Rovin v. State

Valerie Rovin v. State of Maryland, No. 19, September Term, 2023, Opinion by Booth, J. MARYLAND COMMON LAW CLAIMS OF FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, AND ASSOCIATED CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARISING UNDER ARTICLES 26 AND 24 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant for violating the juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article § 9-305 (2021 Repl. Vol.). At the conclusion of Petitioner’s bench trial, the circuit court acquitted her based upon its interpretation of the statute.

Petitioner brought a civil suit against a sheriff’s deputy, alleging that by filing an application for statement of charges, and causing her arrest pursuant to a warrant, he was civilly liable under the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and that he violated her rights under Articles 24, 26, and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The deputy filed the application for statement of charges after consulting with the State’s Attorney’s Office and relying on the determination by that office that Petitioner’s conduct violated the statute. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on the common law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, and on the claims alleging violations of Article 24 and Article 26 arising from the same conduct, under circumstances in which the deputy arrested the plaintiff pursuant to a warrant that was issued by a neutral judicial officer. When an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial officer.

The issuance of a warrant by a neutral issuing judge or judicial officer creates a strong presumption that it was objectively reasonable for police officers to believe that there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on a lack of probable cause faces a heavy burden. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012). Although a warrant is not an absolute shield, civil liability will arise only in circumstances in which “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Id. at 547 . In order to overcome the presumption of objective reasonableness that attaches to a warrant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the judicial officer wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

The application of these principles is based upon the “sound presumption” that the judicial officer is more qualified than the law enforcement officer to make a probable cause determination. In addition to the strong presumption of probable cause that attaches to a warrant, when an officer obtains and follows legal advice from a prosecutor when applying for a statement of charges after presenting a full and fair disclosure of everything that was presented to the officer, there is “further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.” See Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553 . Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on counts alleging false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), and violations of Article 26 (Count VI) and Article 24 (Count IV) (as that count pertains to conduct alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution). Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer after the deputy who obtained the warrant sought legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office.

As a matter of law, Petitioner cannot overcome the strong presumption of probable cause that attached to the warrant in the circumstances presented. The Court determined that the application for statement of charges was based upon an objectively reasonable interpretation of the juror intimidation statute, and thus probable cause and legal justification existed for Petitioner’s arrest and imprisonment. MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS — ARTICLE 40. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on Petitioner’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights under Article 40 (Count V) and Article 24 (as it related to the free speech claim).

Based upon its examination of the application for statement of charges that was presented to the neutral judicial officer, the Supreme Court held that the judicial officer had probable cause to believe that Petitioner’s speech constituted a “true threat” and fell outside the protections of Article 40. The Court held that the presence of probable cause defeated any Article 40 claim arising from Petitioner’s arrest and imprisonment. MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS — ARTICLE 24 — CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUROR INTIMIDATION STATUTE. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on Petitioner’s Article 24 (Count IV) claim to the extent that she alleged that Maryland’s juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article § 9-305 (2021 Repl.

Vol.), is unconstitutionally vague. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No.: C-22-CV-17-000326 Argued: February 6, 2024 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 19 September Term, 2023 VALERIE ROVIN v. STATE OF MARYLAND Fader, C.J., Watts, *Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Watts, J., dissents. Filed: August 15, 2024 *Hotten, J., now a Senior Justice, participated in Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal the hearing and conference of this case while an Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State active member of this Court.

After being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Government Article) this document is authentic. 2025.02.25 Article IV, § 3A, she also participated in the 14:26:44 -05'00' decision and adoption of this opinion. Gregory Hilton, Clerk This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In this instance, we are asked to determine whether the State may be subject to civil liability for an arrest under circumstances in which, after interviewing a victim, a deputy obtained legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office that there was probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a statutory criminal offense, a judicial officer found probable cause to issue a warrant, and thereafter a trial judge acquitted the individual of the charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question. The issues presented in this case arise in the context of Petitioner, Valerie Rovin’s, arrest and prosecution for violating the juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article (“CR”) § 9-305 (2021 Repl.

Vol.). Ms. Rovin, upset by a jury’s verdict rendered against her daughter in a criminal trial, went to the jury foreperson’s workplace on the same day to confront him about the verdict. According to the foreperson, Ms. Rovin yelled at him, acted in an aggressive and threatening manner, and told him, among other things, that she was going to have an individual from Nicaragua “take care of him.” The foreperson immediately reported this exchange to the Sheriff’s Office. The deputy sheriff who investigated the matter consulted with prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, who advised the deputy that Ms. Rovin’s conduct violated the juror intimidation statute.

Thereafter, the deputy applied for a statement of charges. A District Court Commissioner determined that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Ms. Rovin’s arrest. At the close of the State’s case at Ms. Rovin’s bench trial, her counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not constitute juror intimidation under the statute because Ms. Rovin’s daughter’s criminal trial had concluded, and thus the foreperson was no longer serving on a jury and his service had concluded. The State disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s narrow interpretation of the statute and argued that the foreperson’s jury service was for the period of his summons, and that as a result of Ms. Rovin’s actions, the foreperson was dismissed from his jury service early.

The circuit court determined that although Ms. Rovin’s actions were “very improper” and may have been evidence of juror “retaliation,” her actions did not fit within the conduct prohibited by the juror intimidation statute, and it therefore entered a judgment of acquittal. Ms. Rovin then filed a civil suit against, among others, the State’s Attorney and Assistant State’s Attorney who advised the deputy and subsequently prosecuted her, and the deputy who applied for the charges and sought a warrant for her arrest. She asserted that the defendants, through their conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution, committed common law torts and violated her rights under various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. After the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the matter was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, this Court granted certiorari to determine, among other things, whether absolute immunity barred the claims.

With respect to the claims against the prosecutors, we held that the circuit court was correct in entering summary judgment in their favor because they were entitled to absolute immunity. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317 (2021). We determined that the immunity extended not only to the prosecutors’ decision to prosecute, but also to their conduct in advising the deputy prior to the filing of the application for statement of charges. Id. at 355–56.

Although we held that the State could not be civilly liable for the actions of the prosecutors 2 (and after declining to extend prosecutorial immunity to the deputy’s conduct), for the reasons discussed more fully herein, we declined to decide whether the State could be civilly liable for the deputy’s conduct in applying for charges and obtaining an arrest warrant under these circumstances. We remanded the case to the circuit court. On remand, the circuit court entered summary judgment in the State’s favor, ruling that “neither the [deputy nor the sheriff] can be civilly liable for [Ms. Rovin’s] arrest pursuant to a warrant based upon a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest even though that determination was later held by a trial court to be based upon an error of law.” After the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment in the State’s favor, Ms. Rovin filed a petition for writ of certiorari. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I Background A. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin’s Daughter The proceedings in this case arose after Ms. Rovin’s daughter was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and related traffic offenses in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County in June 2015. 1 Ms. Rovin’s daughter received a sentence that included jail time. Ms. Rovin attended a portion of her daughter’s trial. On the same day the jury 1 State v. Bailey, No. 22-K-15-000171 (Md. Cir. Ct. Wicomico County, June 16, 2015). 3 convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter, Ms. Rovin located the jury foreperson at his workplace and confronted him about the verdict. According to Ms. Rovin’s complaint, she had met the foreperson approximately one year prior to the trial.

They discussed the fact that they had the same last name, as well as the possibility that they shared a common relative, Bill Rovin, who had moved to Nicaragua. Ms. Rovin indicated, however, that to her knowledge, she and the foreperson were not related. The complaint also alleges that the foreperson and one of Ms. Rovin’s daughters were Facebook friends. 2 After Ms. Rovin left the foreperson’s workplace, he reported the incident to the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook responded to the call.

