Maryland case law › Roland v. Messersmith

Roland v. Messersmith

208 Md. App. 532 (2012) · Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Maryland Court of Special AppealsDisposition: AffirmedKenney✓ Good law
HoldingLaura Roland owned a 94-acre farm in fee simple.

KENNEY, J. This appeal stems from a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of farm property in Little Orleans, Maryland (“the Property”), which was once owned in undivided fee simple absolute by Laura Roland. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Allegany County determined that the effect of two valid deeds relating to the Property was to transfer a 3/5 interest in the Property to Arlin Messersmith, Jr., appellee, as a tenant in common with two of Mrs. Roland’s children. The court then granted Messersmith’s petition to partition the Property according to those interests. Erie Roland (“Roland”), personal representative of the estate of Laura Roland, appellant, challenges that judgment, raising a single issue for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in determining that Mrs. Roland could validly grant herself both a life estate and a future interest as a joint tenant remainderman with her children?

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that Mrs. Roland validly conveyed to herself both a life estate and a “remainder,” which in the circumstances presented here constituted a possibility of reverter. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The evidence at trial established that Mrs. Roland and her husband owned the Property, which consists of approximately 94 acres of farmland and a residence, as tenants by the entireties. When her husband died in October 1996, Mrs. Roland became the sole owner of the Property. At that time, she had four adult children: David, Kirby, Eric, and Victoria.

On March 18, 2003, Mrs. Roland executed a deed (“the 2003 deed”) that reserved for her a life estate in the Property and 535 conveyed the remainder to her and her four children as joint tenants with right of survivorship. She continued to live on the Property, along with David and Kirby. Messersmith, whom Kirby identified as his cousin and a close family member, owned a two-acre parcel adjacent to the Property. Mrs. Roland agreed to sell Messersmith, for $1000, a .67 acre parcel that he needed in order to build on his property, but, under the joint tenancy, she could not transfer any portion of the Property without the agreement of her four children.

Victoria and Eric did not, for financial reasons, want to sell the .67 acre parcel, which led to friction within the family. Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby sought to break the joint tenancy in order to convey their interests in the Property to Messersmith. When asked “how did the discussion come from the point of giving him a little bit to build a house until he gets all your interest? How did that happen?,” David testified: • “[Sjomehow we got into giving [Messersmith] a larger amount.

We just thought, oh let them have it. We can live on it for the rest of our lives, let them have it.” • “[W]e thought that if the Messersmith[s] owned our share, well, we thought that [Victoria] and Eric ... probably would lay and wait for us to grow old and then [the Property] would go to them, and then they would split it up and sell it and have an abundance of more of everything[.]” • “We wanted to share with [Messersmith], We wanted to see him get his house put up and ... get his life started in Little Orleans.... [A]nd in return, we just wanted to receive a little bit of, just a little bit of money and have the ... right to live there until we passed away.” Kirby also testified that Mrs. Roland wanted to convey her interest to Messersmith because there were “things to be done around the house, ‘cause we don’t have tractors and things to do with, Mr. Messersmith does. And at the time it sounded like a good idea to [Mrs. Roland], to have ... everything transferred to Mr. Messersmith.” Messersmith testified that 536 originally, David and Kirby were “talking about” selling the .67 acre parcel to him, “but after they found out that they couldn’t sell it without [Victoria’s] signature, then they said they wanted ... to get rid of it.” An attorney, Raymond Weston, was enlisted at Messersmith’s request to prepare a deed. Weston testified that he was aware that Victoria was not going to be transferring her interest but he had been advised that Mrs. Roland, David, Kirby, and Eric wished to convey their interests.

When Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby came to his office to sign the deed, Weston advised them that he represented Messersmith and that the deed as written conveyed all of their “right[s], title and interest” in the Property to Messersmith. According to Weston, Mrs. Roland “read the deed very closely” and “openly discussed” having had a “falling out” with Victoria, whom Mrs. Roland believed needed to be “admonished” for being “greedy” because “others were always there, fixing the property, taking care of her in old age,” while Victoria and Eric “weren’t helping her out and she wanted to keep it in [the family], so [Messersmith] could use it.” Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby all signed the deed. Weston then sent the deed to Eric for his signature, with a cover letter containing the same advisements he had given to Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby. When Eric declined to execute the deed, Weston revised it to provide for conveyances only by Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby.

On November 3, 2005 those three signed the deed (“the 2005 deed”), which identifies Mrs. Roland as a “life tenant” and David, Kirby, Eric, and Victoria as “remaindermen,” conveying the property to Messersmith for $10 consideration. The granting clause identifies the grantors as Mrs. Roland, Kirby, and David. The habendum clause 1 provides that Messersmith is “TO HAVE AND HOLD” the Property “for fee simple as Tenant in Common,” 537 with Messersmith having a 3/5 interest and Victoria and Eric each having a 1/5 interest. According to Weston, this was intended to be in the nature of a quit claim deed conveying all of Mrs. Roland’s interest in the Property because he was not sure whether, under the 2003 deed, Mrs. Roland held both a life estate and a remainder or only a life estate.

