Roane v. Washington County Hospital

SONNER, Judge. The procedural questions raised in this appeal stem from a medical malpractice claim. Appellant, Charles H. Roane, alleged that appellees, Washington County Hospital and Dr. A.F. Abdullah, injured his right arm during surgery for his carpal tunnel syndrome. The Circuit Court for Washington County dismissed the claim pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.

We affirm the dismissal, but for the reason that res judicata barred the claim. Background Roane filed his first medical malpractice complaint on April 29, 1996 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The claim was docketed as Civil Action No. B-96-1322. Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint because Roane failed to submit it for arbitration as required by Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-2A-04, and Davison v. Sinai Hospital, 462 F.Supp. 778 (D.Md.1978), aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.1980).

Roane then voluntarily dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(i). Roane refiled the claim in the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office on September 9, 1996. Following nearly two years of discovery, the parties agreed to waive arbitration ⁵⁸⁶ and to pursue the matter in the Circuit Court for Washington County. True to his original instinct, however, on September 21, 1998, Roane filed the second complaint in the federal district court, not the State circuit court.

This complaint was docketed as Civil Action No. CCB-98-3191. It mirrored the first federal complaint. Appellees moved to dismiss the second complaint on the ground that Roane’s filing in federal court contravened the forum selection clause of the parties’ waiver agreement, which set the case for State circuit court. They requested dismissal of the action, or, in the alternative, transfer of the case to the State court.

Following a conference call with the parties, the district court accepted appellees’ argument and, on December 9, 1998, ordered the case “[transferred to the Circuit Court for Washington County.” The circuit court “received” the case and designated it as Civil Action No. 21-C-98-005882 OT. The parties construed this transfer as a de facto refiling of the suit in State court. At this point, the case proceeded on two different tracks. Roane pursued the claim in federal court by appealing the district court’s transfer.

In circuit court, he moved, unsuccessfully, to stay the circuit court proceedings during the pendency of the federal appeal. Appellees answered Roane’s complaint in circuit court, and the parties prepared for trial. The circuit court also handled a number of substantive matters, including a motion for summary judgment and two motions for intervention. At the federal level, on September 10, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plain language of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act precluded the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties.

Accordingly, it vacated the district court’s transfer of the case to State court and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. Dr. Abdullah then moved to dismiss the suit in circuit court. He argued that the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision rendered the State action invalid, and that Roane’s pursuance of the same cause of action in both State and federal court constituí ⁵⁸⁷ ed improper claim splitting. 1 In November 1999, Roane voluntarily dismissed his second federal complaint, Civil Action No. CCB 98-3191. The parties dispute whether this dismissal was at Roane’s behest, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(i), or by order of the federal court, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).

We note that the dismissal paper was drafted by Roane’s counsel, titled “Voluntary Dismisal,” and signed by Roane’s counsel. The district court judge wrote “approved” on the paper and signed her name. On November 23, 1999, Washington County Hospital moved to dismiss the claim in circuit court, arguing that under Rule 41(a)(1) and the Maryland counterpart, Rule 2-506(c), Roane’s second voluntary dismissal of the federal claim operated as an adjudication on the merits, which served as res judicata to the State action. Dr. Abdullah joined in the Hospital’s motion.

The circuit court granted the dismissal on March 13, 2000, not adopting appellees’ arguments, but ruling that, “[ujnder the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, the Fourth Circuit’s decision immediately divested the Circuit Court for Washington County of any jurisdiction as further proceedings were unequivocally contemplated in the U.S. District Court.” Discussion The Law of the Case Doctrine: At the outset, the parties agree that the trial court erred in basing its ruling on the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine provides that “once a decision is established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case it continues to be the law of the case.” Kline v. Kline, 93 Md.App. 696, 700 , 614 A.2d 984 (1992); see also ⁵⁸⁸ Hagez v. State, 131 Md.App. 402, 418 , 749 A.2d 206 , cert. denied, 359 Md. 669 , 755 A.2d 1140 (2000). The mandate rule, a subset of the doctrine, presumes that on remand, a trial court will follow the law of the case as established by the appellate court on appeal. Tu v. State, 336 Md. 406, 416-17 , 648 A.2d 993 (1994). “Neither questions that were decided nor questions that could have been raised and decided on appeal can be relitigated.” Kline, 93 Md.App. at 700 , 614 A.2d 984 .

The federal courts, like Maryland courts, apply the law of the case doctrine and the mandate rule. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739 , 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (1981 & 2000 Supp.). The circuit court’s analysis foundered, however, because both concepts apply only within a given court system.

Thus, a federal appellate court’s decision binds a federal trial court, and a decision by this Court binds a State trial court, but the decision by the Fourth Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals could not bind the Circuit Court for Washington County. While the circuit court traveled the wrong path, however, as explained below, it reached the right result, and we ordinarily affirm under those circumstances. See Tiller Constr. Corp. v. Nadler, 334 Md. 1, 16-17 , 637 A.2d 1183 (1994); Hurt v. Chavis, 128 Md.App. 626, 640 , 739 A.2d 924 (1999); Pope v. Board of Sch.

Comm’rs, 106 Md.App. 578, 591 , 665 A.2d 713 (1995). Concurrent Jurisdiction, Voluntary Dismissals & Res Judicata: The federal courts and Maryland State courts often possess concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court laid down the ground rules to be applied in cases of concurrent jurisdiction between State and Federal courts nearly 60 years ago, holding in Penn ⁵⁸⁹ General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189 , 55 S.Ct. 386, 389 , 79 L.Ed. 850 (1935), that: Where the judgment sought is strictly in personam, for the recovery of money or for an injunction compelling or restraining action by the defendant, both a state court and a federal court having concurrent jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation, at least until judgment is obtained in one court which may be set up as res adjudicata in the other.... It has generally been recognized that this doctrine is not one of Constitutional imperative, but rather one of comity, or accommodation.

Cavaliere v. Town of North Beach, 101 Md.App. 319, 328-29 , 646 A.2d 1058 (1994). Thus, in this case, Roane’s claim could properly proceed in the Fourth Circuit and Washington County until one of those jurisdictions rendered an adjudication on the merits that had res judicata effect. One such kind of adjudication derives from the procedural rule on voluntary dismissals. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) states in part: 2 (a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.

(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who