Ms. Rovin disputes what was said during her conversation with the foreperson. She does not, however, appear to dispute what the foreperson told the deputy. The foreperson reported that Ms. Rovin behaved erratically and aggressively, caused a commotion, and appeared to be outraged by the foreperson’s decision to convict Ms. Rovin’s daughter. The foreperson told Deputy Cook that Ms. Rovin invaded his personal space to the point that he felt very “uncomfortable and threatened.” The foreperson also stated that Ms. Rovin told him that she would have “Bill Rovin” “take care of him[.]” The foreperson did not know Bill Rovin, and when he asked who Bill Rovin was, Ms. Rovin told him that Bill 2 Ms. Rovin’s daughter who was convicted of the DUI and related traffic offenses was not the same daughter with whom Mr. Rovin was Facebook friends.

Ms. Rovin does not suggest that the foreperson knew Ms. Rovin’s daughter who was convicted. 4 Rovin worked in Nicaragua and had people who could “take care of” him. The foreperson interpreted this as a threat and alerted the police. B. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin Officers of the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office consulted with the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office and were advised that Ms. Rovin’s conduct constituted juror intimidation under CR § 9-305 and that she should be charged accordingly. Under that statute, “[a] person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State or of the United States in the performance of the person’s official duties.” CR § 9-305(a).

Around the same time, the foreperson applied for a peace order against Ms. Rovin and gave sworn testimony in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Wicomico County. He stated that he was a member of a jury that convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter and that Ms. Rovin came to his workplace and threatened to harm to him. Specifically, he testified that Ms. Rovin threatened that she would have “somebody come in from out of town” to harm him and that “she told [him] she was going to contact somebody who was going to send people . . . to take care of [him] . . . people from Nicaragua where Bill Rovin lives.” The judge explained to the foreperson that he was unable to obtain a peace order because the statutory requirements were not satisfied. 3 The foreperson testified that the State’s Attorney’s Office had advised him to apply for the peace order. The judge informed the 3 Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 3-1503 (1984, 2021 Repl.

Vol., 2022 Supp.) identifies the grounds for which a peace order may be obtained. 5 foreperson that “there’s a statute, it’s a criminal offense to intimidate a juror[,]” and “if [Ms. Rovin] has done what you say she has done, that may very well be a criminal offense.” After that hearing, Deputy Cook applied for a statement of charges against Ms. Rovin. Among other things, the application recited the information provided by the foreperson. It also stated that the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office had consulted with the State’s Attorney’s Office, and that office “believed” that this was a case of juror intimidation under CR § 9-305(a) “and should be charged accordingly.” The application further stated that the foreperson “was assigned as a [j]uror for the [Circuit Court for] Wicomico County for the month of June 2015 and had to be discharged from further duty as a result of this incident.” A District Court Commissioner agreed that there was probable cause that Ms. Rovin violated CR § 9-305 and, consequently, issued a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Rovin was arrested on June 18, 2015.

She was held for one day, after which she was placed under house arrest. In July 2015, the State’s Attorney’s Office filed a criminal information charging Ms. Rovin with intimidating a juror in violation of CR § 9-305(a) and second- degree assault. Thereafter, Ms. Rovin remained on house arrest for approximately four months until her trial commenced. Ms. Rovin was tried in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County.

The record in this case includes only very limited portions of the transcript of her criminal trial. 4 4 Specifically, the record includes two pages of the foreperson’s testimony, counsels’ legal arguments on the defense’s motion for acquittal at the end of the State’s case, and the court’s ruling on the motion. The transcript reflects that the State called 6 The foreperson testified that Ms. Rovin came to his workplace “in an extreme state of agitation[,]” started yelling at him, and asked him how he could “put another Rovin in jail[.]” The foreperson testified that the building included a preschool program and that there were “probably over 100 kids in the building at that time, so [he] wanted to escort her away” from the public area and asked her to come to his office. After being escorted into the foreperson’s office (which had a double glass door, making the area visible to the public), the foreperson testified that Ms. Rovin “continued yelling” at him “for putting her daughter in jail[.]” According to the foreperson, the yelling continued, and Ms. Rovin told him that “Bill Rovin . . . in Nicaragua” would take care of him. The foreperson testified that after Ms. Rovin left his office, he googled Bill Rovin “and saw that he had business dealings in Nicaragua” and, therefore “knew in [his] mind[,] it was a valid threat.” At the close of the State’s case, Ms. Rovin moved for an acquittal, arguing that, on both the evidence presented at trial and the law, she did not commit either offense with which she was charged.

Pertaining to the second-degree assault charge, Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued that the evidence failed to prove that any threat Ms. Rovin made against the foreperson rose to the level of an imminent battery. Specifically, Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued that although his client was “yelling,” “being rude,” and that her conduct was “distasteful,” such conduct did not put the foreperson in fear of imminent offensive physical contact or harm. With respect to Ms. Rovin’s statement that “Bill Rovin from Nicaragua” would “send someone to take care of” the foreperson, defense counsel argued several witnesses, including Deputy Cook. However, those portions of the transcript are not part of this record. 7 that having someone “come from Nicaragua and take care of him” “is the antithesis of immediate and imminent.” As for the juror intimidation charge, Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued that the court should interpret the statute very narrowly, focusing on the fact that the trial had concluded when Ms. Rovin confronted the foreperson at his workplace and, therefore, her conduct could not have influenced an ongoing proceeding.

Ms. Rovin’s counsel argued: What [the juror intimidation] statute says is a person may not by threat, force or corrupt means try to influence, intimidate or impede a juror in the performance of the person’s official duties. . . . [Here,] they had already found [Ms. Rovin’s daughter] guilty. There was not a pending judicial proceeding, no pending trial. [The foreperson] had already completed his official duty . . . and there is no way that she could have influenced that verdict, which was over. * * * She had to attempt to influence a juror in the performance of his official duties. She did not have that intent because she couldn’t have any influence on his official duties. Just because [a circuit court judge] decided that he should not serve on any future juries does not mean that my client was trying to cause that result.

She went there to criticize him for finding her daughter guilty, and according to [the foreperson] to threaten that somebody else would come and do harm. But she wasn’t trying to [affect] the outcome of the trial[.] * * * [A]t best you could consider her conduct [as] a threat of retaliation against [the foreperson] for a prior verdict. . . . She was just voicing her opinion, granted in a way she shouldn’t have, everybody knows that. But it did not amount to a crime.

I think she understands better than anybody she shouldn’t have done this, but the bottom line is she didn’t commit a crime[.] The State disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s counsel’s “extremely narrow reading” of the juror intimidation statute, which limited a juror’s “official duties” to “simply sitting on a single jury.” The State pointed out that sworn jurors are “under the [c]ourt’s subpoena for 30 days[,]” and that as a result of Ms. Rovin’s conduct, the foreperson was dismissed from 8 his official duties as a sworn juror on June 17—prior to the expiration of his juror service on June 30. The court questioned how Ms. Rovin was “trying to get this particular juror to take any action[.]” The court observed that Ms. Rovin’s conduct was “not proper,” and “shouldn’t have been done,” but expressed its view that her conduct did not appear to violate the statute. The prosecutor disagreed, stating: [B]y intending to intimidate him, which she certainly did, to stalk out, find the [foreperson’s] name . . . go there and make that threat, I think she absolutely intended to intimidate him. The natural and probable consequence . . . was that he was unable to serve the rest of the month, he couldn’t possibly be a fair juror for the rest of the month.

