Ross v. CHAKRABARTI

KENNEY, J. Daniel Hubert Ross, appellant, filed a pro se complaint against GEICO Indemnity Company and two of its employees, Chandrima Chakrabarti, a staff attorney, and Todd Drake, a claims examiner, appellees (collectively, GEICO). He alleged that GEICO “unconstitutionally abridged [his] freedom of expression and association” by directly settling an automobile collision claim with a person whom Ross, although not admitted to the Bar, was attempting to represent as an attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney. 1 The Circuit Court for Prince ⁵²⁹ George’s County dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling that the power of attorney did not preclude GEICO from dealing directly with the claimant and did not permit Ross to perform legal services that amount to the unauthorized practice of law. In his brief, Ross asserts that this Court “has the power to determine whether preventing non-attorneys from providing information or services under power of attorney serves the public interest.” In his view, “a prohibition on power of attorney services does not serve the public interest.” To the extent that the issue is before us, we disagree and reject Ross’s contention that he has constitutionally protected “rights” under the power of attorney in question to practice law. In sum, and as we explain below, we hold that the circuit court did not err in its determination that Ross’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted to appellant against GEICO.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The circuit court set forth the following summary, which based on our review of the record is an accurate account of the relevant events alleged in Mr. Ross’s complaint and accompanying exhibits. On February 7, 2008, Leroy Skipper granted a power of attorney to Plaintiff Daniel H. Ross. (Compl. ¶ 5.) On March 14, 2008, Plaintiff, who is not authorized to practice law (Compl. ¶ 10.), filed a Complaint on behalf of Skipper in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County, Case No. 85222008. (Compl.

Ex. J.) That Complaint alleged that Skipper’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by Neion T. Gaines on August 18, 2007 causing damages to Skipper’s vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4.) The matter was transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No. CAL 08-09993. (Compl.

Ex. E.) Plaintiff subsequently filed several pleadings on behalf of Skipper, including motions for sanctions and default. (Compl. ¶ 16.) On July 2, 2008, Defendant Chakrabarti, a ⁵³⁰ staff attorney for GEICO Indemnity Company, insurer for Neion T. Gaines, filed an Answer to the underlying Complaint. (Compl.

Ex. H.) In addition, Defendants alerted the Attorney Grievance Commission of the Maryland Bar that Plaintiff had filed an action in the District Court of Maryland under a Power of Attorney for another individual. (Compl. ¶ 23.) In a letter dated July 10, 2008, Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, wrote to Plaintiff advising him “[t]hat the activity on your part constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.” (Compl. Ex.

G.) Hirshman warned Plaintiff that there “is also a criminal penalty for one engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” (Id.) On July 15, 2008, the Honorable Albert W. Northrup issued an Order as follows: ORDERED, that under Maryland Rule 2-131 Daniel H. Ross appears to have no standing at this time to bring suit on behalf of Leroy Skipper. That Rule states “an individual may enter an appearance by an attorney or in proper person.” A person with “power of attorney” is not authorized to represent an individual or file suit on his behalf and sign pleadings on his behalf. The individual may file suit on his own behalf or have a licensed attorney do so on his behalf. Therefore, any motions filed by Daniel Ross are not properly before this court at this time.

(Compl. Ex. B.) On August 1, 2008, Plaintiff and Skipper went to the office of defense counsel, Defendant, and while there, Defendant settled Skipper’s claim with Skipper, agreeing to and signing a Notice of Dismissal of the underlying action, which was later filed in this Court on or about August 5, 2008. (Compl. ¶¶ 28, 33.) Plaintiff now files a separate civil action against Defendants alleging a conspiracy to violate his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise or enjoy powers of attorney.

