Rizer v. Perry

Irving, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. There are two appeals in this case taken by different parties in antagonistic interests, and both claiming against the heirs-at-law of Mrs. Mary Hoye, in whose favor the decree of the Court below was passed. The case therefore presents a tripartite contest. The trustees of “The Mary Hoye School House ” insist that the Court below was in error in declaring a certain legacy to them, void.

The other appellants, who are the residuary legatees and devisees under Mrs. Hove's will, contend there ivas no error in declaring that legacy void, but that there was error in disregarding their claim, as the residuary legatees and devisees, to the proceeds of the void legacy or devise, (whichever it may be regarded,) and in giving the same to the heirs-at-law of Mrs. Hoye. The clauses of the will involved in this case, and the facts which raise the controversy, are sufficiently set out in the opinion of the Judge who decided the case below. The questions involved are so fully and clearly discussed in that opinion, and concurring as we do in the conclusions reached, we should add nothing to its reasoning, but for the earnest reliance of the counsel for the residuary legatees and devisees, in this Court, upon the 309th sec. of Art. 93 of the Code, as abolishing all distinctions between real and personal property as respects the operation of the residuary clause of a will. The argument in favor of that position was very ably presented; and at the hearing we were strongly impressed by the authorities cited from other States where statutes like our own prevail, and doubted whether our own decisions, pronounced since the ¹³⁵ passage of the Act of 1849, which gives the section referred to in the Code, and without the point having been made, ought to be followed.

After a careful examination of all the authorities cited, and others that were not cited, we find the decisions in the other States upon that question are by no means uniform; but on the contrary are very conflicting. The preponderance, if any, being we think in favor of upholding the distinction, so far as lapsed and void legacies are concerned, where the statute has not in express terms provided for them. In some of the States void and lapsed devises are held to stand on different foundations, and are to be controlled by a different rule. Following Doe, Lessee of Stewart vs. Sheffield, 13 East, 526, and Morris vs. Underdown, Willes, 293, it has been held that devises void from the beginning, pass with the residue under the residuary clause; whilst lapsed devises having been good when made, but becoming inoperative for after arising causes, should not so pass, unless expressly so directed by statute.

Patterson vs. Swallow, 44 Penn., 486 ; Ferguson’s Lessee vs. Hodges, 1 Harrington, 524 . Our decision of Lingan vs. Carroll, 3 H. & McH., (353,) 333, is referred to in those cases, and cited as counter authority which could not be followed. The doctrine of Lingan vs. Carroll was again re-asserted in Tongue vs. Nutwell, 13 Md., 415 , in Deford vs. Deford, 36 Md., 168 , and in Orrick and Wife vs. Boehm, 49 Md., 105 ; and that must still be the law of this State, unless the 309th sec. of Art. 93, which does not appear to have been brought to the attention of the Court in those cases compels a departure from the ruling in those cases. The language of our statute is very broad and general, and if it would not disturb the authority of decisions already rendered, in the face of the statute which it was the duty of the Court to know, and of which the Court did know and had passed upon hi other aspects, (though it was not, as appears, especially brought to their atten-r ¹³⁶ tion in those cases,) we should incline to follow the rulings in Massachusetts and New Jersey, where they have statutes similar to our own; New Jersey's statute being almost verbatim, the same.

But to follow the decisions in Prescott vs. Prescott, 7 Metcalf, 141, Thayer vs. Willington, 9 Allen, 295 , and Smith vs. Curtis, 5 Dutch., 345, and other cases in those States of like import, would unsettle the law as it has been held and acquiesced in in this State since 1849, when the law was passed, and long before; 'and would be according to the statute an object and effect not heretofore ascribed to it or understood. Some of the cases cited, fully sustain the contention of the residuary devisees, that in those States statutes like ours have been held