Whether she intended that result, the State argues, is irrelevant; it’s whether she intended to intimidate him. If she intended to intimidate him[,] she is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of her actions. In response to the court’s question as to whether Ms. Rovin intended to intimidate the foreperson in connection with his official duties as a juror, the prosecutor noted that under the testimony presented to the court, “[a] juror’s official duties extend 30 days.” The prosecutor further explained that the State’s interpretation of the statute required the court to determine whether “a reasonable juror who . . . had this occur could perform, could be reasonably expected to be fair and impartial, which is [a juror’s] official duties for the rest of the month.” After considering these arguments, the trial court agreed with Ms. Rovin’s counsel’s characterization of the evidence—that Ms. Rovin merely sought to “retaliate” against the foreperson for the prior verdict, rather than attempting to convince him to take some action to affect the verdict. The court stated that “the evidence here is of a retaliation for 9 something that was already done, which is improper, but not in violation of [CR § 9-305].” The court then granted Ms. Rovin’s motion, stating: Well, I think this is a very difficult case.

I think [Ms. Rovin’s] actions were very improper. * * * As far as the violation of [CR § 9-305], I think this should be a violation of the law to intimidate or threaten a juror for something they have already done, but that’s not what this statute does. It’s to prevent somebody from impeding an ongoing judicial process, to [a]ffect the outcome of the case, or something of that nature. It’s not to retaliate for something that a juror has done in the past. * * * I think the actions that have been testified to as to the Defendant if they are true are wrong and should not have been performed, but I don’t think they violate [CR §] 9-305, and the Court’s going to grant the Defendant’s motion. As to the second-degree assault charge, the court acquitted Ms. Rovin because “the threat of doing something to somebody at some time in the future is not by legal definition an assault.” C. Ms. Rovin’s Civil Case Against the State 1.

Rovin v. State – Part I Following her acquittal, Ms. Rovin sued the State, the prosecutors, and law enforcement officers 5 who were involved in her criminal charges and prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the defendants’ conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution gave rise to civil liability under various common law torts, and violated her rights under Article 5 In addition to the State, Ms. Rovin named the following individuals as defendants: Wicomico County State’s Attorney Matthew Maciarello, Assistant State’s Attorney Richard Brueckner, Sheriff Michael Lewis, Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook, the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office, and the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office. 10 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Specifically, the initial complaint alleged seven counts: false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV), false light invasion of privacy (Count V), defamation (Count VI), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed in an unreported opinion, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because, among other things, Ms. Rovin’s claims against some of the individual defendants required a showing of malice or gross negligence to proceed, pursuant to State personnel immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), and Ms. Rovin may have needed discovery to prove those elements. 6 Rovin v. State, No. 233, Sept. Term, 2018, 2020 WL 3265119 , at ⁹ (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. June 17, 2020). We granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court in part. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317 (2021) (“Rovin I”). 6 The Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Md. Code Ann., State Government Article (“SG”) § 12-101 et seq. (1984, 2021 Repl.

Vol., 2022 Supp), provides statutory immunity for “State personnel” from suit for any tortious act or omission committed, so long as the individual was acting within the scope of his or her public duties without malice or gross negligence. See SG § 12-105; CJ § 5-522(b). The MTCA identifies the various individuals who qualify as “State personnel,” including sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. SG § 12-101(a)(6).

The Act provides a concomitant waiver of State immunity, subject to certain monetary and other limitations, where the Act provides State personnel immunity. Under this framework, the State may be liable (up to a certain amount) when State personnel immunity applies but retains its immunity when State personnel may be liable in their individual capacities because they acted with malice or gross negligence, or because they acted outside the scope of their public duties. See SG § 12-104; CJ § 5-522. 11 Aside from the false light invasion of privacy and defamation counts, which were not before us, 7 we held that summary judgment was proper on the claims filed against the individual defendants. Concerning the claims against the State’s Attorney and Assistant State’s Attorney, we held that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in their favor because they were entitled to prosecutorial immunity—an absolute immunity—and, therefore, the State could not be held civilly liable for their actions in this case.

Rovin I, 472 Md. at 349 . We also held that the prosecutors were entitled to prosecutorial immunity not only for prosecuting Ms. Rovin, but also for their conduct in advising Deputy Cook to institute charges against her. 8 Id. at 355 . Specifically, we explained that “prosecutorial immunity applies where a prosecutor advises a law enforcement officer to file with a judicial officer an application for a statement of charges as this is an act related to the decision of whether to prosecute and an act closely associated with the prosecutor’s role in the judicial process.” Id. at 355–56. As for the claims against the law enforcement officers, Deputy Cook argued that we should extend prosecutorial immunity to his acts because he relied on the advice given by 7 After Ms. Rovin’s arrest, law enforcement officers made statements about Ms. Rovin’s arrest and her conduct.

These statements relate to Ms. Rovin’s counts for false light invasion of privacy and defamation. In Rovin I, the State did not raise in its petition for writ of certiorari that portion of the Appellate Court’s judgment reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Ms. Rovin’s counts of false light invasion of privacy and defamation. This Court’s reversal of the Appellate Court’s judgment did not extend to those counts. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 331, 334 (2021) (“Rovin I”). 8 Moreover, we made clear that, although Ms. Rovin also included both the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office and the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office as defendants in her complaint, neither office was “a legal entity subject to suit[.]” Rovin I, 472 Md. at 329 n.3; see also id. at 339 n.9. 12 the prosecutors, namely, that there was probable cause to believe that Ms. Rovin violated the juror intimidation statute.

We did not accept Deputy Cook’s invitation to extend prosecutorial immunity to law enforcement officers who consult with prosecutors, id. at 356 , observing that we had “never made any form of absolute immunity generally applicable to actions by law enforcement officers, and we decline[d] to do so [t]here[,]” id. at 362 . Although we declined to extend absolute immunity to the law enforcement officers’ conduct, we held that they were entitled to State personnel immunity under the MTCA. Id. at 330–31. Based upon her pleadings, we observed that Ms. Rovin did not allege that any of the individual defendants “acted with the malice or gross negligence required to defeat State personnel immunity.” Id. at 363 .

In the last eight pages of our opinion, we discussed an issue of first impression raised by the State—“whether liability can attach to an officer who makes an arrest based on a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct in question was criminal after conferring with prosecutors and obtaining a warrant from a District Court Commissioner.” Id. at 365 . In arguing that it should not be civilly liable in this case, the State relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), in which the Court held that there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer initiates a traffic stop on reasonable suspicion that is based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law. We discussed the State’s contentions pertaining to Heien. We also noted that in the context of common law claims for malicious prosecution, the probable cause necessary to defeat such a claim typically exists when a layperson relies upon the 13 advice of an attorney, including a prosecutor, that the conduct constitutes a crime, even if that advice is mistaken.

Id. at 367–73 nn.15–16 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 (Existence of Probable Cause) (1977), Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22 (Probable Cause to Initiate Criminal Proceedings)). After discussing these principles, we declined to apply them because they were raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 373. Instead, we returned “the case to the circuit court for a determination as to whether Heien is applicable to the circumstances of this case.” Id.

Having determined that the officers were “not entitled to absolute judicial or prosecutorial immunity[,]” we remanded the case to the circuit court, stating that “all of the claims in the complaint against the State based on the alleged actions of the officers remain[.]” Id. at 374. In a concurring opinion, Judge McDonald stated that, although he had “no problem with a disposition that sen[t] the case back to the circuit court,” he believed that the Court could address the legal issue of whether the State could be liable for an “asserted error of law” without remanding the case to the circuit court. Id. at 375 (McDonald, J., concurring). In his view, it was not the deputy’s role to second-guess the prosecutors’ legal advice to file the warrant application or the District Court Commissioner’s decision to issue the warrant, and he would have affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on that basis. 9 9 Judge McDonald observed that these claims “turn[ed] on whether the deputy sheriff who arrested Ms. Rovin was at fault for executing the arrest warrant based on an error of law.” Rovin I, 472 Md. at 375 (McDonald, J., concurring).