Mr. Ross’s complaint sets forth three claims, all of which are labeled “Conspiracy to Interfere with Constitutional Rights.” Although overlapping and repetitive, Ross’s griev- ⁵³¹ anees essentially arise from GEICO’s settlement with Skipper on August 1, 2008, Bar Counsel’s admonishment against his unauthorized practice of law, and the circuit court’s order applying Maryland Rule 2-131 in declining to consider any pleadings that he filed in the lawsuit he brought on Skipper’s behalf. • In “CLAIM ONE,” Ross alleges a conspiracy by GEICO “from approximately March 14, 2008, to approximately August 1, 2008,” to deprive him “of his rights to exercise and enjoy powers of attorney,” thereby “reducing] Plaintiff to a badge of slavery so that, on purpose, and in effect, his right to exercise and enjoy powers of attorney would be arbitrarily and capriciously denied on account of money and status.” As “OVERT ACTS” proving this conspiracy, Ross cites GEICO’s failure to recognize his right “to settle the principal’s claims of damages and losses” and the circuit court’s July 15, 2008 order denying him “access to the Maryland Circuit Court on equal terms[.]” • In “CLAIM TWO,” Ross alleges that GEICO complained to the Attorney Grievance Commission in order “to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate [him] in the free exercise and enjoyment of his powers of attorney,” and that by “failing] to repudiate” the circuit court’s July 15, 2008 order “denying [him] equal access to the Maryland Circuit Court,” GEICO was “acting under color of’ Maryland law to “reduce [him] to a badge of slavery by which [GEICO] again demonstrated that this non-barred plaintiff had no powers of attorney’s rights which they need respect on August 1, 2008 to settle the principal’s claims as pro se agent.” • In “CLAIM THREE,” Ross alleges that GEICO “misapplied Maryland Rule 2-131 to discourage and curtail [his] civil rights activities.” According to Ross, Rule 2-131, “as construed and misapplied by defendants to the plaintiff,” “promotes a pecuniary monopoly that criminalizes freedom of expression and petition in the circuit court,” “serves no public interest,” violated his First Amendment rights “by unduly inhibiting protected freedom of expression and petition against corporate and governmental intrusion,” and ⁵³² violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by barring only “person[s] similarly situated [i.e., any plaintiff acting under powers of attorney] and proscribing] individious discrimination against persons with powers of attorney.” The GEICO defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss Mr. Ross’s complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Ross failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing, the circuit court agreed, ruling in a written opinion that “a power of attorney does not authorize a lay person to practice law,” that any conspiracy alleged by Ross “does not rise to the level of a political and social expression” that is constitutionally protected, and that he “lacks standing to sue” on the ground that the claimant had “freedom to choose” him as his representative in court. Ross noted this timely appeal challenging the judgment of dismissal. DISCUSSION If the circuit court’s decision that Ross’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted was legally correct, we must affirm it.

See RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643-44 , 994 A.2d 430 (2010). We review the complaint on the basis of its averments and the exhibits referenced in and attached to it. See id. Like the circuit court, we must assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences therefrom, and view such allegations in the light most favorable to Ross, as the party opposing the motion.

See id. at 643 , 994 A.2d 430 . Dismissal is appropriate “if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.” Id. In his brief to this Court, Mr. Ross asserts four arguments stemming from his basic complaint that he was not permitted to act as Mr. Skipper’s “attorney.” 2 As pleaded in ⁵³³ the complaint, Ross believes that the power of attorney gave him a “right” to act as Skipper’s “agent” for all purposes related to his claim arising out of his motor vehicle accident with GEICO’s insured, including litigation, and that GEICO’s direct settlement of Skipper’s claim violated Ross’s “right” to perform such “services” under the power of attorney. According to Ross’s complaint, GEICO and its two employees engaged in a conspiracy that resulted not only in this wrongful settlement of Skipper’s claim, but also in Bar Counsel’s warning against his unauthorized practice of law and in the circuit court’s refusal to consider any pleadings he filed in the prior lawsuit brought on Skipper’s behalf.

In our view, Ross’s complaint rests on the factual and legal fallacy that the power of attorney gave him unrestricted exclusive authority to act on Skipper’s behalf with respect to matters including “Insurance Transactions” and all “Claims and Litigation.” Despite efforts of opposing counsel, Bar Counsel, and the circuit court to explain to Mr. Ross that this power of attorney does not give him the right to dispense legal advice or to appear in court on Mr. Skipper’s behalf, Ross either misunderstands or mischaracterizes his “powers” and “rights” under this document. The power of attorney, by its own terms, gave Ross the right to act on Skipper’s behalf only “to the extent that [Skipper was] permitted by law to act through an agent.” ⁵³⁴ (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the law does not permit Skipper