Roper v. Camuso

²⁴³ I. HARRELL, J. The W.C. and A.N. Miller Development Company (“Miller”) developed Spring Meadows, a residential subdivision near Damestown, in western Montgomery County. Miller created covenants at the inception of the Spring Meadows development in order to maintain open space concepts and views from within the development to the surrounding rolling hills. These covenants were recorded concurrently in the land records of Montgomery County with the conveyance by Miller arguably of all the lots in the development, with the exception of a lot conveyed to Elise Roper, Petitioner. The covenants provide, in part: l.(d) No line fence or wall, or fence or wall used for the purpose of dividing or enclosing a lot, in whole or in part, shall be placed, erected or permitted to remain on any lot, or any portion thereof, except hedge, shrubbery, stone, brick, ornamental iron, mortised post and split rail, or plank, which does not exceed four (4) feet in height, except with the written consent of the [Architectural Control] Committee ... 6.

The Grantor [Miller] expressly reserves to itself, its successors and assigns, the Architectural Control Committee and each Grantee of a lot within Spring Meadows which is subject to these covenants, conditions and restrictions and its and their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to enforce the covenants, conditions and restrictions herein contained and to take such legal or other action as may be required attempting to violate any of these covenants, conditions or restrictions. On 25 August 1988, Suzanne Camuso (“Respondent”) and her husband purchased from Miller lot 35 in Block D of Spring Meadows. Their deed provided that it was “subject to covenants and restrictions of record.” A copy of the covenants was recorded concurrently with their deed. Four years later, Miller conveyed Lot 36 of Block D, adjoining the Camusos’ lot, to Elise Foley (now Elise Roper) (“Petitioner”).

Although ²⁴⁴ Foley’s deed provided that the conveyance was “[s]ubject to covenants and restrictions of record,” no covenants or restrictions were recorded concurrently with the Miller — to—Foley deed. Later, in 1992, Ms. Roper built a fence on her lot along the common boundary with the Camusos’ lot. That fence allegedly exceeded the height restrictions imposed by the covenant. By letter dated 5 October 1992 to Ms. Roper, Allison N. Miller, III, in his capacity as Vice President of the Spring Meadows Architectural Control Committee, 1 noted that a “resident” in the Spring Meadows community had inquired about a “picket stockade fence” and a “drive way post lamp lighting” installed on Ms. Roper’s property.

He enclosed a copy of the covenants with the letter and noted concern that the structures violated the covenants. Ms. Roper did not take any action to remove the structures or otherwise bring them into conformity with the covenants. By letter dated 1 July 1993 to Ms. Roper, Edward J. Miller, 2 in his capacity as President of the Architectural Control Committee, referred to the 5 October 1992 letter and noted that “several property owners in the Community” had voiced concerns about the type of fence installed. Ms. Roper did not remove or otherwise alter the structures in response to this letter either.

In 1997, Ms. Camuso planted a row of approximately sixty-five Leyland Cypress trees on her lot along the Camuso/Foley common boundary. According to Ms. Roper, by the summer of 2000, the trees had grown to a height of more than eight feet and branches had grown over the fence on her property and into the vertical space above her property. Without consent, Ms. Roper and her husband pruned some of the ²⁴⁵ branches, including some branches on the Camusos’s side of the boundary. On 30 August 2000, Ms. Camuso filed, in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, a trespass and destruction of property action against Ms. Roper for cutting the trees.

The case was removed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on a jury trial request. Ms. Roper also filed a counter-claim, seeking damages for malicious prosecution (Count I), a declaration that the trees violated the Spring Meadows covenants (Count II), and injunctive relief requiring Ms. Camuso to comply with the covenants as to the trees (also in Count II). Approximately a year after suit was filed, trial was held. The trespass and malicious prosecution claims were tried to a jury.

Allison N. Miller, III, the vice president of Miller, in addition to his Architectural Review Committee position, testified as a witness for Ms. Roper. He explained that the covenants applied to every lot in Spring Meadows, but that Ms. Roper’s lot was the only one he knew of that expressly was not subject to the covenants. He further testified that it was his understanding that only grantees who had covenants recorded on their properties were entitled to enforce the covenants: Q: Who may enforce the covenants? A: The company, the grantor or the grantees.

