Roddy-Duncan v. Duncan

CHARLES E. MOYLAN, Jr., Judge, Retired, specially assigned. Our reversal of the judgment in this case is on very narrow procedural grounds. We are remanding the case so that the trial judge may conduct a hearing on the appellant’s Motion to Vacate a Default Judgment, and the necessarily attendant question of whether Maryland properly had jurisdiction to hear this case. The jurisdictional contest is between Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The appellant, Mary Roddy-Duncan (“Wife”), and the appellee, Theodore Duncan (“Husband”), were married on March 12, 1988, in Philadelphia. Three children were born to the marriage: 1) Nina, now 14; 2) Jan, now 11; and 3) Theo, now 8, all born in Pennsylvania. At the time of the couple’s separation on January 9, 1999, the family was living in Johns-town, Cambria County, in western Pennsylvania. After the couple’s separation in 1999, the Husband, who worked for the federal government, was reassigned to the Washington, D.C. area.

After living for nine months in northern Virginia, he moved to Montgomery County, Maryland. The Wife remained at all times in Pennsylvania but had moved, by June 2000, from Cambria County to Philadelphia. Jumping ahead in the legal chronology (we will go back), on August 14, 2002, the Husband filed a Bill of Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, asking for 1) an absolute divorce, 2) the custody of the three children, and 3) child support for the children from his Wife. A scheduling conference was held on November 14.

There was no appearance by the Wife or by anyone on her behalf. No answer to the ²⁰⁰ complaint was filed by the Wife. A trial date was set for December 27. On November 27, the Husband moved for an Order of Default, claiming that a copy of the Petition for Absolute Divorce and a Summons had been personally served on the Wife on August 25, requiring her to respond no later than October 25.

It further alleged that she had failed to respond and had failed to appear, either in person or by counsel. At the scheduled hearing on December 27, the trial judge granted the Order of Default. It was filed on December 31. On January 31, 2003, the trial court granted the Husband an absolute divorce from the Wife.

The decree also granted him sole legal and physical custody of the three children. It ordered the Wife to pay $1,499.00 per month in child support and further charged her with an arrearage of $7,495.00. The judgment was entered on February 4. At the December 27, 2002, hearing that led to that decree, neither the Wife nor anyone on her behalf appeared.

It is not the ultimate merits that concern us in this case, for they were never the subject of an adversarial hearing. The critical pleading, as we now review the proceedings, was the filing by the Wife, on March 5, 2003, of a pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment, claiming “Lack of Jurisdiction, Proper Service, Duplicate Pleading & Fraud, Mistake and Irregularity.” On March 12, the Husband filed his opposition to that motion. Without either an evidentiary hearing or argument, by counsel or pro se, the court denied the Motion to Vacate on March 28, 2003. It is that denial of the Motion to Vacate without any further inquiry into its allegations that compels us to reverse in this case.

The decision as to whether to conduct a hearing on a motion such as this is, to be sure, entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge. It is furthermore true that an appellate court is extremely deferential when reviewing such exercises of discretion. In this case, however, and on an issue as fundamental as the very jurisdiction of the State of Maryland over the case, we conclude that no less than two “red flags” ²⁰¹ were up and flying and that either should have caused the court to pause and make further inquiry. We feel confident that either of those “alerts,” had they been noticed by the trial judge, would have caused him serious concern.

SERVICE ON THE WIFE The first concern should have been with the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts over the person of the Wife. She was at all times a resident of Pennsylvania. Matters as grave as the granting of a divorce, the custody of her three children, and the obligation to pay child support were all decided against her by way of default, without a shred of testimony or a word of argument on her behalf and in her total absence. Default judgment, of course, may sometimes be appropriate and is sometimes necessary, but, because of its fundamentally ex parte nature, should not proceed until the court is completely satisfied that there has been proper notice of the impending proceedings served on the defaulting absentee party- In her Motion to Vacate, the Wife flatly alleged: The Defendant here was never served with a summons or complaint for divorce in this matter and her attorney in Pennsylvania informed this Court by letter (Exhibit C) of the matter in Pennsylvania, giving Defendant the impression that this case in Maryland would be dismissed.