Judge McDonald summarized his conclusion regarding the asserted error of law in this case, stating: 14 2. Rovin v. State – Part II After the case was remanded, Ms. Rovin amended her complaint. 10 She did not modify her allegations with respect to gross negligence or malice, but she did add additional counts against the State (the sole remaining defendant) 11 thus alleging eight counts in total: false arrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), and claims under Articles 24, 40, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Counts IV, V, The asserted error of law relates to the breadth of the juror intimidation statute ([CR] § 9-305) at the time that the warrant was issued and executed. Several lawyers and judicial officers—the District Court judge in the peace order hearing, the prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, the District Court Commissioner—each opined that the facts alleged by the victim fell within the juror intimidation statute. Only the trial judge at Ms. Rovin’s criminal trial reached a different conclusion.

The basis for the trial judge’s conclusion was that the victim of the alleged intimidation had concluded his service at the trial of Ms. Rovin’s daughter, even though (as alleged in the statement of charges) he remained an active member of the jury pool at the time of the incident. That legal conclusion was a questionable interpretation of § 9-305, as the circuit court below indicated, and was never reviewed by an appellate court because, of course, the State cannot appeal an acquittal. Even if one were to conclude that the trial judge in Ms. Rovin’s criminal case was correct as to the breadth of § 9-305, it was not the role of the deputy sheriff to foresee the future and overrule the legal judgments of the State’s Attorney who authorized the prosecution and arrest and the judicial officer who ordered the arrest by issuing the warrant. Id. at 375–76 (footnote omitted). 10 Ms. Rovin’s amended complaint is now the operative complaint. 11 The new counts in Ms. Rovin’s complaint were counts V and VI, alleging violations of Article 40 and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, respectively.

Separately, Ms. Rovin omitted her original count of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 15 and VI respectively), 12 false light invasion of privacy (Count VII), and defamation (Count VIII). The State filed an answer with respect to the false light invasion of privacy and defamation counts and a second motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on the remaining counts. In its motion, the State presented briefing not only on Heien, but also on whether law enforcement officers could be civilly liable for an arrest pursuant to a warrant based upon a judicial officer’s probable cause determination. The State cited cases from this Court discussing the application of these principles in the context of false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution claims.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, reasoning that Heien’s mistake of law framework applied. The court ruled that “neither the [deputy nor the sheriff] can be civilly liable for Plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to a warrant based on a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest even though that determination was later held by a trial court judge to be based on an error of law.” Subsequently, Ms. Rovin moved to certify that order as a final judgment under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), 13 and to stay her remaining claims for false light invasion of privacy and 12 Although Ms. Rovin’s state constitutional protections mirror protections that she would have under the Federal Constitution, she has not alleged any federal violations. Recovery for federal violations arise under statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—“whereas the redress for State violations is through a common law action for damages.” DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 50 (1999). “Unlike in a § 1983 action and unlike in an action for some common law torts, neither the local government official nor a local governmental entity has available any governmental immunity in an action based on rights protected by the State Constitution.” Id. at 51 (citations omitted). Maryland Rule 2-602(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the court expressly 13 determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order 16 defamation.

In so doing, she asserted that she would suffer financial hardship if she were forced to proceed on those counts before an appellate court considered the “mistake of law” argument. The circuit court granted her motion and certified its order as an appealable final judgment. 14 Thereafter, Ms. Rovin noted an appeal. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Rovin v. State, No. 198, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 4855950 (Md. App. Ct. July 31, 2023).

The Appellate Court concluded “that like the Fourth Amendment, Article 26 tolerates an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law.” Id. at ¹⁷ . The court next concluded that there was “probable cause to arrest Ms. Rovin, based upon an objectively reasonable interpretation of the juror intimidation statute[,]” because “threatening a juror shortly after a verdict could serve part of a larger effort to undermine the verdict and secure a new trial, by causing the juror to carry out future duties while intimidated, influenced, or impeded by the threat.” Id. at ²¹ (footnote omitted). As for Ms. Rovin’s claims under Articles 24 and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights that the juror intimidation statute was unconstitutional, the court held that the statute was not void for vagueness, either facially or as applied to her conduct. Id. at ²⁴–26.

The court also determined that Ms. Rovin’s free speech rights were not violated. Finally, the Appellate Court affirmed the entry of a final judgment . . . as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties[.]” 14 In its certification order, the circuit court stated, in part, that the “remaining defamation and false light counts in Counts VII and VIII of the Amended Complaint are separate and independent from Counts I-VI” that were resolved by the court’s summary judgment order, and “that certifying the [summary judgment order] for appeal is the most judicially expeditious path forward.” 17 the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Rovin’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, because the arrest “warrant provided legal justification for Ms. Rovin’s arrest and imprisonment” and because the “officers’ construction of Section 9-305(a) was objectively reasonable.” Id. at ²⁶–27. Ms. Rovin filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted to consider whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Rovin’s claims alleging violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and common law torts in connection with her arrest. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

II Standard of Review We review the decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Gambrill v. Bd. of Ed. of Dorchester County, 481 Md. 274, 297 (2022). “We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the facts against the movant.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [] the [moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2- 501(a). “If no material facts are in dispute, we determine whether the trial judge’s ruling was legally correct.

Ordinarily, we may affirm the trial court only on the grounds upon which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment.” Gambrill, 481 Md. at 297 18 (quoting Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 608 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)). “Nonetheless, we may affirm summary judgment on a different ground if the trial court would have no discretion as to the particular issue.” Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 465 Md. 588 , 614 n.6 (2019) (quoting Young Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dustin Constr., Inc., 459 Md. 356, 383 (2018)) (cleaned up). In this case, we are asked to decide several questions of law. Specifically, we must determine whether the State may be civilly liable under constitutional and common law claims arising from the plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to a warrant that was obtained in good faith and based upon legal advice of the prosecutors, and after a judicial officer determined there was probable cause for the arrest, where the plaintiff was later acquitted of the criminal charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question.

We must also determine whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Ms. Rovin’s claim that her arrest and imprisonment violated her free speech rights. Finally, we must determine whether the juror intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague. We undertake a de novo review in each instance. III Parties’ Contentions Ms. Rovin’s claims all arise out of the same conduct—her arrest pursuant to a warrant for violating the juror intimidation statute where she was later acquitted of the charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute.

Ms. Rovin contends that the State is liable under the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and 19 malicious prosecution for this conduct. Specifically, Ms. Rovin asserts that because the trial judge determined that her actions did not violate the juror intimidation statute, which resulted in an acquittal, there necessarily could not have been probable cause to arrest, detain, or prosecute her. In particular, she alleges that “based upon the facts contained in the arrest warrant,” it was “objectively unreasonable to believe that [she] had committed a crime.” Accordingly, she asserts that she was arrested “without legal justification,” “without probable cause,” and pursuant to a “facially invalid warrant.” She further contends that after her arrest, and prior to her prosecution, it should have become “clear and obvious” that her arrest was not supported by probable cause or legal justification, and she should “have been immediately freed from that imprisonment.” In addition to her common law claims, Ms. Rovin asserts that the law enforcement officers violated her rights under the due process and search and seizure provisions of Articles 24 15 and 26 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, respectively. Article 24 protects substantive and procedural due process rights and is the State analogue to the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

State v. Dett, 391 Md. 81 , 92 n.3 (2008). Article 26, like the Fourth Amendment of the 15 Article 24 states: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” 16 Article 26 states: “That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.” 20 United States Constitution, 17 protects a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Ms. Rovin also argues that even if the officers had probable cause to arrest her for violating the juror intimidation statute, her Article 24 rights were nonetheless violated because she was arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted pursuant to a “statute that is vague and invalid, unconstitutional, and void-for-vagueness[.]” She further asserts that her Article 40 18 free speech rights were violated because, among other things, she was arrested and imprisoned for engaging in protected speech. The State maintains that there was both probable cause and legal justification to arrest Ms. Rovin, which defeats Ms. Rovin’s claims as a matter of law.