David, Kirby, and Messersmith characterized the agreement as a “handshake” deal. It was the understanding of David, Kirby, and Mrs. Roland that they were conveying their entire interests in the Property to Messersmith. In her deposition, however, Mrs. Roland claimed to have not understood that she was transferring her interest in the Property. She acknowledged that pressure to sign the deed came from David and Kirby.

David, Kirby, and Mrs. Roland believed that they had retained life estates allowing them to live on the Property. David and Kirby also believed that Messersmith would later give them some money. 2 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Roland and David consulted an attorney, who advised them that, as a result of the 2005 deed, they no longer held any interest in the Property and that Messersmith was not obligated to let them live there. In April 2006, seeking to set aside the 2005 deed, Mrs. Roland filed suit to quiet title to the Property, arguing that the 2003 deed conveying to her both a life estate and a remainder interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship was null and void as a matter of law and that the 2005 deed was obtained by fraud or coercion. 3 The 2005 deed was recorded on May 18, 2006. The following week, in a “Document of Clarification” dated May 24, 2006 and also drafted by Weston, Messersmith stated that, after the conveyance under the 2005 Deed, he “had an opportunity to evaluate the value of’ the Property and that, “even though 538 the [Property was granted for the love and affection that grantors [of the property] felt for” him, he was “now in a favorable financial position and desire[d] to give grantors a reasonable sum representing the value of said property previously conveyed.” In addition, the Document stated that David and Kirby “may have non-exclusive rights to reside on said property in the ‘Roland House’ ... for the term of their natural life for the sum of ten dollars per annum.” According to Weston, David and Kirby executed this document as grantees because “they were concerned that depending on what happens to the lawsuit,” Mrs. Roland, Eric, and Victoria might “take retribution ... and kick them off the property at some point.” David acknowledged that he and Kirby each received a check from Messersmith for $24,000, and that Mrs. Roland was offered the same amount but did not accept it.

In June 2006, seeking to enforce the 2005 deed, Messersmith filed his own quiet title suit to establish his interest as a 3/5 tenant in common with Eric and Victoria, and to partition the Property accordingly. This suit and Mrs. Roland’s quiet title suit were consolidated for trial. At the conclusion of a bench trial on November 20, 2007, the circuit court ruled that the 2003 deed was a valid conveyance by Mrs. Roland to herself of both a life estate and a divided remainder interest, and that the 2005 deed was not obtained by fraud or coercion. Messersmith’s petition for partition was held in abeyance. 4 While that matter was pending, Mrs. Roland died, and Eric, the personal representative of her estate, was substituted as the proper party in interest.

By order dated June 7, 2010, the trial court entered a final judgment order declaring that the 2005 deed was “valid and effective,” and that “by operation of said Deed,” Messersmith had a 3/5 interest in the Property 539 (consisting of the three 1/5 remainder interests conveyed to him by Mrs. Roland, David, and Kirby), Eric had a 1/5 interest, that Victoria had a 1/5 interest, all held in as “tenants in common.” In addition, the order stated “that three commissioners are to be appointed to partition and divide the [P]roperty in accordance with each parties [sic] respective interest.” Roland noted this timely appeal. DISCUSSION Here, recast in a more classic property law format, A, the fee simple absolute owner of real property, simultaneously reserved a life estate interest in the property to herself and conveyed the “remainder” to herself and her four children, B, C, D, and E, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The sole question raised in this appeal is ultimately a legal one: is this a valid conveyance? In other words, may a grantor devise to herself both a life estate and a concurrent remainder interest as a joint tenant with right of survivorship?

Roland argues that the answer is “no” because the conveyance “violates a basic principle of real property law” by allowing the grantor to create a future interest in herself that could never become a present estate. More specifically, in Roland’s view, the 2003 deed “created a legal nullity” that “could never be fulfilled” because [a]s soon as Mrs. Roland passed away, so did her interest as a joint tenant remainderman], since a joint tenancy by its definition severs that person’s interest and leaves it to the remaining joint tenant(s). Had the 2003 Deed left the remainder to the children as tenants in common, rather than as joint tenants, then Mrs. Roland’s remainder interest could theoretically have passed through probate. According to Roland, the true effect of the 2003 deed was to create a life estate for Mrs. Roland, with the remainder to her four children as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and thus, the 2005 deed conveyed only Mrs. Roland’s life estate and the remainder interests of David and Kirby.

As a result, 540 Messersmith holds a 2/4 interest in the Property, not the 3/5 interest decreed by the trial court. “The case law setting forth the general rules of construction of deeds affirms that, ‘the court should take into consideration the language employed, the subject matter, and surrounding circumstances,’ essentially the deed as a whole.” County Comm’rs v. St. Charles Assocs., 366 Md. 426, 463 , 784 A.2d 545 (2001) (quoting Weiprecht v. Gill, 191 Md. 478, 484-85

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