proof enclosure, or an outside stairway accessible to all living units.

This building had only one exit, and met none of the recognized exceptions. Therefore, within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, the building was maintained in violation of the fire code in Prince George’s County at the time of the fire. ... I disagree with [Olenick’s] opinion that [appellees] were in compliance with the Fire Code pursuant to Section 11-252 of the Prince George’s County Code. That part of the Code states the non-compliant conditions may be permitted to continue “only if, in the opinion of the Fire Chief or his authorized representative, they do not constitute a distinct hazard to life or property.” I have seen no evidence in this case which demonstrates that the [appellees’] noncompliance with the fire code at the time of the fire was permitted by the Fire Chief or his authorized representative, nor have I seen any evidence the [appellees] applied for a Variance as ⁶⁴⁴ contemplated under Section 11-294 of the Prince George’s County Code.

In addition, ... requirements for existing buildings can be modified by the authority have [sic] jurisdiction (ie.[sic] The Fire Chief or his authorized representative) but only where it is clearly evident that a reasonable degree of safety was provided. Again, I see no evidence the [appellees] ever sought any type of modification of the requirements of the Code or a determination that a reasonable degree of safety was provided in the opinion of the Fire Chief or his authorized representative. (Internal citations omitted.) At the motion hearing on April 5, 2007, appellees’ counsel argued: In every context of a third-party criminal act, the law’s the same. You have to establish, if you’re going to sue the business proprietor for negligence, a similar act or acts previously that are highly like the one that you’re suing about in order to establish foreseeability.

There’s no exception .... If you’re going to hold [a] business owner liable, you[’ve] got to show that it happened before so that they’re on notice of a likelihood of it happening again____ I’ll concede everything they say for purposes of today’s motion. It doesn’t change that element that they have to establish. They’ve got to show that it happened before.

There’s absolutely no evidence. In response, appellant’s counsel contended: [I]t doesn’t matter how this fire started, whether it was ... someone falling asleep with a cigarette, an intentional act, a faulty piece of equipment that started a fire. They had an obligation to be in compliance with the fire code, and they were not in this case, and as a result, my client was forced out of the only exit available when they’re required under the fire code to have two separate exists [sic] remotely located from each other with two separate paths of trial. Your Honor, ... because you have a violation of a statute, that’s a prima facie ease[ ] of negligence and all we’ve got ⁶⁴⁵ [to] show is that violation was a proximate cause of the injury and in this case if two separate exists [sic] were available to my client, he wouldn’t have had to go out the only one that was blocked by the fire.

Subsequently, the court issued a “Memorandum and Order of the Court” (the “Order”), granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment. 4 The court said, in part: In this case, the fire that caused [appellant’s] injuries was started by the criminal act of a serial arsonist. The evidence fails to suggest that [appellees] were aware of criminal activity similar to the arson that occurred on June 19, 2003 on the premises of the Oxon Park Apartment building. Therefore, [appellees] were not under a duty to protect [appellant] against such acts. Furthermore, whether or not the acts or omissions that [appellant] mentions constitute a violation of the Prince George’s County Fire Code, it is highly unlikely that [appellees] could have affected the arsonist from starting the fire in the entry way by adhering to the fire code.

Therefore, the Court concludes that there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and [appellees] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) Appellant noted an appeal on May 7, 2007 (No. 516, September Term, 2007). On the same day, appellant filed a “Motion to Stay Time for Appeal,” asserting: [Appellant] has filed Notice of Appeal in order to preserve his appellate rights. However, [appellant] also seeks a reconsideration of the Court’s Order granting summary judgment and the Court’s consideration of the settlement agreement reached between the parties.