(Emphasis supplied). In his motion in opposition, the Husband did not elaborate on the issue of personal service but only referred back to the hearing of December 27, 2002. That this Court thoroughly dealt with the issues of jurisdiction in its hearing on the 27th day of December, 2002 and that Defendant continually ignored this Court’s notices of hearings. At the December 27 hearing, there had actually been no testimony with respect to the service of notice on the Wife.

Neither of the two witnesses, the Husband or Marlene Young, ²⁰² made mention of the subject. It was the trial judge who, in summing up the legal posture of the case, made mention of an indication in the case file that the Wife had been served. I also notice in this file that Ms. Duncan, the Defendant, in the Complaint filed, has listed a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania street address. I also notice that in the consent order signed by the parties in Pennsylvania, they agreed that they would exchange children for visitation purposes at a gas station in Joppa, Maryland.

And it actually is indicated in your court file that when the Defendant was served with process in this case, she was served on August 25th, 2002 at the Magnolia Exxon gas station on Pulaski Highway in Joppa, Maryland. So she was actually served in Maryland, which means that Maryland has personal jurisdiction over her. She has never raised—she’s been served, she’s never raised any issue that Maryland has no jurisdiction over the custody of the children, she’s never raised any objection that Maryland has jurisdiction over the divorce, or she’s never raised any objection that Maryland has personal jurisdiction over her. (Emphasis supplied).

There was in the case file an Affidavit of Service by Marlene Young, attesting that the Summons had been personally served on the Wife at 8:30 P.M. on August 25, 2002, at the Magnolia Exxon Station at 1101 Pulaski Highway, Joppa, Maryland. The service was not made by a representative of the Sheriffs Department, and in such a case Maryland Rule 2-126(a), in pertinent part, provides: If service is made by an individual other than a sheriff, the individual shall file proof under affidavit which shall also state that affiant is of the age of 18 or over. As the Maryland case law states, “It is true ... that a proper return is prima facie evidence of valid service of process and a simple denial of service by the defendant is not sufficient to rebut the presumption arising from such a return.” Sheehy v. Sheehy, 250 Md. 181, 185 , 242 A.2d 153 (1968). See also Adkins v. Selbyville Mfg.

Co., 134 Md. 497 , ²⁰³ 107 A. 181 (1919). We note, however, that such references to the presumption are in the context of the return of service being made by the sheriff. In this case, there were, at the very least, indications that some further inquiry was appropriate about the service of a summons upon the Wife. The private process server had made the trip with the Husband from Gaithersburg in Montgomery County to Joppatown in Harford County, where the Husband and Wife were to exchange children for visitation purposes.

Marlene Young, after attesting “nor am I otherwise interested in this suit,” gave her address as 58 Golden Ash Way in Gaithersburg. The Summons being served listed the Husband’s address as 58 Golden Ash Way in Gaithersburg. This was a clue, if noticed, that she was no ordinary sheriffs deputy. At the subsequent December 27 hearing before the trial judge, Marlene Young, the process server, was the only witness other than the Husband to appear on his behalf.

Her function at that hearing was in a very different capacity. At the hearing, she gave her address as 58 Golden Ash Way in Gaithersburg, just as he had done. The two had been living in the same house for several years. Marlene Young’s testimony at the December 27 hearing certainly suggested that, in addition to their living in the same house, there was a close relationship between her and the Husband.

She stated of her own personal knowledge that the Husband had not cohabitated with his Wife for so much as one night over the course of the preceding two and one-half years. She stated absolutely that there was not “any hope of a reconciliation between” Husband and Wife. She took care of his three children for approximately five hours every day. She affirmed that the Husband was “a phenomenal father to his children.” For watching the children, Marlene Young received $25 an hour, $125 a day, $600 a week, or approximately $2,580 a month or $30,000 a year.

When the Husband works “nights or weekends,” sometimes for “weeks at a time,” Marlene Young is the only person responsible for them. ²⁰⁴ Marlene Young’s December 27 testimony was enough to cast into question her earlier attestation, “nor am I otherwise interested in this suit” and, at the very least, would have made further inquiry appropriate about the circumstances of the Summons having been served upon the Wife. It clearly would not have been appropriate if the Husband himself had served the Summons. The question naturally arises as to whether Marlene Young was, in ultimate fact, any more neutral as a process server than the Husband would have been. 1 The validity of the entire default judgment procedure in this case hinged on the legitimacy of the service of process on the ²⁰⁵ Wife by Marlene Young and on both the integrity and the accuracy of Marlene Young’s return on the summons. The trial judge, however, was uninformed about the very existence of any possible questions in those regards.