The State points out that the probable cause determination in this case was made by a neutral magistrate after the deputy obtained legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office. Under these circumstances, the State argues that it was objectively reasonable for the deputy to rely upon the warrant in making the arrest. In addition to the probable cause that attached to the warrant, the State also notes that under the Restatement of Torts, as well as our case 17 The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 18 Article 40 states: “That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” 21 law, a deputy’s good faith reliance on legal advice provides a basis for probable cause in the context of malicious prosecution claims.

As a matter of first impression, the State argues that this Court should hold that the State is not liable when a law enforcement officer applies for charges and obtains a warrant based on a reasonable, good faith mistake of law. Although this Court has never addressed whether an individual’s Article 26 rights are violated where an officer makes an arrest based upon an objectively reasonable mistake of law, the State points out that in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 84 (2014)—in the context of reasonable suspicion necessary for a lawful traffic stop—the United States Supreme Court determined that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in such an instance. The State asserts that this Court should apply the same principles to Ms. Rovin’s civil claims. We decline the State’s invitation to import the United States Supreme Court’s Heien analysis here for a simple reason.

That case involved an officer’s reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based upon the officer’s objectively reasonable belief that a motor vehicle law had been violated. In other words, Heien applied a constitutional framework to an officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion in the field without the benefit of a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer. In contrast, this case involves a probable cause determination by a judicial officer in connection with the issuance of an arrest warrant. Of course, in either instance, the Fourth Amendment mandates that the search or seizure be objectively reasonable.

We determine that consideration of the claims presented here should be analyzed under this Court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s framework for determining probable cause, and in particular, probable cause to arrest when a warrant 22 is issued. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18 (1999); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 (1995); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 19 19 Given our decision not to consider the application of Heien in this case, the Dissent argues that we should simply reverse the circuit court’s ruling and “not decide the matter on a ground other than the one that the circuit court did and for which we remanded the case in” Rovin I. Dissent Op. at 1. We disagree with the Dissent’s narrow focus on Heien for several reasons. When the parties initially briefed this matter to this Court in Rovin I, the State specifically asked us to consider whether law enforcement officers could be civilly liable for an arrest that was made on an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct was criminal after conferring with prosecutors and obtaining a warrant from a neutral judicial officer.

Notwithstanding that the issue was before us, we remanded all the claims related to the deputy because the State mentioned Heien in its briefing before us for the first time. Rovin I, 472 Md. at 374 . As noted, one member of the Court saw no reason to remand and would have determined that the warrant provided probable cause. Id. at 374 (McDonald, J., concurring).

On remand, Ms. Rovin amended her complaint, adding two new constitutional claims—violations of Article 26 and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In response, the State filed a new motion for summary judgment. In addition to arguing that the circuit court should apply Heien, the State once again argued and briefed whether the deputy could be liable based upon the probable cause determination made by the neutral judicial officer. Based upon the briefing and arguments, the circuit court ruled that Heien applied.

The circuit court also ruled that law enforcement cannot be “civilly liable for [Ms. Rovin’s] arrest pursuant to a warrant based on a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest even though that determination was later held by a trial court judge to be based on an error of law.” In other words, the circuit court expressly ruled that the warrant provided probable cause for Ms. Rovin’s arrest. Whether probable cause existed pursuant to the warrant has been a central focus in the briefs and oral arguments of the parties from the State’s initial motion for summary judgment continuing through the briefing to this Court in this second appeal. Moreover, we granted certiorari on questions extending beyond the application of Heien, including Ms. Rovin’s request that we determine “whether the warrant issued for” her “arrest was invalid based on the contents of the warrant, which show no crime was committed.” In her opening brief, Ms. Rovin argued that the circuit court’s “warrant-related analysis [was] 23 It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether we adopt the Supreme Court’s Heien analysis when considering an Article 26 claim. 20 We shall save that question for another day. 21 [in]correct[,]” and that the “circuit court was also wrong in concluding that the warrant acted as an absolute shield against liability[.]” Ms. Rovin has squarely placed before us the issues of whether there was probable cause for her arrest and the validity of the warrant. There is no reason for this Court to limit its consideration of this case simply to whether Heien applies. 20 Although Heien concerned a mistake of law in the context of reasonable suspicion necessary for a lawful traffic stop, we observe that the Supreme Court relied heavily upon its probable cause jurisprudence in holding that the Fourth Amendment tolerates objectively reasonable mistakes of law.

Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 62–64 (2014) (discussing United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (Cranch) 311 (1809) and Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)). We further observe that courts routinely conclude that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Heien applies to probable cause determinations. See, e.g., Mahone v. Georgia, No. 20- 14752, 2022 WL 2388426 , at ³ (11th Cir. July 1, 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 435 (2022) (determining that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the context of a civil suit filed against the state where an officer made a reasonable mistake of law by erroneously believing that the plaintiff committed a home invasion under an interpretation of a statute); United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2022) (observing that “officers may make certain reasonable mistakes [of law] and still have probable cause”); United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197 , 203–05 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an objectively reasonable mistake of law supported probable cause); Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that “officers may have probable cause to arrest based on reasonable mistakes of law” (internal quotations omitted)); May v. Pritchett, No. 22-10147, 2022 WL 16753599 , at ⁵ (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (stating that “probable cause or reasonable suspicion can rest on objectively reasonable mistakes of fact or law” (footnote and citation omitted)). We simply conclude here that we can consider Ms. Rovin’s claims within the existing framework of the probable cause jurisprudence of this Court and the United States Supreme Court.

As such, we need not decide whether Heien applies to claims arising under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 21 Given that we have determined that Ms. Rovin’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, as well as her state constitutional claims arising from the same conduct, may be resolved without considering whether to adopt Heien, we abrogate the Appellate Court’s determination that Heien governs this analysis. 24 IV Discussion At the outset, we mention some key analytical principles that govern our consideration of the issues presented in this case. First, although in certain contexts the contours of state constitutional rights are not precisely the same as federal constitutional rights, in the context of the allegations presented here, we have consistently construed the state constitutional rights in pari materia with the comparable rights under the Federal Constitution. 22 Second, the facts upon which Ms. Rovin relies to support her common law claims and constitutional claims arising under Article 26 and Article 24 (as they pertain to false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution) are the same. In cases in which the plaintiff alleges common law and constitutional claims arising from the same conduct— here, an unlawful arrest and imprisonment—we consider the claims together. See State v. 22 See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18 (2006) (analyzing civil common law claims for malicious prosecution and state constitutional claims alleging violations of Articles 24, 26, and 40 in pari materia with their federal constitutional analogues); see also King v. State, 434 Md. 472, 483 (2013) (stating that “[a]lthough we have asserted that Article 26 may have a meaning independent of the Fourth Amendment,” to date, we have not held “that it provides greater protection against state searches than its federal kin”); Padilla v. State, 180 Md. App. 210, 226 (2008) (observing that “the cases are legion in which Maryland courts have construed Article 26 in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment”) (collecting cases); Irma S. Raker, Fourth Amendment and Independent State Grounds, 77 Miss.

