Robin Express Transfer, Inc. v. Canton Railroad

Moore, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal arises out of a collision which occurred at approximately 4 a.m. on September 29, 1972 at a railroad crossing on North Point Boulevard in Baltimore County, involving a locomotive owned by appellee, Canton Railroad Company (Canton), and a tractor-trailer owned and operated by appellant, Robin Express Transfer, Inc. (Robin). Canton filed suit against Robin based upon negligence in the truck’s alleged failure to stop for a red traffic signal. Robin filed a counter-claim against Canton alleging that the railroad was negligent in failing to maintain the automatic signals in properly functioning condition.

The case was submitted to a jury in the Circuit Court for'Baltimore County (Raine, J., presiding) on two issues calling for a determination of whether there was negligence on the part of Canton or Robin, or both. 1 The jury found that both parties were ³²³ guilty of negligence contributing to the happening of the accident. A motion by Robin for a new trial was denied. The trial court, however, granted Canton’s motion for judgment n.o.v., entering judgment in favor of Canton for $6,293.55 on its own claim and also in favor of Canton on Robin’s counterclaim. From this judgment Robin appeals, seeking a reversal and reinstatement of the original jury verdict.

I The accident occurred at a point where Canton’s single track railroad, running east and west, intersected with North Point Boulevard (State Route 151), a major traffic artery consisting of two northbound and two southbound lanes separated by a 34 foot wide grass median. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. At the intersection of the highway and the track there were two crossarm signals. 2 There were also yellow and black railroad crossing signs located on North Point Boulevard approximately 300 feet north and south of the crossing. The most important signal system, however, and the focal point of Robin’s allegations of negligence, consisted of four automatic traffic signals, one over each northbound and southbound lane of traffic, controlled by an electrically wired system connected to the railroad tracks.

These traffic signals were designed to remain green for vehicular traffic on the Boulevard and change from green to yellow to red when a train approached the crossing from either direction; and to stay red until the entire train had proceeded completely beyond the intersection. Three fully independent, battery-powered circuits controlled three separate sections of the railroad track circuit IT controlled that part of the track between a point about 220 feet west of the highway and a point about 26 feet west of the highway; circuit 3T controlled a like section of track east of the highway; circuit 2T spanned the area from 26 feet from the edge of the road on either side of the intersection, including ³²⁴ the entire part of the track crossing the north and south roadbeds of the Boulevard. When a train approached from the west it would, at a point about 220 feet from the first southbound lane of the road, complete the circuit (IT) by contact with the rails which were wired to a battery. The battery well was located approximately 10 feet from the tracks with wires running underground and emerging at the tracks in an electrical connection.

By shorting the circuit the train activated the four traffic signals to change from green to yellow to red. Simultaneously with the traffic signal turning red, the circuit activated a separate signal — visible only to the train and located on a pole about 20-30 feet from the intersection — causing it to change from red to green, thereby indicating to the train engineer that it was safe to enter the intersection. This process whereby the highway traffic signal turned red (and the train signal turned green) took approximately 5 seconds from the train’s first contact with the wired track, according to testimony by Canton’s mechanic. Finally, as a safety measure, the system was so designed that if a battery went dead or lost its voltage the system would “fail-safe” by causing the vehicular traffic signals to turn red and remain red.

This had been observed to happen occasionally in the past. Just before the accident the Canton train, pulling nine freight cars, was proceeding eastward toward the intersection with North Point Boulevard, as it did about three times a week. It had rained previously and the weather was still “misty” but the engineer said that visibility was good. As the train approached the road the engineer testified that he sounded the bell (air operated) when he was 50 to 60 feet away from the road, that the bell remained on continuously and that the horn was blasting up to the time of impact.

The double headlights were on, mounted on the top part of the locomotive and affording illumination “at least a half a block.” In addition, the locomotive’s “ground lights” were operating which “shine down to the ground and takes and shows [sic] the whole lower part of your locomotive.” ³²⁵ The engineer also testified that he noticed that the signal light for the train was red and did not turn green until the train was 10-15 feet from the signal pole, or about 30-40 feet from the road. 3 The train was at that point traveling at 2-3 m.p.h. When the signal light turned green the engineer said that he also saw, by the reflected light, the Boulevard traffic signal turn from green to yellow to red. At that time he began to release the brake and the train accelerated somewhat to about 4 m.p.h. as it reached the road. In the meantime, the tractor-trailer, proceeding northbound from Sparrows Point toward Baltimore in the inside lane, was also approaching the intersection and its headlights were seen by the engineer and his helper in the cab of the locomotive.

The truck was then “several hundred feet away” and they assumed it would stop. The truck continued, however, and collided with the 250,000 pound locomotive in the last northbound lane of the Boulevard. The engineer and his helper described it as a “terrible impact” which “raised up” the cab, throwing the crewmen to the floor. When the engineer arose, he threw the emergency brake, stopping the train about 168 feet east of the point of impact.

The helper estimated that at the time of impact the train was going 10-12 m.p.h. There was no testimony as to the truck’s speed but the investigating officer, William Pulaski of the Baltimore County Police Department, called as a witness by Robin, testified that there were no skid marks. The driver of the truck was fatally injured and the only eyewitness testimony of the collision came from the train crewmen. Officer Pulaski testified that he arrived on the scene at 4:07 a.m., approximately seven minutes after the accident.

