Roberts v. State

CATHELL, Judge. Petitioner, Bonnie Roberts A/K/A Bonnie Iqbal-Perbaksh A/K/A Bonnie Elaine Singington, 1 was charged with first degree murder and related offenses in the death of Dr. Stephen Olowu. Prior to the trial, petitioner, through her attorney, filed a Motion to Request Mental Examination, which the trial court denied without a hearing. A jury, sitting in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, convicted her of second degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

She was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty and ten years respectively. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed her convictions in an unreported decision. 2 She presents two questions, for which we have granted a writ of certiorari: 1. Did the trial Court err in denying, without a hearing, a motion for examination of the defendant for competency to stand trial where the motion included a proffer sufficient to overcome the presumption of competency? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding a failure to preserve the issue and that the trial judge was correct in applying the “Hillmon Doctrine”? ³⁵⁰ We answer the first question in the affirmative.

We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County and remand the case to that court for a new trial. Because we answer petitioner’s first question in the affirmative and accordingly vacate the decision of the trial court, it is unnecessary for us to address petitioner’s remaining question. I. Facts and Background The facts of the underlying case are as bizarre as they are tragic. The basic facts are as follows: (1) on July 28, 1996, Dr. Stephen Olowu was found dead in petitioner’s home on St. George’s Island; (2) the cause of death was determined to be “a single, close-range, through-and-through gunshot wound [to the] chest”; and (3) the gun used in the shooting belonged to petitioner and, according to some accounts, was found lying in the victim’s hand.

During the trial, the defense counsel argued that Dr. Olowu must have accidently shot himself while cleaning the gun, while the State contended that petitioner murdered Dr. Olowu and staged the crime scene to look like an accident. The following is a summary of witness testimony. On the morning of July 28, 1996, Mr. Joseph Vernon Moore 3 drove to petitioner’s house on Thomas Road on St. George’s Island in Piney Point, Maryland to collect payment for cutting grass. Petitioner came out the rear door of her home and talked with Joseph Moore.

After a brief conversation, Joseph Moore left the premises and returned approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later with his brother, Mr. Charles R. Moore. Upon their return, petitioner again exited the house through the rear door and proceeded to write them a check for $100 for cutting the grass on her property. ³⁵¹ Petitioner then entered the house to get a second check to compensate the brothers for future lawn care. Within one to two minutes, petitioner exited the house again and asked Joseph Moore to come into the house. He testified that: And she come out of the back, come to the back door, and she said, Vernon, come here a minute.

I said what’s the matter. Well, just come here. Well, the woman was just acting like she was going out of her mind, to my opinion. Just so upset, you know.

And I still didn’t know, I thought the dog had bit her. Joseph Moore continued to describe Ms. Roberts demeanor in his testimony: All I saw her do was crying____ She acted terrible, just like she’s, like, you know, like the world blowed up. Very, very upset.... She said — one word she said, “I’m so sorry” about twelve times I guess. “I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry.” Joseph Moore further testified that he followed petitioner into the house where he saw a man lying on the floor.

As he approached the victim’s body, he noticed a gun and two “piles” of “purple, bluish” blood. The Moore brothers then went across the street to Ms. Sumali Hinckley and Mr. Joseph W. Suchinsky’s house to call for help. When they arrived, they explained to both Ms. Hinckley and Mr. Suchinsky that there was an emergency at petitioner’s house. Mr. Suchinsky testified that the time was approximately 1:00 to 1:30 p.m.

He then dialed 911, reported the shooting, and the four of them proceeded to petitioner’s house. Mr. Suchinsky testified that upon arriving at petitioner’s house “you could see that [petitioner] was emotionally disturbed” and that petitioner “was leaning over, holding onto the railing of the porch, and her knees seemed to be buckling.” Ms. Hinckley testified that when she arrived at petitioner’s house, petitioner was sweaty and nervous. When petitioner asked for a glass of water, Ms. Hinckley entered petitioner’s house to get a glass of water and saw the bloodied victim ³⁵² laying on the floor. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Suchinsky entered the house to get petitioner a chair and also saw the victim.

Ms. Hinckley and Mr. Suchinsky testified that they recognized the dead man laying on the floor of petitioner’s house. Both of them recalled seeing petitioner and the victim at petitioner’s house emptying groceries out of a red jeep the previous afternoon at approximately 4:00 p.m. Ms. Hinckley also remembered seeing the victim again on Sunday, July 28, 1996, at approximately 10:30-11:00 a.m. on petitioner’s property- Shortly thereafter, three separate emergency response personnel arrived. 4 All three testified that when they entered the home they found the bloodied victim laying on the floor. Collectively, they noted that: (1) there was a large quantity of blood on the floor and on the victim; (2) the blood had soaked through both the rug the victim was laying on and his shirt; (3) that the blood was a dark red and purplish color and was no longer flowing from the victim; (4) the victim’s body was cold to the touch, although it was quite warm in the house; and, (5) there was a gun and gun cleaning rod laying in the vicinity of the victim.