Q: In laymen’s terms, that would be— A: The Miller Companies and/or the residents. Q: By resident, would that be a homeowner? A: It would be a grantee which would be a property owner who has had the covenants recorded on their property. At the conclusion of the jury trial phase, the jury found in favor of Ms. Camuso on her trespass claim and awarded damages.

The jury also found against Ms. Roper as to her malicious prosecution claim. As to Ms. Roper’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the trial judge, in an effort to avoid time-consuming ²⁴⁶ duplication, considered the same evidence introduced before the jury. Neither party objected to this. He also heard additional testimony and heard additional argument from counsel.

He found that Ms. Roper failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had standing to enforce the covenants and dismissed her declaratory and injunc-tive claims on that basis. 3 ²⁴⁷ Petitioner appealed. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. 372 Md. 429 , 813 A.2d 257 (2002).

II

We granted certiorari to consider the following issues: I. May a property owner whose land is not expressly subject to restrictive covenants apply the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants to enforce restrictive covenants against a property owner whose land is expressly subject to those covenants?

II

What evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that land not expressly subject to restrictive covenants was intended to be subject to restrictive covenants? We conclude that the Court of Special Appeals and Circuit Court erred and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this matter to that court with directions that it reverse the Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

III

Ms. Roper argued to the intermediate appellate court that the trial court erred in finding that she did not have standing to enforce the covenants. She conceded that her property was not burdened expressly by the covenants because they were not recorded with her deed and, therefore, a presumption arose that the restrictions did not apply to her lot. Ms. Roper ²⁴⁸ asked the Court of Special Appeals to conclude nonetheless that her lot was burdened by the covenants under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants. Under that doctrine, her lot would be burdened by the covenants and thereby bestow upon her the corresponding right to benefit from and enforce the covenants to the same extent as enjoyed by the property owners in the development whose lots were burdened expressly by the covenants.

Ms. Camuso contended in the intermediate appellate court that Ms. Roper’s arguments demonstrated a misunderstanding of the appropriate standard of review governing the appeal and that the clearly erroneous standard does not apply because the relevant issues raised on appeal were tried by the judge, not the jury. Ms. Camuso reasoned that, to enforce such a restriction in equity, one must have standing entitling him or her to seek equitable relief and that the trial judge’s finding that Ms. Roper did not have standing was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. Camuso averred that the intent of the parties controlled the court’s interpretation of the covenants and that the only intent that could be inferred from the deeds and covenants was that the Spring Meadows covenants govern Ms. Camuso’s lot, but did not apply to Ms. Roper’s lot. Respondent argued that that intent was revealed by the documentary evidence and Mr. Miller’s testimony that the Roper lot was not intended to be burdened by the covenants.

The Court of Special Appeals found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ms. Roper lacked standing to enforce the covenants against Ms. Camuso. Because Ms. Roper conceded that the covenants were not recorded with her deed, triggering the presumption that the restrictions do not apply to her lot, the only contention the intermediate appellate court considered on direct appeal was whether Ms. Roper’s lot was subject to the covenants under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants. The court described the doctrine by referring to what this Court stated in Schovee v. Mikolasko, 356 Md. 93 , 737 A.2d 578 (1999): ²⁴⁹ The doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants recognizes, at least under certain circumstances, that when a common grantor develops land for sale in lots, pursues a course of conduct indicating an intention to follow a general plan or scheme of development with respect to the land, and imposes substantially uniform restrictions on the lots conveyed, those same restrictions may be enforced against the land retained by the common grantor if that land is found to be part of the general plan of development and the buyers purchased their lots with that understanding. (quoting Schovee, 356 Md. at 99-100 , 737 A.2d at 582 ).

The intermediate appellate court observed that such cases typically are initiated by a plaintiff who owns a lot in a subdivision that expressly is subject to covenants and asks a court to exercise its equitable powers to impose the covenants upon a lot within the subdivision that has not been subjected expressly to the covenants. The defendant in the typical case is usually the developer or common grantor who retained title to an unrestricted lot or parcel. Ms. Roper, however, presents an unconventional circumstance because she seeks to subject her property to the covenants so that she may have standing to enforce them against another grantee who clearly is subject to the covenants. The court essentially concluded that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants was inapplicable to Ms. Roper’s case because there are no Maryland cases with similar factual circumstances.