In order to preserve the time for [the] court to consider these two matters, the [appellant] moves the Court to stay the time for [appellant] to appeal it’s [sic] Order granting judgment. ⁶⁴⁶ On May 16, 2007, appellant filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” of the summary judgment Order. The court denied appellant’s Motion to Stay Time for Appeal on May 17, 2007, and, after a hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, it denied that motion on September 7, 2007. DISCUSSION A On review of a grant of summary judgment, we “review the record in the light most favorable to [appellant as] the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.” Educ. Testing Serv. v. Hildebrant, 399 Md. 128, 140 , 923 A.2d 34 (2007).

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and ... the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2 — 501(f) (2008). Thus, the first task for the reviewing court is to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists; “where such dispute is absent ... we proceed to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md. 700, 711 , 914 A.2d 1193 (2007). “A material fact is a fact that, depending on how it is decided by the trier of fact, will affect the outcome of the case.” Mandl v. Bailey, 159 Md.App. 64, 82 , 858 A.2d 508 (2004); see also Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 654 , 851 A.2d 576 (2004). Put another way, if the court does “not rest [its] decision” upon a particular factual ground, “any dispute as to facts relating [to that ground] is not a dispute with regard to a material fact and does not prevent the entry of a summary judgment----” Daniel v. Kensington Homes, Inc., 232 Md. 1, 13 , 192 A.2d 114 (1963). Ordinarily, on review of a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court may “ ‘uphold the grant of a summary judgment only on the grounds relied on by the trial court.’ ” Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. 681, 711 , 923 A.2d 971 ⁶⁴⁷ (2007) (citations omitted), aff’d, 403 Md. 367 , 942 A.2d 722 (2008) .

In this case, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the fire was unforeseeable as a matter of law because it was set by an arsonist. Therefore, in the court’s view, it was immaterial whether appellees complied with the Fire Code: Even if they did not comply, the court reasoned, they had no duty to protect appellant from the arsonist’s intentional criminal acts. As we shall explain, we disagree. B Appellant argues that appellees’ alleged violations of the Fire Code breached a duty owed to him and caused his injuries.

He states: “Mr. Rivers does not allege in this case that the Appellees had a duty to protect him from the criminal actions of the arsonist. Rather, the duty alleged is a duty to maintain Mr. Rivers’ apartment building in a safe condition and ... a statutory duty to comply with the fire code.” Appellant relies on Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 483 , 869 A.2d 837 (2005), in which the Court stated: The law in this State regarding the breach of a statutory duty remains the same today as it has for over ninety years. To make out a prima facie case in a negligence action based on the breach of a statutory duty, a plaintiff must show “(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.” Brooks [v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.], 378 Md. [70,] 79, 835 A.2d 616 [ (2003) ]. “Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent.” Id. If a landlord of property ... fails to maintain the premises in a safe condition and someone whom the Code was designed to protect ... is injured as a result of the landlord’s ⁶⁴⁸ failure to maintain the premises [in compliance with the applicable statutes], the plaintiff will have successfully established a prima facie case of negligence.

It will then be incumbent upon the finder of fact to determine whether the landlord’s actions were reasonable under all of the circumstances. In appellant’s view, “[t]he cause of the fire is irrelevant. The fact that it was started by a criminal act rather than a negligent act is also irrelevant.” He asserts: “Surely, Mr. Rivers, a tenant in this building, was a member of the class of persons the fire code was designed to protect.” According to appellant, “the injury was of the type the ordinance was undoubtedly intended to prevent. Simply put, the potential for the outbreak of fires is the specific emergency for which provisions of the fire code are enacted.” Appellees counter that “business proprietors such as the Appellees are not the insurers of the safety of their tenants.” They summarize their view of the law: In order to impose a duty on a business premises owner, requiring that he protect individuals upon his premises from the intentional criminal acts of third parties, it must be shown that the incident from which the case arises was foreseeable.

Otherwise, no duty arises. Proof of foreseeability requires evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that highly similar criminal activity against persons or property had occurred on the premises previously. Only prior criminal acts actually occurring on the same premises are relevant in making a determination of whether the defendant was under a duty to keep the premises safe under the circumstances alleged in the lawsuit. Appellees cite Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160 , 359 A.2d 548 (1976), as well as several other cases, in support of the proposition that “there is no special duty imposed upon the landlord to protect his tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord’s premises.” Id. at 166 , 359 A.2d 548 .

