Rosado v. State

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In a court trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Hargrove, J., presiding), the appellant, Louis Rosado, was convicted of assault with intent to murder and the use of a handgun in a crime of violence. Sentences were imposed, and it is from these judgments that this appeal was filed. Sylvester Ferguson, the alleged victim, testified that on April 29, 1975, he was walking down a street in Baltimore City with a friend when the appellant ran out of an alley and shot him twice.

He indicated that a few days earlier he had had a discussion with the appellant in which he protested the relationship between the appellant and the victim’s wife. He denied having a weapon at the time of the altercation. The hospital records, admitted over objection, indicated that Ferguson had been shot twice in the abdomen — one bullet lodging on the right side and the other on the left side. The appellant took the stand and testified that Ferguson had ordered him to stay away from his wife.

On the day of the altercation he was en route to his grandmother’s house when Ferguson ran out from behind a car and began shooting at him. He ran at Ferguson who dropped his gun and ran. Rosado picked up the gun and chased Ferguson, firing two shots at him during the pursuit. He stated he did not know whether Ferguson was hit by the shots which he fired.

The case was then submitted to the trial court which ruled that the appellant’s version of the incident was incredible to the court, and that the physical facts demonstrated by the hospital records were inconsistent with the appellant’s testimony. The court further ruled that the appellant’s own testimony negated the theory of self-defense. On the basis of these conclusions the Court found the appellant guilty and imposed sentence. The appellant has raised four issues to be considered by this Court.

Initially, he contends that the trial court abused ⁴³² its discretion in unduly limiting the scope of cross-examination of the prosecuting witness as to his attempt to have the charges against the appellant withdrawn. We agree that this was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and shall reverse. The transcript reflects the following colloquy between the trial court and counsel. “Q. Since this has happened, have you personally gone to the Eastern Police Station and indicated to anybody there — MR. FLEISCHMANN: Objection.

MR. LEVINSON: I haven’t finished my question. THE COURT: I can anticipate it. It is an improper question.

That is not his function. MR. LEVINSON: Well, if Your Honor please, I think it might not be his function with respect to a charge brought by the State, but I think it can bring out the demeanor of the witness with respect to the crime that we are talking about. It goes to credibility also.

THE COURT: Well, how can it go to credibility? MR. LEVINSON: Well, if the man — if you are anticipating the question that I wanted to ask him that he wanted to drop the charges in this matter immediately after it happened — THE COURT: It is not relevant. MR.

LEVINSON: I take exception. THE COURT: It is not relevant. It is not his function to drop the charges. That’s the State’s function solely.” It is, of course, a well-settled legal principle that the extent of cross-examination is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.

Williams v. State, 15 Md. App. 320 , 290 A. 2d 542 (1972); Jenkins v. State, 14 Md. App. 1 , 285 A. 2d 667 (1971); Long v. State, 7 Md. App. 256 , 254 A. 2d 707 (1969). ⁴³³ Where, however, the