Robb v. Wancowicz

BYRNES, Judge. Appellant Richard B. Robb, Jr. (“Robb”) challenges the ruling of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Peter Franklin Wancowicz (“Wancowicz”) on claims brought against him for negligent entrustment, negligence, and civil conspiracy. He pres ⁵³⁴ ents two questions for review, which we have separated into four questions and rephrased as follows: I. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when there were genuine disputes of fact.

II

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Wancowicz was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrustment claim.

III

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that a statutory violation by Wancowicz could not constitute evidence of negligence against Robb.

IV

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Wancowicz was entitled to judgment as a-matter of law on the civil conspiracy claim. Finding no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee. FACTS On October 7, 1993, Carol Lunner (“Lunner”) took possession of a 1976 Chevrolet Malibu from one Delma' Thomas. Lunner was the owner of the Malibu, having inherited it from her mother, who had died on May 1, 1993.

Lunner had allowed Thomas to use the Malibu for some time after she inherited it. When Lunner asked Thomas to return the car and Thomas refused, Lunner took it and drove it to the Baltimore County apartment complex at which she lived. Lunner left the Malibu in the apartment complex parking lot. Approximately one week later, Thomas went to the parking lot and removed the license plates from the Malibu.

For several weeks, Lunner left the Malibu parked in her lot, without license plates. Soon Lunner became concerned that the car would be towed away because it did not have license plates affixed to it. She called Wancowicz, who is her father, and asked him to help her move the car off of the parking lot to his residence in Harford County. Wancowicz had in his garage an expired set of Maryland license plates, ALH 124, that had been issued for a vehicle that his son inherited from his (Wancowicz’s) father.

Wancowiez’s son had retitled that ⁵³⁵ car to his own name and had obtained new plates; he had failed, however, to return the old plates to the Motor Vehicle Administration. Wancowicz took the expired plates to Lunner’s apartment parking lot, affixed them to her Malibu, and drove the Malibu to his house in Harford County. According to Wancowicz, he later removed the expired license plates from the Malibu and put them back on a shelf in his garage. Lunner’s testimony on that issue is ambiguous, but could be construed to mean that, to her recollection, the expired plates were not removed from the Malibu after Wancowicz drove it to Harford County.

The Malibu remained in Wancowicz’s garage until early November, 1993. At that time, Lunner either reaffixed the expired plates to the Malibu and started driving it regularly or started driving it regularly without having to reaffix the expired plates, as they were still attached. In either case, from November, 1993 forward, Lunner drove the Malibu on a regular basis, with license plates ALH 124 displayed. In January, 1995, Lunner moved out of her Baltimore County apartment and moved in with Wancowicz while she searched for a new place to live.

Lunner had a history of negligent driving, about which her father was aware. On February 2, 1995, Lunner drove her Malibu across the center line of Jarettsville Pike, in Baltimore County, and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Robb. Robb and Lunner both suffered serious personal injuries in the accident. Lunner acknowledges that she was speeding right before the impact and that she had been drinking alcohol earlier that day.

She claims that the steering wheel of the Malibu locked, making it impossible for her to control the car. On July 13, 1995, Robb filed suit against Lunner in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging negligence. Lunner did not file an answer and a default order was entered against her. On October 13, 1995, Robb filed an amended complaint, adding Wancowicz as a defendant and alleging negligent entrustment, negligence, and civil conspiracy against him. ⁵³⁶ Wancowicz moved for summary judgment on all of the claims against him.

On February 11, 1997, after Robb had filed his opposition to the motion, the court held a hearing and granted summary judgment in favor of Wancowicz on all counts. Thereafter, the court conducted an inquisition on damages and, on March 11, 1997, issued an order entering judgment in favor of Wancowicz and entering judgment against Lunner, for $719,668.95, plus costs. Robb then noted this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment, our task is to decide whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and whether the lower court’s ruling is legally correct.

Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502 (1974); McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md.App. 205, 209 , 359 A.2d 100 (1976). DISCUSSION I. Disputes of Fact Robb contends that the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in the face of two genuine disputes of fact was erroneous. The first dispute of fact concerns whether Waneowicz left the expired license plates on the Malibu after he drove it to Harford County. The second dispute is over whether Wancowicz knew that Lunner was driving the Malibu with the expired license plates on it.

To enter summary judgment, the trial court must find, inter alia, that there is “no genuine dispute of material fact.” Md. Rule 2-501(e). A “material fact” is one “ ‘the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.’ ” Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 343 Md. 185, 206 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996)(quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985)); Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 104 Md.App. 1, 49 , 655 A.2d 1 (1995), aff'd in part, rev’d in ⁵³⁷ part, 342 Md. 363 , 676 A.2d 65 (1996). “[F]or there to be disputed facts sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate ‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ ” Tri-Towns v. First Federal, 114 Md.App. 63, 65 , 688 A.2d 998 , cert. denied, 346 Md. 28 , 694 A.2d 950 (1997)(quoting Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 244 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992)).

At the close of the summary judgment hearing, immediately before granting the motion, the trial judge stated that he found “nothing that reaches out to give me something to show a dispute as to a material fact.” The court was aware, from the memoranda submitted and the argument of counsel, that disputes of fact existed. The court ruled, however, that, even resolving the disputes of fact in Robb’s favor (ie., assuming that Wancowicz did not remove the license plates from the Malibu after he drove it to Harford County and that he knew that Lunner was driving the Malibu on a regular basis with the expired plates affixed to it), Wancowicz was entitled to judgment in his favor, as a matter of law. If that determination was legally correct, the mere existence of disputed facts is of no consequence, as any such facts are by definition not material.

