Roadway Express, Inc. v. Gray

⁶⁷ Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In The Corsican, a biography of Napoleon by R. M. Johnson, the Emperor admonished an aide whom he had entrusted to deliver an important message: “Go, sir, gallop and don’t forget the world was made in six days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time.” We, like the Little General, are unable to grant the boon of time. This action originated on June 8, 1976, when Ira B. Gray, appellee, a former employee of Roadway Express, Inc., appellant, filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for benefits allegedly due him by reason of an accidental injury arising out of his employment.

In his claim Gray stated that the accident occurred between the 15th and 30th of June, 1974. He described the incident as follows: “Was helping maintenance man fix landing gears on trailer, I was in a stuped [sic] position pulling on something and it slipped and I reared up and hit the back of my head.” The appellee’s claim also stated that August 5,1974 was the first day he lost from work because of his injury and that he returned to his employment on February 8, 1975 and remained on the job until July 8, 1975, when he was compelled to stop work because of the onset of seizures. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, after accepting the employee’s claim, notified the employer that it had set a “consideration date” of July 1, 1976 and that it would pass an order on the basis of the evidence in the hands of the Commission if no request for hearing was received by that date. It was at this point that the employer first failed to note the inexorable passage of time.

No request for a hearing was filed. On July 15, 1976, on the basis of the application of the employee for compensation benefits which represented the only information before the Commission, it passed an order finding that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of his employment and awarded the appellee temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $102.80 per week beginning on. August 8,1974. A copy of that order was mailed to the employer and nothing was heard from it until August 31,1976 when it filed with the ⁶⁸ Commission a petition to rescind and/or modify the Commission’s order of July 15, 1976.

Medical reports filed with the Commission showed that the appellee had been treated at North Arundel Hospital on August 7, 1974 for severe headaches and vomiting. He was admitted to North Arundel Hospital on August 25, 1974, where his condition. was diagnosed as “Basilar Artery Aneurism with Hemorrhage.” He was transferred to London, Ontario where he underwent surgery on September 11, 1974. By October 13, 1975 the medical records indicated that he was suffering from a seizure disorder related to the condition, and surgery was performed. None of the records of the hospital contained any reference to a work related injury, but a subsequent medical report filed by the claimant indicated the basilar aneurysm developed from a sharp occipital trauma occurring after June 19, 1974, and rupturing on August 8, 1974.

In its petition to rescind the order of July 15, 1976 the employer gave as its reasons the following: “1. The claimant failed to report the alleged accident as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Maryland. “2. The claimant failed to file with his claim form, medical reports as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Maryland. “3. There was no legally sufficient evidence before the Commission to permit it to pass an Order, other than the self-serving Employee’s Claim form. “4.

The interest of justice require that this case be set for hearing.” It also requested that the Commission set the case in for a hearing and raised the following issues for decision at that hearing: “(a) Is the employee’s claim for compensation barred due to his failure to report the alleged injury as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Maryland? “(b) Is the employee’s claim barred for failure to ⁶⁹ file medical reports as required by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Maryland? “(c) Is the employee’s claim barred for failure to file his claim within the time prescribed by the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Maryland? “(d) Did the employee sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment? “(e) If the employee did, in fact, sustain an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, on what date did said injury occur? “(f) Is the claimant’s disability the result of an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment? “(g) Such other and further issues as may be raised at the time of the hearing on this motion.” A hearing on the motion to reconsider was held before the Commission on October 27, 1976, and on November 4, 1976 the Commission’s order of July 15, 1976 awarding the appellee compensation benefits was affirmed. The employer entered an appeal to the Superior Court of Baltimore City and the employee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based upon the following reasons: “1. That the appeal from the order of award was not timely filed in the lower court. “2. That the appeal is not allowed by law and should be dismissed ... as the decision of the Commission to not vacate its previous decision on the same matter under Article 101, Section 40(c) is not appealable. “3.

That an appeal was not filed within the statutory period of thirty (30) days from the date of the final order in accordance with Maryland Rule B4. On July 18, 1977, the employer filed an answer to the employee’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and also filed a supplemental petition. In both the answer and the supplemental petition the employer alleged ⁷⁰ that the Commission’s refusal to vacate its order represented an abuse of its discretion. The matter came on for hearing before Chief Judge Anselm Sodaro sitting in the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

He ruled that the refusal of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to vacate its order was not appealable and further that the appeal from the order of the Commission of July 15,1976 was not timely filed. Under these circumstances the trial judge held that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It is from this ruling that the within appeal was (this time) timely noted. Appellant presents three issues to be determined by this appeal which it states as follows: “Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant’s appeal on grounds of abuse of discretion from the refusal of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to vacate its Order of July 15,1976 ? “Was the refusal of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to vacate its Order of July 15, 1976, an abuse of its discretion? “Was the Commission’s Order of July 15, 1976 void?” Appellee adds a fourth issue which he states as follows: “Whether, after an employer has failed to file a timely appeal of a temporary total disability award, an order by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission denying an untimely filed request to reopen a case under Section 40(c) for reconsideration of an issue previously decided, is an appealable decision?” We believe it is necessary for us to consider first the issue raised by appellee because a negative answer to that question would be dispositive of this case.

The thrust of appellee’s argument is that the Commission’s refusal to reopen or vacate its previous order under the power vested in it by Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Cum. Supp.) Article 101, Section 40 (c) was not arbitrary and unreasonable and that the trial court was correct in determining that the date of the original ⁷¹ order was the effective date for the determination of whether or not the appellant had exercised in a timely fashion its rights to review. If it had not, then the appeal had to be dismissed as the court would then have had no jurisdiction over the controversy. We agree with the trial judge that the appellant had not exercised its right to review within the time limits established by the statute and by the Maryland Rules and that the Superior Court, therefore, was without jurisdiction.

We shall affirm. The review of any final action of an administrative agency by a court where such review is specially authorized by statute is governed by the B rules of Chapter 1100 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Rule B4 a sets the time for filing a motion for review as 30 days from the date of the action appealed from. It is conceded that the employer received notice of the filing of appellee’s claim, that it also was notified that the claim would be considered on July 1, 1976 and that in the absence of a request for a hearing the Commission would pass an order on the basis of the information in the hands of the Commission on the consideration date.

No request for a hearing or other means of raising issues was filed by the employer prior to the date of consideration. An order awarding temporary total compensation was filed on July 15,1976. The employer under Rule B4 a had 30 days from that date to seek review in the Circuit Court of the Commission’s order, but no order for appeal was filed. The employer gives as its excuse for the failure to file its appeal within the time allowed the statement that it was investigating the claim and that while it recognized that an appeal “would have entitled it to a trial de novo,” such an appeal “would seem to be a superfluous activity.” The Court of Appeals, in Holland Mfg.

Co. v. Thomas, 136 Md. 77, 79 , 110 A. 209 (1920), a case involving the question of jurisdiction where an appeal was not timely filed, stated, “This language is positive and mandatory, and we have no power to disregard it. It was evidently intended to secure expedition in the review of the decisions of the Commission, and to forbid the ⁷² hearing of such appeals unless taken within the time limited.” Appellant seeks to avoid the result of its failure to exercise its rights in a timely fashion by suggesting that the original order of the Commission was void because the appellee failed to abide by the requirements of the Workmen’s Compensation Law in that he failed initially to notify the employer of the accident and failed to file medical reports with his claim form as required by the statute. These allegations are, however, matters of defense which were available to the employer had he exercised his right to raise issues prior to the consideration date, or his right to request a hearing, or his right to appeal and