The general consensus among the three gentlemen was that the victim was already dead when they arrived on the scene. 5 Testimony concerning crime scene analysis was provided by John M. Roeder, a crime lab technician with the St. Mary’s County Sheriffs Department, and Joseph Kopera, a firearms, ³⁵³ tool mark, ballistics expert with the Maryland State Police Crime Lab. Mr. Roeder, who arrived on the scene between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m., testified that “[t]he weapon was laying in the hand. It looked like it had either — it could have either fallen into the hand or it could have been placed in the hand.” Mr. Roeder also testified that he conducted a gunshot residue test 6 on the victim that was inconclusive. The trial court accepted Mr. Kopera as an expert in the field of ballistics, firearm identification, and gunpowder residue.

He described the weapon found in the victim’s hand as a .380 caliber Beretta semiautomatic pistol. 7 He testified that the gun had no defects and that the spent bullet and cartridge casing found at the scene had been fired from the gun. When discussing the gun’s safety features, he testified that the gun had a hammer block, and that it would not fire without a magazine inserted. Additionally, it would not discharge if dropped. He concluded that the gun had been perpendicular to the victim when it was fired.

Mr. Kopera also examined the shirt taken from the victim. He detected gun powder residue on the shirt, however, he concluded that because the shirt did not have a hole in it, that the shirt must have been open at the time of shooting. Based on this powder residue, Mr. Kopera determined that the gun was six to twelve inches from the shirt when fired but that the actual distance from the victim would have depended on how the shirt was being worn. His rationale was supported by testimony from Dr. Margarita A. Korell, Assistant Medical Examiner from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Baltimore City.

She testified that stippling 8 on the victim’s skin indicated that the weapon was fired from a close range. Although she was unable to deter ³⁵⁴ mine the time of death, she thought that the victim only-survived “a minute or so” after the shooting. Ms. Shari Jones testified that she had been involved in a relationship with the victim, Dr. Owolu, since 1993, that they lived in Connecticut together, and that he was the father of her child. Ms. Jones further testified that she had received a call from petitioner on June 26, 1996, in which the stated purpose of the call was to confirm the existence of Shari Jones.

In that conversation, petitioner stated that “she was [Dr. Olowu’s] wife and that she wasn’t going to, you know, just go away. That she had rights, that she was going to exercise these rights.” Ms. Jones also testified that the victim told her a few days prior to his death that he wanted to go to Maryland to tell petitioner that their relationship was “over” and “that she would have to leave him alone.” He left telling Ms. Jones that he would be back on Saturday. Ms. Jones further testified that she was not aware that July 28 was petitioner’s birthday or that the victim was going to St. George’s Island with petitioner.

II

The Trial Petitioner was subsequently arrested and brought to trial for the murder of Dr. Owolu. On February 25, 1999, prior to the first motions hearing, petitioner’s attorney filed a Motion to Request Mental Examination with the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County. The motion provided: 1. Ms. Roberts has had a long history [of] Psychiatric problems.

Although there has been no history of any violence on her part, Ms. Roberts had been evaluated and treated by a number of physicians and found not to be competent. 2. Counsel has been in communication with her physicians and her former attorney who reside and practice within the Washington [D.C.] area. The information counsel has received from the aforementioned individuals raises a question as to the issue of competency. Although counsel has had, and continues to have, difficulty communicating with Ms. Roberts, it appears that her memory for recent ³⁵⁵ and remote events seems somewhat mixed.

Her judgment and insight appear unclear at this time. 3. Both of Ms. Roberts’ physicians believe that she should be placed in a psychiatric hospital where she can receive adequate treatment. However, since she has been housed at the St. Mary’s County Detention Center, Ms. Roberts, through counsel!,] asks this Court to issue an order that she be evaluated by a suitable licensed or certified examiner at the expense of the [S]tate. 4. Counsel believes that this examination is very necessary and should be done as soon as possible since the trial in this case is scheduled to begin on March 30, 1999.

If the Court believes that a hearing on the issue of competency is necessary or if any additional information is required, counsel would be more than happy to provide same. The very next day, the State filed an answer to this motion. Relevant to the case at bar, it argued: 2. That the preliminary threshold of mental incompetency has not been properly raised by the Defendant in that the Defendant has not entered a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity; neither has the Defendant provided or released to the State any medical and/or psychological or psychiatric reports in support of her allegations. 3.

That the Defendant has filed a Motion for Mental Examination at the expense of the State rather than a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity and does not comply with the requirements of Rule 4-242. 4. That the Defendant’s motion in essence seeks to improperly shift upon the Court the onus of raising sua sponte the issue of mental competency. 5. That at no time has the Defendant been adjudicated not criminally responsible by reason of insanity by the State of Maryland or by any other jurisdiction. 6. That pursuant to Rule 4-242 a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity shall be in writing and ³⁵⁶ entered at the time the Defendant initially pleads unless good cause is shown. [Citations omitted.] The trial court denied the motion on the very next day without a hearing. 9 A trial on the merits commenced on March 30, 1999.