The Court of Special Appeals further found that Ms. Roper would not be entitled to relief even if the doctrine was applicable to her “reverse” factual circumstances. The court enumerated the elements a party must show in order for a court to enforce covenants against a party not expressly subject to the covenants: (1) a common owner subdivided property into a number of lots for sale, (2) the common owner had an intention to create a general scheme of development for the property as a whole, in which use of the land was unrestricted, (3) the vast majority of subdivided lots contain restrictive covenants that reflect the general scheme, (4) the property against ²⁵⁰ which application of an implied covenant is sought was intended to be part of the general scheme of development, and (5) the purchaser of the lot in question had notice, actual or constructive, of the condition. (quoting Schovee, 356 Md. at 103 , 737 A.2d at 583-84 ). The court purported to apply these factors to the factual record of the present case and opined that a reasonable fact-finder could find or infer the following: that [Miller] did subdivide a farm property into a number of building lots for sale; that [Miller] did intend to create a general scheme of development of the property as a whole; that all but one (appellant’s) of the lots were expressly subject to the general scheme created by the covenants; and that appellant purchased her lot with an understanding that it would be subject to the covenants as well.

The court further found “[w]hat a rational trier of fact could not reasonably infer, however, is that appellant’s lot was intended to be a part of the general scheme.” The Court of Special Appeals commented that the record was “devoid of an explanation of why her lot was not similarly burdened” and found that Ms. Roper “has failed in meeting her burden of rebutting the presumption that her lot was not intended to be burdened.” Thus, the court concluded that Ms. Roper did not have standing and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County.

IV

A. Ms. Roper posits to this Court that a property owner whose land is not subject expressly to restrictive covenants nonetheless may enforce, under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants, restrictive covenants against a property owner whose land is subject expressly to those covenants. She further contends that she presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her property was intended to be subject to Spring Meadows’ restrictive covenants and that the developer’s more contemporary testimony at trial in this matter ²⁵¹ should not be determinative of what the developer’s intent was at the time of conveyance and recordation. Petitioner suggests that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants exists “to provide a measure of protection for those who bought lots in what they reasonably expected was a general development in which all of the lots would be equally burdened and benefitted.” Schovee, 356 Md. at 107 , 737 A.2d at 586 . Although the “typical” case arises when a developer fails to include restrictions in one or more subsequent deeds and those buyers proceed to use their property in a manner not allowed by the restrictions, 356 Md. at 108 , 737 A.2d at 586 , Ms. Roper contends that the doctrine nonetheless applies to her situation.

Although Petitioner, in her brief, walks us through application of the five factors outlined in Schovee , we need focus only on the fourth factor (lot sought to be subjected to the restriction was intended to be part of the general scheme) as it is the main object of Ms. Camuso’s challenge to the attempted application of the doctrine. Satisfaction of the first element, that a common owner subdivided a property into a number of lots for sale; the second element, grantor’s intent to create a general scheme to restrict all of the land in a subdivision; the third element, that the vast majority of subdivided lots be burdened by the covenants reflecting the general scheme; and, the fifth element, notice of the covenants, is not challenged seriously. The fourth factor composing the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal easement is that the property against which application of an implied covenant is sought was intended to be part of the general scheme of development. Ms. Roper naturally asserts that her lot was intended as part of Spring Meadows’ general scheme of development.

She suggests that the fact that the Spring Meadows covenants were not recorded with her deed presents “opposing implications” — an implied intent that the grantor intended to include all of the land in the development to the same restrictions versus an implied intent that land not burdened expressly not be subject to the ²⁵² development’s restrictions. Therefore, she urges consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine whether her lot was intended to be part of the general scheme. Ms. Roper enumerates the following facts supporting an intent to subject her property to the covenants: —Petitioner’s Deed contained the phrase, “Subject to covenants and restrictions of record.” —The developer, Miller, gave Petitioner a copy of the Spring Meadows covenants at closing. —Miller designed Spring Meadows as a residential community of open spaces with panoramic views. —Miller also planned Spring Meadows as an equestrian community with bridle paths, i.e., easements running along the rear of many lots, including Petitioner’s. —The Architectural Review Committee, in letters dated 5 October 1992 and 1 July 1993, expressed the intent that Petitioner’s property conform to the Spring Meadows covenants. —Mr. Miller expressed his opinion that Petitioner’s property was subject to the Covenants. —Petitioner believed her property was subject to the Covenants. Petitioner contends that after she purchased her home, she was treated by the Architectural Control Committee, controlled by the developer, as if her property was subject to the Covenants.