Rather, as the Court said in Scott , a landlord owes its tenants “the duty of reasonable and ordinary care to keep the ⁶⁴⁹ premises safe.” Id. at 165 , 359 A.2d 548 . The Court explained that the foreseeability of a third person’s criminal acts is a factor in determining whether the duty of ordinary care requires the landlord to protect its tenant from harm: “If the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity ... he then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity.” Id. at 169 , 359 A.2d 548 (emphasis in original). But, said the Court, id., [sjince the landlord can affect the risk only within his own premises, ordinarily only criminal acts occurring on the landlord’s premises, and of which he knows or should have known (and not those occurring generally in the surrounding neighborhood) constitute relevant factors in determining, in the particular circumstances, the reasonable measures which a landlord is under a duty to take to keep the premises safe. Seeking to apply Scott and its progeny to the case at bar, appellees argue: The Appellant here argues that the Appellees had a duty to prevent his injuries by virtue of the existence of the building code provisions to which he cites.[ ] That argument puts the cart before the horse since the applicable law is clear that before a duty can be imposed upon the Appellees under the circumstances presented here, there must be a showing of foreseeability.

Foreseeability is a prerequisite to the existence of a duty in any negligence case. In the absence of foreseeability, there is no duty to act or to refrain from acting. In turn, when a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on a defendant for the intentional criminal acts of a third party with whom the defendant had no relationship, the plaintiff must prove that highly similar acts occurred at the premises of the defendant prior to the incident which gives rise to the litigation in order for a jury question to arise as to the issue of foreseeability. Thus, absent proof of similar acts or events, there is no duty. ⁶⁵⁰ Rejecting appellant’s reliance on the statutory obligation imposed by the Fire Code, appellees reason: “No duty is created simply by the existence of a statute.” They also assert: Appellant failed to produce any evidence of any prior criminal incidents similar in nature to that which occurred at Mr. Rivers’ apartment building.

That evidence was crucial to generating an issue on foreseeability. In the absence of any such evidence, the defendants owed the plaintiff no duty whatsoever to protect him from the crime which underlies this case. We first consider the applicable statutory scheme. As part of its Fire Code, the County has adopted the “Life Safety Code,” also known as “NFPA 101,” a standard body of fire protection regulations promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association.

See County Code, § ll-253(a)(l) (incorporating NFPA 101). At the time of the fire, the 1994 edition of the Life Safety Code was in effect in the County. See Prince George’s County Res. No. CR-36-1996 (adopted July 23,1996). 5 The purpose of the Life Safety Code is “to provide minimum requirements, with due regard to function, for the design, operation, and maintenance of buildings and structures for safety to life from fire and similar emergencies.” NFPA 101 (1994 ed.), § 1-2.1.

More particularly, “[a]s related to fire safety, the objective of [the Life Safety Code] is to protect the occupants not intimate with the initial fire development from loss of life and to improve the survivability of those who are intimate with the fire development.” Id., § 1-2.2. The Life Safety Code “applies to both new construction and existing buildings,” and provides “specific provisions for existing buildings that might differ from those for new construction.” Id., § 1-4.1. ⁶⁵¹ As a “fundamental requirement,” the Life Safety Code mandates, id., § 2-8: Two means of egress, as a minimum, shall be provided in every building or structure, section, and area where size, occupancy, and arrangement endanger occupants attempting to use a single means of egress that is blocked by fire or smoke. The two means of egress shall be arranged to minimize the possibility that both might be rendered impassable by the same emergency condition. In addition, the Life Safety Code requires that, “[w]here exits are not immediately accessible from an open floor area, safe and continuous passageways, aisles, or corridors leading directly to every exit shall be maintained and shall be arranged to provide access for each occupant to at least two exits by separate ways of travel.” Id., § 5-5.1.2.

