Rosenzwog v. Gould

Constable, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from a decree passed decreeing specific performance of a contract made by the appellant for the purchase from the appellee of a ground rent issuing out of property located in Baltimore City. The bill alleged that the appellee acquired title through one James H. Corrigan, substituted trustee of the trust estate created by the will of Samuel Hubbell, who died in 1836, leaving surviving him as his heirs at law and next of kin a widow, Sarah C. Hub-bell, who died in 1880, and a daughter Rachel, who intermarried with one Barnard; that the daughter Rachel had one child, Kate G. Barnard, who married one Gaspari; that Kate G. Gaspari died in 1911, without descendants and prior to the death of her mother, the daughter of the testator, in 1915. Shortly after the death of Rachel E. Barnard her executors filed a petition in the equity case, in which years prior the Superior Court had assumed jurisdiction over the Samuel Hubbell trust estate, asking the Court to decree as to whom the trust estate should go, that is, to the legatees under a will left by the said Rachel E. Barnard or to the heirs at law of the brother and sisters of the testator, Samuel ²¹¹ Hfibbell, who had been named in his will to receive the principal of the trust estate in the event of the death of his daughter Rachel without descendants.

To this petition all of the legatees under the will of Rachel E. Barnard and all1 of the descendants of the deceased brother and sisters of' Samuel Hubbell, who were entitled by descent or otherwise to the estate of their respective parents, filed answers. Upon submission of the case to the Court, it was decreed that, the daughter Rachel had but a life estate, and the trustee was directed upon request being made by the descendants of the brother and sisters, all of whom were sui juris, to sell the property and distribute the proceeds among them. Said request was filed, and the property duly sold to the appellee and said sale duly reported to and ratified and confirmed, and a distribution of the trust estate made in conformity to the decree, and no appeal taken from the decree. The answer filed by the appellant admitted all the allegations of facts contained in the bill, but alleged that the decree authorizing the sale and distribution under the same was invalid, for want of proper parties before the Court.

The case was then heard on bill and answer. This case plainly comes within the thoroughly settled doctrine applicable to collateral attacks upon titles obtained by purchasers at sales under decrees of a Court of Equity. The rule is well stated in Long v. Long, 62 Md. 33 , as follows: “With respect to the jurisdiction and power of the County Court to pass the decree, under which the sale was made, we can entertain no doubt. The clause of the will forbidding the sale or lease of the property until the occurrence of certain events, did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court.

The Court was one of general equity jurisdiction, and the subject matter and the parties fell within the limits and scope of that jurisdiction. The object of the application was, in the first place, to have one trustee removed and another appointed in his stead; and, in the second place, to have real property which was held in trust sold for the interest and ²¹² comm on benefit of all parties concerned. These were objects clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court; and while it may have been.error to authorize the sale, in view of the special provision of this will, yet that was matter of construction upon which the Court was competent to pass, and for any error committed in that respect, the proper remedy was either by bill of review in the same Court, or an appeal to a Court of Keview. The general and well settled rule of law in all such cases is, that when the proceedings are collaterally brought in question, and it appears on their face that the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of this Cburt, they were not impeachable for mere errors or irregularities that may be apparent.

Such errors and irregularities must be corrected by some direct proceeding, either "in the Court to set them aside, or on appeal. If, however, there be a total want of jurisdiction, either of parties or subject matter, the proceedings are void and can confer no right, and will be rejected, though the objection be taken to them in a collateral