L.J. 401 , 403 (2007) (“With respect to Article 26, Maryland has not resolved Fourth Amendment issues on independent state grounds and continues to interpret Article 26 in pari materia with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.”); Kirsch v. Prince George’s County, 331 Md. 89 (1993) (construing the due process and equal protection rights embodied in Article 24 in pari materia with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584 (1997) (explaining that the freedoms protected by Article 40 are co-extensive with those protected by the First Amendment). 25 Dett, 391 Md. 81, 92 (2006) (analyzing the plaintiff’s Article 24 claim and the common law false imprisonment claim together because there was no separate, independent argument with respect to the constitutional provision); Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 202 (2000) (concluding that, for purposes of summary judgment, defendants did not have legal authority to arrest the plaintiff, and on that basis alone, summary judgment was improperly granted on the plaintiff’s Article 24 claims); see also Roshchin v. State, 219 Md. App. 169, 181 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 446 Md. 128 (2016) (explaining that “because it is clear” that the plaintiff’s Article 24 claim was “based on an alleged arrest without proper justification,” the court applied “the same standard in assessing this claim as is applicable to an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution” (citing Dett, 391 Md. at 92 )). Third, as our case law makes clear, when considering whether a plaintiff has set forth a common law claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, the test as to whether probable cause and legal justification exist in a particular case is judged by principles applicable to the law of arrest. Ashton, 339 Md. at 120 ; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655 (1970).

A. Common Law Elements Although Ms. Rovin has alleged separate claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, the elements “are identical.” Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264 (2000). They are: (1) a deprivation of the liberty of another; (2) without consent; and (3) without legal justification. Id.; see also Ashton, 339 Md. at 119 . Here, like the vast majority of false 26 arrest cases, our focus is on the last element—whether the deprivation was without legal justification.

The necessary elements for a malicious prosecution claim are: (1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) “malice,” meaning that the primary purpose in instituting the proceeding was something other than bringing an offender to justice. Heron, 361 Md. at 264 . Our focus here is on two elements—probable cause for purposes of the malicious prosecution claim, and legal justification for purposes of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims. In many contexts, the element of “legal justification” for establishing false arrest and false imprisonment is different from the “probable cause” element for malicious prosecution.

See Ashton, 339 Md. at 119–121. 23 However, within the context of 23 We discussed the concept of “legal justification” in the context of false imprisonment in Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70 (1995). That case involved warrantless arrests of minors for violating a local curfew ordinance that this Court later held to be facially unconstitutional. Id. at 90 . After declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, we discussed, among other things, the arresting officers’ liability for Maryland common law and constitutional torts based on false imprisonment.

Id. While examining liability in tort for warrantless arrests, we discussed the distinction between arrests made pursuant to warrants and warrantless arrests. Id. at 120 . Specifically, we observed that “the test whether legal justification exist[s] in a particular case has been judged by the principles applicable to the law of arrest.” Id.

(quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655 (1970)). We discussed how we applied these principles in our case law and pointed out that just as a law enforcement officer’s authority to arrest is different for each type of arrest, so too is the liability for any civil action that may follow from the arrest. Id.

First, we observed that a police officer has legal justification—and is therefore not civilly liable—where the officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant that “appears on its face to be legal” “even if, unbeknownst to the arresting police officer, the warrant is in fact improper.” Id. (citing Brewer v. Mele, 267 Md. 437, 440 (1972), Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 27 the claims presented by Ms. Rovin here—which are governed by the principles applicable to the law of arrest involving an arrest warrant and based upon the objectively reasonable standard governing the officer’s reliance on said warrant—the elements of legal justification and probable cause overlap. Therefore, to prevail on the common law claims that have been asserted in this case and on the state constitutional claims alleging the same conduct, Ms. Rovin must establish a lack of probable cause. In other words, the presence of probable cause defeats these claims as a matter of law.

B. Probable Cause Principles Generally The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend.

IV

The Fourth Amendment is not a “guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (emphasis in original). It is an oft-cited proposition that the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 381–82 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). As we noted, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides the same protections as the Fourth Amendment. 341, 348 (1886), Campbell v. Webb, 11 Md. 471, 482 (1857)). Second, we noted that a police officer also “has legal justification to make a warrantless arrest where he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the arrestee perpetrated the offense.” Id. “[W]ith respect to both of these types of arrest,” we stated that “legal justification to arrest may depend, in part, upon the arresting officer’s good faith and reasonable belief in his authority to arrest.” Id. 28 To satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, probable cause is required for both warrantless arrests and arrests pursuant to a warrant. 24 “Probable cause” is a term of art in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and is defined as “a ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709, 722 (2017) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003)); see also Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403 (1988) (explaining that probable cause is a “non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion”).

Thus, “‘the quanta of proof’ appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision.” Id. at 722 (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 ) (cleaned up). Probable cause is “a fluid concept[,]” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 . The standard represents “a necessary accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s duty to control crime.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975). 24 Although this case involves an arrest pursuant to a warrant, it is well established that with probable cause to believe a person has committed a felony or is committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of police, police may constitutionally arrest that person without a warrant.

See Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 322 (2019). 29 Probable cause to arrest under federal and state constitutional law is determined based upon an objective standard. Davis v. DiPino, 121 Md. App. 28, 51 (1988) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 494 (1984)). Under this objective standard, probable cause to arrest exists where “the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Elliot v. State, 417 Md. 413, 431 (2010) (quoting Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 501 (2007)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When an arrest involves a warrant, the probable cause analysis (as well as the legal justification analysis for purposes of false arrest and false imprisonment), requires the application of different principles.

We therefore turn to the manner in which probable cause is determined in the context of an arrest pursuant to a warrant. C. Arrest Warrants and the “Strong Presumption” of Probable Cause A warrant must be issued “upon probable cause,” which must be supported by “Oath or affirmation,” see U.S. Const. amend IV; Md. Decl. R. Art. 26, and issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate[,]” see Johnston v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h) (6th ed. 2020) (stating that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a warrant may only issue upon probable cause, which in the case of an arrest warrant means probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and also probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed it”).

Notably, “[i]t 30 is for the issuing magistrate rather than the complainant to determine whether this probable cause exists[.]” Id. (emphasis added). When considering whether a warrant may issue based upon probable cause, “[t]he task of the issuing judge [or judicial officer] is to reach a practical and common-sense decision, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, as to whether there exists a fair probability” that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652, 667 (2006) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238– 39).

In the suppression context, a reviewing court applies a highly deferential standard of review. Id. at 668 . Under that standard, the “duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. (cleaned up).

In doing so, a reviewing court ordinarily confines its “consideration of probable cause solely to the information provided in the warrant and its accompanying application documents.” Id. at 669 . The reviewing court does not consider “evidence that seeks to supplement or controvert the truth of the grounds advanced in the affidavit.” Id. This principle is known as the “four corners rule.” Id. One exception to this rule is where “testimony or other proof is proffered by a defendant that the police officer who sought the warrant provided deliberately false material evidence to support the warrant or held a reckless disregard for the truth.” Id.

(citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 171–72 (1978)). The Supreme Court of the United States has explained the deference due to an issuing judge’s probable cause determination: 31 Because a search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great deference to a magistrate’s determination. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 913–14 (1984) (cleaned up).

Accordingly, “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the police[ officer] can do in seeking to comply with the law. Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 921 (cleaned up). As the Supreme Court has held, “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or,” as we have sometimes put it, “in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23).

Nonetheless, under Supreme Court precedent, “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness.” Id. at 547 . In other words, the warrant is not an absolute shield 32 against civil liability. That said, the threshold for determining whether one of the narrow exceptions below applies is a “high one.” Id. In the context of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, 25 the Supreme Court has outlined four circumstances under which police will be unable to reasonably rely on a warrant that is later determined to have been improperly issued: (1) when the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit that “the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;” (2) when the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial role;” (3) when “a warrant [is] based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;” or (4) when the warrant is facially deficient (e.g., failing to particularize the place to be searched).

Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712 (1994) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 ) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 26 25 Maryland does not have an independent exclusionary rule for physical evidence. Instead, we recognize and routinely apply the good-faith exception that was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See e.g., Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423 , 468–69 (2022); Whittington v. State, 474 Md. 1, 37 (2021); Stevenson v. State, 455 Md. 709 (2017); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76 (2007); Greenstreet v. State, 392 Md. 652 (2006); Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62 , 77–78 (2010); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 (1994). 26 In Leon, the Supreme Court “held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained under a search warrant that has later been found to be deficient, so long as the law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant.” Minor, 334 Md. at 712 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 ). The “exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, rather than to punish the errors of neutral magistrates.” Id. at 713.

The holding in Leon “is also based upon the ‘great deference’ that is afforded search warrants issued by neutral magistrates.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 ). “Consequently, when police officers have acted in good faith pursuant to a search warrant that is later invalidated, excluding evidence would ‘only rarely’ serve the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 ). 33 While the Supreme Court has regularly discussed and considered the Leon exceptions in the context of criminal suppression hearings, it has also applied them in other contexts, including whether a police officer is able to rely upon the probable cause determination that attached to a warrant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in which the supporting affidavit failed to establish probable cause. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).

For purposes of determining whether probable cause and legal justification exist under our common law and constitutional claims, we do the same here. 27 We first pause to clarify one point. The right of recovery for federal constitutional violations by state officials arises from statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—and involves the consideration of government immunity. By contrast, “the redress for State [constitutional] violations is through a common law action for damages.” 28 DiPino, 354 Md. at 50 . As 27 The Dissent criticizes our discussion of Messerschmidt because it was not cited by the parties.

Dissent Op. at 8. To be sure, the parties’ focus was on Heien, which is understandable given our discussion of Heien in Rovin I. That said, we determine that it is prudent to rely upon settled precedent of the United States Supreme Court, which holds that a strong presumption of probable cause attaches to a warrant in contexts similar to Ms. Rovin’s common law and constitutional claims. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heien and Messerschmidt is rooted in objective reasonableness—the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment—a principle upon which this Court regularly relies when considering probable cause. There is no reason for us to withhold consideration of this precedent in the context of this case. 28 We have previously recognized such a common law cause of action for damages “where an individual is deprived of his liberty or property interests in violation of Articles 24 and 26[.]” Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp.

Center, 300 Md. 520 , 537–38 (1984). In doing so, we emphasized that we did “not suggest that a violation of every state constitutional right gives rise to a common law action for damages.” Id.; see also DiPino, 354 Md. at 50 n.7 (“We do not mean in any way to suggest that an action for damages lies 34 such, Ms. Rovin’s constitutional claims for damages for her false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment can be vindicated by a common law tort action. Under the State Constitution, governmental officials do not have qualified immunity when a violation is established. Although “[p]roof that [an] official acted in [an] objectively reasonable” manner that would exempt the official from liability under Section 1983 is not relevant to whether an official has immunity for state constitutional claims, it is relevant to “whether the official committed a violation” in the first instance.

Id. at 51 . In other words, if the plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment were supported by probable cause and were therefore objectively reasonable, there is no violation of the common law torts or of state constitutional rights in the first instance. Stated another way, we apply the same principles of “objective reasonableness” underlying the application of a Section 1983 qualified immunity determination when considering whether a plaintiff’s arrest was objectively reasonable, which would defeat the common law claims and constitutional claims arising from the same conduct as a matter of law. Accordingly, we turn to the Supreme Court’s articulation of these principles and its jurisprudence relating to civil cases alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment involving warrants.

In Malley, the Supreme Court held that “the same standard of objective reasonableness that [it] applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.” 475 U.S. at 344 (footnote omitted). The Court explained that for the violation of all provisions of the Constitution or Declaration of Rights; it may or may not[.]” (emphasis omitted)). 35 the relevant question is whether a “reasonably well-trained officer” “would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” Id. at 345 (footnote omitted). In Messerschmidt, the Supreme Court expounded upon the principles expressed in Malley in the context of a civil suit under Section 1983 filed by occupants of a residence against deputy sheriffs and a county sheriff’s department, alleging that they were subjected to an unreasonable search because the warrant authorizing the search of their home was not supported by probable cause. 565 U.S. at 546 . In that case, a deputy undertook an investigation into a woman’s assault by her boyfriend, during which the woman advised that the boyfriend had ties to a gang.

Id. at 540–42. The deputy sought two warrants: one for the boyfriend’s arrest and one to search his home. Id. at 541 . The search warrant sought to seize items related to gang activities and weapons.

Id. Prior to submitting the warrant applications to a neutral magistrate for approval, the deputy had them reviewed by his supervisor as well as a deputy district attorney. Id. at 543 . The occupants filed suit against, among others, the sheriff’s department and the deputy, alleging that the search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad and seeking damages.

Id. at 544 . After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the validity of the search warrant, the district court found that the warrant was invalid because it was overbroad in two respects: (1) it authorized a search for weapons in excess of the specific weapon that was allegedly used in a crime; and (2) it sought evidence related to gang-related materials, when there was no evidence that the crime was gang-related. Id. The district court determined that the third Leon exception applied and rejected the officers’ 36 claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Id. After the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment. Id. at 556 . The Court considered the plaintiffs’ claim that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the warrant satisfied the third Leon exception—that the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable—which “allow[s] suit when ‘it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.’” Id. at 547 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 ).

The threshold for establishing “this narrow exception” “is a high one” because, “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination” because “[i]t is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 ; Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9 (“It is a sound presumption that the magistrate is more qualified than the police officer to make a probable cause determination, and it goes without saying that where a magistrate acts mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence of a magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable.” (internal quotations and citation omitted))). The Court disagreed that the plaintiffs had satisfied the high threshold to overcome the presumption of probable cause that was established by the neutral magistrate’s warrant. Id. at 548–49.

The Court determined that it was not “entirely unreasonable” for an officer 37 to believe, “in the particular circumstances of [the] case,” that there was probable cause to search for firearms beyond the particular weapon allegedly used in the crime and that evidence regarding gang affiliation would be helpful for prosecuting the plaintiff in the attack on his girlfriend. Id. at 548–50. In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court observed that the appellate court “gave no weight” to the fact that the officers had the warrant reviewed and approved by their superiors, a deputy district attorney, and a neutral magistrate. Id. at 553–54.

The Court observed that “the officers thus ‘took every step that could reasonably be expected of them.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 (1984)). The Court reasoned that, “[i]n light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant,” and “[i]ndeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that [the officers] were plainly incompetent, but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and the Magistrate were as well.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court concluded by stating: The question in this case is not whether the Magistrate erred in believing that there was sufficient probable cause to support the scope of the warrant he issued.

It is instead whether the Magistrate so obviously erred that any reasonable officer would have recognized the error. The occasions on which this standard will be met may be rare, but so too are the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to impose personal liability on a lay officer in the face of judicial approval of his actions. Even if the warrant in this case were invalid, it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that officers can be considered “plainly incompetent” for concluding otherwise. Id. at 556 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 ). 38 D. A Summary of the Probable Cause Framework that Applies to Common Law Claims Alleging False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution Arising from a Warrant We summarize the principles that apply to a common law tort claim seeking redress for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution arising from an officer’s arrest pursuant to a warrant.