Not misinformed. Uninformed. Our concern in this case is not so much with what was said but with what was not said. As a one-time, lay process server rather than an experienced professional, did Marlene Young, as she made her return, know what the term of art “personal service” actually amounted to?

Would it, in her perception, have been sufficient to tender a piece of paper to the Wife which the Wife did not accept? Would it have been sufficient to have waved a piece of paper in front of the Wife? In an ex parte proceeding where there is no adversary to ask questions, how do such questions get raised? In an ex parte proceeding particularly, therefore, is there any obligation on counsel, as an officer of the court, to raise questions in which the judge might be very interested but of which the judge is obviously unaware?

We do not suggest an answer. We only raise a question. In this case, it might be very revealing to hear the testimony of both the Wife and of Marlene Young, under oath and in detail, as to what actually happened at the Magnolia Exxon Station in Joppatown. Counsel’s bland generality that “service was made” simply will not serve.

When the Wife alleged, in her Motion to Vacate the Judgment, that she “was never served,” the Husband’s unilluminating response that “this Court thoroughly dealt with the issues of jurisdiction in its hearing on the 27th day of December, 2002” is a masterpiece of deft avoidance. The questions we have asked above were never raised, let alone resolved, at the hearing on December 27. At a hearing, on remand, the judge may well be interested in some answers to what was, at the least, an unorthodox modality of service. The Pendency of the Divorce Case in Pennsylvania An even more serious concern is the jurisdiction of Maryland over the subject matter of this case.

It was clearly brought to the attention of the trial judge that there had at ²⁰⁶ one time been pending litigation between the Husband and the Wife in Pennsylvania. As to the status of that litigation, however, the judge was selectively furnished with an only partial status report. Immediately following the separation of the Husband and the Wife in January of 1999, the Wife filed her Complaint for Divorce and Child Custody on January 27, 1999, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania. The Husband filed an Answer to the Complaint in that same court on April 4, 1999.

On June 16, 2000, an Amended Interim Order from the Cambria County Court addressed the issue of child custody. The Husband and Wife were to share legal custody but the Husband was awarded primary physical custody. The Cambria County Court retained jurisdiction over the matter. On December 4, 2000, a Consent Order was filed by the Cambria County Court, essentially confirming the earlier custody determination but making it clear that the Wife enjoyed “partial physical custody.” Once again, the Cambria County Court asserted that it was retaining jurisdiction over the matter.

Both the June 16, 2000 and the December 4, 2000 orders of the Pennsylvania Court, affecting only custody, were filed in the Maryland action. Nothing concerning the pending divorce action in Pennsylvania, however, was filed. At the December 27 hearing in Maryland, notwithstanding that passing allusions to the Pennsylvania divorce proceedings may have been made, the judge was under the distinct impression that there was pending in Pennsylvania only a custody case and not a divorce case. THE COURT: I was looking through the Court file and I noticed that Mr. Duncan filed his complaint for divorce here in this Court in August of this year, he attached to his complaint a copy of a consent order of December b, 2000 in the Court of Common Pleas in Cambria County, Pennsylvania.

And that order indicated that the parties would have joint legal custody; the children would live primarily with their father, provide for visitation; and then in the last paragraph, one entitled Jurisdiction, it indicates that the ²⁰⁷ court in Pennsylvania would retain jurisdiction over this matter. And that matter then was, it appears to me, a custody case; not a divorce case, but custody of the children. (Emphasis supplied). Significantly, counsel for the Husband did absolutely nothing to disabuse the trial judge of that critical misapprehension.

A very effective modality of deception is to relate and to emphasize partial information while remaining discreetly low-keyed about other critical information. What the Husband did not file with the court was a copy of the Wife’s divorce action of January 27, 1999. More significantly, the judge was not informed about events that were actively proceeding immediately prior to the Husband’s filing of his divorce action in Montgomery County on August 14, 2002. On May 15, the Husband had moved in Cambria County to have the divorce case transferred to Maryland.

On June 3, the Cambria County Court had signed an Order denying the Motion to Transfer. On June 19, the Husband had moved in Cambria County to have his Wife’s divorce action dismissed. On July 21, the Cambria County Court had signed an Order denying the Motion