II

Negligent Entrustment In his amended complaint, Robb alleged that Wancowicz negligently entrusted to Lunner the expired license plates that had been issued for another vehicle, thereby facilitating her operation of her Malibu automobile, “a potentially dangerous instrumentality if operated in a negligent and unsafe manner.” The trial court ruled that, on the undisputed facts and resolving any disputes of fact in favor of Robb, the evidence could not support a negligent entrustment claim. Robb argues that this ruling was legally incorrect. We disagree. Maryland has adopted the doctrine of negligent entrustment as set forth in the Second Restatement of Torts: ⁵³⁸ One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); Broadwater v. Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 554 , 688 A.2d 436 (1997). As the trial court observed, and as is undisputed, the license plates that Robb contends Wancowicz negligently entrusted to Lunner were simply pieces of metal that were not inherently dangerous instrumentalities and did not cause any harm themselves. The essence of Robb’s negligent entrustment claim is that, by supplying these license plates to Lunner, Wancowicz enabled Lunner to use a chattel (her car) and that she then did so negligently, so as to cause his physical injuries. If there were any doubt that Robb’s negligent entrustment claim lacked vitality when the trial court issued its summary judgment ruling, that doubt was erased by the Court of Appeals’s decision in Broadwater v. Dorsey, supra.

In that case, the Court held that parents who entrusted an automobile to their adult child, with knowledge of the child’s history of reckless driving, could not be held liable in damages to a third party who subsequently was injured by the child’s negligent driving. The adult child of the defendants in Broadwater was a mentally ill drug addict who had been involved in numerous traffic accidents, from the age of fifteen. His driving record was replete with speeding violations and other traffic infractions. The parents purchased a sports car and transferred it to their son, who retitled it in his own name.

Thereafter, the son drove the sports car across the center line of a highway, causing an automobile accident in which the plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries. The Court based its holding on the parents’ legal inability to control and lack of responsibility to control their adult son’s conduct, as well as their lack of control over the use of the ⁵³⁹ automobile involved in the accident. In reversing a jury-verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the Court explained: We must ... focus on the [defendants’] rights as the parents of an adult child, not their influence on [their adult child]. Generally, when a child reaches the age of majority, the parent’s legal responsibility ends and, concomitantly, the parent’s legal right to control the actions of the child also ends. [The defendants] had no legal right to control [the adult child] at the time of the accident because he was an adult.

Their continuing financial support of their son does not confer on them any legally cognizable right to control his actions. Nor did [the defendants] have any right of control over the [car] involved in the accident. Regardless of whether [the defendants] sold [their son] the car or gave it to him as a gift, under the circumstances of this case, their ability to exercise control over the car ended when they relinquished title. 344 Md. at 562-63 , 688 A.2d 436 . Also instructive is Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8 , 585 A.2d 196 (1991), in which the Court held that a wife did not “supply” an automobile to her husband, for purposes of the tort of negligent entrustment, by titling the vehicle in their joint names.

The Court observed: [I]n order for [the wife] to have “supplied” the car to [her husband] at the time of the accident, and thus be liable under a negligent entrustment theory, she had to have the power to permit or prohibit [him] from using the vehicle. That power could emanate from a superior right to control the operation of the car or from a special relationship between the “entrustor” and the driver, such as a parent-child relationship. [The wife] in this case did not have the power to permit or prohibit [her husband’s] use of the [car] because, as co-owner, she did not have superior rights to it. Id. at 19 , 585 A.2d 196 (citations omitted). At the times relevant to Robb’s claims against Wancowicz, Lunner was an adult (in her early thirties) who held a valid driver’s license.

Wancowicz had no legal right to exercise ⁵⁴⁰ control over Lunner. Lunner owned the Chevrolet Malibu that she was driving when she collided with Robb’s vehicle. Wancowicz could not control Lunner’s access to her car, whether she drove the car, or whether she drove the car carefully. Moreover, Wancowicz had no legal right to control Lunner’s use of the expired plates (which belonged to neither one of them) after he affixed them to her car.

Robb assumes, incorrectly, that Lunner would not have been able to drive at all had Wancowicz not supplied her with the expired license plates in question. He concludes from that assumption, also incorrectly, that Wancowicz exercised control over Lunner’s driving. Even if the Malibu were the only vehicle to which Lunner had access (a point on which Robb offered no proof), it is clear that Lunner did not need the expired license plates that Wancowicz affixed to the Malibu to be able to drive that car at all or to be able to drive it without the risk of being stopped by the police for not having license plates. Obviously, the license plates were not mechanically necessary to the operation of the car.

More to the point, when the license plates issued for the Malibu were stolen by Thomas, Lunner was entitled (and indeed was required) to affix to the car a temporary plate bearing the vehicle’s registration number. Md.Code Ann., (1992 RepLVol.), § 13-415(e) of the Transportation Article (hereafter “T.A.”). She could have used a temporary plate for the Malibu until she obtained replacement license plates. Under Broadwater , if Wancowicz