When an arrest is pursuant to a warrant, probable cause is predetermined by a judicial officer. The issuance of a warrant by a neutral issuing judge or judicial officer creates a strong presumption that it was objectively reasonable for officers to believe that there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on a lack of probable cause faces a heavy burden. See Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 546 ; see also Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep’t, 22 A.3d 1115, 1124 (R.I. 2011) (Rhode Island Supreme Court applying these principles in the context of common law claims for malicious prosecution and probable cause to arrest). Of course, the warrant is not an absolute shield, and civil liability will arise in circumstances in which “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 ).

In order to overcome the presumption of objective reasonableness that attaches to a warrant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that one or more of the Leon exceptions apply, namely that: (1) the judicial officer issuing the warrant was misled by an affidavit that the “affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) the judicial officer “wholly abandoned his” or her “judicial role”; (3) the “warrant [was] based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; or (4) the warrant is so 39 facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 ; see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 344–45; Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547–48. The application of these principles is based upon the “sound presumption that” the judicial officer “is more qualified than the police officer to make a probable cause determination, and it goes without saying that where a [judicial officer] acts mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence of [a judicial officer], the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). E. Another Probable Cause Presumption—Arising from the Prosecutor’s Legal Advice In addition to the strong presumption of probable cause that attaches to a warrant, we also point out a separate basis from which an officer can reasonably believe that a warrant is supported by probable cause.

That is, when an officer obtains and follows legal advice from a prosecutor when applying for a statement of charges after presenting a full and fair disclosure of everything that was presented to the officer, there is “further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.” 29 Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553 . 29 The Dissent mischaracterizes the separate basis for probable cause that arises from an officer obtaining and relying upon a prosecutor’s legal advice as being “akin to a grant of absolute immunity[.]” Dissent Op. at 11 n.6. We disagree. An officer who obtains and relies upon legal advice simply has a separate basis upon which the officer can reasonably believe that a warrant is supported by probable cause. Indeed, our adoption of the probable cause principles outlined in Messerschmidt in the context of law enforcement’s reliance on the prosecutor’s advice offers less protection 40 With these principles in mind, we turn to Ms. Rovin’s allegations.

F. Ms. Rovin’s Claims as Alleged in Her Amended Complaint As we already noted, Ms. Rovin asserts that the State is liable under the common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and attendant constitutional claims, for the deputy’s conduct in obtaining a warrant resulting in her arrest for violating the juror intimidation statute because under her interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—which was accepted by the trial judge—her conduct did not violate the statute as a matter of law. Although she acknowledges in her complaint that the deputy consulted with the State’s Attorney’s Office prior to filing the charge, and that the warrant was issued by a District Court Commissioner, she nonetheless asserts that there was no legal justification or probable cause to arrest her because her actions did not amount to a crime “as a matter of law.” She further asserts that “based on the facts contained in the than the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the malicious prosecution context, which provides: The advice of an attorney at law admitted to practice and practicing in the state in which the proceedings are brought, whom the client has no reason to believe to have a personal interest in obtaining a conviction, is conclusive of the existence of probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings in reliance upon the advice if it is: (a) sought in good faith, and (b) given after a full disclosure of the facts within the accuser’s knowledge and information. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 666(1) (Effect of Advice of Counsel) (1977) (emphasis added); see also Rovin I, 472 Md. at 368 n.15; Gladding Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fowler, 264 Md. 499, 509 (1972); Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 587 (1948). 41 warrant affidavit and alleged against her[,]” it was “objectively unreasonable to believe that” she had committed a crime. Additionally, Ms. Rovin asserts that the warrant was “facially invalid.” We address these contentions below.

First, the issuance of the warrant by the neutral District Court Commissioner “creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for the officer[] to believe that there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Horton, 22 A.3d at 1124 ; see Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553 . Second, the deputy sought and relied upon the advice of the State’s Attorney’s Office in making the application for statement of charges. Such action “provides further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 553 . “In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant[,]” and “[i]ndeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that” Deputy Cook was “plainly incompetent, but that” the State’s Attorney’s Office and the District Court Commissioner “were as well.” Id. at 554 . In this case, Deputy Cook took “every step that could reasonably be expected of” him.

Id. Stated another way, it “was not the role of the deputy sheriff to foresee the future and overrule the legal judgments of the State’s Attorney who authorized the prosecution and arrest and the judicial officer who 42 ordered the arrest by issuing the warrant.” Rovin I, 472 Md. at 375–76 (McDonald, J., concurring). 30 Ms. Rovin points out that a warrant “is not an absolute shield” to civil liability and that she can overcome the strong presumption of probable cause attendant to a validly executed search warrant in this case. She recites several of the Leon factors in her complaint. As an initial matter, we note that she has not alleged the first one.

Specifically, as we observed in Rovin I, “Ms. Rovin has not alleged that [Deputy Cook] made material omissions or misstatements of fact in the arrest warrant application[.]” 472 Md. at 366 . Although she disagrees with the foreperson’s account of the events, she does not allege that Deputy Cook falsely recounted those events in the application for charges as they were reported to him by the foreperson, and for good reason. Comparing the Deputy’s recitation of the facts in the application for statement of charges with the foreperson’s testimony under oath that he provided at the peace order hearing on the same day, they are consistent, if not identical. In other words, the undisputed evidence is that Deputy Cook recounted the facts in the application for statement of charges as the foreperson had recounted them to him.

However, Ms. Rovin asserts that the warrant in this case fits within several other Leon exceptions—namely, that the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia 30 In the parties’ first trip to our Court, we held that the State is not liable in tort for the prosecutor’s conduct in advising the deputy to file an application for charges based upon the prosecutor’s advice. Rovin I, 472 Md. at 355–56. It would be incongruous to hold the State civilly liable for the deputy’s conduct in relying upon the prosecutor’s advice to file an application for charges. 43 of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” and that the warrant was “facially deficient.” She also argues that the District Court Commissioner “wholly abandoned his judicial role by rubber stamping a warrant application obviously lacking in probable cause.” Where there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts, the question whether those facts do or do not amount to probable cause is one of law for the court. Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484 , 509–11 (1984) (explaining that where the material facts on which the defendants relied in initiating prosecution were not in dispute, whether those facts established probable cause was a question of law for the court).

To determine whether Ms. Rovin has satisfied the “high burden” of overcoming the strong presumption of probable cause that attached to the warrant, we turn to the application for statement of charges that was presented to the District Court Commissioner, which asserted the following under oath: • The victim of the crime had been the foreperson serving on a jury in which Ms. Rovin’s daughter was convicted of a crime. The presiding judge sentenced Ms. Rovin’s daughter to jail time. • Apparently during the trial, Ms. Rovin became disorderly and had to be escorted out of the court room. • After the trial concluded, Ms. Rovin called the foreperson’s workplace and became verbally aggressive with the receptionist. • At approximately 5:30 p.m. on the same day, Ms. Rovin visited the foreperson’s workplace. • Ms. Rovin became verbally assaultive with the foreperson, and the foreperson escorted Ms. Rovin to his office so patrons would not see the commotion. 44 • Ms. Rovin complained to the foreperson that he “sent her daughter to jail.” Due to her “erratic and aggressive behavior,” the foreperson told Ms. Rovin that she had to leave and began escorting her out of the building. According to the foreperson, Ms. Rovin “would get close to him, invading his personal space and to the point where he felt very uncomfortable and threatened.” • Prior to leaving, Ms. Rovin “threatened” the foreperson by telling him that “Bill Rovin” would “take care of him.” The foreperson had no idea who Bill Rovin was. When the foreperson denied having any knowledge of this individual, Ms. Rovin claimed that Bill Rovin “worked in Nicaragua” and has people that will “take care of him.” The foreperson felt this statement “was an indirect death threat.” • The Deputy attempted to contact Ms. Rovin at the number from which she initially called in order to warn her not to