In a letter dated 5 October 1992 and in a followup letter dated 1 July 1993, the Committee questioned whether Petitioner’s fence conformed to the Spring Meadows covenants. The 5 October 1992 letter read as follows: October 5,1992 Ms. Elise Foley 14801 Spring Meadows Drive Darnestown, MD 20874 Dear Ms. Foley: We are in receipt of an inquiry from a resident of Spring Meadows relating to a “picket stockade fence” and “drive ²⁵³ way post lamp lighting” being installed at your house. The inquiry questions the conformity of Spring Meadows Covenants of said fence and post lamps. I have enclosed a copy of the covenants which specify allowable building guidelines and requests for approval.

We would be happy to review any plans you have for this work and approve if in conformity with the applicable covenants. We bring this to your attention given the enforceability section of the Covenants. Please call if you have any questions. Sincerely, Allison N. Miller, III Vice President Architectural Control Committee Enclosure The follow-up letter provided: July 1,1993 Ms. Elise Foley 14801 Spring Meadows Drive Darnestown, MD 20874 Dear Ms. Foley: On October 5, 1992, we sent you a letter regarding a “picket stockade fence” and “driveway post lamp” installed on your property at the above noted address.

This letter was prompted by concerns voiced by several property owners in the Community about the conformity of the type of fence installed with the restrictive covenants that specifically state the allowable fence types that may be installed. I bring this to your attention at the request of those concerned property owners. Should you have any questions relating to this matter, please do not hesitate to call. Sincerely, Edward J. Miller, Jr. President ²⁵⁴ Architectural Control Committee Ms. Roper draws attention to the language, “several property owners,” in the 1 July 1993 letter, as evidence that her neighbors, Miller, and Respondent, considered Ms. Roper’s property to be burdened by the covenants.

Petitioner dismisses the failure to record the covenants with the deed to her lot by referring to a quotation from Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955): “That several lots were conveyed without restrictions does not of itself negative an intent that there should be a general comprehensive plan, nor is it fatal to a finding that there was such a plan.” 206 Md. at 352 , 111 A.2d at 864 . Ms. Roper’s argument continues that the community plan for open spaces and panoramic views would be defeated if she, and she alone, could erect tall fences on her property to obstruct the views of her neighbors; subdivide her lot and build additional homes on less than two acres of land; 4 and erect and rent out signs and billboards on her property in contravention of the covenants. 5 Ms. Roper concludes that to “ensure the integrity of the Spring Meadows plan of development,” her property must be subject to the covenants. Ms. Roper’s second bundle of assertions center around her contention that she presented ample evidence from her deed and extrinsic to her deed to prove that her lot was intended to be burdened by the covenants. 6 Ms. Roper insists that if her ²⁵⁵ deed itself is not sufficient evidence to show that her lot was intended to be part of a general scheme or plan of development and subject to its covenants, extrinsic evidence must be considered. For example, all of the deeds to lots in Spring Meadows, including hers, referred to the Spring Meadows covenants.

The letters from the Architectural Review Committee to Roper indicate that several property owners in Spring Meadows understood Ms. Roper’s property to be part of the general scheme, subject to the covenants, and enforceable for the benefit of all property owners in the development. Miller gave Ms. Roper a copy of the covenants at her settlement, indicating again the intent that Ms. Roper’s lot be subject to the covenants. Ms. Roper concludes that the evidence favors the inference that her lot was intended to be burdened by the covenants and she therefore has standing to enforce them. Petitioner’s final contention is that the contemporary testimony of Allison N. Miller, III, at trial should not be considered as determinative of the developer’s intent at the time of conveyance.

Although this Court has not made any definite pronouncement on the matter, we stated in Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224, 230 , 111 A.2d 590, 592 (1955), in holding that evidence outside a deed could be considered in deciding issues involving restrictive covenants, An inference which appears with sufficient clearness from any source should be accepted. To this one reservation should be made, however. It may be questioned whether present testimony by one of the developers as to his meaning and purpose in inserting the covenant in the conveyances is receivable in evidence to support or defeat the contentions of purchasers of lots [ ] (Emphasis added), ²⁵⁶ Ms. Roper further asserts that “it is not always the purpose in the grantor’s mind that must be carried out. From expressions used, [and] inducements extended[,] the law determines rights and obligations and not from subsequently disclosed mental operations to the contrary.” Turner, 206 Md. at 352, 111 A.2d at 863 (emphasis added).

