Rofra, Inc. v. Board of Education

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Because the successful bidder to perform plumbing work for the Board of Education of Prince George’s County had not conformed to a prerequisite of solicitation requiring that the bidder be “a licensed master plumber, or have a licensed master plumber in their employment,” appellant, an unsuccessful bidder, filed a two count declaration seeking injunctive relief and damages for breach of contract. Appellee moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court ⁵³⁹ for Prince George’s County. On November 21,1974 appellant dismissed Count I of the declaration because the injunctive relief sought had become moot, and confessed judgment on the appellee’s motion as to that count.

Issue was joined, however, as to the appellee’s motion relative to the remaining count praying damages for breach of contract. After a hearing on the motion, the judge granted the motion for summary judgment saying: “My conclusion is as long as they use a master plumber doing the work he is required to do the rest is only directory. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment will be granted. Judgment entered for the defendant, and costs, as to the second count.” Appellant contends that the trial judge erred because there were material disputes of fact on the record indicating that the contract was wrongfully awarded.

Without reaching the question decided by the trial judge, we find the result reached by him nonetheless proper. When appellant dismissed its first count seeking injunctive relief, it was left seeking damages for breach of contract; however, it had no contract with appellee which it could breach. Its own pleading noted the “awarding of the contract to William F. Harrison, Inc., rather than to Plaintiff [appellant].” When this fact was brought to appellant’s attention at argument upon appeal, appellant suggested — or acquiesced in the suggestion — that the contract allegedly breached upon which this suit was founded, was a contract conceived by appellee’s invitation to bid and consummated when appellant accepted by submitting its proposal, which, appellant contends, was the only proper one before the board. We do not