Roland Park Co. v. State

McSherry, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Whether the appellant is liable for the franchise tax* or bonus imposed by the Act of 1890, ch. 536, is the sole question involved in this proceeding. The appellant is a body corporate, incorporated on July the thirtieth, 1891, under the general incorporation law, and its capital stock was limited by its charter to one million of dollars. The Act of 1890, which adds a new section to the Code, prescribes that “ every corporation incorporated since January first, eighteen hundred and ninety, under any general or special law of this State, except cemetery companies, &c., shall pay to the State Treasurer, for the use of the State, a bonus of one-eighth of one per centum upon the amount of capital stock which said company is authorized to have,” &c., &c.

This act was approved and became effective on-April the eighth, 1890. The contention of the appellant is that this statute is only applicable to corporations formed ⁴⁵¹ after January the first and before April the eighth, 1890, and that the word “ since,” properly construed, makes the provisions of the act relate only to such corporations as were formed between January the first and April the eighth, 1890. This contention is founded on the assumption that the word “ since ” means, and necessarily means, and was intended to mean," a period of time beginning with the first of January, 1890, and ending with the date when. the statute became effective. To support this contention 'we have been referred to various lexicons which define the word “ since.” We are not, however, dealing with a question of mere philology.

What we have to do is to discover the legislative intention and to give to it, when ascertained in accordance with established canons or rules, full and complete effect. The mere words which the Legislature may use are not always controlling. If the obvious purpose of an enactment is beyond the literal meaning of the language employed, it will not be restricted in its scope and application by the narrow significance of its words ; and equally, too, broad and comprehensive terms will not include that which is not within the design and the object of the statute. The real intent, when ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of the language, State v. Milburn, 9 Gill, 109 ; Milburn v. State, 1 Md. 17 ; because both the canons of verbal criticism and the rules of grammatical construction must alike yield to the manifest spirit and intent of an enactment.

Or, as differently expressed, “Sometimes cases not within the words are held to be within the act, and other cases are by construction taken without the operation of the law, though covered by the language, according to the intent and design of the Legislature.” Wilson, &c. v. State, use of Davis, 21 Md. 1 . This intent or design máy be gathered not merely from the language of the enactment, but also from the causes or necessity which prompted its passage, and from foreign circumstances. Johnson and Wife v. Heald, Extr., 33 Md. 352; Durousseau v. U S., 6 Cranch, 307 . ⁴⁵² Now, the obvious puipose of the Act of 1890 was to raise a revenue for the treasury of the State. No reason has been assigned or can well be suggested for limiting its application to such corporations as were formed within the' space of three months and eight days in the beginning of the year 1890.

By its first section it added a new section, to be known as sec. 88 A, to Art. 81 of the Code of Public General Laws, relating to revenue and taxes, and thereby indicated that its provisions imposing the bonus should be a permanent and continuing part of the written law of the State, until repealed. The mere fact that it was included in, and by its express terms became a part of, the fixed and established revenue and tax-system, at least