She contends that the purposes of the covenants would not be furthered by focusing on the developer’s present expression without considering all other relevant evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence. B. Ms. Camuso asserts that the appropriate standard of review for this Court is found in Maryland Rule 8-131(c) which provides for review of the trial court’s judgment on both the law and the evidence. 7 Under this standard, the trial court’s judgment may not be set aside unless the trial court made an error of law or if its judgment on the evidence was clearly erroneous. Ms. Camuso urges that the trial court did not make any errors of law and that the trial court’s factual findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. Camuso contends that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed because both the Court of Special Appeals and the trial court properly found that, even if the doctrine of negative reciprocal covenants were available to her, Ms. Roper failed to prove that she had standing to enforce the covenants. 8 Ms. Camuso does not argue that Spring Meadows was ²⁵⁷ not intended to be developed according to a common plan, but that Ms. Roper’s lot was not intended to be part of that plan.

Ms. Camuso reiterates the intermediate appellate court’s reasoning that there existed an initial presumption that the covenants did not apply to her lot and Ms. Roper failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. Respondent claims that the evidence shows that Ms. Roper failed to demonstrate that the common grantor intended her land to be burdened by the covenants as part of a uniform scheme of development. The evidence showing that Miller apparently recorded the Spring Meadows covenants concurrently with the rest of the deeds in the community, but not with Ms. Roper’s deed, is itself conclusive evidence that Ms. Roper’s lot was not intended to be burdened by the covenants, according to Respondent. She relies on Schovee to conclude that the use of recorded declarations normally would be conclusive as to whether a parcel was burdened by a covenant. 356 Md. at 113 , 737 A.2d at 589 .

Although noting an exception recognized by this Court permitting application of the doctrine in cases where the developer “acted inconsistently with its exclusion [of a particular lot from the recorded covenants] and, through its conduct, afforded a basis to apply the doctrine,” 356 Md. at 103 , 737 A.2d at 584 , Ms. Camuso claims that the record in this matter is devoid of any evidence of such conduct. She suggests that the mere fact that Ms. Roper received a copy of the covenants with her deed simply indicates that the developer wanted her to be aware of them and was not an assertion that her lot was intended to be burdened. Ms. Camuso further argues that Maryland law requires that covenants be construed based on the intent of the parties as expressed in the written instrument. The only intention of the parties that may be inferred from the deeds and covenants at issue in this case, according to Ms. Camuso, is that the Spring Meadows covenants govern Ms. Camuso’s lot, but do not apply to Ms. Roper’s lot.

The documentary evidence pointed to by Ms. Camuso in support of her contentions is corroborated, in her view, by the ²⁵⁸ testimony of Allison N. Miller, III: only grantees who had the covenants recorded as to their property were entitled to enforce the covenants. Analyzing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, Respondent argues it would be impossible to reach any conclusion other than that the covenants do not apply to Ms. Roper’s lot and she therefore does not have standing to enforce them. Ms. Camuso continues by disputing the persuasiveness of the evidence proffered by Ms. Roper to support the contention that there was an intent to subject her lot to the covenants. First, she argues that the fact that Ms. Roper’s deed references the covenants is irrelevant as the covenants themselves were not recorded with the deed to her lot.

Second, she suggests that the copy of the covenants conveyed to Ms. Roper reflected an intent to inform her of the restrictions imposed on the other members of the community, but not impose them upon her. Third, the community plan for open spaces with panoramic views is also unavailing, according to Ms. Camuso, and does not imply that Ms. Roper’s lot was burdened by the covenants. Fourth, the letters from the developer, in the name of the Architectural Review Committee and sent to Ms. Roper in 1992 and 1993, suggest that the developer wanted her to comply with the covenants, but did not imply that she was legally bound to do so. That the developer never filed a legal action against Ms. Roper undercuts Petitioner’s argument that the developer believed she was bound by the covenants.

Ms. Camuso notes Mr. Miller’s testimony that he did not know whether Ms. Roper was subject to the covenants. She contends that Ms. Roper’s argument that his testimony should not be relied on to defeat her contentions as a lot purchaser, under Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224 , 111 A.2d 590 , is not preserved for appellate review because she did not object to his testimony at trial. Penultimately, Ms. Camuso argues that Ms. Roper’s claim for equitable relief is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, her failure to do ■ equity, and the doctrine of comparative hardship. Respondent claims that under Maryland law ²⁵⁹ [t]he maxim that “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands” closes the doors of a court of equity to any person who has violated any of the fundamental principles of equity relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.

The doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. While equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.... Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the application of the maxim by the chancellor. Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md. 136, 142 , 43 A.2d 193, 197 (1945).

In this case, Ms. Camuso argues that Ms. Roper does not have clean hands because she trespassed on Ms. Camuso’s lot numerous times and destroyed branches on her trees. Ms. Camuso also alleges that Ms. Roper continuously violated the same covenants she charges Ms. Camuso with violating since 1992. Maryland law also requires “she who seeks equity must do equity” and there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Roper is prepared to remove or reduce the height of her fence to make it comply with the Spring Meadows covenants. See Funger v. Mayor and Council of Somerset, 244 Md. 141 , 151— 52, 223 A.2d 168, 174 (1966).

Ms. Camuso finally contends that we should affirm the judgment under the doctrine of comparative hardship which provides that a court may decline to issue an injunction where the hardship and inconvenience which would result from the injunction is greatly disproportionate to the harm to be remedied. Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 396-97 , 761 A.2d 899, 912 (2000). The relief requested by Petitioner would require Ms. Camuso to destroy sixty-five Leyland Cypress trees and entail a significant expense.

Denying the relief would simply mean that Ms. Roper’s view on one side of her property is obscured by the trees. Thus, ²⁶⁰ granting the injunctive relief sought by Ms. Roper would impose a far greater, hardship on Ms. Camuso than denying that relief would impose on Ms. Roper. V. A. The issues before this Court arise from the trial judge’s disposition of Ms. Roper’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The standard of review of an action tried without a jury is clear.

Rule 8-131(c) provides that the judgment of the trial court is not to be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. See supra n. 7. We expressed the appropriate standard of review of dispositions of injunctive relief requests in Urban Site Venture II Ltd. P’ship v. Levering Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 340 Md. 223 , 665 A.2d 1062 (1995): Both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, when reviewing a case tried without a jury, must “review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Maryland Rule 8-131(c)---- [W]e must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and decide not whether the trial judge’s conclusions of fact were correct, but only whether they were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 340 Md. at 229-30 , 665 A.2d at 1065 (internal citations omitted).

Trial courts are granted broad discretionary authority to issue equitable relief. State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Talbot Co., 370 Md. 115, 127 , 803 A.2d 527, 534 (2002). We stated in Colandrea that because “[t]he trial court ordinarily has the discretion to grant or deny a request for injunctive relief in general equity matters ... that decision is reviewed by this Court under an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” 361 Md. at 394 , 761 A.2d at 911 . B. The doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants developed in order to provide protection for purchasers buying lots in what they reasonably expected was a general ²⁶¹ development in which all of the lots would be equally burdened and benefitted.

Our decisions in Schovee and Turner provide the substantive history of the development of this doctrine in Maryland law. The seminal prerequisite for asserting that an implied negative reciprocal covenant exists is a common grant- or who has a general plan of development for the land. If a general plan of development exists establishing certain restrictions on property use, those restrictions could be enforced in equity. Adams, 206 Md. at 229-30 , 111 A.2d at 592 .

We stated in Turner that “[t]he jurisdiction of equity to enforce certain rights in respect of land is not necessarily dependant upon technicalities which are so important at law.” 206 Md. at 345-46, 111 A.2d at 860. A court’s primary interest in equity is to give effect to the actual intent of the grantor. In such context, we do so by looking not only to language in deeds, but variously to matters extrinsic to related written documents, including conduct, conversation, and correspondence. We stated in Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 489 , 41 A.2d 479, 483-84 (1945): The intention to adopt a general plan of development with restrictions may be indicated in different ways.

When it is intended to adopt such a general plan, the simplest method is to include all of the restrictions in every deed, and to state that they bind not only the property conveyed, but also the property retained, and that they are placed upon the property for the benefit of the owners of all parts of it. In Schovee , we observed that the Maryland cases considering implied restrictions on land retained by a common grantor have turned on two key inquiries: whether (1) there was a general plan of development, and (2) if so, the retained land was intended to be a part of the development. 356 Md. at 106 , 737 A.2d at 585 . We stated in McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 128 , 197 A. 580, 584-85 (1938): [I]f in such a case it appears that it was the intention of the grantors that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan of development and use which should affect