On April 6, 1999, the jury found petitioner guilty of second degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. She was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty and ten years. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed her conviction in an unreported decision.

III

Analysis The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying, without a hearing, a motion for examination of the defendant for competency to stand trial where the motion included a proffer sufficient to overcome the presumption of competency. We hold, under the circumstances of this case, that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing providing an opportunity for petitioner to present evidence in respect to whether to refer her for a competency evaluation to be used in making a competency determination. Once an accused alleges incompetency to stand trial, a trial court is required to make a determination as to the accused’s competency to stand trial based on the evidence on the record. While we do not say that a formal hearing on the merits is required in all circumstances, especially where the allegation of incompetency is a bald one unsupported by any alleged facts that, if true, would demonstrate such incompetency, we do hold that when a defendant makes an allegation of incompetency to stand trial and there is no evidence in the record as to the defendant’s incompetency to stand trial, as opposed to a proffer, an accused must be afforded an opportunity to present evidence upon which a valid determination can be made.

Although the trial court had no automatic obligation to grant petitioner’s ³⁵⁷ motion and order a mental examination upon her proffer, once petitioner’s competency to stand trial was called into question, as it was by this motion, the trial court then had an affirmative duty to determine petitioner’s competency based on evidence in the record. Under the facts of this case, the trial court had no basis for finding that examination was or was not necessary because, at the time the issue of petitioner’s competency was raised, there was no evidence in the record upon which a determination could be made. Therefore, under the circumstances in the case sub judice, a hearing to permit the introduction of evidence, or some other method of receiving evidence, was required in order for the trial court to make a valid determination of competency as required by Maryland Code (1982, 2000 Repl.Vol.), section 12-103 of the Health-General Article. a. Competency v. Not Criminally Responsible Before starting our analysis of the issue at hand, we feel that it is imperative that we once again clarify the distinction between competency to stand trial and responsibility for a criminal act.

In its answer to the trial court, the State argued that the preliminary threshold of mental incompetency was not properly raised by petitioner because she had not entered a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity. This is an improper interpretation of the law of Maryland. As the Court of Special Appeals has said “[t]he sole issue of competency to stand trial is not raised by a plea and its determination is a matter resting exclusively in the court.” Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.App. 689, 695 , 244 A.2d 888, 891 (1968) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 155 Md. 733 (1969). Maryland Code (1982, 2000 RepLVol.), section 12-101(e) of the Health-General Article states that: “Incompetent to stand trial” means not able: (1) To understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) To assist in one’s defense. ³⁵⁸ Contrastingly, Maryland Code (1982, 2000 RepLVol.), section 12-108(a) of the Health-General Article provides that: A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity: (1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law.

Comparing these two statutes, it is evident that although they encompass similar topic areas, the Legislature intended them to be distinct and unique. “Prior to the enactment of chapter 709, Laws of Maryland, 1967 ... the Maryland courts had applied the same standard for both insanity at the time of commission of the crime and ‘insanity’ at the time of trial....” 10 Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 297-98 , 372 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1977). See Md. Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol.), Art. 59 § 7. The enactment of 1967 Maryland Laws, Chapter 709 codified a distinction between the two standards. See Md. Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol., 1967 Cum.Supp.), Art. 59 § 7; Raithel, 280 Md. at 297 , 372 A.2d at 1073 .

It is evident that whether an accused enters a plea of not criminally responsible has no bearing on the accused’s competency to stand trial. As we indicated in Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 373 , 384 A.2d 91, 102 (1978), a case in which we recognized that an accused could be competent to stand trial as well as not criminally responsible, “the test for competency to stand trial and the test for criminal responsibility at the time of the commission of the offense [are] separate and distinct.” Therefore, the State’s assertion that the preliminary threshold of mental incompetency was not properly raised by petitioner because she had not entered a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity was simply wrong. ³⁵⁹ b. Determination of Competency The Supreme Court of the United States has said that “[i]t is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 , 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992); see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 , 95 S.Ct. 896, 903 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 , 86 S.Ct. 836, 838 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process....”); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 254 , 582 A.2d 794, 797 (1990) (“If a state fails to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent, it denies him due process.”); see also Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650 , 759 A.2d 764 (2000). In accordance with this principle, Maryland Code (1982, 2000 Repl.

Vol.), section 12-103 of the Health-General Article 11 provides: § 12-103. Court determination of competency. (a) Hearing. — If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. (b) Court action if defendant competent. — If, after receiving evidence, the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial shall begin as soon as practicable or, if already begun, shall continue. ³⁶⁰ (c) Reconsideration of competency. — At any time during the trial and before verdict, the court may reconsider the question of whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. [Some emphasis added.] We begin our analysis with a discussion of statutory construction.

As we have stated numerous times: We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136 , 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent.

Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445 , 697 A.2d at 458 ; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.’ ” Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, ³⁶¹ [wjhen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ... [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327 , 524 A.2d 51 (1987), ... [although we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.” [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59 .

We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381 , 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted).

State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717-19 , 720 A.2d