As the building in issue was constructed in the 1940s, the particular requirements of the Life Safety Code relating to existing buildings are also relevant. In an existing building, the Life Safety Code requires that “[e]very living unit shall have access to at least two separate exits remotely located from each other----” Id., § 19-2.4. The Life Safety Code provides four exceptions to this requirement. First, a living unit in a building may have access to only a single exit if the exit is dedicated to the living unit (or, in some circumstances, shared with only one other unit), and other conditions apply.

Id. Second, a building may have only a single exit if it contains “an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler system,” and complies with other conditions. Id. Third, a single exit is permitted for a building of three stories or less under certain conditions.

Id. Finally, “[a] building of any height with not more than four living units per floor” is permitted to have a single exit if the exit is “a smokeproof enclosure or outside stair,” and there is no more than twenty feet of travel distance between the entrance door of each unit and the exit. Id. Of import here, the parties agree that the Property did not conform to any of the exceptions set forth in NFPA 101, § 19-2.4. ⁶⁵² At the outset, we reject appellees’ contention that a duty of care is not created “simply by the existence of a statute.” To the contrary, “[a] duty may be, and often, is prescribed by statute.” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358 , 744 A.2d 47 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 72 , 835 A.2d 616 (2003); see Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt.

Co., 173 Md.App. 305, 345 , 918 A.2d 1230 (2007). Appellees’ reliance on Scott, supra, 278 Md. 160 , 359 A.2d 548 , is also misplaced. Scott involved a wrongful death suit brought against a landlord by the relatives of a tenant who was shot to death by unknown persons in the landlord’s parking garage. Id. at 161-62 , 359 A.2d 548 .

Notably, there was no applicable statute that established a duty of care. The Court’s holding was “a subsidiary of the broader rule that a private person is under no special duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person, in the absence of statutes, or of a special relationship.” Id. at 166 , 359 A.2d 548 (emphasis added). And, with the exception of Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135 , 642 A.2d 219 (1994), which we shall discuss in more detail, infra, in the other cases cited by appellees none of the defendants violated an applicable statute. 6 ⁶⁵³ Thus, the cases on which appellees rely were subject to the general rule, articulated by the Scott Court, that “a private person is under no special duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person.... ” Scott, 278 Md. at 166 , 359 A.2d 548 .

But, where a relevant statute provides the applicable duty of care, the rule is otherwise. As the Court ruled in Polakoff, supra, 385 Md. at 476 n. 5, 869 A.2d 837 , “[t]he standard for establishing a prima facie case of negligence in a statutory-based negligence action is different from the general standard for establishing a prima facie case of negligence in cases that are not governed by a statute.” The principle has been long recognized. In Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 380 , 100 A. 510 (1916), the Court stated that “violation of a statute ... is itself sufficient to prove such a breach of duty as will sustain a private action for negligence.” We elucidated the distinction in Moore v. Myers, 161 Md.App. 349 , 868 A.2d 954 (2005): To prevail in a typical negligence action, one must show “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” But, “where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, ... the defendant’s duty ordinarily ‘is prescribed by the statute’ or ordinance and that the violation of the statute or ordinance itself is evidence of negligence.” Id. at 363 , 868 A.2d 954 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Polakoff, 385 Md. at 475-76 , 869 A.2d 837 ; Horridge v. Saint Mary’s County Dep’t of Social Serv., 382 Md. 170, 182-83 , 854 A.2d 1232 (2004); Brooks, 378 Md. at 72 , 835 A.2d 616 ; ⁶⁵⁴ Brown, 357 Md. at 358-59 , 744 A.2d 47 ; Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670-72 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks, 378 Md. at 86-89 , 835 A.2d 616 ; Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84 , 585 A.2d 232 (1991).

Thus, when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s duty is established by statute, “all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.” Brooks, 378 Md. at 79 , 835 A.2d 616 . As the Court explained in Brown, 357 Md. at 359 , 744 A.2d 47 , once