The traffic lights governing vehicular traffic were red. He ³²⁶ gave the dimensions of the median, the traffic lanes and shoulders as 34 feet, 12 feet and 8 to 10 feet, respectively. Over Robin’s objection, he was permitted to testify on cross-examination, that in making his initial report he found no improper action on the part of the railroad and that the cause of the accident was the violation of the traffic signal by the tractor-trailer operator. Over Canton’s objection, the police officer was also permitted to testify on direct examination concerning observations made by him of an apparent malfunction of the traffic control system, some eight hours after the accident, at the end of his tour of duty.

As he was driving northbound on North Point Boulevard he observed a train coming in the same direction (from west to east) as the train involved in the collision. He stopped his car in the median to watch the operation of the traffic signals. As the train came close to the Boulevard, the vehicular traffic signals remained green. The train stopped and let off a flagman.

The officer got out of his car and, along with the flagman, stopped the automobile traffic on the Boulevard. The officer testified that “as the train passed and cleared the northbound lanes of Route 151, North Point Boulevard, it went approximately 250 feet and hit the switch on the west [sic] side of the roadway before the. light changed red for the traffic on North Point Boulevard.” The trial judge, in his memorandum opinion granting Canton's motion for judgment n.o.v., stated that this testimony of the police officer was “the only evidence to suggest that the light was not properly functioning at the time of the collision” but that it should not have been admitted. 4 It was held: “The Court believes that the condition of the automatic signal system is of a transitory or changeable nature, and that the condition of the signal seven or eight hours after the accident is ³²⁷ circumstantial and too speculative, and should not have been admitted. At best it amounted to a mere suggestion that a wire might have become disconnected that ran from the battery well to the track. The uncontradicted evidence is that whenever a battery dies or loses its voltage the automatic traffic signal is designed to cause the light for vehicular traffic to remain red, and the only prior complaints about the traffic signal system not functioning properly concerned traffic being held up by a red light when no train was in the area.

It is far more rational to conclude that the subsequent malfunction that the officer observed was caused in some manner by the impact on the locomotive and the tracks, rather than to infer that the system was malfunctioning at the time of the accident. This is particularly true when you consider the officer’s testimony that when he first arrived on the scene the light was red when the locomotive had not yet reached the point where the officer observed the light turn red at the later observation.” (Emphasis added.) II The ultimate question for our determination on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Canton’s motion for judgment n.o.v. 5 The settled rule is that in our appellate review of the trial court’s action we must assume the truth of all credible evidence and of all inferences fairly deducible therefrom and consider the same in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made; and if such evidence and inferences lead to conclusions with which reasonable minds could not differ, then the issue is one of law for the court and not one of fact for the jury. ³²⁸ Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126 , 316 A. 2d 837 (1974); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. McFarland, 21 Md. App. 501 , 319 A. 2d 824 (1974); Miller v. Michalek, 13 Md. App. 16 , 281 A. 2d 117 (1971), citing Belleson v. Klohr, 257 Md. 642, 646 , 264 A. 2d 274 (1970). The police officer’s testimony concerning the malfunctioning of the traffic signals eight hours after the collision is a classic illustration of circumstantial evidence. From such evidence, Robin urges that the jury might legitimately infer a system disorder at the time of the accident, probative on the issue of Canton’s alleged negligence.

It contends that the circumstantial evidence was properly submitted to the jury and, in effect, improperly withdrawn from the jury upon the granting of the motion for judgment n.o.v. This argument, however, betrays a fundamental misconception of the respective functions of court and jury where the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is involved. See generally, Harper and James on Torts, Vol. 2, §§ 19.3, 19.4. It is the function of the court, in the first instance, to decide whether the inference of negligence is legitimate or permissible. If the decision is “no” the evidence should be withheld from the jury.

Contrariwise, if the decision is “yes,” the evidence should be submitted to the jury for its evaluation of the force of the inference of negligence. This is so because, as Horney, J. observed in Short v. Wells, 249 Md. 491 , 240 A. 2d 224 (1968), “The value of circumstantial evidence depends on the strength and genuineness of the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” The fundamental difference in the functions of the court and jury and the test for determining whether the evidence should be submitted to the jury are in Short v. Wells, succinctly defined (pp. 495-6): “The court makes the initial determination on the basis of whether the inference of negligence, as a generalization, is more probable than not,” Then, if the court “decides that the inference is permissible” “[I]t should submit the evidence to the jury to ³²⁹ finally determine whether the inference of negligence is more probable than not in that particular case. ” (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., p. 212, the author explains: “The inference must cover all of the necessary elements of negligence, and must point to a breach of the defendant’s duty. The mere fact of the presence of a banana peel on a floor may not be sufficient to show that it has been there long enough for reasonable care to require the defendant to discover and remove it; but if it is ‘black, flattened out and gritty,’ the conclusion may reasonably be drawn. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether reasonable men on the jury may draw it.” Accordingly, we must reject appellant’s contention that the trial court in the instant case invaded the province of the jury.

We think the court correctly characterized as “circumstantial” the condition of the signal approximately eight hours after the accident; and that when the court stated “it is far more rational” to conclude that the malfunction observed by the officer was caused in some manner by the impact, it was effectively deciding in the negative the question of whether the inference of negligence was more probable than not. This constituted the exercise of a proper judicial function. The decision was amply supported. 6 ³³⁰ Furthermore, we find misplaced appellant’s reliance upon Stitzel v. Kurz, 18 Md. App. 525 , 308 A. 2d 430 (1973). This was a one-car accident case wherein the parents of a deceased passenger brought suit against the driver and against Baltimore County.

The basis for a claim of negligence against the County was that it had erected an incorrect road sign which had misled or confused the driver. The sign, as originally erected on May 1, 1970, showed a curve in a direction opposite to the direction of the actual curve. This Court, in an opinion by Judge Powers, held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the County. We stated (p. 538): “When